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# THE GREAT WAR

SECOND VOLUME  
THE MOBILIZATION OF THE  
MORAL AND PHYSICAL FORCES





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ALBERT LÉOPOLD CLÉMENT MARIE MEINRAD

ALBERT I

King of the Belgians.



# THE GREAT WAR

## SECOND VOLUME THE MOBILIZATION OF THE MORAL AND PHYSICAL FORCES

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## PREFACE

The subject with which this volume deals is twofold. The mention of material forces and their mobilization in the contents of a history of a mighty war conveys at once an approximately adequate notion of the intended treatment. An examination of the armament and military establishments of the belligerent powers, which forms a natural part of the history of any war, becomes an indispensable feature of a comprehensive account of the present conflict, by reason of the astounding progress in the methods and equipment of warfare accomplished in recent years, which very few persons outside the military profession have had the leisure or inclination to follow intelligently. This part of the subject requires neither apology nor explanation.

A few words of explanation are required, however, to indicate the character and scope of the treatment of the moral forces.

Our study of the motives and causes of the war does not alone afford a satisfactory picture of the intense, palpitating currents of human life and emotion during the memorable days before, and at the commencement of, the gigantic struggle. The subject-matter of the first volume may be regarded as the anatomy of history. It remains for us in this present volume to endeavor to invest the structure with the quality of life, by representing the reaction of human feeling in response to the impression of the

momentous events, the nature and force of the opinion of different classes of the population in the countries to which the conflict spread, the spiritual forces which gave vigor and buoyancy to national effort, and the action of these factors in cabinet councils, the elaboration of policy, and parliamentary proceedings. The scope of the first volume was necessarily confined to the irreducible minimum required for the treatment of the essential motives and of the causes and their operation. The present volume should expand our view to enable us to contemplate with deeper sympathy and broader intelligence the ineffaceable experience through which the moral life, the social consciousness of the nations of Europe, passed in the midsummer days of 1914.

Since the beginning of the war the different belligerent governments have published collections, more or less inclusive, of their official correspondence, containing negotiations, exchanges of views, and observations of all kinds which preceded the initial stage of hostilities. These collections have made their respective appearances in the British Blue Book, French Yellow Book, Belgian Gray Book, German White Book, Russian Orange Book, Austro-Hungarian Red Books, Serbian Blue Book, and Italian Green Book. These and other available contemporary documents have been employed in the investigation of the motives and causes of the war. These same sources must again be brought into requisition for the inquiry which we are about to undertake, and in addition we shall have frequent recourse to expressions and illustrations of opinion and feeling recorded in the press and the periodical literature of the different countries.

It is obviously impossible to treat this branch of the subject in an exhaustive sense, as its extent is almost boundless. Besides, no arbitrary line of demarcation can be drawn

between the province of this volume and that of the first. It will be a constant aim to free the path from needless difficulties by discretion in the choice of evidence which is representative, characteristic, and suggestive, and by which consistent and enduring impressions will be most readily produced.

An insensible or indolent disposition may seek to gain a cheap reputation for critical sagacity by postponing indefinitely the examination of every question connected with the motives, impulses, and responsibility of the different nations with the specious excuse that the evidence at hand is inadequate, misleading, or part of a play intended to deceive the public. The same argument might just as appropriately be used in an attempt to prove that a decision in any current question, such as the tariff or "preparedness," should be postponed until all temptation to dissimulation had disappeared with the disappearance of the practical importance of the question at issue. The war is the dominating fact of the present generation. Neutrality cannot escape its far-reaching consequences. But to understand the problems which it has created and to appreciate its enduring effect upon the life of humanity, we must exert ourselves at once to form an estimate of the human forces by which it was generated and carried on. That the evidence is partly obscure should stimulate us to greater effort and acuteness of method, not drive us to discouragement.

Although it is perfectly obvious that much of the possible data for the inquiry undertaken in this present volume must remain hidden for a long time, and that many of the documents which we do possess are misleading, the circumstances have, by way of compensation, rendered much of the available evidence unusually trustworthy. If the critical period had continued as many months as its actual

duration in days, much of the evidence would probably have been less transparent. As it was, diplomacy and the organs of public opinion were caught off their guard. The compression of such a tremendous storm of mental or spiritual anguish into a few short days, when the strain was almost too great for human endurance, hardly allowed time to adjust the mask of composure and dissimulation. Such incidents as the midnight interviews of the German Chancellor and Sir Edward Goschen and of Count Pourtalès and M. Sazonoff, and the final interviews of Sir Edward Goschen and Baron Beyens with the German Chancellor and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs respectively are a peculiar product of the frenzied precipitation of events. We are informed that it was customary for the ancient Germans to debate when intoxicated and vote when they had become sober. Thus they deliberated when concealment and misrepresentation were impossible, and decided when error was improbable. In the more urgent deliberations before the Great War intense mental anguish produced the effect of physical stimulants. In some of those terrific moments the delirium of eagerness and anxiety laid bare the heart of diplomacy and drew forth impulsive utterances, formed without premeditation, which are faithful indications of the innermost hopes and fears, thoughts and impressions. Few and transitory as these occasions were, they furnish us some historical documents of unimpeachable authenticity.

Despite the terrible bloodshed and appalling destruction of the Great War, the present age is not without some compensating advantages which reflection will from time to time reveal. Prominent among them is the insight which it gives us into the souls of nations. With ordinary conditions the study of national, or racial, psychology has been a rather futile, unsatisfactory pursuit, in which the investigator

too often lost himself in a jungle of trivial, inconclusive facts, or rose into the rarer atmosphere of visionary, uncritical generalities. Serious scholars hesitated to regard such performances as scientific. The strikingly faulty predictions made by several of the nations about the effect of the war on their opponents are an example of the difficulty of penetrating to the hidden springs of national character.

The great crisis suddenly illuminated the whole field of national temperament with brilliant, scrutinizing flashes of light. In the instinctive reaction of national feeling under the mighty forces released by the explosion, a reliable basis for empiric observation has been created. By living the experience of a few supremely fateful days with the nations involved, we are admitted to their intimacy. Characteristics of which the nations themselves were unconscious are revealed to us. Our imagination, sensibility, and receptivity are stimulated. Our spirits are purified, as in tragedy, through a vicarious experience, by the great feelings, elation, pity, and terror, aroused by the contemplation of the stupendous forces, their blind, ungovernable violence and fearful collisions.

It is a purpose of the present work to avoid two failings into one or the other of which many narratives of military occurrences are allowed to drift. Some authors are so engrossed in the political significance of the events that their account of military operations is hopelessly general, abstract, indefinite; deprived of vitalizing contact with the actual facts and movements by which the results were produced. Other writers, yielding to a personal inclination of a different sort, conduct the bewildered reader into such a maze of mostly unintelligible and unexplained detail, that he loses breadth of vision for the larger reality.

As a timely precaution against such unfortunate deviations we shall set out on our course with the steadying

ballast of clear, concise accounts of military and naval matters. Captain Henry C. Whitehead, U. S. A., and Admiral F. E. Chadwick, U. S. N., are authorities in their respective subjects, and the value of their succinct, well-balanced descriptions of the military and naval establishments of Europe will be appreciated at once by anyone who has not been content with the barest framework of information on these fundamental topics. With the literature available for the non-professional reader in even our leading libraries it is easier to obtain a comprehensive store of knowledge about the ancient Roman army of Trajan than about the contemporary army, let us say, of William II. A definite survey of the actual military and naval establishments of Europe gains in importance by the probability that they will be the basis, in consequence of the experience of the present war, for an evolution no less far-reaching than that which we anticipate in the field of political and social organization.

GEORGE H. ALLEN, PH. D.

# THE MORAL FORCES



## CHAPTER I

### THE MORAL FORCES IN THE TEUTONIC EMPIRES

The archduke's recklessness and popular animosity. British opinion of Serbia. Mr. Trevelyan's testimony. Serbia's attitude after the Sarajevo outrage. Austrian opinion in July, 1914; Count Tisza, Herr von Tschirsky. The Viennese public and the rupture with Serbia. German discontent with the settlement of 1911. The contest in armaments. The alleged secret report of March 13, 1913. The attitude of various classes in Germany regarding foreign relations. "If I were Kaiser." The news of the Austro-Serbian rupture in Berlin. The great crisis in German policy; the extraordinary council at Potsdam on the evening of July 29, 1914; the midnight interviews and communications. Warlike enthusiasm in Berlin. The historic session of the Reichstag, August 4th; the Kaiser's and Chancellor's speeches and the Social Democratic response.

An act of temerity furnished the occasion for the fatal event that set in motion the train of occurrences, which, releasing stores of accumulated enmity in their impulsive course, pressed quickly forward to Armageddon. In reckless defiance of the Serbian nationalist sentiment, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand persisted, in spite of the warning that a plot had been formed against his life, in visiting Sarajevo with his gifted consort, the Duchess of Hohenberg, on the fateful Sunday, June 28th, which was the anniversary of the Battle of Kossovo, when the old Serbian Empire was shattered by the Turkish host in 1389. This occasion is celebrated by the Serbs as a commemoration of national tradition and solidarity. The rashness of the archduke tempted him to pass through the streets of the metropolis of a province where an element of the population regarded itself as subjugated and oppressed and looked upon him as the embodiment and support of the

tyranny which it endured, on a day which recalled the actual Greater Serbia of a long distant past, emphasized by contrast the injustice and humiliation of the present situation and visualized the national unity of the future to which the Serbian stock so earnestly aspires. His presence in Sarajevo on that day was a challenge; and to credit subsequent official investigation, it would appear that the Heir Presumptive of the Hapsburg dominions was a doomed victim of his own audacity from the time that he entered Bosnia. It is related that a bomb was found near the scene of the assassination, that two others were discovered under the table at which the archduke was to have taken his luncheon, and that another was brought to light from the chimney of the apartment assigned to the duchess. The railway, moreover, had been mined with dynamite.

We have considered the consequences of this abominable crime in so far as they have a directly causative relation with the subsequent orgy of slaughter by which atonement for it was sought. It is our present purpose to examine the ensuing occurrences as they relate more intimately to the lives and feelings of the different peoples. It is a curious coincidence that England's greatest authority on the history of her common law once alluded to two of Great Britain's present allies as "the despised Russia and the contemptible Serbia," voicing, it is true, with a trace of irony a popular prejudice of thirty years ago. Nations change in the course of a generation, but opinions about them may change with far greater rapidity. A distinguished writer, Mr. George Macaulay Trevelyan, the author of well-known works on Garibaldi and the struggle for Italian unity, actuated by the supposed analogy between the Serbia of to-day and the Piedmont of yesterday in their relation with Austria, made a first-hand investigation of conditions in Serbia during the winter and early spring

of 1915. He describes the Serbian nation as a "rare example of a purely democratic society," and depicts for us a country peopled with independent peasant proprietors, free from the extremes of pauperism and wealth, without social questions and their attendant discord, with "no politics except patriotism, no loyalty except to their country." Serbia's only deficiency, as it would seem, is a natural consequence of her essential element of social soundness. For in this primitive, democratic community political leadership is necessarily improvised. The administration suffers from the lack of a class who are equipped by their traditions and environment for the public service.

The public ceremonies for the anniversary of Kossovo, which was being celebrated with unusual pomp in the principal Serbian towns, were officially suspended on the evening of June 28th, when news of the outrage in Sarajevo had been received. But the Austro-Hungarian consuls reported that the people made no effort to conceal their satisfaction. In some places, as it appears, the crime was discussed in public, on the streets and in the cafés, with such undisguised expressions of delight as violated every consideration of decency. It is not surprising, in view of the exasperation engendered by friction between the two countries, and the repeated thwarting of Serbian ambitions, that among a people of rather primitive, unsophisticated ways of thought and expression, a foul murder even, with the political significance of the archduke's assassination, should have transformed a national festival into a carnival of popular hatred.

But whatever may have been the attitude of the Serbian people, the government seems to have been apprehensive of serious consequences from the awful crime, and to have taken special pains for maintaining an irreproachable attitude. Thus on June 30th, M. Yovanovitch, Serbian


Minister at Vienna, informed Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, that the Serbian government condemned most vigorously the outrage committed at Sarajevo, and that they were prepared to do all in their power to prove that they would not permit this hostile agitation in Serbia. An anxious interchange of communications followed between the Serbian minister in Vienna and his home government, in which M. Yovanovitch reported the hostile demonstrations in Vienna and the threatening tone of the greater part of the press, which immediately connected the Sarajevo atrocity with prominent circles in Serbia. But the Austro-Hungarian government, for its part, protested against the violent sentiments displayed in the Belgrade papers. A press war, we may conclude, preceded the outbreak of actual hostilities between the two countries by about a month. The Serbian minister reported on July 3d that the Austrian press generally represented the conspirators as Serbs, although before this they had scrupulously employed the distinctive terms *die Bosniaken* and *die bosnische Sprache* for the Bosnians and their language.

The funeral ceremonies of the Russian Ambassador Hartwig, who died suddenly while at the Austro-Hungarian Embassy in Belgrade, were celebrated on July 14th. He had been regarded as the very soul of the Panslavist propaganda in the Balkan States, and the Austrian press disseminated the report that excesses were committed at the time of the funeral against Austro-Hungarian subjects; but the Serbian Prime Minister denied absolutely the truth of this rumor.

The ominous silence of the Austro-Hungarian government naturally excited speculation as to its policy with regard to the Sarajevo crime. M. Yovanovitch reported that the choice lay between two courses, either to regard



Count Stephan Tisza, Prime Minister of Hungary.



Count Julius Andrássy.



the outrage as a domestic incident and invite the friendly coöperation of Serbia in discovering and punishing the guilty, or to treat it as justification for a vigorous hostile action against Serbia. In fact the Serbian minister in Vienna practically forecast the course of Austria-Hungary as early as July 15th.

In consequence, probably, of the premonitions proceeding from M. Yovanovitch, the Serbian Prime Minister, M. Pashitch, sent identical instructions to the Serbian diplomatic representatives in the different capitals providing them with evidence of Serbia's correct attitude, citing, for instance, the condolences of the Serbian royal family, the offer of the Serbian government to surrender to the Austro-Hungarian authorities any Serbian subjects who might be implicated in guilt, Serbia's manifest desire to maintain friendly relations with her neighbor, and the failure of the Austro-Hungarian government to apply for Serbian assistance.

There was probably a conflict of views in influential circles in Vienna as to the proper course to be followed, and at first a period of indecision resulted. The former associates of the murdered archduke, the leaders of the clerical and military groups, above all those who were not resigned to allowing Serbia to keep the place which she had won in the Balkan Wars, regarded an energetic foreign policy as indispensable for the healthy existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. They dreamed of cleansing the state of its domestic impurities through the generous agency of the currents of patriotic enthusiasm which would be set in motion by a brilliant progress of expansion. They believed that national honor and considerations of expediency alike required the adoption of drastic measures against Serbia. A very large popular element, and very likely the majority of the middle classes, who had suffered loss and

annoyance through two partial mobilizations occasioned by Serbia's turbulent pretensions, were prepared to welcome the idea of radical measures. They regarded a final squaring of accounts with the troublesome neighbor with a feeling of anticipated relief.

The program of forcible action found a powerful advocate in Count Tisza, Prime Minister of Hungary. Some even believe that he was the decisive factor in bringing about the war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Count Stephen Tisza is the head of a Calvinistic minority in Roman Catholic Hungary. He was born in 1864 and entered parliament in 1886, where he rapidly won the influence which intense conviction and indomitable energy invariably command. We find him leader of the Liberal party and prime minister in 1903. He was overthrown by a coalition and passed the years 1906-1910 in retirement.

Count Tisza is the champion of uncompromising Magyarism, of the historic rights of Hungarian national supremacy within the historic boundaries of the territory of the Hungarian Crown. When he became prime minister again, after the crisis on the question of the suffrage in 1912, a new opposition party committed to a democratic franchise reform was organized under Count Andrassy. Count Tisza is an all-round redoubtable combatant—in the parliament, where he acts with brutal determination, ejecting by force, on one occasion, the entire opposition, who had brought matters to an absolute deadlock by their persistent obstructionist methods, and on the field of honor, where he is the hero of many sabre duels. Count Tisza, the most conspicuous individual in Austria-Hungary, is a character who will not permit himself to be slighted in our narrative. There is every reason to believe that the aged emperor desired to maintain the peaceful tradition of his reign, unbroken since 1866, and end his days in tranquillity. His

proclamation to his people issued after the Sarajevo outrage, ascribing the crime to a misguided fanatic, contained no reference to a hostile conspiracy, no implication of Serbian complicity. The unobtrusive character of the murdered archduke's obsequies is probably due to the emperor's refusal to sanction a pompous ceremony which might have occasioned a formidable hostile demonstration. It was at first reported that the Kaiser and the King of Spain would both be present at the funeral; but these plans were quietly dropped.

We learn of a council of ministers in Vienna on July 13th, when the consequences of the Sarajevo outrage were discussed at great length. The fact that the Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold, went at once to Ischl, the emperor's summer residence, to report the results of these deliberations, is an indication of their importance, and some of the circumstances suggest the conjecture that this meeting was a turning point, that from this time the party advocating forcible measures was in the ascendancy.

A report by M. Yovanovitch a day or two later furnishes a significant hint. The minister said: "Rumors from the most authoritative diplomatic sources in Berlin reached me in Vienna to the effect that the Wilhelmstrasse (location of German Foreign Office, as well as Chancellor's Palace) did not approve of Austria's policy on this question (Austro-Serbian relations) and that Herr von Tschirschky (German ambassador in Vienna) has exceeded the instructions given to him." The existence of convincing evidence to prove Herr von Tschirschky's extreme views and violent Slavophobia raises this statement above the level of mere political gossip. The French ambassador in Vienna, for example, reported that the German ambassador showed himself to be a partisan of violent resolutions, while willingly allowing it to be understood that the German imperial

chancellery might not be in complete agreement with him on this point.

We may assume that Herr von Tschirscky from the first animated and encouraged the group in Austria-Hungary which demanded vigorous measures, and this leads to the further conjecture that this group shared the opinion, which he is known to have held, that Russia would not go to war in defense of Serbia, and that a vigorous program respecting the latter could be put into execution by sudden action before the powers had recovered from their surprise. This explains the quite evident endeavor to dispel the apprehension and suspicion of the other powers and their diplomatic representatives at Vienna.

As early as July 11th, Count Tisza replying to an interpellation of the opposition in the Hungarian parliament expressed himself in a deliberately obscure manner. The press, in so far as it was amenable to official inspiration, became more moderate in tone.

The Russian ambassador left for his vacation in the country on July 21st in consequence of reassuring declarations made to him at the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

But the undercurrent of half-suppressed excitement and anxiety was not diminished. It required no unusual acuteness to perceive that the political atmosphere was electric. The apparent tranquillity was the oppressive, disquieting stillness of the sultry day that precedes the storm. The Bourse reflected the prevailing spirit of uneasiness. As early as July 10th, Hungarian four per cent public securities reached the lowest price ever quoted on the Buda-Pesth stock exchange since they were first issued.

A French consular report on general conditions in Austria-Hungary predicted on July 20th many of the most

conspicuous features of the note to Serbia. It added the observation:

“There is here, as in Berlin, a party which accepts the idea of a conflict on a general scale—in other words, a conflagration. The governing idea probably is that it is necessary to start before Russia can have finished the great improvement of her army and of her railways, and before France has overhauled her military organization.

“But here there is not agreement in high circles. Count Berchtold and the diplomats want at most a localized operation against Serbia, but everything has to be considered possible—everything. I have been struck by a curious fact. Generally, the official telegraph agency, in its summaries of the views of the foreign press, disregards all but the official newspapers and the more important organs; it omits all quotations and all mention of the others. This is a rule and a tradition. For the last ten days the official agency has daily supplied to the press of Austria-Hungary a complete review of the whole Serbian press, giving a prominent place to the least known, the smallest and most insignificant newspapers, which, owing to their very insignificance, use language which is freer, more daring, more aggressive, and frequently insulting. The object of this work of the official agency is evidently to arouse opinion, to create an opinion favorable to war. The fact is significant.”

This allusion to the activity of the press bureau has been quoted because it has created considerable comment. While significant, its importance as proof of a deliberate plan of inflaming animosity by employing such effective agencies for exercising popular influence as the press has perhaps been exaggerated. The impending crisis might naturally lend an interest to the opinions of many Serbian papers whose contents would ordinarily be an object of

absolute indifference to Austrian readers. On the eve of a possible intervention of the United States in Mexico we are supplied with a selection of quotations from the columns of newspapers in Latin America of whose very existence we have hitherto been entirely ignorant.

Baron Giesl, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Serbia, reported from Belgrade on the 21st that contempt had been added to hatred, since the Serbian press encouraged the belief that in its political evolution the Austro-Hungarian monarchy had reached an advanced stage of impotence and disintegration.

Observations, he said, led him to the inevitable conclusion that "a settlement with Serbia, involving a war not only for the preservation of Austria-Hungary's position as a great power, but even for her very existence, cannot be permanently avoided.

"In the view of an official representative of the Austro-Hungarian government, who is observing events on the spot, the realization is inevitable that we cannot afford to permit any further diminution of our prestige.

"Should we decide to make far-reaching demands, with effective control of their execution (and such measures alone could clean the Augean Stable of Greater Serbian intrigues), we would have to consider all possible consequences. From the very outset we must be firmly resolved to persevere in our attitude.

"Half measures, demands, endless debating, and finally a foul compromise, would be the hardest blow to Austria-Hungary's authority in Serbia and her standing as a great power in Europe."

It is said the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia was mainly the work of Count Forgach, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, who had formerly been ambassador at Belgrade, when he is credited with having

procured forged documents which formed the basis of the charges against the Croatian deputies that led to the famous Friedjung Trial described in Volume I, page 198. It is reported, moreover, that the German ambassador in Vienna collaborated with Count Forgach in drawing up the momentous message to Serbia. The excessive haste with which measures implying hostilities were put into execution by the Austro-Hungarian authorities as soon as the time-limit granted to Serbia had expired, on July 25th, has been interpreted as showing that Austria-Hungary was determined in any case upon a rupture with Serbia, and that the presentation of the note was a merely specious indication of a disposition to settle the matter by peaceful negotiation.

On the same evening, for instance, the Chief of the Serbian General Staff, General Putnik, was arrested at Kelenföld, a junction point near Buda-Pesth, as he was returning to Belgrade with his daughter after a sojourn at Gleichenberg, an Austrian watering-place. He was placed in custody and examined, but released after a day or two.

A more striking indication of inordinate haste was the expeditious departure of Baron Giesl from Belgrade after the receipt of the Serbian reply. He had doubtless been instructed to sever diplomatic relations with Serbia straightway, if the response to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum should not be satisfactory. The response was placed in his hands at 5.58 in the afternoon of the 25th and he discovered its unsatisfactory character, notified the Serbian Foreign Office accordingly, and left with his suite by the 6.30 train for Buda-Pesth. His instructions prescribed that any but an absolute, literal acceptance of the Austro-Hungarian note as a whole, should be rejected. All the preparations for departure at the Austro-Hungarian Embassy must have been already executed in anticipation of an

unsatisfactory answer. There had been unmistakable indications during the course of the day, it is true, that the Serbians themselves did not expect that their reply would be accepted and lead to a peaceful settlement. Baron Giesl had learned that the court train was being made ready, and that the money of the national bank and of the railways and the archives of the foreign office were being removed to the interior of the country. The garrison left town in field equipment, and many sanitary convoys were sent off in a southerly direction. Above all, general mobilization was ordered at three in the afternoon, and a few hours later the government removed to Nish, where the Skupschtina was summoned to meet the next day.

The news that the Serbian reply was not acceptable and that diplomatic relations had been broken off was received with an unparalleled outburst of patriotic enthusiasm in Vienna. Crowds paraded the principal avenues during the evening of the 25th singing patriotic songs, and congregated in front of the War Office and the Foreign Office. Attempted hostile demonstrations before the Russian Embassy and the Serbian Legation were prevented by the police. The temper displayed by the people in the capitals and other large cities showed the popularity of the idea of a war with Serbia.

In obtaining a comprehensive perception of the more important threads in the web of diplomatic intercourse which preceded the war, it is necessary to examine some conspicuous incidents bearing upon the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia. It may be recalled that the German Foreign Office favored a direct exchange of views between Vienna and St. Petersburg as an alternative for Sir Edward Grey's proposal for mediation by four powers, with which the German government was not willing to concur. The friendly conversation between M. Sazonoff





The Hofburg, Vienna, offices of the Ministry of War.



The French Embassy, Vienna.

and Count Szápáry, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg, on July 26th, will serve as a convenient starting point.

M. Sazonoff agreed that Austria-Hungary's professed goal was legitimate, but he feared that her path was not the surest. Four of the ten demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian note were either impractical or incompatible with the independent sovereignty of Serbia; as for the others, with some minor changes in form, it would not be difficult to find a basis of agreement. Consequently, M. Sazonoff instructed the Russian ambassador in Vienna to request that the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in St. Petersburg "should be authorized to enter into a private exchange of views with him in order to redraft some points in the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia."

Immediately after his return to Vienna from leave of absence, M. Schébéko submitted M. Sazonoff's request to Count Berchtold. But the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister informed him that, since Austria-Hungary had decided to take a decisive step in connection with her dispute with Serbia, she could not retract and enter into a discussion of the note. Public opinion would rebel against such a proceeding even if the government consented to it. This reply, communicated to the Russian Foreign Ministry on the same day as Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Serbia, was interpreted in the sense that Austria-Hungary refused to continue an exchange of views with regard to her conflict, and this chagrined M. Sazonoff very much.

A hint from Count Pourtalès, German Ambassador in St. Petersburg, induced Count Szápáry to endeavor to dispel M. Sazonoff's misgivings by repeating that Austria-Hungary had no intention of annexing Serbian territory or infringing the independent sovereignty of Serbia. M. Sazonoff said that he was convinced of Austria-Hungary's

sincerity as far as Serbian territory was concerned, but that to force on Serbia some of the conditions in the note would reduce her to a vassal state.

Count Pourtalès on July 29th reported to his own government M. Sazonoff's disappointment at Austria-Hungary's attitude. A candid examination of the evidence which is available tends to show that at this time the Kaiser and his government were going as far as was compatible with their conception of the duty of an ally to bring about an understanding between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Unfortunately there is almost no positive evidence of unimpeachable authenticity to enlighten us as to the nature of Germany's efforts in this direction.

Von Mach remarks: "If the Chancellor says that Germany was using her good offices in Vienna, this is as valuable a bit of evidence as the reprint of a dispatch in the White Paper (British Blue Book), unless we wish to impugn his veracity, in that case the copy of a dispatch would be valueless, for he might have forged it."

While the statement of von Mach is true in a general sense, nevertheless, assuming the credibility of both, the dispatch will usually have more historical value than a general declaration such as that of the Chancellor, because it is more specific. It tends to show in what particular manner the influence of one power was exerted on another.

One document, at least, a dispatch that the German Foreign Office claims to have sent to the German ambassador in Vienna on July 30th, may be cited as evidence for Germany's pacific action. This message is not included in the German White Book. It was communicated to the Berlin correspondent of the *Westminster Gazette* on August 1st. Its authenticity has been attacked, but it seems probable that it was a genuine part of the correspondence. The text is as follows:

“The report of Count Pourtalès does not harmonize with the account which your Excellency has given of the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian government.

“Apparently there is a misunderstanding which I beg you to clear up.

“We cannot expect Austria-Hungary to negotiate with Serbia with which she is in a state of war.

“The refusal, however, to exchange views with St. Petersburg would be a grave mistake.

“We are indeed ready to fulfil our duty.

“As an ally we must, however, refuse to be drawn into a world conflagration through Austria-Hungary not respecting our advice.

“Your Excellency will express this to Count Berchtold with all emphasis and great seriousness.”

The Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Berchtold, is reported to have replied that there was, in effect, a misunderstanding, and that the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in St. Petersburg had already received instructions to renew conversations with M. Sazonoff.

On the same day that the above-mentioned dispatch was transmitted to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, Count Berchtold had a long interview with M. Schébéko, and their conversation, conducted in a friendly tone, was greeted in diplomatic circles as a very auspicious omen. Count Berchtold expressed his willingness that the exchange of views should be resumed in St. Petersburg; they had been interrupted, as he explained, in consequence of a misunderstanding on his part as to the scope which M. Sazonoff wished to attribute to them.

Reference has been made in the first volume (page 245) to the general impression that Austria-Hungary yielded at the last, and that the belligerent attitude of Germany thwarted the pacific effect of this conciliatory departure in

the policy of her ally. By yielding, we understand a willingness on the part of Austria-Hungary to submit her note to a revision. The opinion was expressed in the first volume that such a recession on the part of Austria-Hungary was very improbable. The question may now be investigated upon a broader basis of documentary evidence. It is a problem of fundamental importance for the appreciation of the psychological forces behind the great war. Was Austria-Hungary at the end dragged into the war, an unwilling partner, as some believe, or did her rulers follow a consistently voluntary policy throughout? The answer is involved in the problem before us.

The opinion that the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in St. Petersburg had conveyed to the Russian Foreign Office the willingness of the Dual Monarchy to submit its quarrel with Serbia to international discussion was disseminated by dispatches from M. Sazonoff to the Russian diplomatic representatives in the principal capitals. It appeared that this very important communication had been made in an interview on the evening of July 31st. It was inferred that Austria-Hungary was ready to consent to a revision of her demands. But the report took on a variation in tone according to chance circumstances of transmission or the temperamental differences of the individuals through whom it passed. Some of its distinctions in version are puzzling.

One instance will suffice as an example. According to the British diplomatic correspondence, as published, the counsellor of the Russian Embassy in London reported the substance of M. Sazonoff's communication of the 31st as follows:

“The Austro-Hungarian ambassador declared the readiness of his government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. M. Sazonoff replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that





The houses of Parliament, London.



The Reichstag, Berlin.

the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers.

“M. Sazonoff hoped that the British government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Serbian territory.”

In this form the report has an optimistic air. But the corresponding entry in the Russian Orange Book in M. Sazonoff's words has the following tenor:

“I have requested the British ambassador to express to Grey my deep gratitude for the firm and friendly tone which he had adopted in the discussions with Germany and Austria, thanks to which the hope of finding a peaceful issue to the present situation need not yet be abandoned.

“I also requested him to inform the British minister that in my opinion it was only in London that the discussion might still have some faint chance of success and of rendering the necessary compromise easier for Austria.”

Unless it should be assumed that the Russian government has withheld a more significant dispatch, this message would indicate that the interview in St. Petersburg on the evening of July 31st was unimportant; and this view is supported by a report of the British ambassador in Russia. Sir George Buchanan telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey on August 1st that M. Sazonoff had had an interview with the Austro-Hungarian ambassador the evening before, but that the latter, “not being definitely instructed by his government, did his best to deflect the conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Serbia.” M. Sazonoff had to remind him that “the real question which they had to solve at the time was whether Austria was to crush Serbia and to reduce her to

the status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave Serbia a free and independent state.”

In sifting the correspondence that passed between Count Szápáry and Count Berchtold we find a telegram from the former dated the 31st, acknowledging the latter's communication of the 30th, in which the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister had authorized the continuation of the conversations in St. Petersburg. Count Szápáry stated that he had already at his own initiative resumed conversations with Sazonoff, but that the points of view on the two sides had not materially approximated to each other. There is no mention in this telegram of any conversation with M. Sazonoff subsequent to the receipt of Count Berchtold's instructions of the 30th.

Another dispatch from Count Szápáry dated August 1st reported that he had visited M. Sazonoff on the same day and had informed him that he had received instructions from Vienna (still those of July 30th, apparently) which he transmitted to him with the reservations imposed by his ignorance of the subsequent attitude created in Vienna by the general Russian mobilization. He had informed M. Sazonoff that Count Berchtold was prepared to submit the text of the note to discussion as far as its interpretation was concerned. M. Sazonoff had expressed satisfaction and suggested that the negotiations should be carried on in London. Count Szápáry had replied that Count Berchtold had assumed direct contact in St. Petersburg and he was not in a position to commit himself as to London.

One is tempted to ascribe this message to the 31st and identify the interview described in it as the conversation of the evening of the 31st to which such a striking character has been attributed, assuming an error in the date as published in the Red Book. In any case the dispatch reveals

no inclination to accept a revision of the demands made to Serbia.

All the evidence thus far considered refers back, as we have seen, to the position taken by Count Berchtold on the 30th. Leading German authorities regard the 30th as the focal point in Austria-Hungary's policy and Count Berchtold's expressions on that day as the convincing proof of Austria-Hungary's compliance and Russia's perfidy. Russia responded to Austria-Hungary's compromising attitude by a general mobilization, thereby making war inevitable. But there is nothing in our accounts of the proceedings on the 30th to prove that Austria-Hungary was willing to compromise. On the contrary, there is positive evidence that she was not prepared to modify her position with respect to Serbia in any essential point. Count Berchtold authorized Count Szápáry to give M. Sazonoff any explanation he desired concerning the note to Serbia, but he added:

“In any case this could only take the form of subsequent explanations as it was never our intention to depart in any way from the points contained in the note.”

A seemingly more striking communication is reproduced in the Red Book with the date July 31st. In accordance with instructions from Herr von Jagow, Herr von Tschirsky, German Ambassador in Vienna, had communicated to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office on the 30th the suggestion made by Sir Edward Grey to Prince Lichnowsky on the 29th regarding mediation by four powers. That was the time when the British Foreign Secretary urged that the German government should suggest any method by which the influence of the four powers not directly concerned in the controversy could be used to prevent war. Accordingly, on the 31st, Count Berchtold sent the following instructions

to Count Szögyény, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Berlin:

“I ask your Excellency to convey our warm thanks to the Secretary of State (for Foreign Affairs) for the communications made to us through Herr von Tschirscky, and to declare to him that in spite of the change in the situation which has since arisen through the mobilization of Russia, we are quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir Edward Grey to negotiate between us and Serbia.

“The conditions of our acceptance are, nevertheless, that our military action against Serbia should continue to take its course, and that the British Cabinet should move the Russian government to bring to a standstill the Russian mobilization which is directed against us, in which case, of course, we will also at once cancel the defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which are occasioned by the Russian attitude.”

The text of this message was communicated likewise to the Austro-Hungarian ambassadors in London and St. Petersburg.

A thoughtful consideration of this dispatch will show that while its tone is conciliatory, it does not prove that the Vienna government receded in any essential point from its original position. The mere acceptance of mediation in itself did not bind the Austro-Hungarian government to submit to such terms as the mediating power or powers might suggest. The Austro-Hungarian rulers probably regarded the proposed mediation as a convenient channel for the transmission of Serbia's submission, and the adjustment of the details for the application of their demands.

This communication, even if it had contained a substantial concession, would probably have been too late to exert any decisive influence on the course of events.



Sacking the house and destroying the furniture of a Serbian in Sarajevo.



The younger generation's enthusiastic reception in Berlin of the news of war.



The official *Fremdenblatt* in Vienna denied the supposed change in the Austro-Hungarian policy on September 25th in the following terms:

“The report of (Sir Maurice) de Bunsen, former British Ambassador in Vienna, of September 1, 1914, regarding the background of the present war, as published by the British government, contains the statement of his Russian colleague that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg, Szápáry, informed Minister Sazonoff that Austria-Hungary agreed to submit to mediation the points in the note to Serbia which were incompatible with Serbian independence.

“As we learn from an authoritative source, this statement disagrees entirely with the facts. . . . The passage cited in the ambassador’s report” is “due to a design of representing the action of German diplomacy as the real cause of the outbreak of the war by alleging that Austria-Hungary adopted a yielding attitude. Such attempts cannot obscure the truth that Austria-Hungary and Germany harmonized in the desire to maintain the peace of Europe.”

Our examination of the evidence leads to the following conclusions regarding the Austro-Hungarian attitude:

The Austro-Hungarian government promised to respect the territorial integrity and independent sovereignty of Serbia.

It was prepared to interpret or explain the demands contained in the note to Serbia, and to accept the mediation of third parties for the negotiation of terms of peace with Serbia.

But it was not willing to depart in any essential respect from the demands contained in the note.

The folly of hasty conjectures has nowhere been more signally illustrated than in the prophecies that were made with such facility with regard to the fate of the Dual

Monarchy. Austria-Hungary was described as "a ramshackle empire, bound together by a rope of sand," which would fall to pieces from the impact of the first hostile blow. Germans even, while convinced of the ultimate victory of the Fatherland, sometimes predicted that the present world-war would result in the liquidation of the Hapsburg realm; and, at the news of the early Russian victories in Galicia, our own press did not hesitate to proclaim the destruction of the monarchy's power of resistance and the defenselessness of Vienna.

Yet Prince Bismarck once declared that if Francis Joseph ever mounted his charger all the nationalities in his dominions, in spite of their mutual jealousies, would march in his train; and the course of events has in large measure confirmed the truth of his assertion. The bond of union has held against the repeated terrific blows. The common danger has brought a realization of common interests and of the advantages of political association. The tempest of war has apparently purified the political atmosphere. The fierce heat of conflict has fused to a large extent the hitherto discordant sentiments of nationality.

In consequence of the tardy achievement of her national unity, and the correspondingly late development of her colonial aspirations, Germany's share in the exploitive areas of the earth was absurdly disproportionate to her greatness. The *Welt-politik* approved by the German government since the closing years of the nineteenth century was the expression of a determination to arrest the tendency of closing the doors against the penetration of new lands by German enterprise and influence. Germany had indicated that she would not sanction a further reduction of the remaining independent area of the world in disregard of her interests or a curtailment of equal opportunity where it still existed.

This policy was undoubtedly approved by the intellectual, industrial, and commercial classes. It commended itself to the favor of the substantial, influential people generally throughout the country. The comprehension of this fundamental doctrine is the key to Germany's attitude in relation to international questions before the war, and a very important factor in understanding the spirit with which the German people entered into the struggle.

Persia and Morocco had been conspicuous examples of unappropriated exploitive areas. But no sooner had attention been directed toward Persia as a promising field for German enterprise than Great Britain and Russia signed a convention by which they compromised their conflicting ambitions in Asia and particularly agreed to separate spheres of influence in Persia. This arrangement was regarded in Germany as a first, but definite, step towards the conversion of Persia into exclusive preserves. But Germany, in the Potsdam Conference between the Tsar and the Kaiser in 1910, recognized the existence of Russia's special interests in Northern Persia, and contented herself with the withdrawal of Russia's opposition to the development of the Bagdad Railway, and her promise to construct a line from Teheran to Khanikin on the Turkish frontier for the purpose of linking the Bagdad Railway with the proposed Persian system.

The threatened absorption of Morocco had put the new *Welt-politik* to its first important test. The determined attitude of the German government resulted in the Algeiras Conference and the establishment of the principle of independence and the "open-door." Subsequent French encroachments in Morocco led to the more drastic assertion of German policy, the Agadir incident in 1911. But in the ensuing negotiations Germany abandoned Moroccan

independence in return for territorial compensations of doubtful value in the Congo.

If we survey the history of the last few years from the German point of view, considering especially the attitude of the German government in regard to Persia and Morocco, and bearing in mind that the chief concern of the German government is with the aspirations of the German people, we may be inclined to admit the sincerity of Germany's rulers in their repeated assertions that they had kept the peace in spite of serious provocations and difficulties.

The general feeling of disappointment aroused in Germany by the terms of settlement of the Moroccan difficulty in 1911 was an essential element in the psychological state of the German people in the years intervening before the Great War, as regards their attitude on the foreign situation. A feeling of annoyance and disillusionment penetrated all classes. Even the Socialists united their criticism with the reproaches of the other parties, although they regarded the government's mistakes as proof of the futility of Imperialism, not as evidence of a lack of courage in supporting an expansionist policy.

German pride was wounded by the treaty of November 4, 1911, and a large part of the German people did not forgive the government for its alleged submission in the face of threats. They regarded the treaty as a humiliation, and looked upon the unexpected attitude of firmness exhibited by France as an unjustifiable impertinence.

Not only the chronological sequence of events, but the attitude of an overwhelming majority of the French people and the whole spirit of French political life in recent years, which has been largely absorbed in domestic conflicts and in policies utterly opposed to military aggrandizement, prove that the reestablishment of three years'

service in France was solely the result of the unusual augmentation of the German military forces in 1913. Nevertheless, after these exceptional measures had been proposed, first in Germany and then in France, the German authorities turned the French program to account as an argument in urging the adoption of their own proposals.

Allusion has already been made to the shrewdness of the German government in manipulating public opinion in advance so as to make it responsive to the demand for unusual exertions. The series of centennial celebrations in commemoration of the heroic events of 1813 furnished an admirable opportunity of nerving patriotic enthusiasm for considerable sacrifices. The extraordinary exertions undertaken by the French made a profound impression in Germany. The Germans had become accustomed to regard the military inferiority of the French as an immutable factor in all their calculations. The French intention of restoring a situation approaching military equality, by reinstating compulsory service for three years, excited a feeling of irritation and annoyance; it was even looked upon as menacing and provocative. The semi-inspired *Cologne Gazette* declared in an article full of bitterness that the greatest danger appeared to threaten Germany from France.

The French Yellow Book contains under number 2 the text of an alleged official, secret German document, dated March 13, 1913, dealing with the strengthening of the German forces, which was submitted by the French Minister of War to his colleague of foreign affairs with the assertion that it was derived from a trustworthy source. The document contains the following striking passage:

“The idea that our armaments are a reply to the armaments and policy of the French must be instilled into the people. The people must be accustomed to think that an

offensive war on our part is a necessity if we are to combat the adversary's provocations. We must act with prudence in order to arouse no suspicion, and so as to avoid the crisis which might damage our economic life. Things must be so arranged that under the weighty impression of powerful armaments, of considerable sacrifices, and of political tension, an outbreak shall be considered as a deliverance, because after it would come decades of peace and of prosperity, such as those which followed 1870."

The document emphasized the importance of an understanding with the leaders of discontented factions in Egypt, Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco, so as to prepare revolutions which would break out simultaneously with a European war. It declared that the small states in Europe must be forced to side with Germany or be cowed. It expressed the opinion that the fortresses of Belgium and Holland could probably be rapidly conquered and neutralized, so as to preclude the possibility of a flank attack against Germany.

"In the south," it continued, "Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and we can count on her defending her neutrality against France with energy, and thus protecting this flank. As has been said above, the situation with regard to the small states on our northwest frontier cannot be viewed in the same light. There the matter is vital for us, and the end towards which we should strive should be to take the offensive in great superiority from the outset. For this it will be necessary to concentrate a great army followed by strong forces of the *Landwehr*, which will lead the small states to follow us, or, at least, to remain inactive in the theatre of war, and which will crush them in the case of armed resistance. If these states could be persuaded to organize their system of fortifications in such a manner that they could make an effective protection

for our flank, the invasion plan might be given up. But for this it would also be necessary, particularly in Belgium, that the army should be reformed so that it might offer serious guarantees of effective resistance. If, on the other hand, that country's defensive organization were turned against us, which would give obvious advantages to our western adversary, we could not in any way offer Belgium any guarantee of the security of her neutrality."

We may compare with this statement of military policy the following remarks of General von Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff:

"The commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor must be disregarded. When war has become necessary it must be waged by ranging all the chances on one's own side. Success alone justifies it. Germany cannot and must not give Russia time to mobilize, or she will be obliged to maintain on the eastern frontier a force which would leave her in a position of equality, if not of inferiority, in front of France. Therefore, we must forestall our principal adversary immediately there are nine chances in ten that we are going to have war, and we must begin war without waiting, in order brutally to crush all resistance."

The authenticity of the document quoted above has apparently not been challenged. While its significance must not be overestimated, judged by itself it is weightier evidence of bellicose intention than the documents discovered by the Germans in the Belgian archives.

Notwithstanding the impulsive attitude of military circles, it is a fact that an overwhelming majority of the German people earnestly desired the maintenance of peace, so long as it was compatible with national honor and vital interests. The educated and influential classes generally regarded the cardinal principles of German *Welt-politik*




as the indispensable guarantee for the preservation of these national interests.

There was, undoubtedly, an impetuous, noisy minority, even among civilians, composed of representatives of different parties and classes, who held that the conditions required that Germany should precipitate events by inaugurating a more aggressive policy leading to war. In the ranks of the hereditary nobility and large rural proprietors, the Junker-class, there were some who regarded the existing situation as intolerable, the actual social and economic tendencies as subversive of their privileges and interests, and war as the only exit from a fatal *impasse*. The numerical strength of the nobility in the Reichstag had been steadily declining. Their representation fell from 162 in 1878, to 83 in 1898, and 57 in 1912, of whom only 27 identified themselves with the Conservatives. The process of democratization, although less advanced than in western Europe, was slowly but surely undermining the traditional authority of the Junkers, blighting their prestige by its profane touch. Experience has shown, moreover, that the patriotic fervor born in brilliant victories, by creating an excessive spirit of devotion to national ideals and prejudices, strengthens traditional institutions and privileges.

The extreme Conservatives demanded a modification in the political franchise of the empire. This view is represented in an interesting political monograph which appeared in 1912, entitled, "If I were Kaiser" (*Wenn ich der Kaiser wär*'), in which the author, Herr Frymann declared:

"Politically, the German nation is ill unto death. It can be saved only by an alteration of the constitution, and if the constitution cannot be altered owing to the opposition of parliament, then it must be altered notwithstanding the will of parliament, exactly as a father orders the surgeon to operate on a child against the child's will."





Charts showing the precincts which returned Social Democrats to the Reichstag in 1903, 1907, and 1912. In 1907, although the Socialist vote was greater than in 1903, the number of delegates was less; this was partly due to the unequal size of the voting precincts, some containing 40,000 or 50,000 people, and others 500,000 or 600,000.

The author proposed that existing international antagonisms be allowed to follow their natural course leading to war, which would invigorate the healthy, nationalist forces in Germany. He maintained that a successful war would result in a moral revival and the election of a Reichstag with a large patriotic majority. The government should take immediate advantage of this to secure an amendment of the constitution abolishing the present electoral basis of equal, universal suffrage, so as to guarantee in the future the political preponderance of the trustworthy, conservative forces, thoroughly imbued with nationalist principles.

To the ruling classes it must indeed have seemed that there was an alarming element of infection in the state, since they regarded the largest body of voters, by reason of their adherence to a certain party, as political outcasts, unworthy of association in the common bond of citizenship. The Kaiser once said of the Social Democrats:

“For me every Social Democrat is an enemy of the Empire and the Fatherland.”

Prince von Bülow declares in his *Imperial Germany* that the Social Democratic movement is the antithesis of the Prussian state. He says:

“From first to last during my term of office I recognized that the Social Democratic movement constituted a great and serious danger. It is the duty of every German ministry to combat this movement until it is defeated or materially changed.”

Social Democracy was uncompromisingly opposed to the spirit of the existing monarchy. It detested militarism, denounced the increase in armament, and ridiculed the policy of expansion.

The steady growth of the Social Democrats may be traced in the following table of the number of Socialist

votes cast, and of the Socialist members returned to the Reichstag, at successive elections:

Date.	Votes cast.	Members returned.
1884	550,000	24
1887	763,000	11
1890	1,427,000	35
1893	1,787,000	44
1898	2,107,000	56
1903	3,011,000	81
1907	3,539,000	43
1912	4,250,000	110

The results of the elections for the Reichstag in 1912 were a cause of very grave concern for those who regarded the Social Democrats as dangerous enemies of the state. The position of the Social Democrats in the new chamber will be illustrated by a comparison of the numerical representation of the leading political groups and parties, as follows: Conservatives 45, Center 90, Poles 18, Alsace-Lorrainers 9, National Liberals 44, Radicals 41, Social Democrats 110. The Social Democrats controlled more than one-third of the entire number of votes cast at this, the last election before the war; and many persons cherished the fond conviction that the ever-diminishing margin between the actual strength of the Social Democrats and the attainment by them of an absolute majority in the Reichstag was the measure of the space which separated European society from the realization of enduring peace, not necessarily because they regarded the intentions of the German government as more belligerent than those of other states, but because it takes two parties to make a quarrel, and in any quarrel involving the Great Powers Germany must inevitably be the dominating factor on one side of the conflict. Therefore the elimination of Germany

as a potentially belligerent power through the agency of a Social Democratic majority would destroy the very groundwork for a great war.

Monster meetings were organized by the Socialists as a demonstration against the impending war. On the evening of July 29th no fewer than twenty-seven such meetings were reported in Berlin alone, with an aggregate attendance of 60,000, and the number rose to fifty on the evening before the declaration of war. This agitation spread to all parts of the country, but it had absolutely no influence on the course of events.

The world had been deluded by an exaggerated estimate of the effectiveness of Socialism as a force making for peace. Both the hopes and fears that had been entertained regarding the probable attitude of the Socialists everywhere turned out to be fictitious in the presence of war as a reality. The seeming contradiction between the Socialists' professions of passionate hostility to war and their meek compliance with the government's decision has been the subject of reproachful comment. One reason for their submission is the fact that the declaration of martial law, by severing communication between the different countries, prevented the international coöperation of the Socialistic forces. Then, in general, the Socialists in each country regarded the war, in so far as it concerned themselves individually, as a defensive war and therefore not incompatible with their principles.

In Germany, as we shall presently see, the Social Democrats voted unanimously for the war appropriation in the Reichstag, although it is reported that Dr. Liebknecht and several others opposed this in the preliminary conference when the attitude of the party was determined.

In explaining the position of the German Socialists it is necessary to observe that the situation at the outbreak of

the war as viewed in Germany was most favorable to national solidarity of opinion, because it permitted the government to appear as the involuntary defender of the higher civilization against the hideous menace of Panslavism. Probably no other aspect of affairs could have rallied the sentiment of the rank and file of the Social Democrats so successfully to the support of the government's policy.

The warlike enthusiasm of a large portion of the Berlin populace was revealed by the spirit with which intelligence of the Austro-Hungarian note and the subsequent Serbian reply was received. On Saturday evening, July 25th, in spite of the pouring rain, crowds stood in front of the newspaper offices, especially in Unter den Linden, awaiting tidings of the Serbian response. Special editions of the papers announced the rupture at Belgrade, and when this news was disseminated, about 8.30, a crowd of young people paraded Unter den Linden, singing patriotic songs and shouting, "Long live war," and "Down with Serbia." They marched to the Siegessäule (Column of Victory), and offered their exulting respects before the Austro-Hungarian and Italian Embassies, including the famous Siegesallee (Avenue of Victory) in their route, where, like echoes from the dark recesses of the Tiergarten, came martial recollections of the victorious Hohenzollerns, who stand in a double row, at accurate intervals, in rigid whiteness, spectral monitors of an unbroken tradition—a much-criticised series of statues, detested abroad as the plastic expression of Prussian arrogance.

The correspondent of the *Westminster Gazette* writing from Berlin on July 26th, indicated concisely, and with insight, the position of the Teutonic powers; and while the peremptoriness of Germany's attitude was somewhat exaggerated, the course of events has proved the approximate



Siegesallee, Avenue of Victory, Berlin, where in a double row statues of victorious Hohenzollerns have been erected.



Emperor William speaking from the balcony of the palace in Berlin.



accuracy of his exposition. "The policy of the German and Austrian governments," he said, "is absolutely beyond doubt; Russia will not be allowed to meddle in what is claimed to be entirely an Austro-Serbian affair. Germany is solid with Austria and any unfriendly Russian action will bring a declaration of war. It is even probable that any Russian action which can be interpreted as a provisional threat will be met by a German note, asking Russia to say definitely whether she proposes to intervene or not. There is so far no German official, or even 'inspired,' ground for this assumption: but military considerations, emphasized officially only a few months ago, will not allow the Austro-German allies to give away any strategical points to Russia, such as a new 'trial mobilization' or 'veiled concentration of troops.' . . . The German press with the exception of Socialist organs accepts this official attitude as self-evident, and shows complete solidarity."

Russia regarded as historically untenable the proposition that a great power might regulate alone, at its own discretion, a controversy with a Balkan state. Her prestige, as we have seen, was involved in maintaining the independence and integrity of Serbia.

The policy of Germany, like that of each of the other belligerent powers, had its crucial moment. It came to the parting of the ways, the fateful choice. The forces of enmity had been gathering silently and inevitably for decades; but they were released to wreak destruction through the agency of conscious acts of human judgment. Destiny and free will were thus mysteriously associated.

M. Sazonoff declared on July 28th that the key to the situation was in Berlin. German writers have called this war the German War, and their opponents would probably not begrudge them this designation. Just as Germany is the most prominent belligerent power, so it may be

readily conceded that the decisive moment in German policy was the most significant point in the bewildering maze of occurrences that preceded the war, whatever opinion we hold concerning Germany's responsibility. Unmistakable signs will guide us to this point of supreme importance.

On the evening of the 28th Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia. On the morning of the 29th a conversation took place in a friendly tone between M. Sazonoff and the German ambassador. But later in the day news of Count Berchtold's refusal to discuss the terms of the note to Serbia reached the Russian Foreign Minister, destroying M. Sazonoff's hope of arriving at a direct understanding with the government at Vienna. Russia proceeded to a partial mobilization in response to Austria-Hungary's uncompromising attitude.

Russia's mobilization was reported in Berlin on the same day, and in the afternoon the German ambassador in St. Petersburg called upon M. Sazonoff to deliver a characteristically emphatic message. He promised that Austria-Hungary would respect Serbian integrity, but declared that the German government was resolved to mobilize if Russia did not stop her military preparations. Count Pourtalès had intimidated Russia by a peremptory summons at the time of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis in 1909. He was convinced that Russia would likewise be unwilling to risk a war on Serbia's account in 1914. His communication on the afternoon of July 29th was really a veiled threat, because it was generally recognized that mobilization in Germany almost inevitably meant war. This time Russia did not recede. M. Sazonoff declared in a communication to the Russian ambassador in Paris: "As we cannot comply, we have no alternative but to hasten our preparations and assume that war is inevitable."

Germany had adopted the attitude that the Austro-Serbian controversy was a purely local affair in which no other power had any right to intervene, and apparently the German government was prepared to interpret any military demonstration calculated to exert pressure on Austria-Hungary as equivalent to interference in the Austro-Serbian quarrel. Russia refused to acquiesce in this position. A direct conflict of views was thus produced, and it devolved upon Germany to enforce her doctrine or abandon it. It was Germany's turn to show her hand. Evidently the crucial moment for Germany's conduct had arrived. The days before the war were prolific in sensational incidents to which the circumstances attributed an appropriate setting. We involuntarily recall certain midnight interviews and dispatches in the night of July 29-30, whose unusual nocturnal character betrays the terrific tension, the culmination in the crisis of decision. They are the glow in the sky at night which reflects the seething crater of frenzied anxiety. Significant proceedings were crowded into the short hours of this summer night with ideally dramatic compactness and definiteness.

The leading civil and military authorities of the German Empire were the Kaiser's guests at dinner in the Neues Palais on the evening of Wednesday, July 29th. The dinner was followed by an extraordinary council, which occupies a unique position of importance among the decisive events of the critical days that preceded the war. When all the historical evidence will be available, and will have been sifted, perhaps fifty years hence, this conference in the stately palace that terminates the long vista through the park at Potsdam will probably be regarded as unquestionably the most significant occurrence in the action of the forces that brought on the hour of destiny.

Around the solemn council board, with the Kaiser presiding, were gathered the military and civil dignitaries and advisers, such as Field Marshal von Moltke, Chief of the General Staff, and his associates, Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, the Father of the German Navy, Imperial Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs von Jagow, the impetuous Crown Prince, and Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of the Kaiser, the sailor prince, Inspector-General of the German Navy, who had just returned from a visit in England, where of course his eyes had not been closed to the evident signs of an imminent conflict in Ireland.

Perhaps the reminiscences of a participant will some day reveal the course of debate on this momentous occasion. For the present, we are dependent on casual hints and allusions. The firmness of Russia had shattered the hope of a decisive diplomatic victory. We may be sure that von Moltke and the other military chiefs, who had been receiving disquieting communications concerning Russia's extensive preparations, pressed for energetic measures, immediate mobilization and war. We may assume, on the other hand, that the civilian chiefs urged in opposition that the field be left open for diplomacy, which still gave promise of arriving at a satisfactory agreement. The military group confronted their opponents with arguments based on inflexible, material facts. War with Russia and France was sooner or later inevitable, and there would never again be so favorable an occasion for waging it. The Teutonic powers possessed the initiative and a just cause. But every hour of delay diminished Germany's advantages, which consisted in the perfection and adaptability of her organization. This enabled her to concentrate her troops with rapidity and in superior strength at the strategic positions. But these advantages would be



Count Helmuth von Moltke, chief of the general staff of the German army at the outbreak of the war.



neutralized if Russia were given time to bring up her formidable masses. A campaign conducted with determination and alacrity would be brief, inasmuch as the decisive factors were preparation and technical resources, in which Germany was vastly superior.

The reflections and considerations that passed through the Kaiser's mind may never be revealed. Convinced of his stupendous responsibility before God for the welfare of 67,000,000 people, he doubtless contemplated on the one hand the palpable danger that threatened his highly-developed empire, and the ignominy of appearing to hide another discomfiture behind the screen of a plausible compromise; on the other, the imponderable consequences of a deliberately aggressive policy. Involuntarily, perhaps, his imagination surveyed in rapid flight the achievements of the past, the heritage of glory and of duty. For many generations the fortunes of Prussia had been describing an upward curve. The soaring progress of power and prosperity gave assurance of a still greater destiny. The vision of an imposing hegemony extending from the Baltic Sea to the Persian Gulf, embracing the most promising exploitive regions, was no longer remote, an empire of peace that would obscure the brilliant trophies of Alexander the Great and Julius Cæsar. One more determined effort and the guarantee of an unparalleled development would be secured. One throw of the dice, one word—mobilization—would set in movement the tremendous machinery for fashioning the crowning element, the apex, of the structure on which successive generations had toiled. But still the Kaiser scrutinized his conscience and was reluctant to take the fateful step.

The council probably reviewed and sanctioned provisionally the plan of campaign on two fronts, of which the essential features were the smashing blow across Belgium

at France, and the subsequent hurried movement eastward before the slowly-moving Russians were ready, so as to coöperate with Austria-Hungary in crushing them in detail.

Finally, the council confirmed the position in regard to Russia, which made war almost certain, but owing chiefly to the Kaiser's hesitation, no doubt, active measures were suspended until Russia could be again approached and Great Britain sounded. But the feverish anxiety of the chiefs of the German government was so great that they could not tolerate a delay until morning to communicate with these two powers on the most fundamental questions of policy.

After this extraordinary council, at one o'clock in the morning of the 30th, as we have already observed in the first volume, the Kaiser telegraphed to the Tsar, to support the action of the German ambassador and emphasize the perilous consequences of Russian mobilization.

Count Pourtalès called upon M. Sazonoff at two o'clock the same morning and urged in somewhat less categorical terms that Russia should cease military preparations. He inquired whether Russia could not be satisfied with the promise that Austria-Hungary would not violate Serbia's integrity. M. Sazonoff replied that Russia had to safeguard Serbia's independence and sovereignty as well. He expressed his conviction that Germany was intervening in St. Petersburg while refusing to intervene in Vienna, so as to give Austria-Hungary time to crush her neighbor before Russia could bring aid. It is reported that the German ambassador "completely broke down on seeing war was inevitable," and appealed to M. Sazonoff "for some suggestion which he could telegraph to the German government as a last hope." At that M. Sazonoff drew up the formula by which Russia engaged to stop all military

preparations on condition that Austria-Hungary would eliminate from her ultimatum the points which violated the sovereignty of Serbia. As we have already seen, this formula was rejected by Herr von Jagow as unacceptable for Austria-Hungary.

It was directly after his return from the council at Potsdam that Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, after requesting Sir Edward Goschen to come to him, made the startling inquiry whether Great Britain would remain neutral in a European war on condition that Germany would promise to respect the neutrality of Holland and the territorial integrity of France as distinguished from her colonies and dependencies, a proposal which Sir Edward Grey very promptly rejected. It was indeed an alarming revelation that the German government already contemplated the possibility or necessity of hostile operations against France, and had apparently even reflected on the nature of the spoils of victory. This interview in itself would be strong presumptive evidence that the council at Potsdam regarded war as practically unavoidable, and it would be corroborated by the convening of the Federal Council on the 30th. For without the adhesion of this sovereign body a declaration of war would scarcely be constitutional.

Even at the last, when the steadfast adherence of Germany and Russia to their respective policies left apparently no other alternative than war, it is not unlikely that the Kaiser gave his sanction reluctantly to mobilization and hostilities. There is even a rumor that the Kaiser was constrained to take the fatal step by the threatened resignation of the military and naval chiefs.

The first days of August have left their ineffaceable impression upon the memory of all those who experienced the thrilling events and sensations in Berlin. The news

that Germany had delivered in St. Petersburg what was virtually an ultimatum was disseminated by a special edition of the *North German Gazette* late in the afternoon of July 31st. It was immediately recognized that war was almost unavoidable. The realization of the gravity of the situation impregnated the throbbing life of the great city with an irrepressible feeling of elation. The stirring spectacle of the departure of the troops in 1870, graven in the hearts of surviving witnesses, perpetuated by art, loomed large in the popular imagination. The commonplaces of life were swept aside like autumn leaves before the tingling, stimulating blast of patriotic exhilaration.

At half past five the Kaiser appeared at the balcony of the palace, surrounded by members of his family and courtiers, above a sea of upturned faces. For a time it seemed as though the frenzied roar of applause that swelled and reverberated from the countless throats of the dense multitude would never cease. When finally it subsided the Kaiser addressed the people in a clear, penetrating voice, as follows:

“A stern hour of tribulation for Germany has arrived. Envy on all sides compels us to assume a righteous attitude of defense. The sword is forced into our hand. If my efforts at the last moment do not avail to bring our opponents to reason and maintain peace, I trust that with God’s help we shall so wield our sword that we can sheathe it with honor. War would extort from the German people an enormous tribute of wealth and blood, but it would prove to our opponents the gravity of assailing Germany. And now I commend you to God. Go to church, kneel before God, and implore His help for our gallant army.”

At a quarter before twelve on the night of July 31st a great concourse of people marched in procession from Unter den Linden down Wilhelmstrasse singing patriotic

songs and drew up before the Chancellor's Palace. The Chancellor appeared at the central window of the Congress Chamber, the historic hall where the Treaty of Berlin was drawn up in 1878, and the convention for the partition of Africa sanctioned in 1885; Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg was received with a loud ovation. When silence had been obtained, speaking in firm, ringing tones, he addressed the assemblage as follows:

“At this momentous hour, to give expression to your patriotic feeling, you have come to the house of Bismarck, who, with the Emperor William I and Field Marshal von Moltke welded the German Empire together. We wish to go on living tranquilly in the empire that we have developed in forty-four years of peaceful labor. The whole effort of the Kaiser has been devoted to the maintenance of peace. To the very last hour he has striven to preserve the peace of Europe, and he is still working for this purpose. Should all his efforts prove fruitless, should the sword be forced into our hands, we shall take the field with a clear conscience, and the conviction that we did not seek war. We shall then wage war for our existence and for our national honor to the last drop of our blood. In the gravity of this hour I remind you of the words which Prince Frederick Charles cried to the men of Brandenburg: ‘Let your hearts beat to God, your fists on the enemy.’”

Again, after news had spread on August 1st that mobilization had been ordered, a vast concourse of people assembled in the square in front of the palace, crying, “We wish to see our Kaiser, we wish to see our beloved Kaiser,” until the Kaiser, accompanied by the Kaiserin, appeared at a balcony, and addressed the people in the following words:

“I give thanks from the depths of my heart for your outburst of devotion and loyalty. In the impending

contest I know no parties amongst my people, only Germans. And whatever parties have assailed me in the conflict of opinions, I forgive them all. Our only concern at present is to stand together like brothers, and then God will aid the German people to victory."

The *Berlin Lokalanzeiger* declared on August 3d: "We begin to-day the final fight which shall settle forever our great position in the world, which we have never misused, and when the German sword again glides into its scabbard, everything that we hope and wish will be consummated. We shall stand before the world as its mightiest nation, which will then, at last, be in a position, with its moderation and forbearance, to give to the world forever those things for which it has never ceased to strive—peace, enlightenment, and prosperity."

The German Reichstag was hastily summoned to meet on August 4th, for the purpose of voting the necessary supplies for the war. The opening of this extraordinary session was an impressive ceremony. The deputies assembled in the famous White Hall of the Royal Palace in Berlin at one o'clock, where the Kaiser, in the presence of the Kaiserin, the Crown Princess, the Princes Eitel Frederick and August William, the Chancellor and Secretaries of State, and the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, read the following address from the throne:

"In this hour of destiny I have summoned the chosen representatives of the German people about me. For nearly a half century we have persistently followed the path of peace. Attempts to impute a warlike inclination to Germany and to restrict her position in the world have been a severe test for our people's patience. But with unswerving honesty of purpose my government has continued to pursue, even amid provocative circumstances, the development of all moral, spiritual, and economic

forces as the highest goal. The world has witnessed how tirelessly amid the confusion of conflicting forces of recent years we have kept our place in the front rank to shield the nations of Europe from a war between the greatest powers.

“The gravest dangers which had been evoked by the occurrences in the Balkans seemed to have been surmounted, when the murder of my friend, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, caused the abyss to open. My noble ally, the Emperor and King Francis Joseph, was forced to grasp the sword for the defense of his empire against a dangerous agitation which proceeded from a neighboring state. The Russian Empire thrust itself in the way of the allied monarchy in the latter’s pursuit of her lawful interests. Not alone our duties as ally call us to the side of Austria-Hungary. We have the mighty task of protecting the common civilization of the two empires at the same time as our own position against the assaults of hostile forces.

“With a heavy heart I have been compelled to mobilize my army against a neighbor, by whose side it has fought on so many battlefields. I beheld with sincere grief the destruction of a friendship which Germany had loyally maintained. The Imperial Russian government, giving way to an insatiable nationalism, has taken the side of a state which has occasioned the misfortune of this war by countenancing criminal conspiracies. It was no surprise that France ranged herself on the side of our opponents. Too often have our attempts to arrive at more friendly relations with the French republic encountered the old-time aspirations and bitterness.

“Gentlemen, all that human forethought and energy can accomplish in arming a people for a supreme contest has been done with your coöperation. The enmity which

has been spreading for a long time in East and West has now burst forth in bright flames. The present situation is not the consequence of temporary conflicts of interests or diplomatic constellations; it is the result of a spirit of hostility toward the power and success of the German Empire which has been active for many years.

“No passion for aggrandizement impels us. We are inspired by the unbending determination to preserve the place which God has granted us for ourselves and all coming generations.

“You can perceive in the documents laid before you how my government, and particularly my Chancellor, struggled to the last moment to avoid the supreme catastrophe. We grasp the sword with a clear conscience and innocent hand for a necessary action in self-defense which has been forced upon us.


“My summons goes forth to the peoples and races of the German Empire to bid them stand with undivided strength as brothers by the side of our allies for the protection of all that we have created in peaceful labor. Like our forefathers, firm and faithful, earnest and chivalrous, humble before God and eager for battle in the face of the enemy, we put our trust in the Almighty, and may He be pleased to strengthen our defense and guide us to a happy issue.

“Gentlemen, the entire German people, grouped about its princes and leaders turns its eyes upon you to-day. Pass your measures with unanimity and expedition; that is my innermost wish.”

Having reached the intended termination of his address from the throne, the Kaiser laid aside his manuscript; but then, borne along by the impulsive force of his emotion, he added:

“You have read, gentlemen, what I said to my people from the balcony of the palace. I repeat that I no longer





The Session of the Reichstag, August 4, 1914, which voted five billion marks, up to that date the largest single war-credit ever demanded of any legislative assembly.

know any parties; I know only Germans. And as sign of this, that you are determined, without distinction of party, class, or religion, to stand together with me through thick and thin, peril and death, I summon the leaders of the parties to step forward and pledge this by a grasp of the hand."

The swelling emotion of those who had witnessed this simple but impressive ceremony found spontaneous expression in singing the national hymn; and then the Kaiser, after grasping the hand of the Chancellor and that of General von Moltke, left the hall amid a storm of enthusiasm.

The business session in the Hall of the Reichstag convened at three o'clock and continued until 5.50. It was opened by the Chancellor with the following speech, to which the members responded at intervals with prolonged outbursts of applause:

"A tremendous crisis has broken in upon Europe. Since we won for ourselves the German Empire and a place of respect before the world, we have lived for forty-four years in peace and have guarded the tranquillity of Europe. We have grown strong and mighty in peaceful labor and are therefore envied. We have borne with dogged patience the fact that in East and West hatred was nourished against us and bonds were fashioned for us under the pretence that Germany longed for war. The wind which was then sown has brought forth the whirlwind. We desired to live on in peaceful pursuits, and like a silent vow the feeling passed from the Kaiser to the youngest recruit; only in defense of a righteous cause may the German sword ever glide from its scabbard. The day on which we must draw it has come against our wish, and in spite of our sincere endeavors. Russia has applied the torch to the house. We stand in the midst of a war which has been forced upon us by Russia and France.

“Gentlemen! A number of documents hastily collected under the pressure of rapidly succeeding events has been placed before you. Permit me to point to the facts which determine our attitude.

“From the very beginning of the Austro-Serbian conflict, we declared that the dispute must be confined to Austria-Hungary and Serbia and we worked with this end in view. Every cabinet, particularly that of England, adopted the same attitude. Russia alone declared that she must have a voice in the decision of this controversy. Thus the danger of European complications raised its threatening head. As soon as the first definite information about military preparations in Russia reached us, we notified St. Petersburg, in a friendly but emphatic tone, that warlike measures against Austria would find us at the side of our ally, and that military preparations against ourselves would compel us to take corresponding measures, and that mobilization was very near to actual war. Russia assured us in the most solemn manner of her desire for peace, and that she was making no military preparations directed against us. In the meantime, England endeavored to mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and in this attempt we warmly seconded her efforts. On July 28th the Kaiser besought the Tsar by telegram to take into consideration that Austria-Hungary had the right and duty to protect herself against the Greater Serbian agitation, which threatened to undermine her existence. The Kaiser drew the attention of the Tsar to the solidarity of monarchical interests in face of the outrage of Sarajevo. He asked for the latter’s personal assistance in clearing away the differences between Vienna and St. Petersburg. Almost at the same time, and before the receipt of this telegram, the Tsar asked the Kaiser to come to his aid by inducing Vienna to moderate her demands. The Kaiser

undertook the rôle of mediator. But this action at his order had scarcely been started, when Russia mobilized all her military forces which are directed against Austria-Hungary, while Austria-Hungary had only mobilized those of her army corps which are immediately directed against Serbia; toward the north she had only mobilized two of her army corps, and they were far from the Russian boundary.

“The Kaiser straightway pointed out to the Tsar that this mobilization of the Russian forces against Austria-Hungary rendered difficult, if not impossible, the rôle of mediator, which he had accepted at the Tsar’s own request. Nevertheless, we continued our mediation in Vienna, and carried it to the farthest point compatible with our position as ally. During this time Russia spontaneously repeated her assurances that she was making no military preparations against us.

“We come to July 31st. The decision was to be taken in Vienna. We had already by our representatives brought about the resumption of direct communications between Vienna and St. Petersburg which had been interrupted for a time. But before the final decision had been taken in Vienna, came the news that Russia had mobilized all her military forces—mobilized, therefore, against us as well. The Russian government, which knew very well from our repeated representations what mobilization on our frontier meant, gave us no notification or explanation of this mobilization. It was not until the afternoon of the 31st that a telegram came from the Tsar to the Kaiser in which the Tsar guaranteed that his army would not assume a provocative attitude towards us. But the mobilization on our frontier had been in full progress since the night of July 30-31. At the same time that we were acting as mediator in Vienna in compliance with Russia’s request,

the Russian forces were appearing along our extended and almost completely open frontier; while France, without actually mobilizing, was making military preparations, as she herself confesses.

“What was our position? We had thus far deliberately abstained from calling up a single reservist for the sake of European peace. Were we to continue patiently waiting until the powers, between whom we are wedged in, chose a convenient time for striking a blow? It would have been a crime to expose Germany to such a peril. Therefore, on July 31st, we demanded Russia’s demobilization as the only means which could still preserve the peace of Europe. The Imperial (German) ambassador in St. Petersburg received further instructions to declare to the Russian government that in case our demand met with refusal we must consider that a state of hostilities existed.

“The Imperial ambassador carried out these instructions. We do not even yet know what Russia replied to our demand for demobilization. No telegraphic communication on the subject has reached us, although the telegraph lines still transmitted less important dispatches.

“Therefore, long after the expiration of the indicated time-limit, the Kaiser was obliged on August 1st, at five o’clock in the afternoon, to order a general mobilization of our forces.

“At the same time it was necessary for us to assure ourselves of the attitude of France. To our direct question, whether she would remain neutral in the event of a war between Germany and Russia, France replied that she would act as her interests demanded. This was an evasive, if not a negative, reply to our question.”

After presenting evidence intended to show that France initiated hostilities on the Franco-German border, chiefly

the incidents mentioned in the German declaration of war against France, the Chancellor continued as follows:

“Gentlemen, we are now in a position of necessity; and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg; perhaps they have already entered Belgian territory. Gentlemen, this is in contradiction to the rules of international law. The French government has declared in Brussels that it is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as it is respected by the enemy. But we knew that France stood prepared for an invasion. France could wait, but we could not. A French inroad on our flank on the lower Rhine could have been fatal to us. So we were forced to set aside the just protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian governments. The wrong—I speak openly—the wrong that we now commit we will try to make good again as soon as our military goal has been reached. When one is threatened as we are, and all is at stake, he can only think of how he can hack his way through.

“Gentlemen, we stand shoulder to shoulder with Austria-Hungary.

“As for England’s attitude, Sir Edward Grey’s statements made yesterday in the House of Commons show clearly the point of view of the English government. We have assured the English government that, as long as England remains neutral, our fleet will not attack the northern coast of France, and that we will not violate the territorial integrity or independence of Belgium. I now repeat this statement before the whole world, and I may add that, so long as England remains neutral, we would also be willing, in case of reciprocal assurances, to abstain from all hostile operations against the French merchant marine.

“Gentlemen, such has been the course of events. I repeat the Kaiser’s words: ‘Germany goes to war with a

clear conscience!' We are fighting for the fruits of our peaceful labor, for the inheritance of a great past, and for our future. The fifty years are not yet passed during which, Count Moltke said, we should have to remain armed for the defense of our inheritance and the conquests of 1870. Now the great hour of trial for our people has struck. But we face it with clear confidence. Our army is in the field, our navy is ready for battle—behind them stands the entire German people—the entire German people [he glanced at the Social Democrats, pausing an instant to receive their expression of approbation] united to the last man!

"You, gentlemen, know your duty in all its greatness. The bills before you require no further explanation. I ask you to pass them quickly."

The response of the Social Democrats, as expressed by their parliamentary leader, Herr Haase, has a peculiar interest:

"On behalf of my party I am commissioned to make the following statement: We are face to face with an hour of destiny. The consequences of imperialistic policy, which has inspired an era of armament competition, and accentuated the differences between the nations, have burst over Europe like a deluge. The advocates of this policy must bear the responsibility. We refuse to accept it. The Social Democrats have struggled against this fateful development with all their power, and until the very last moment they worked to preserve peace through impressive demonstrations in all countries, in accord with their brothers in France. Their exertions have been in vain. We stand now before the inexorable fact of war. The horrors of hostile invasion threaten us. The question before us is not now that of war or peace, but concerning the necessary supplies for the national defense. We must

now consider the millions of our fellow-countrymen who, without any fault of their own, are plunged into this catastrophe. They will suffer most from the ravages of war. Without distinction of party, we follow with our innermost good wishes those of our brothers who have been called to the colors. We think also of the mothers who must part with their sons, of the wives and children who are robbed of their supporters, and for whom the terrors of hunger are added to anxiety of death. To these will soon be added thousands of wounded and crippled soldiers. We regard it as an imperative duty to stand by them all, to mitigate their sufferings, to help their immeasurable need. For our nation and for its future liberty, much, if not all, is hazarded, should victory come to Russian despotism, whose hands are already stained with the blood of the best of its own people. This danger must be averted and the civilization and independence of our own land secured. In these circumstances we prove the truth of our constant assertion: in the hour of danger we do not leave our Fatherland in the lurch. And in this attitude we feel that we are true to the principles of the International, which recognizes the right of every nation at all times to independence and self-defense, just as, in accordance with it, we condemn any war of conquest. We demand that as soon as the end of securing our safety has been attained, and the enemy is inclined to peace, this war be terminated by a treaty which shall make friendship with our neighbors possible. We demand this not only in the interests of international solidarity, for which we have always striven, but also for the good of the German nation. Guided by these principles, we agree to the credits which are required."

The extraordinary credit of 5,000,000,000 marks (\$1,190,000,000), the largest single war-credit ever demanded of

any legislative assembly, was unanimously passed, and the Reichstag was adjourned until November 24th.

While the violation of Belgian neutrality from the British and Belgian points of view, together with the question of moral culpability, is treated elsewhere, the present situation is a convenient point for the consideration of a question which must challenge the curiosity of all thoughtful students of Germany's method of inaugurating her campaign. What effect, if any, did the German authorities believe that their traverse of Belgium would exercise in the determination of British policy? Did they regard British conduct as immutably fixed without reference to Belgium? Was their invasion of Belgium in effect a conscious defiance of Great Britain?

Professor Hans Delbrück declares that if it were true that England entered the war because Germany disregarded Belgian neutrality, Germany cheated herself out of a sure victory by her unwise step. He contends that it is absurd to credit the Kaiser, Chancellor, and German General Staff with such a blunder, and concludes that these authorities must have been convinced that England would have entered the war in any case and that the Allies themselves would have crossed Belgium if the Germans had permitted them the opportunity. It was, in fact, almost inevitable that Great Britain would sooner or later have been drawn into the war. Professor Delbrück implies, however, that there were only two conceivable courses of British conduct, namely, interference in any case, and interference in consequence of the violation of Belgian neutrality, the latter of which he repudiates. But logically there was a third possibility, interference in no case. Germany's conduct could be explained just as readily on the assumption of a belief that Great Britain would not intervene in any

circumstances, as of a conviction that she would interfere in any situation.

Count Andrassy, to whose views reference has already been made, regards as untenable the view that the active participation of Great Britain came as a surprise to the leading circles in Berlin. On the other hand, an English writer declares just as categorically: "All the evidence indicates that it was an *idée fixe* in Berlin that under no circumstances whatsoever short of an actual attack on British shores would the United Kingdom participate in a European war." These two expressions of opinion taken at random illustrate the absolute diversity of views regarding a question of fundamental interest.

In endeavoring to form our own judgment on this problem, we shall examine separately the attitude of the German civil and military authorities. This method will not compromise the value of the investigation, and it may contribute to the accuracy of the results.

There is no doubt that one of the principal aims of Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg's policy had been to secure a durable understanding with Great Britain. In the course of his important address before the Reichstag, December 2, 1914, he alluded to this hope, declaring that by wearisome efforts it had been possible to arrive at an understanding regarding some economic points of controversy, reducing thereby the possible causes of friction. It is known, for example, that an agreement had been concluded regarding the extension of the Bagdad Railway to the head of the Persian Gulf. The fact, of itself, that the Chancellor made the above-mentioned admission in a speech, the tendency of which was to establish Great Britain's stubbornness, might seem to indicate that the progress accomplished in the policy of reconciliation had really been considerable. We may assume, therefore, that

before the war the German Foreign Office cherished the hope of maintaining friendly relations with Great Britain; and it is not irrelevant to recall, in this connection, the Chancellor's very hearty expression of approbation of Sir Edward Grey's skill and fairness in dealing with the Balkan crisis of 1913.

In the course of the memorable midnight interview with the British ambassador in the night of July 29-30, the Chancellor declared that the object of his policy had always been to bring about an understanding with Great Britain, and that "he had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was, of course, at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which the present crisis might possibly produce would enable him to look forward to the realization of his desire."

On the morning of August 4th, after the invasion of Belgium had become a reality, Herr von Jagow sent the following message to Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London:

"Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at the expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir Edward Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian

neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance."

This message was communicated to Sir Edward Grey, who read it to the House of Commons on the same day, where, in spite of the gravity of the situation, the unconsciously humorous inconsistency of the proof of good intentions proposed by the German Foreign Secretary provoked a general manifestation of amusement. This communication betrayed a deplorable inability to survey the situation from any other than a subjective point of view. For how could those who regarded the invasion of Belgium as the breach of a solemn covenant be persuaded that a new promise would serve as pledge for the harmless consequences of the violation of the old one? Such a message would never have been dispatched by one who was convinced that the participation of Great Britain in the war was inevitable.

Sir Edward Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, presented the British ultimatum to Herr von Jagow at the Foreign Office at about seven o'clock on the evening of August 4th, demanding assurance by twelve o'clock the same night that the German government would not proceed with its violation of the Belgian frontier. "In a short conversation which ensued," Sir Edward Goschen reports, "Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France."

Directly afterwards the British ambassador called to take leave of the Chancellor. The latter, who was in a very excited state in consequence of the step which Great Britain had taken, gave way to a passionate outburst. To quote again from Sir Edward Goschen's report (given at length in the *Appendix* to this volume):

“He said that the step taken by His Majesty’s Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word,—‘neutrality,’ a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a *scrap of paper*, Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter’s neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of ‘life and death’ for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium’s neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said: ‘But at what price will that compact have been kept! Has the British Government thought of that?’ I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument.”

After reading the account of this historic interview it seems impossible that any agency less potent than

amazement and the keenest disappointment could have torn aside so completely the veil of customary reserve and laid bare the experienced bureaucrat's most intimate state of feeling, impelling him to utter in a moment of abandonment expressions which he may subsequently have regretted, and which furnished a slogan to his country's foes. The Chancellor's stupefaction is the most convincing proof that the heads of the civil administration had not regarded the hostility of Great Britain as probable.

To the testimony already noted in this connection, we may add of course, as cumulative evidence of the belief of the German state department that Great Britain would stand aloof, all the restraining circumstances mentioned in Volume I, Chapter VIII, in connection with the threatening state of affairs in Ireland.

Turning our attention now to the chiefs of the military administration, we shall discover that all the evidence seems to indicate that in the opinion of the German General Staff, the intellectual leadership of the military establishment, while Great Britain's participation in the war was probable, it might be disregarded as a factor of slight importance in relation to the main features of the German plan of campaign. A monograph appearing a short time before the war, entitled *Germany's Hour of Destiny*, by Colonel H. Frobenius, may be regarded as a fairly accurate expression of the prevailing opinion in the leading military circles. The German Crown Prince telegraphed his congratulations to Colonel Frobenius on account of this work, saying: "I hope your book will find its way into every German home."

Colonel Frobenius bases his conjectures upon the fundamental distinction of the purposes of warfare into two classes, the unlimited and limited, as defined by the great strategist Clausewitz. The former involve the utilization

of all the energy and forces of a state in the supreme endeavor of crushing its opponent. The latter are confined to the attainment of some particular, restricted advantage; they do not aim at the complete subversion of the enemy. The purpose of France, for example, in a war with Germany would be unlimited; but that of Great Britain would be limited, confined to the destruction of the German fleet. Great Britain would wish to spare the German army as much as possible for the maintenance of an equilibrium on the continent after the war, or as a useful auxiliary in an eventual conflict with Russia.

For this reason, according to Frobenius, the interests and strategic plans of Great Britain and her continental allies would be widely divergent. The latter's operations would naturally be directed along lines converging on Berlin, whilst Great Britain would wish to employ her expeditionary force solely in ferreting out the German navy from the harbors where it would take refuge, that it might be destroyed by the superior British navy. Colonel Frobenius was convinced that it was the British intention that the expeditionary force of 150,000 men should disembark at Antwerp and act in concert with the French armies, extending their left wing, until a first important victory had been gained over the Germans, when the British would turn to the more congenial task of coöperating with their own fleet in subduing the German naval bases and coast defenses. The violation of Belgian neutrality is assumed by this author without comment. He remarks: "In France the opinion prevailed that England would unselfishly furnish a military force to serve French interests. This is preposterous in the case of this country, which never yet subordinated its own interests to those of other nations. Quite the contrary, in many cases it utilized their forces for its own purposes and interests."

The conclusions of Colonel Frobenius as to the scope of the prospective British operations on the continent and the limited strength of the forces contemplated were supported by many indications. For instance, a sensation had been created in Germany in the autumn of 1905 by the statement of M. Delcassé, French Foreign Minister during the international crisis a short time before, that he had received Great Britain's promise to disembark 100,000 men in Schleswig and seize the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal in the event of hostilities between France and Germany.

The substance of the Anglo-Belgian conversations relative to the disembarkation of a British expeditionary force, first of 100,000, later 160,000 men, to defend the neutrality of Belgium, as revealed in the documents "discovered" by the Germans in the War Office in Brussels, was probably not unknown to the German General Staff.

The opposition in Great Britain, France, and Belgium to the Dutch plan of erecting a modern fortress at Flushing to command the estuary of the Scheldt made a great impression in Germany, where it confirmed the suspicion that the British expeditionary force would be disembarked at Antwerp. This project of fortifying Flushing was proposed in November, 1910, several months before the final Moroccan crisis, as part of a larger plan of coast defenses in the Netherlands. Sir Edward Grey declared in the House of Commons on February 16, 1911, that the British government thought it undesirable to state its view on the measures taken by a foreign government to protect its own territory. There was a strong movement in the Netherlands itself against the scheme of fortification on account of the expense involved, and it was quietly dropped.

Our conclusions regarding the opinion of the controlling personalities in Germany about British policy in relation to the German invasion of Belgium may be briefly summarized.

The civil authorities thought that Great Britain would probably abstain from interference in a continental conflict so long as there was a prospect that the integrity of France and the smaller neutral countries would not be destroyed. The military authorities regarded the intervention of Great Britain as probable, but not a matter of vital importance to Germany. For all assumed, apparently without exception, that Great Britain's participation in continental warfare would not in any case extend beyond sending the expeditionary force of 160,000 men, which, in view of the enormous numbers engaged, would scarcely exert an appreciable effect in determining the issue. The general staff was probably confident that with actual conditions a conflict with France could be brought to the decisive point before Great Britain could make ready other forces to be transported to the continent.

Loath to believe that Germany would persist in her harsh design with reference to Belgium, Baron Beyens, the Belgian Minister in Berlin, solicited an interview with Herr von Jagow on August 4th. After listening while Baron Beyens explained that any other reply to Germany's demands than the refusal which had already been conveyed to the German government would have been incompatible with the honor of Belgium, the German Foreign Secretary admitted privately the justice of the Belgian minister's argument.

Herr Gottlieb von Jagow is before all else a gentleman of affable manners, conciliatory temperament, and tactful address. He had earned conspicuous merit as ambassador at Rome during a critical period of four years when the mutual recriminations and jealousy of Italy and Austria and the former's venture in Tripoli threatened to destroy the Triple Alliance. The renewal of the pact in these trying circumstances had been a noteworthy diplomatic achievement. Herr von Jagow returned to Berlin very reluctantly, at the Kaiser's urgent request, in 1913 to

undertake the duties of the Foreign Office as successor of the late Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter.

The suggestion is apt to present itself to the mind of one who studies attentively the diplomacy of the critical days before the war that if the policy of Germany had been guided by the personal feeling and conviction of Herr von Jagow, the war could have been avoided, or at least postponed. But unfortunately the whole course and character of events convey the impression that Herr von Jagow's initiative was strictly limited and that in all important matters the decision was dictated from sources higher up. It must have violated Herr von Jagow's finer sensibility to endorse a policy which subordinated the distinction of right and wrong to considerations of expediency.

As Herr von Jagow recited the motives of the German government he seemed to Baron Beyens to be merely repeating a lesson taught him by the Chief of the General Staff. His final declaration with regard to the German movement into Belgium, expressed, no doubt, with a very sincere feeling of anguish and with absolute frankness on his own part, was as follows:

"We have been compelled by absolute necessity to make this demand upon your government. It is for Germany a question of life and death. In order that she may not be crushed, she must herself crush France and then turn against Russia. It is with a feeling of extreme mortification that the Kaiser and his government have been obliged to take this decision. To myself it is the most painful step that I ever have taken in my career."

When Baron Beyens demanded his passports, Herr von Jagow's ingenuous exclamation of astonishment, his remark that he did not wish to break relations with him, serves to show that the German government did not expect that Belgium would carry her resistance to the point of actual

warfare. When Baron Beyens predicted that the hostility of Great Britain would be the consequence of Germany's conduct and asked Herr von Jagow whether the supposed advantages of crossing Belgium were worth the price, the latter merely shrugged his shoulders in reply.

Baron Beyens took his dinner alone at the adjacent Hotel Kaiserhof, absorbed, doubtless, in gloomy meditations. His mission was at an end. The methods of diplomacy were powerless before the stern resolution that was impelling the world's most formidable military organism. The industry and commerce of the civilized nations had attained a giddy pinnacle of prosperity. On every side were the evidences of amazing progress. But to Baron Beyens it must all have seemed a mockery, a world from which the soul had been banished, a society deaf to the plea of justice, a generation which witnessed and approved the apotheosis of a heartless materialism.

He may have passed over in memory, with an impression of cruel irony, the many assurances and attentions which his king and nation had received from their powerful neighbor. Perhaps his reflections turned to prominent instances in Prussian history where a similarly contemptuous disregard of justice seemed to have been exhibited, the invasion of Silesia by Frederick the Great "without any demand for reparation, in the very act of pouring forth compliments and assurances of good-will," the entirely unexpected invasion of Saxony by the same monarch which inaugurated the Seven Years' War and inflicted upon the unhappy electorate the misery which Belgium has suffered. It is true that in this second event genuine evidence of the complicity of Saxony in a coalition of powers against Frederick was discovered among the state papers at Dresden.

Later in the evening, when Baron Beyens issued from the hotel, the newsvendors were already hawking an extra

edition of the *Tageblatt* announcing Great Britain's declaration of war against Germany. The prediction of Baron Beyens had been realized with startling rapidity. A crowd of well-dressed people,—not riffraff,—roused to a fury of indignation by the news just published had gathered in front of the British Embassy in Wilhelmstrasse, and were singing the national hymn, "*Deutschland, Deutschland, überall,*" in tones of defiance. The attitude of these people could not have been more concisely expressed than by the Chancellor's words when he said of Great Britain's action, that it "was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants." Deceived until the last moment as to the probable conduct of Great Britain, the populace naturally ascribed their delusion to the studied duplicity of their new opponent rather than to the lack of perspicuity on the part of their own government.

Their fury increased in intensity. The two policemen stationed before the door of the embassy were either overpowered or remained indifferent to the whole proceeding, and presently a volley of brickbats crashed through the windows of the drawing-room. Sir Edward Goschen immediately communicated with the Foreign Office and Herr von Jagow not only informed the Chief of Police, so that an adequate force of mounted police was dispatched for preventing any repetition of this unpleasant occurrence, but very courteously went himself to the embassy to express his regrets for the rude behavior of his countrymen. The British ambassador had nothing but words of praise for the thoughtful conduct of Herr von Jagow throughout these trying days. On the morning of the 6th the ambassador and his household were smuggled away in taxicabs by side streets to the Lehrter Station, whence they departed in a special train, without any molestation, for the Dutch frontier.

## CHAPTER II


### THE MORAL FACTORS IN BELGIUM, FRANCE, AND ITALY

Condition of Belgium before the war. King Albert I. Relations with Germany. German plan of traversing Belgium not an improvisation. Belgian precautions. The Belgian government and the crisis; Luxemburg; German ultimatum; Belgian deliberations and reply. German declaration of war. Vagaries of German apologists. Count Andrassy's opinion. France; the Alsace-Lorraine Question. Recent French politics. M. Jaurès. Socialism in France and Germany. Military law for three years' service. Doumergue Cabinet. Caillaux Case. The elections of 1914, and ministerial crisis. Viviani Cabinet. Senator Humbert's disclosure. Assassination of M. Jaurès. The French people and the war-crisis. The declaration of war. The historic session of the Chamber. The coalition ministry. The moral forces in Italy.

In turning now to Belgium, if we ask ourselves, in Gladstone's words, "What is that country?" and search the answer, we shall discover that her distinction among the nations had even increased since the Great Commoner depicted it with such generous enthusiasm before the House of Commons in 1870.

The official enumeration of 1910 found 7,423,784 souls in Belgium, as many, in other words, as dwelt in all the vast expanse of Canada, living and prospering in 11,372 square miles of territory; and what is more astonishing, increasing by immigration as well as by the natural excess of births over deaths. Belgium is the most densely peopled country in Europe. With the same degree of density the British Isles would have had a population of 79,414,187, instead of 45,370,530, in 1911, and France, 135,185,556, instead of 39,601,509. Let the French cease to deplore their stationary population and imitate their neighbors!

1648




1740



1810



1815



1648



Spanish Provinces  
 Austrian Provinces  
 French Provinces  
 Dutch Provinces  
 Boundary of the Empire

1740



Dominions of the House of Austria  
 French Provinces  
 Kingdom of Great Britain

1810



Empire of Napoleon  
 Empire of Austria  
 Independent States

1815



Austrian Provinces  
 French Provinces  
 German Confederation

During the past three hundred years the provinces which constitute Belgium have been ruled over, in turn, by Spain, Austria, and France; after the downfall of Napoleon they were united with Holland to form the kingdom of the Netherlands. In 1830 the people revolted and an independent kingdom was formed.

The rate of increase during ten years in Belgium had been slightly higher than in Maryland, and a little lower than in Virginia. Although Belgium has the population of Pennsylvania crowded into an area only twice the size of Connecticut and Rhode Island, her national wealth before the war was equivalent to the aggregate valuation of all real and personal property in Illinois, and every fourth person had an account in the savings banks.

Doubt has been expressed as to the existence of a Belgian nation. For the country never formed an independent political unit until 1830; its very name was resurrected from antiquity. It contains to-day peoples of very distinct stock, the Flemish in the west, of Teutonic origin, and the Walloons in the east, of Latin-Celtic descent, the former somewhat more numerous than the latter. But no more effective agency than Belgium's present experience could be imagined for fusing and amalgamating the two peoples. The Belgians will come forth from the fiery furnace a spiritually welded and unified nation.

Nature and man had worked together to make Belgium at the same time a hive of industry, the home of art, and a very agreeable abiding-place. The combination within so small an area of a remarkable diversity of landscape and physical features makes Belgium a sort of miniature of Europe. It offers nearly all the varieties of rural exploitation, from vineyards and orchards to grazing and the production of the hardier grains. Agriculture and the breeding of domestic animals have been developed by patient, intelligent labor to a very high state of excellence. The accurate attention devoted by the public bureaus to the collection of agricultural statistics, especially those relating to the economic aspects of the distribution of land and to intensive cultivation, makes Belgium serve the purpose of an experimental laboratory for her neighbors in western Europe.

Abundant deposits of coal, accessibility to the sea, and convenient inland waterways favored the development of Belgian industry. The collieries produced 23,053,540 tons of coal in 1911, about as much as those of Ohio. The production of pig-iron amounted to 2,466,700 metric tons in 1913, having doubled in eleven years, while that of steel ingots rose to 2,515,040 tons in 1912. Belgium had the largest per capita production of iron and steel of any country. The aggregate horse-power of Belgian industrial plants doubled in the interval 1900-1911. Liège and Charleroi, in the midst of the coal deposits, are the centres of the metallurgical industry. There are ordnance foundries at Liège and Mechlin, and celebrated manufactures of small-arms at Liège.

The foreign commerce of Belgium was comparable with the entire external trade of South America. Antwerp vied with the world's leading ports in its tonnage of exports and imports. A network of canals connects the Scheldt and the Meuse with all the important industrial centres of the country, as well as with the Rhine and the navigable rivers of northern France. Belgium possesses the greatest railway mileage of any country in proportion to her area.

Every prospect was gladdened by the bounty of nature carefully nurtured, the evidences of useful industry, or suggestions of the amenities of life in a land of century-old civilization and refinement. Belgium was stored with the monuments and masterpieces of art and the ingenious products of human handicraft and skill. In no country would the operations of a hostile army create greater disturbance to the intricate web of human occupations or more cruel, relentless havoc.

By a heartless irony of destiny Belgium was the first victim in a conflict regarding Serbia—Belgium, whose unique concern had been to avoid entanglements and to

live at peace with all her neighbors. The tempest of war broke with terrifying suddenness and irresistible fury over the devoted country. Before the majority of the Belgians had fairly realized that there was an international crisis a veritable human inundation was submerging their fair provinces. Their gardens were trampled down by a ruthless soldiery; their highways were filled with homeless fugitives fleeing destruction; towns and villages were reduced to blackened, shapeless masses of ruins. The Belgians were made to expiate alleged violations of the rules of war by fire and sword. Their perversity in defending their homes incited savage acts of retaliation, the slaughter of civilians without discrimination by those whose very presence on Belgian soil was a transgression of international law, by those whom the rules adopted at The Hague in 1907, and subscribed to by Germany, if strictly interpreted, would deprive of the quality and rights of belligerents.

A situation is hardly apt to occur to which the assize of the nations would be more inclined to apply the following rules of The Hague Neutrality Conference of 1907:

Article I. Neutral territory is inviolable.

Article II. Belligerents are forbidden to send troops or convoys either of munitions of war or of provisions through the territory of a neutral state.

Article X. The act of a neutral state of *resisting any violation of its neutrality, even by force of arms, cannot be regarded as an act of hostility.*

An assertion that Germany by an unprovoked declaration of war, without any reasonable grievance or demand for reparation, could appropriate the legitimate dignity of a belligerent in her action in Belgium might appear to be mere useless quibbling.

A systematic policy of intimidation and terrorism appears to have been deliberately employed by the arrogant


invaders of Belgium, who were indignant that a people whom they had been accustomed to regard with contempt should presume to embarrass for a moment the mighty progress of their plan of campaign. In a short space of time a land smiling with peace and prosperity was converted into one of sorrow and desolation.

An effort was made in the first volume of this history to demonstrate that the international guarantee for the inviolability of Belgium was binding upon the German Empire as well as the North German Federation, chiefly because doubt as to its continuous validity has been raised by some prominent authorities on political science in this country. The German Empire itself had acknowledged quite unmistakably that it considered itself bound by these treaty obligations respecting Belgium. This statement will be substantiated in the course of the following considerations relative to the political background of Belgium's situation in the war.

There have been three kings of the Belgians. Leopold I, fourth son of the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld, was succeeded, upon his death in 1865, by his more famous son, Leopold II, who died in his turn on December 17, 1909, leaving the crown to his nephew, Albert Leopold Clement Marie Meinrod, who rules as Albert I.

King Albert was born in Brussels, April 8, 1875, and was married to the Duchess Elizabeth of Bavaria, October 2, 1900. He has won the unlimited affection of his subjects and the glowing admiration of the world by his integrity and chivalrous qualities, his unsparing industry, unflinching devotion to duty, and invincible courage in the midst of the most disheartening and appalling disasters. The figure of Albert I will stand aloft on its pedestal in the Pantheon of human reverence when the niches of most of the world's warriors will have been usurped by more genuine benefactors of the race.





The Palace of Justice, Brussels.

The present King of the Belgians gave proof of his zeal, as heir-apparent, by performing a tedious journey of inspection in the Congo, where the administration had fallen into disrepute. He left London, April 3, 1909, for Capetown, whence he proceeded to Katanga. From there he traversed the country on foot, through forests and jungles, a wearisome route of 1,500 miles to Boma on the lower Congo, and returned to Antwerp, August 16th.

The relations between the royal Belgian and imperial German families were apparently very amicable. The royal Belgian pair were entertained quite intimately at Potsdam in May, 1911, although, in consequence of the Kaiser's indisposition, the Crown Prince delivered the address of welcome at the state dinner, in which allusion was made to the felicity conveyed to the Belgian court by a German princess. The Kaiser, Kaiserin, and Princess Victoria Louisa returned this visit at the end of October of the same year, while the international exposition was in progress in Brussels. Never did the Kaiser abandon himself more completely to his naturally impulsive inclination to amiability. Among other recipients of his special cordiality was M. Max, Mayor of Brussels, whose name we shall encounter later. The Kaiser expressed himself with the utmost enthusiasm with regard to the beauty of the city and the marvellous progress of the country which he had not visited for thirty-two years; and it may be freely admitted that a return to Brussels after a much shorter absence and with a far humbler reception is likely to produce a very lively feeling of satisfaction.

The Kaiser was charmed with all he saw—too captivated, the Belgians have since then been led to suggest.

The Kaiser made still another occurrence an opportunity for a manifestation of cordiality towards Belgium. According to an ancient custom, the first entry into Liège

of a new sovereign after his coronation is attended with a public celebration. The Kaiser availed himself of this "Joyeuse Entrée" of the King and Queen of Belgium and the royal children into Liège, which took place in August, 1913, to send General von Emmich as a special envoy to bear to the royal family the solemn assurance of the friendship of the German ruler. At the festal banquet General von Emmich expressed in the warmest terms his admiration for the virtues of the Belgian people and the merits of their sovereign. But only a year later this messenger of peace and good-will forced his way into Liège at the head of an invading army bringing death and destruction.

The German minister at Brussels declared in 1905 that Belgian neutrality was a political dogma for his government.

The German Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, took refuge as early as 1911 behind the same pretext for avoiding a formal, public promise which Herr von Jagow employed on July 31, 1914, namely, that a public statement of Germany's intentions regarding the observance of Belgian neutrality would be equivalent to a partial disclosure of the German plan of campaign against France, as elaborated for an eventual conflict, by reducing the range of uncertainty regarding the direction of Germany's operations. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg assured the Belgian government privately that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality, but that a public statement in this sense would permit France to concentrate all her forces on her eastern frontier. One might suppose that a nation proud of its honor would shrink from exploiting the suspicion of a felonious intention for realizing a military advantage in time of peace.

Early in 1912, Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter, then German Foreign Secretary, while engaged in conversation with Baron Beyens, but lately arrived in Berlin as Belgian

minister, alluded in a tone of ingenuous surprise to the signs of apprehension in Belgium at the time of the international crisis in 1911. "There is no ground for the fear that Germany would violate your territory or that of your neighbors in the Netherlands," he declared.

At the time when the proposed enlargement of the German military establishment and the corresponding financial measures were undergoing discussion in the committee stage, on April 29, 1913, two Social Democrat members of the Reichstag raised the question of Germany's eventual attitude towards Belgian neutrality by alluding to the apprehension felt in Belgium that Germany would not respect her treaty obligations. Herr von Jagow replied to their inquiry concerning the German government's intentions: "Belgian neutrality is determined by international agreements and Germany is determined to respect these agreements." At the renewed insistence of the Socialist members, Herr von Heeringen, the Minister of War, declared: "Belgium plays no part in the causes which justify the proposed reorganization of the German military system. That proposal is based on the situation in the East. Germany will not lose sight of the fact that the neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by international treaty." (See *Appendix*.)

An important commentary upon the German assertion, based upon one of the documents discovered in the War Office in Brussels, that Great Britain intended to disembark troops in Belgium and forestall Germany in violating Belgian neutrality, is a letter addressed by Sir Edward Grey to the British minister in Brussels, dated April 7, 1913. A rumor in a sense similar to the present German conviction regarding Great Britain's intentions had arisen in Belgium and the British Foreign Minister repeated in this communication his assurances to the Belgian minister in consequence of it, as follows:

“I said that I was sure that this government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not believe that any British government would be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it. What we had to consider, and it was a somewhat embarrassing question, was what it would be desirable and necessary for us, as one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, to do, if Belgian neutrality was violated by any power. For us to be the first to violate it and to send troops into Belgium would be to give Germany, for instance, justification for sending troops into Belgium also. What we desired in the case of Belgium, as in that of other neutral countries, was that their neutrality should be respected, and, as long as it was not violated by any other power, we would certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory.”

A convincing array of evidence forces us to the conclusion that the German plan of campaign on the west, with the movement across Belgium as the characteristic feature in consequence of the invulnerable line of barrier fortresses in eastern France, had been prepared in every detail long before the war. And if this is true, we can scarcely escape the conviction that the frequent reiteration of Germany's correct and cordial attitude towards Belgium was really part of a deliberate plan of deception. It may extenuate the complicity of German officials and diplomatic representatives to suppose that they had not been fully initiated into the designs of the German General Staff, or that they believed that the scheme of crossing Belgium was merely an optional plan, held in reserve for the event of an actual violation of the Belgian frontier on the part of France.

Leopold II had not been blind to the danger which threatened Belgian independence from the east, and never allowed an occasion to escape for urging the necessity of strengthening Belgium's military capacity for resistance.

To the fortress of Antwerp, commonly regarded by Belgians as their national redoubt, Liège and Namur were added to hold the keys of the valley of the Meuse, the natural highway for armies traversing Belgium in either direction. The steel cupolas of the two latter, designed by the celebrated Belgian military engineer, M. Brialmont, were regarded for a time as the zenith of development in the art of fortification. In 1906 the sum of 63,000,000 francs (\$12,159,000) was voted for remodelling and expanding the defenses of Antwerp, and fifteen new forts were constructed forming an outer ring about the city. Until 1909 the Belgian army, numbering about 100,000 men, was recruited by volunteer enlistments supplemented by conscription, with substitution permitted for the benefit of those who were drafted. This antiquated system was inadequate as well as undemocratic; but it required a strenuous effort to induce the Belgians to submit to the unaccustomed inconveniences of universal compulsory military service. The middle classes in manufacturing communities, where the division of the population into industrial classes is accentuated, might naturally regard with aversion the promiscuous life and associations of the barracks. The proposal for a radical reform in the basis for military service involved a long parliamentary struggle. The last document signed by Leopold II on his deathbed was an act requiring the performance of military service by one son in each family; and finally, in 1913, a bill was passed establishing the principle of universal compulsory service, although in practice only about one-half of the annual contingent was to be called up for active service. The period of service with the colors was fixed at fifteen months for the infantry, and the aggregate effective forces available in time of peace were estimated at 56,080 for 1914-1915. At the close of 1913 the army comprised six

divisions posted at Antwerp, Liège, Namur, Ghent, Mons, and Brussels. The effective forces on a peace-footing at that time amounted to 6,500 each for four divisions, and somewhat more than 8,000 for the other two. These numbers would be raised to 25,000 and 32,000 respectively in time of war.

When the development of the reserve force should have attained its normal limit through the gradual diffusion of military training, the available forces on a war-footing would have numbered about 340,000. At the outbreak of the war in 1914 they actually amounted to about 226,000 soldiers and 4,500 officers.

In view of the strikingly suspicious indications, it is difficult to understand how the foreign offices of the western powers could have entertained any illusions as to the designs of Germany. The strategic railways in Germany directed towards the Belgian frontier, the reluctance of the Chancellor to make a public statement of the German attitude in 1911, his non-committal expression on the same subject in the midnight interview with the British ambassador in Berlin on July 29, 1914, the evasive remarks of Herr von Jagow relative to the British inquiry on July 31st, and his reiteration of the pretext that a statement by the German government would disclose a certain part of the German plan of operations, and, above all, the very obtrusive fact that Germany did not accept the formal invitation of Great Britain to agree specifically to abstain from molesting Belgium—these and many lesser signs would seem to have left small room for doubt that the German military authorities had absolutely resolved to stake their chances of winning a brilliant campaign on an immediate flanking movement across Belgian territory.

Herr von Jagow, solicitous, as it would seem, about an available pretext for war, intimated in his conversation

with the British ambassador on July 31st that hostile acts had already been committed by Belgium, that a consignment of grain, for instance, for a German destination had been placed under an embargo. The Belgian authorities have shown that the actual circumstances of the incident which served as basis for this accusation were the following. A Belgian royal decree of July 30th prohibited provisionally the exportation of certain products, notably cereals. On the 31st the German minister at Brussels made an official inquiry regarding the detention by the Antwerp customs of cargoes of grain, which had arrived there for transshipment to Germany, and were not properly included in the scope of the royal decree, because they had not originated in Belgium. In consequence, instructions were forwarded to the customs authorities on August 1st giving full satisfaction to the German representations.

The Belgian government must have been aware from the first that the international crisis involved an element of possible peril for their own position. On July 29th they decided to place the army on a strengthened peace footing, which signifies calling to the colors three classes of the reserves. The Secretary General of the Belgian Foreign Office, Baron van der Elst, in explaining the nature of this military precaution, intended only to guarantee the fulfilment of Belgium's international obligations, to Herr von Below-Saleske, the German Minister, July 31st, asked the latter whether he had been informed of the conversation which he (Baron van der Elst) had had with the preceding German minister, which led to the Chancellor's private assurance concerning Belgian neutrality. Herr von Below-Saleske replied that he knew of this conversation and that he was certain that the sentiments expressed at that time had not been changed.


In informing the Belgian government on the same day of the note of inquiry addressed by Sir Edward Grey to the French and German governments respectively on the subject of the preservation of Belgian neutrality, the British Minister, Sir Francis Villiers, expressed the expectation of the British Foreign Secretary that Belgium was resolved to do her utmost to maintain her neutrality and that she desired and expected that the other powers would respect and maintain it. M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, assured Sir Francis Villiers in reply that the powers guaranteeing Belgian independence could rest assured that Belgium would neglect no effort to maintain her neutrality and that her military forces, in consequence of the recent reorganization, were sufficient to enable her to defend herself energetically in the event of the violation of her territory. The French government made a formal declaration to the Belgian government on August 1st of their intention of respecting the neutrality of Belgium.

General mobilization was ordered in Belgium on the same day, and the Belgian diplomatic representatives at the capitals of the signatory powers of the Quintuple Treaty, as well as at Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg, were instructed to read to the respective foreign ministers a communication stating that Belgium would strive unflinchingly to fulfil the duties imposed on her by the treaty of April 19, 1839, and that the army had been mobilized and the forts of Antwerp and of the Meuse put into a state of defense so as to enable Belgium to discharge her international obligations.


An official dispatch from Luxemburg, August 2d, informed the Belgian government, as one of the powers which signed the treaty establishing its neutrality, that early in the morning German troops had entered the territory of the grand-duchy, crossing the Moselle by the



Disappearing armored gun turret sunk and raised for firing.



Pentagonal Brialmont fort.



Triangular Brialmont fort or fortin.

The ring fortresses of Liège and Namur were made up of combinations of these forts and fortins with slight variations; the former place was protected by six forts and six fortins, and the latter by four forts and five fortins. Steel cupolas surrounded by concrete contained the guns; generally two 6-inch, four 4.7-inch, two 8-inch mortars, and four quick firers for the forts; two 6-inch, two 4.7-inch, one 8-inch mortar, and three quick firers for the fortins. Including separately emplaced guns, Liège had 400 and Namur 350 pieces.



bridges at Wasserbillig and Remich, and had proceeded in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital, while trains full of troops and ammunition were passing along the railway from Wasserbillig to the same point. These incidents were in violation of the perpetual neutrality of the Grand-duchy of Luxemburg which rested on a treaty signed at London, May 11, 1867, by Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Russia. The second article of this treaty reads as follows:

“The Grand-duchy of Luxemburg, within the limits determined by the Act annexed to the Treaties of April 19, 1839, under the guarantee of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, shall henceforth form a perpetually neutral State.

“It shall be bound to observe the same neutrality towards all other States.

“The high contracting parties engage to respect the principle of neutrality stipulated by the present Act.

That principle is and remains under the sanction of the collective guarantee of the powers (which are) signatory parties to the present treaties, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a neutral state.”

The government of Luxemburg did not fail to address an energetic protest against these aggressive actions to the German diplomatic representative at Luxemburg, and to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs in Berlin. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg sent the ostensibly reassuring communication that Germany contemplated no hostile action against the grand-duchy [very satisfactory tidings—the two friendly and neighboring powers were to be spared the carnage and bitterness of a warlike contest!], and the military measures were only precautionary, intended to protect from a French attack the railways of Luxemburg which are under German management. The

grand-ducal army, though kept in a constant state of mobilization at its war (as well as peace) strength of 155 men, quite sensibly abstained from intervention to prevent the execution of this very reasonable measure!

The Grand-duchy of Luxemburg, it may be explained parenthetically, has an area of 999 square miles, and contained a population of 259,891 souls in 1910. Its importance, of course, lies chiefly in its deposits of iron-ore.

Likewise, on the morning of this same day, August 2d, Sir Francis Villiers informed M. Davignon that Great Britain had received no reply from Berlin to the communication sent in duplicate, July 31st, to the German and French governments in regard to Belgian neutrality. M. Davignon brought to Herr von Below-Saleske's notice the French minister's intention of publishing the formal statement, as conveyed the day before by the French government to the Belgian, confirming the former's intention of respecting the neutrality of Belgium. Herr von Below-Saleske replied that up to the present he had not been instructed to make any official communication, but that the Belgian government knew his personal opinion as to the feelings of security which they had the right to entertain towards their eastern neighbors. M. Davignon added that while all that they knew of Germany's intentions, as indicated in many previous conversations, did not allow them to doubt Germany's attitude of perfect correctness towards Belgium, yet they would attach the greatest importance to the possession of a formal declaration, which the Belgian people would hear of with joy and gratitude.

The formal declaration of Germany's intentions was not long in making its appearance. It was precipitated into peaceful Brussels like an unexpected projectile of terrible explosive force launched from an invisible battery at long range.

Herr von Below-Saleske called at the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at seven o'clock in the evening of the same day (August 2d) and handed to M. Davignon the following note, labelled "very confidential," requiring a reply within the period of twelve hours:

"Reliable information has been received by the German government to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory against Germany.

"The German government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite of the utmost good-will, will be unable, without assistance, to repel so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success to afford an adequate guarantee against danger to Germany. It is essential for the self-defense of Germany that she should anticipate any such hostile attack. The German government would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's opponents force Germany for her own protection to enter Belgian territory.

"In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, the German government makes the following declaration:

"1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the German government binds itself, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian kingdom in full.

"2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace.

"3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in coöperation with the Belgian authorities, to

purchase all necessaries for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity for any damage that may have been caused by German troops.

“4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by resistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

“In this event, Germany can undertake no obligations towards Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two states must be left to the decision of arms.

“The German government, however, entertains the distinct hope that this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian government will know how to take the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the friendly ties which bind the two neighboring states will grow stronger and more enduring.”

This German ultimatum demanding free passage across Belgian territory for German armies, ostensibly in consequence of an imminent invasion of Germany by French forces traversing the same route, was presented nearly twenty-four hours before Germany declared war against France. The note requires no commentary. Hardly an effort had been made to palliate its brutal significance. It left no loophole for discussion. Its abrupt appearance directly after Herr von Below-Saleske's unctuous assurances and the scanty period left for deliberation, and that confined to the night-time, contributed a grim, appalling setting for the tragic situation. With unconscious irony the German authorities, who were destined so soon with such remorseless severity to devastate the towns of Belgium,

menaced the Belgians with indignant resentment should they themselves presume to destroy their own belongings, such as bridges, roads and tunnels.

The Belgian Cabinet was hastily summoned to confer upon the nation's policy and sanction the text of a response to Germany's demands. And throughout most of the ensuing night the manly young king, whose open, genial countenance is so well-known, surrounded by his responsible ministers, wrestled with the supreme problem of duty and the nation's destiny. In spite of the brave words of dispatches and manifestoes, they must have known too well the awful weight and terrible efficiency of the German military machine to allow themselves the consolation of any seductive illusions as to the consequences in case the fateful issue were to be decided by a serious military contest. All that Belgium had accomplished in generations of peaceful, laborious development was at stake. The pleasant, tranquil existence in ancient towns with their tall-gabled houses and tidy, brick-paved streets, in smiling villages, in white-washed cottages by shady lanes, by willow-margined canals with slowly-moving barges, and in trim fields where the crops cherished with fond attention were just ripening, where all was redolent of the languid charm of Flemish life and Flemish cheer; the hallowed monuments of the first rise of urban consciousness and independence in western Europe; the architectural treasures of the centuries; the varied fascination of life in Brussels; the commerce of the world floating on the placid bosom of the Scheldt; the enviable prosperity of a varied industry; a land of opulence in all its most engaging forms—the destiny of all these things, and above all, a nation's honor and reputation were placed in these men's hands, and were involved in the decisions which must be reached within the arbitrary limit of twelve short hours.

There is no situation from which frail human nature so instinctively, so persistently shrinks as one which requires an immediate, unconditional, final decision in matters of profoundest, vital import. How impulsively the imagination applies itself to the task of devising specious pretexts for delay; and to what a cold, benumbing, cringing sense the mind gives way, if it finds itself caught as in a *cul-de-sac*, with no outlet for evasion, betrayed, committed to the dreaded necessity of an immediate, definite choice of conduct. Intensify many times the stern, unrelenting quality of such exigencies in private life, and we vaguely grasp an impression of such crises in the history of nations which test the character of political leadership and distinguish the statesman from the merely laborious bureaucrat. The combination of conscientiousness and responsibility in statesmen through times like these requires a subtle, self-possessed intellect, an adamant will, and nerves as sensitive and true as well-tempered steel.

The picture of this tragic conference calls to mind as counterpart the extraordinary council at Potsdam.

When we contemplate such scenes as these all the conflict of the warring forces resolves itself into a human drama in which the attention is riveted upon the action of a few individuals. History becomes for the time intensely personal. For a moment all the perplexing accessories recede from view and the chief characters stand out against a neutral background in the simple majesty of epic heroism.

Responsibilities involving bigger consequences in men and means this war has produced, but none intenser or more inexorable than that which faced the leaders of the Belgian people, and with which they resolutely grappled through the painful hours of that fateful Sunday night. At first, perhaps, the choice appeared to be simply between ignominy and suicide; between the preservation of Belgium's

material prosperity by the renunciation of a purely impalpable possession, and the possible sacrifice of all worldly goods for a sterile, heroic ideal. But deliberation doubtless confirmed the austere demands of duty. For what trustworthy guarantee of sincerity could be expected from a government which persisted in violating its solemn obligation? Might not a vital necessity be again advanced to justify the military retention of Belgian strongholds? Might not military occupation lead by an unavoidable series of intermediary stages to inclusion in the Imperial Zollverein, and then approximation to the status of Bavaria or Saxony, with summary annexation to Prussia as punishment for obstinacy? The initial loss of honor would involve almost inevitably the loss of independence and of national identity.

The king and council listened to the possibilities of defense as explained by the military authorities. Then the draft of the heroic reply to the German ultimatum, which had been prepared by the Foreign Ministry, was discussed, retouched, and finally adopted. And in the morning, before the expiration of the allotted time, the following intrepid response was forwarded to the German minister:

“The German Government stated in its note of the 2d of August, 1914, that according to reliable information French forces intended to march on the Meuse *via* Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of the best intentions, would not be in a position to repulse, without assistance, an advance of French troops.

“The German Government, therefore, considered itself compelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian territory. In these circumstances, Germany proposed to the Belgian Government to adopt a friendly attitude towards her, and undertook, on the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions

to their full extent. The note added that if Belgium put difficulties in the way of the advance of German troops, Germany would be compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two states to the decision of arms.

“This note has made a deep and painful impression upon the Belgian Government.

“The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contradiction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1st, in the name of the French Government.

“Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her international obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader.

“The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, vouch for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and notably of the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia.

“Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations; she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality; and she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her neutrality.

“The attack upon her independence with which the German Government threatens her would constitute a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law.

“The Belgian Government by accepting the proposals submitted to it would sacrifice the honor of the nation and betray its duty towards Europe.

“Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilization of the world, it refuses to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality.





William Ewart Gladstone.



Bernhard Dernburg.

“If this hope is disappointed, the Belgian Government is firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in its power, every attack upon its rights.”

This was a somewhat less drastic, but certainly no less heroic, manner of response than that of the Spartans to the heralds of the Great King who came demanding earth and water in sign of submission to the Persian yoke, and were thrown into a pit and told to find the symbols there.

At ten o'clock on the morning of the 3d, as no act of war had been committed by Germany, the Belgian Cabinet decided that it was not necessary to make an immediate appeal to the guaranteeing powers. About noon the French minister assured M. Davignon that the French government would immediately respond to an appeal from Belgium; and on the same day the French military attaché communicated the specific offer of five French army corps to assist the Belgian army in the defense of the country. But M. Davignon replied that the Belgian government would decide later what it ought to do.

No communication or measure of the Belgian government at the time of the crisis can be cited as evidence that Belgium had in any way sacrificed her liberty of action, or bound herself by any agreement or understanding incompatible with strict neutrality. She proclaimed her willingness to make any sacrifice to defend her neutrality, and her conduct offered no indication to prove that she was not disposed to defend it against an aggressive action by any power whatsoever.

The German minister made the following communication to M. Davignon at six o'clock on the morning of August 4th:

“In accordance with my instructions, I have the honor to inform your Excellency that in consequence of the

refusal of the Belgian Government to entertain the well-intentioned proposals made to it by the German Government, the latter to its deep regret, finds itself compelled to take—if necessary by force of arms—those measures of defense already designated as indispensable, in view of the menace of France.”

This message was, in effect, the German declaration of war, and Herr von Below-Saleske received his passports the same day and entrusted the German legation to the care of his colleague of the United States. The course of the deliberations of a cabinet meeting, summoned to confer upon the necessary measures to be taken in the emergency, was determined by the tidings that German forces had already crossed the Belgian frontier at Gemmenich. In consequence, the following note was transmitted to the British, French, and Russian ministers at Brussels the same evening:

“The Belgian Government regrets to announce to your Excellency that this morning the armed forces of Germany entered Belgian territory in violation of treaty engagements.

“The Royal Government is firmly resolved to resist by all the means in its power.

“Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to coöperate as guaranteeing powers in the defense of her territory.

“There should be concerted and joint action, to oppose the forcible measures taken by Germany against Belgium, and, at the same time, to guarantee the future maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium.

“Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake the defense of her fortified places.”

Far from associating herself with the enemies of Germany in any unjustifiable act of hostility, Belgium waited

more than twelve hours after her territory had been actually invaded by the German armies before appealing to the guarantors of her neutrality for assistance.

In the meantime the British minister in Brussels presented the following communication to the Belgian Foreign Office:

“I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government that if Germany brings pressure to bear upon Belgium with the object of forcing her to abandon her attitude of neutrality, His Britannic Majesty’s Government expects Belgium to resist with all the means at her disposal.

“In that event, His Britannic Majesty’s Government is prepared to join Russia and France, should Belgium so desire, in tendering at once joint assistance to the Belgian Government with a view to resisting any forcible measures adopted by Germany against Belgium, and also offering a guarantee for the maintenance of the future independence and integrity of Belgium.”

From this message also it will appear how scrupulously the proprieties of Belgium’s peculiar international situation were respected by Great Britain.

The Belgian Parliament had been hastily summoned on the 4th for passing the necessary acts of legislation required by the emergency and impending war, and King Albert addressed the Chambers in solemn session as follows:

“Never since 1830 has a graver hour sounded for Belgium. The force of our right and the necessity for Europe of our autonomous existence make us still hope that the events which we fear will not take place; but if it is necessary to resist the invasion of our soil, duty will find us armed and decided upon the greatest sacrifices!

“From this moment our youth will have risen to defend our fatherland against the danger. A single duty is imposed on our will: a determined resistance, courage, and unity.

“Our enthusiasm is shown by our irreproachable mobilization and by the multitude of volunteers.

“The moment for action is here. I have called you together to allow the Chambers to associate themselves in the enthusiasm of the country. You will find a way to pass all these measures at once. You are all decided to preserve intact the sacred patrimony of our ancestors. No one will fail in his duty.

“The army is equal to its task. The government and myself have full confidence. The government understands its responsibilities and will maintain them till the end to safeguard the supreme good of the country. If the stranger violates our territory, he will find all Belgians gathered round their sovereign, who will never betray his constitutional oath.

“I have faith in our destinies. A country which defends itself imposes respect on all and does not perish. God will be with us.”

On August 5th the three governments to which the appeal of Belgium had been conveyed informed the Belgian government through their ministers in Brussels that they were prepared to respond to the appeal and coöperate in the defense of the country.

Likewise on the 5th, the Belgian Foreign Minister instructed the Belgian representatives in all lands to transmit the following formal communication to the foreign ministers of the governments to which they were individually accredited:

“By the treaty of April 19, 1839, Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria, and Russia declared themselves guarantors of the treaty concluded on the same day between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. The treaty reads: ‘Belgium shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State.’

Belgium has fulfilled all her international obligations; she has accomplished her duty in a spirit of loyal impartiality; she has neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality and to cause that neutrality to be respected.

“In these circumstances the Belgian Government has learnt with deep pain that the armed forces of Germany, a Power guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, have entered Belgian territory in violation of the obligation undertaken by treaty.

“It is our duty to protest with indignation against an outrage against international law provoked by no act of ours.

“The Royal Government is firmly determined to repel by all the means in its power the attack thus made upon its neutrality, and it recalls the fact that, in virtue of article 10 of The Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in the case of war by land, if a neutral Power repels, even by force, attacks on her neutrality, such action cannot be considered as a hostile act.”

Some of the German apologists have propagated with apparently unaffected remissness a misapprehension tending to obscure the true basis for judging Germany's attitude with respect to Belgium. For example, Dr. Dernburg cited the words of Mr. Gladstone denying that “the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee was binding on every party, irrespective of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises,” as a possible argument to justify Germany in breaking the treaty and violating Belgian neutrality, because at the time it was contrary to the interest of Germany to maintain the agreement. Such an interpretation is a distortion of Mr. Gladstone's attitude as expressed in the speech from which the above words were extracted. Mr. Gladstone referred only to the duty of each

of the contracting parties to intervene in active defense of Belgian neutrality against an aggressive action by any other power, not to the more fundamental obligation placed upon the signatory powers of abstaining themselves from the violation of Belgian neutrality. In Mr. Gladstone's opinion, conditions might possibly excuse one of the signatory powers from taking active measures in defending Belgian neutrality against violation, but it was far from his thoughts to suppose that circumstances could ever justify one of these powers in the actual perpetration of such a deed of iniquity. The authors of the illogical view which we are considering make no distinction between the failure to prevent, and the actual commission of, the transgression covered by the international agreement. It is a glaring injustice against Mr. Gladstone to suppose that he could have suggested that any conceivable situation would ever justify Great Britain in violating Belgian neutrality. It is hardly necessary to add that these apologists ignore the fact that, entirely apart from the treaty of 1839, Belgium, like any other state which sees fit to stand aside during a contest between its neighbors, has the right by international law and the most elementary, axiomatic principles of justice to possess her territory undisturbed and inviolate.

The assertion has been made and is perhaps correct, that Great Britain violated the rights of neutrality with the same contemptuous arrogance in bombarding Copenhagen in 1807, and that in the present situation she would not have drawn the sword if France had been the transgressor. But what do these statements prove? They remind us primarily that many German apologists are more eager to besmirch the reputation of Great Britain than to establish the justice of Germany's policy in Belgium. But history is not so much concerned about weighing the relative respectability of the actors whom she represents on the

stage of human affairs, as in investigating the causes and motives, and the results of their conduct. Historians whose field is quite another period will enlighten us with regard to the moral aspect of the bombardment of Copenhagen, as of the annexation of Silesia or dismemberment of Poland. Our present concern is limited to the violation by Germany of the neutrality of Belgium in contravention of a solemn treaty and of international law, which gave any or all of the other guaranteeing powers the right, and at the same time imposed the duty, of intervening. The fact that considerations of self-interest inspired Great Britain with greater alacrity in assuming the defense of Belgian neutrality is urged as a justification or palliation of Germany's offense. As though Germany, after overrunning and ravaging Belgium in open defiance of justice, as her own chief officials acknowledged, should have the right to insist that the powers which entered the lists in vindication of the outraged country ought to be as spotless and as free from selfish motives as the searcher for the Holy Grail!


It cannot be denied that until as late as August 2d the British government did not fully determine to regard the possible violation of Belgian neutrality as a cause for war; and this circumstance has been utilized for establishing the unrighteousness inherent in Great Britain's intervention in the war. But surely Great Britain did not waive her eventual right to intervene by her attitude of uncertainty before the occasion for action had arisen. No right or duty based on a formal agreement is annulled merely by the indecision of one of the parties about the expediency of acting on the basis of the right or duty, before the stipulated period for such action has expired or the compact has been formally repudiated.

As we have already observed (Volume I, page 267), the German government, expressing itself in the words of

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg and Herr von Jagow, explained the invasion of Belgium, at the time, solely as a military necessity. Even the intimation that Belgium had committed acts of hostility, advanced tentatively by Herr von Jagow on July 31st, had been abandoned on August 4th, apparently because of its futility. The German declaration of war against France, August 3d, mentioned the flight of French aviators across Belgian territory. But nobody seems to have taken this allegation seriously, or to have assumed that it justified German intervention in Belgium.

At a later time, not content with this single basis of defense, the military necessity, the German authorities charged Belgium with many violations of neutrality, and the Chancellor declared that "there were already (on August 4, 1914) many indications of the guilt of the Belgian government." He added very judiciously that he had "no documentary evidence" at the time, the reason, doubtless, why no formal protest was made to the Belgian government or its diplomatic representative. We have already disposed of the most conspicuous example of this posthumous evidence, the military "conversations." The other charges would scarcely deserve our attention, except for their extensive circulation in this country.

Thus it has been alleged that Belgian fortifications were all directed against Germany and that this fact is proof of hostile intentions. As we have already noticed, there were three important fortresses in Belgium: Antwerp, Liège, and Namur. A summary method of disproving the above-cited charge would consist in pointing out that Antwerp is situated near the northern, or Dutch, frontier, Liège near the eastern, or German, frontier, and Namur near the southern, or French, frontier. But a less superficial view would regard the location of these fortresses as determined,



Exchanging the crêpe drapery for flags and flowers on the Strassburg monument, which stands on the Place de la Concorde, Paris, on August 11, 1914.



The Prime Minister of Belgium speaking from the balcony of the Parliament House on the day on which Germany declared war.



not by their proximity to frontiers, but by the physical features of the country.

Antwerp is the most prominent fortress simply because it is the all-important port. Liége and Namur are the keys to the valley of the Meuse, which is the natural route for armies endeavoring to traverse Belgium in either direction, the Germans towards France, or the French towards Germany. Liége and Namur command opposite ends of the central section where this route traverses a natural defile, the former nearer Germany, the latter nearer France.

It has been alleged that there were French officers on Belgian soil previous to the invasion of Belgium by Germany. The conventional usages of historical and judicial inquiry permit us to demand more specific evidence than this bare statement without seeming to impugn the veracity of those who have advanced it. If these officers were captured in Belgian fortresses they must have been taken to some German detention camp, where their identity and the exact circumstances could be ascertained. But what judicial significance would their presence in Belgium convey, in any case? German officers have been continuously present in Turkey since 1883 without involving the Turkish government in questions of violated neutrality. It is obvious that the presence of French officers in Belgium while France and Germany were still at peace could not constitute a valid excuse for Germany's hostile action. The neutrality of Belgium could in any case be impaired only by the presence of the French officers during the period intervening between the announcement in Brussels of the existence of a state of war between Germany and France and the invasion of Belgium by Germany. For manifestly, if the invasion of Belgium is to be justified by Belgium's violation of her own neutrality, such violation

would necessarily consist in an action or a situation preceding the invasion. The German declaration of war against France was presented at 6.45 p.m. on August 3d. The German invasion of Belgium commenced during the night of August 3-4, according to some statements as early as midnight. Can anybody reasonably maintain that during these few intervening hours the Belgian government could have received official information of the existence of a state of war between Germany and France and taken the necessary steps to remove any French officers who might happen to be sojourning on Belgian soil! Besides, to make the German allegation a quite consistent cause of war, it would be requisite not only that Belgium failed within these few intervening hours to expel the French officers, after learning of the declaration of war, but that tidings of this negligence should have been brought to the German government, so that in cognizance of it they ordered their forces to commence the invasion of Belgium.

We have thus far been unable to discover any evidence to justify the violation of Belgium's neutrality on the basis of international law or respectable standards of conduct. But let us go further and ask ourselves whether the German professions regarding Belgium will bear the test of consistency; whether they are coherent.

The German government declared that it possessed evidence which left no doubt that France intended to march through Belgium to attack Germany in the lower Rhine territory, presumably a vital spot, so that it was a matter of life and death for Germany to forestall her enemy by marching herself into Belgian territory, this being, in the circumstances, really a defensive measure. The Germans assert, moreover, that they offered the means whereby Belgium could have avoided all the misery that has befallen her by proposing friendly neutrality on

condition of a free passage for their forces through Belgian territory.

If the French preparations for a movement across Belgium to attack the lower Rhine territory of Germany had been on the point of realization, making it a question of life or death for the Germans to anticipate them by moving across Belgium themselves, the German army would have directly encountered the French forces on Belgian soil, and unhappy Belgium would have furnished the battlefields. Far from guaranteeing Belgium against the ravages of war, the German plan would, in this case, have brought destruction upon the devoted country from both sides. But if the French army was not ready to penetrate Belgium at once, the German penetration of Belgium is shorn altogether of its alleged justification as a vital necessity.

The Germans are confronted, therefore, by this fatal alternative: either their march into Belgium would have brought inevitable ruin upon the country, or else it loses the only alleged defense worthy of consideration, the argument of necessity. It follows, therefore, that the German professions, as mentioned above, are neither logical nor consistent.

As for the argument of necessity, the fact that nearly three weeks elapsed, after the declaration of hostilities, before the French were prepared to offer any serious resistance on their own northern frontier is a convincing refutation of the charge that they were prepared to launch an attack across Belgium.

We may briefly recapitulate some of the more salient aspects of the Belgian situation.

By an international agreement, sanctioned and guaranteed by the Great Powers in the most formal manner, Belgium was excluded from the arena of international


contention; her soil was declared inviolable; she was dedicated to perpetual neutrality and peace. This covenant was still binding on the signatory powers in 1914. None of the fundamental conditions had changed since the ratification of the compact, except that the source of danger to Belgium had shifted from her southern to her eastern neighbor. Trusting in the validity of this solemn compact, France left her northern frontier almost undefended, while Germany, who in general relies upon prompt offensive strategy in place of forts, had likewise neglected to fortify her Belgian frontier. The strategic advantage of traversing Belgium in spite of the agreement was doubly attractive to both Germany and France because their common stretch of frontier is difficult to cross.

The French government declared that France would abide by her agreement; Germany yielded to temptation and violated her obligation.

The Germans claim that their invasion of Belgium was justified by the intrigues of the Belgians, evidence for which they discovered several weeks after their invasion began. The posteriority of the discovery destroys its efficacy as proof of the justice of Germany's intentions, while the evidence itself is trivial and unconvincing.

The German government claimed that the French intended to steal the advantage of a march through Belgium; but this assertion has never been substantiated. Germans have endeavored to extenuate their own transgression by declaring that Great Britain also broke her obligation, in spirit if not in fact. They assert that she would not have been disposed to fulfil her stipulation under the treaty by intervening to protect Belgian neutrality in all circumstances. They forget that there is an essential distinction between a direct violation of Belgian neutrality and a failure to defend that neutrality if assailed by another power. No





Forts on the Franco-German frontier. The French since 1871 have expended large sums in carrying out the plans of their engineers to protect their frontier adjoining that of Germany by the fortresses of Verdun, Toul, Epinal, and Belfort; while the Belgian border, because of their reliance on the observance of Belgium's neutrality, was protected by the less powerful fortresses of Maubeuge and Lille. Therefore, the Germans, to reach Paris had the alternative of battering against these strong fortifications or of going around either end and violating the territory of a neutral country. On the south was Switzerland, a mountainous country easily defended; on the north, Luxemburg and Belgium, with the roads to France barred only by the forts at Liège and Namur. Germany, not trusting that the French would respect the neutrality of Belgium, protected her entire frontier.

British sin of omission, much less a hypothetical one, can ever serve as justification for a German sin of commission.

Herr von Jagow gave his explanation of the motive for Germany's conduct briefly, distinctly, and with commendable frankness. His words bear the stamp of sincerity. The invasion of Belgium is a strategic necessity for Germany. "In order that she may not be crushed, she must herself crush France and then turn against Russia." No mention at all is made of an impending violation of Belgian neutrality by France.

We shall dismiss for the present a discussion of the soundness of the oft-repeated protestation that Germany was fighting for her life against fearful odds, and that therefore her methods should be treated in a spirit of forbearance. We may assume that Herr von Jagow was convinced that this was the true situation and many of the civilian chiefs thought likewise. Human imagination has been so incorrigibly enthralled by the mere physical bigness of Russia! We shall proceed to analyze Germany's conduct on the basis of her own Foreign Secretary's conception of the situation.

Germany must commit a transgression in order to save herself from extreme peril. The present generation is amenable to arguments based upon utility. Germany is a large nation, while Belgium is a small one. There are doubtless many persons in whose judgment a vital advantage for a vast number of people will outweigh an injustice inflicted upon a very much smaller body of people. But there is another factor of fundamental importance. The scope of Germany's action involves not merely the honor and happiness of a small unoffending neighbor. It is claimed that the salvation of Germany requires the destruction of France. One nation or the other must be crushed. The position of Belgium is crucial. If Belgium opens a

way for the German forces to the vulnerable part of the French frontier, France will be beaten down and Germany saved. But if Belgium maintains her international obligation in the face of Germany, France will be spared and Germany will be overwhelmed, because Germany is being assailed on two sides at once. Germany demands that Belgium become the accomplice of her design, threatening her in case of refusal with all that she might inflict upon her. Alleging that Belgian neutrality was in danger of violation by her opponent, Germany destroyed it herself.

German might trampled down the barriers of right to grasp the great strategic prize, and Germany expects to be exonerated, because she acted as she did so that France, and not she herself, should be the nation committed to destruction. Is the world to determine, by a careful scrutiny of the relative merits of the civilization of these two countries, which is more worthy to survive, and judge Germany's conduct accordingly? Such a comparison has been frequently undertaken, but will lead to no universally acceptable conclusions. The German and French nations are alike needed in the great family of the nations. The contributions of each are indispensable. But the superiority of neither is so incontestable that in its assertion of an exclusive opportunity of living and flourishing the world will condone the ruin and devastation of a neutral state and the violation of international law and the most solemn engagements and assurances.

In concluding for the present our consideration of Belgium, it will be interesting to notice the opinion of Count Andrassy, an unusually broad-minded observer, and one who, as a Hungarian statesman, would not naturally be swayed by a sentimental bias for the cause of the Allies. He declares:

“The attitude of Germany with regard to Belgium is undeniably a violation of international law; the German government itself admitted it. The fate of Belgium is certainly the saddest page of contemporary history. But the indignation of the English government is not impartial; for one can truly say that there is not a state in the world which has not committed such a violation of international law in the course of its history.”

At least nine out of every ten individuals who might be asked what is the most important inspiring force in militant France would reply without hesitation,—Alsace-Lorraine.

A perplexing, baffling problem is involved, if we try to ascertain the practical importance as a motive in international policy of the French yearning to obtain amends for the humiliation and loss of territory inflicted upon the nation in 1870-1871, the spirit of “revanche.” The Germans seem to be generally convinced that precisely this aspiration, not merely the desire for security against aggression, actuated the French government in associating itself with Russia in the Dual Alliance, and with Great Britain in the *Entente Cordiale*. Those who entertain this view naturally suppose that the real purpose of the *Triple Entente* was offensive, and that the present world-struggle is its work. It follows, logically, that they should regard the French spirit of “revanche” as the elementary cause of the war, about which the other forces successively grouped themselves. We have ascribed the French craving for retaliation to a less prominent position, without denying that it ranks as a very important secondary cause. For an unbiased examination of available indications leads to the conjecture that France would never have provoked a conflict in any conceivable combination of circumstances merely to recover Alsace and Lorraine. Their loss was most acutely felt as a sentimental grief; and the custom

is well-known of annually draping with mourning wreaths and garlands the symbolic statue of Strassburg which sits in the stately company of her seven French sister cities in dignified array about the imposing Place de la Concorde in Paris. But France has never committed any action which revealed an unmistakably aggressive attitude with respect to the lost provinces. On the other hand, a settlement of the question in a manner acceptable to France would have effected a reconciliation between France and Germany, and might have prevented the present conflict; and such a settlement might possibly have been accomplished by a reasonable compromise.


We have noted the difficulty of determining the true national identity of the people of the Reichsland. The statement was made that the portion of Lorraine where French had not supplanted German as the spoken language was ceded to Germany. This was the underlying principle for the division of the province; but in tracing the actual line of demarcation the Germans insisted upon a small but important departure from this basis. Ostensibly for military reasons, a triangular region containing the important fortress of Metz, where French unquestionably prevailed, was included in the German portion of Lorraine. It is reported that Bismarck opposed this addition to the German territorial acquisition, and that his opposition was overruled by the military authorities, who brought effective means of persuasion to bear upon the king. It may be said that generally in the controversies between the military authorities and the Iron Chancellor subsequent events have fully justified the latter's position.

At an international peace conference in Antwerp in 1894 the proposal was made that the retrocession of these French-speaking communities to France should be made the basis of an international reconciliation. But as long





*L'embarquement des Pilots.* Cartoon drawn by L. Sabattier, which appeared in *L'Illustration*, January, 1912, apropos of the formation of the "Great" or "National" cabinet, with Poincaré as Chief and Millerand as Minister of War.



**BRAVO, BELGIUM!**

Cartoon which appeared in *Punch*, August 12, 1914.

as the dominating elements in the German government regarded any territory won in war as a sacred, inviolable trust, the retention of which, without regard to reason or expediency, was a matter of national honor, all projects for reconciliation on such a basis were manifestly fruitless.

Let us not lose sight of a very important industrial factor in the situation on this border, namely, the existence in the extreme northeastern part of the territory of France, between Longwy and Nancy, of enormous deposits of iron ore, which, at the time of the Treaty of Frankfurt in 1871, were regarded as useless by reason of the presence of phosphorus. These deposits, amounting possibly to 3,000,000,000 tons, commensurate, let us say, with the richness of the Lake Superior beds, were made available for exploitation by a scientific discovery made in 1883.

In the second chapter of the first volume the statement was made that the coalition of Radical elements upon which the Waldeck-Rousseau French Ministry reposed in 1898, the so-called *bloc*, tended to bring about a dual alignment of political forces in France. To some observers this may seem like a reckless assertion. For France might seem to be as far as ever removed from the realization of a condition in domestic politics where two individually coherent, clearly defined, well-organized parties, combining together nearly all the elements of political strength in the country, confront each other in perennial conflict,—assuming always that this is the necessary goal for the development of representative institutions in democratic states. The statement may be accepted, however, if taken at its literal face value. For the institution of the *bloc* tended to draw together the political forces of France into two general classes by reason of their respective attitudes of favor or hostility for the ensuing systematic program of radical acts of legislation. Without obliterating the

individual groups representing various shades of political opinion, with often rather subtle and even shifting distinctions, the *bloc* gave a broader scope, a loftier aim, a more consistent general purpose to political activity. But the smaller elements survived, and like the atoms of Democritus they are in never-ceasing movement. They coalesce to form new political entities, and separate to dissolve them.

After about a decade of successive, far-reaching reforms, the impulsive progressive movement began to slacken. The centre of political gravity had so completely shifted towards the Left, that the professedly reactionary groups within the Chamber were left in a comparative state of impotence. But with the accomplishment of those designs of the Radical campaign which inspired the most general and enthusiastic support, the individualism of the different groups became more accentuated. The great coalition of the Left, grown unwieldy, began to disintegrate. Its unquestioned superiority was transformed into a weakness. As there was no longer a worthy opponent without, the groups within the Left took sides against each other, their old foes of the Right playing merely a secondary rôle as casual allies of this or that group or combination. Many of the adherents of the Left, breathless and distracted from the precipitate advance, called for a more prudent course, a breathing-space, a more moderate policy. An interruption in the common action of the Socialist and the less extreme elements of the Radical groups was sooner or later inevitable. The latter feared that the appetite of the former would continually expand with indulgence, and that the collectivist tendencies, from the momentum already gained, would soon become ungovernable, and would unhesitatingly override all other interests.

In the purely political field the first decade of the twentieth century had witnessed amazing achievements in

France. It had seen the complete discomfiture and dispersal of the real or imaginary enemies of the republic, the subordination of the religious orders to strict control, the separation of church and state, the secularization of public, and in large measure private, education. But in spite of the sensational progress of events, in spite of the fact that the French people were constitutionally absolute masters of their own destiny, some of the most elementary progressive legislative measures in the social and economic field, which had been realized in Germany under a paternal bureaucracy years before, had not become law in France; the income tax, compulsory insurance, and old age pensions, for instance. The latter, it is true, were established by a law passed in 1910, but a law so carelessly prepared that it had to be almost entirely revised in 1913.

Out of the indistinctness of party views and aims two general tendencies became discernible, without particular designations, not strictly coextensive with formal groups or combinations, without an arbitrary barrier between them, distinguished more in method than in principle, responding to the most elementary differences of temper and attitude as to expediency, and not controlled by stereotyped traditions. One of these tendencies was relatively cautious, and inclined to emphasize public order and the military security of the state. It might appropriately have adopted the motto "safety first." The other tendency was impatient of restraint, uncompromising in its adherence to principles, contemptuous of the burdensome demands of nationalism and the conventional conception of patriotism. But these distinctions can be made more palpable by illustrations chosen from the salient incidents of the political life of France in recent years.

M. Briand, Prime Minister in 1910, was a representative of the Radical elements who desired the formation of a

“group of order.” His resolution to maintain a firm administration was exhibited in a most conspicuous incident. A strike of railway employees in October, during the recess of parliament, which threatened to paralyze the whole system of internal communications in France, was promptly restrained and brought to naught by the vigorous intervention of M. Briand, who applied the process of “militarization” to the railways involved. This means that he summoned all the employees who were liable for military service in the reserve forces as for a period of instruction, requiring them in reality to continue performing their actual functions as a military duty, subject to court martial in case of disobedience. The same device had once been utilized in similar circumstances in Italy.

This drastic measure in defiance of the elementary theories of democracy brought M. Briand into open conflict with the Socialists, and two Socialist members of his cabinet, M. Millerand and M. Viviani resigned. The conduct of the prime minister was sternly denounced by M. Jaurès, who had become a power with which every ministry had to reckon. Standing head and shoulders above his companions, he was manifestly the chieftain of French Socialism, the French counterpart of Herr August Bebel, with whom he profoundly differed, however, in his views on practical methods, as we shall soon observe.

Born of middle class parentage in 1859, in the South of France, after an excellent education Jean Léon Jaurès became professor of philosophy in the University of Toulouse. He entered the Chamber in 1885 as a Radical-Republican, but was returned in 1893 as a Socialist. He possessed as native endowment of the South the forceful weapon of brilliant, impassioned oratory. Steadfast in adherence to personal conviction, tireless in debate and argument, stalwart in person, he was a born champion of

parliamentary conflict. He was a veteran of hard-fought struggles in defense of the cardinal principles of republicanism. He had witnessed the Boulanger conspiracy and its *débâcle*. He regarded the Dreyfus Case as an issue of supreme importance in which the very existence of the republic was imperilled; and he was one of the stoutest defenders of Captain Dreyfus.

M. Jaurès believed in the expediency of coöperating with the constitutional parties. He had approved of the entrance of M. Millerand, a Socialist, into the Waldeck-Rousseau Ministry in 1898; and he had himself supported the *bloc*, incurring thereby denunciation as a traitor to the Socialist cause. German Socialists as a body maintained that the principles of the Socialist creed must not be contaminated by association with middle-class or capitalist politics or policies, that their hope of ultimate triumph depended upon their attitude of uncompromising aloofness. To the party who is absolutely certain of his eventual capacity for unqualified victory—and the German Socialists had no misgivings in this regard—"splendid isolation is the attitude of prudent generalship," and concessions gratuitously diminish or obscure the fruits of the final triumph.

This fundamental problem was threshed out by the International Socialist Congress at Amsterdam in 1904 in discussing the resolution that no Socialist should hold office in a bourgeois cabinet. The feature of the discussion was a controversial combat of several hours' duration between M. Jaurès and Herr Bebel. The German leader advanced the argument, incontrovertible in itself, that a larger measure of practical Socialism had been attained in Germany with the austere aloofness of the Socialist party than in France where the Socialist current had become diluted in part by mingling with the capitalist streams. Herr Bebel won a formal victory; for the resolution was adopted.

But the differences between Socialistic conditions in France and Germany are considerable. They cannot be entirely eliminated by debates and resolutions. The uncompromising German Socialist must frequently shake his head in despair at the seeming inconstancy of many of his prominent brethren in France. The distinctive features of the Socialistic situation in Germany and France are largely the consequence of the diversity of economic conditions, habits of thought and feeling, and in a measure the attitude of the governments in the respective countries. France, after all, the land of small proprietors, the ideal home of democracy, did not offer so comprehensive a social basis for the development of a numerous, compact body of irreconcilable Socialists. But the economic situation in Germany, with the relatively larger industrial proletariat afforded precisely such a basis, and the German spirit of loyalty to doctrinal principles favored the supremacy of an unbending attitude. Besides, the French Republic, whose fundamental principles were menaced by implacable foes among the reactionary elements, was constrained to marshal all the available elements to its support. It recognized among republicans by principle only relative divergences, not essential contrasts. But the German government, identified in many ways with such conservative forces as the French Republic had to combat, regarded the Socialists with undisguised hostility as malcontents whom it was magnanimous even to tolerate. And the extensive Socialistic legislation, to which Herr Bebel pointed with such complacency, had been largely purloined from the official program of Socialism, and introduced into the field of practical legislation at the initiative of the government for the purpose of undermining the popular support of its avowed antagonists.

However, the United Socialists in France recognized the principle which received this solemn, international

sanction at Amsterdam. They adopted the rule forbidding their representatives to take office in a capitalist government, or vote for the budget, a capitalist instrument for repression. Consequently, when M. Millerand, M. Viviani, and M. Briand, all of them Socialists, became ministers at different times in defiance of this rule, they were formally expelled from the United Social party.

The Briand Ministry resigned, February 27, 1911, and was succeeded by the Monis Ministry, which involved a change in men but not in program. They in turn were followed by the Caillaux Ministry, from June 27, 1911, until January 10, 1912, which gave place to the "Great" or "National" Cabinet with M. Raymond Poincaré as chief, containing M. Millerand, M. Delcassé, and M. Briand, three former prime ministers in one single ministry. Early in January, 1913, the election of M. Poincaré to the presidency resulted in a reorganization of the cabinet with M. Briand at its head.

The selection of M. Poincaré as president was regarded as a triumph for order and nationalism. He was considered a steadfast patriot, although no Jingo, a firm supporter of the *Triple Entente*, and a statesman who aimed to make the presidency an element of stability, and not merely the culminating decorative feature of the political edifice. Tsar Nicholas II expressed his satisfaction at the election of M. Poincaré by a message of congratulation in which he said: "The bonds which unite France and Russia will draw still closer for the greatest good of the two allied and friendly nations."

The ministerial program of the Briand Cabinet comprised the income tax and a plan for electoral reform embodying the election of deputies from each department collectively, regulated in such a way as to guarantee a proportional representation for minorities. The Briand

Ministry resigned in consequence of the adoption of an amendment to their electoral bill which they regarded as depriving it of its efficacy. The Barthou Ministry, the next in order, enjoys the distinction of having secured the reëstablishment of compulsory military service for three years in the teeth of determined opposition led mainly by M. Caillaux and M. Jaurès. No measure created profounder discord among the professed adherents of progressive and popular legislation. The Military Law passed the Chamber July 19th, and the Senate August 7th. It provided that all healthy male citizens, without exception, should serve three years in the active army, and subsequently be enrolled eleven years in the reserve, seven in the territorial army, and seven in the territorial reserve, twenty-eight years of liability to service in all. The severely democratic character of this measure, placing all classes on an absolutely equal footing, recognizing no privilege of exemption, palliated somewhat its inherent unpopularity. Such a radical basis neither existed in Germany nor was desired by the classes which really created public opinion there. Only the apparent imminence of peril made the passage of this law possible in France, and the majority, doubtless, accepted it with the understanding that it was merely a temporary expedient.

The bitterness excited by the passage of the Military Law stimulated the activity of the extreme Radical and Socialist forces. The Radical and Radical-Socialist groups met in congress at Pau in October, and drew up a minimum compulsory program embracing the return to two years' military service, progressive taxation on capital and income, and the defense of the secular character of the elementary schools. Those who subscribed to the principles of this congress called themselves henceforth United Radicals.

The costly military operations in Morocco and the initial expenses involved in the vast enlargement of the army



Jean Léon Jaurès, chief of the French Socialist party for several years previous to his assassination, July, 31, 1914.



August Bebel, for many years leader of the German Socialists.



created a very serious financial situation requiring extraordinary measures. The government proposed a loan of 1,300,000,000 francs (\$250,900,000), but was defeated, December 2d, on the provision that the interest to be paid on the bonds should be exempt from the proposed income tax, and resigned. M. Doumergue formed a cabinet, December 8th, which professed the United Radical program embracing the repeal of the three years' service and legislation against religious schools, although the views of the members individually on the points involved in their public declarations were by no means harmonious.

In fact, the new cabinet affirmed that inasmuch as the three-year basis had become law it ought to be enforced. The financial situation was most embarrassing as the government faced a deficit of about 800,000,000 francs for the ensuing year. M. Caillaux, Minister of Finance, was really the dominating personality in the Doumergue Cabinet. His popularity excited envy, and his methods were not always such as to disarm suspicion. Many regarded him as an unscrupulous demagogue, as a politician who deliberately trimmed his sails to catch the most favorable breeze.

A systematic campaign of incrimination was launched against him in the pages of *Figaro* by M. Calmette its editor. We need not detail the charges. The arraignment impugned the minister's personal honor and political integrity and even implicated him in treasonable intrigues. Madame Caillaux, impelled by resentment at the contumely of which her husband was the victim, and more particularly by dismay at the threatened publication of letters written to her by M. Caillaux at a time when he was married to another woman and inspired with a compromising degree of fervor, visited the private office of the editor of the *Figaro*, March 16, 1914, with the alleged intention of dissuading him. But she brought the ensuing

interview to a tragic termination by shooting and killing M. Calmette. Her husband resigned his position in the cabinet the same evening.

Madame Caillaux insisted that her act was unintentional and involuntary. Her trial focused the attention of the world, and was only less conspicuous than the Dreyfus Affair. These two famous cases form a striking contrast; they illustrate characteristic eccentricities of the most antagonistic political tendencies. The Dreyfus Case exemplifies the monstrous brutality of militarism; the trial of Madame Caillaux, the excessive affability of democracy. During the Caillaux trial, which lasted from July 19th to 28th, the fervid spirit of political partisanship invaded the court room and corrupted the sober atmosphere of judicial procedure. M. Caillaux made his appearance as witness the occasion for an impassioned exhortation, surveying his entire career and political activity as support for his appeal. Madame Caillaux's acquittal was the absorbing topic in Paris on the day that Austria-Hungary sent her fateful declaration of war to Serbia. The verdict was accepted as a sort of public vindication of M. Caillaux's popularity.

The regular election of deputies took place in April and May, 1914, and the question of military service was recognized as the most important subject of contest. The program of the United Socialists demanded a vigorous organization for national defense, with the gradual substitution of a civic militia for the standing army and an immediate return to the period of service for two years, and a pacific foreign policy intended to realize a Franco-German reconciliation. This group declared itself unalterably opposed to any ministry which should hesitate to restore the service for two years.

It is important to explain that adherents of collectivism in France are chiefly divided in their allegiance between

two sharply contrasted organizations and methods of operation. The United Socialists, affiliated with corresponding bodies in other countries, are a political party in the conventional sense. They seek to transform society in accordance with their ideals by parliamentary methods. On the other hand, the General Confederation of Labor (*Confédération Générale du Travail*), commonly known as the C. G. T., the central organ of French Syndicalism, employs more drastic, extra-parliamentary methods in seeking the common goal. Syndicalism regarded with impatient scorn the unlimited faith of the United Socialists in the efficacy of parliamentary action.


The following comparison of the results of the election in the spring of 1914 with the political grouping of the members of the previous Chamber will serve to indicate the nature of the Socialist accession of strength and the political complexion of the war-chamber:

Parties.	Strength in old Chamber.	Strength in new Chamber.
United Socialists . . . .	67	101
Independent Socialists . .	—	2
Republican Socialists:		
Augagneur Group . .	32	29
Briand Group . . . .	10	8
United Radicals . . . .	175	174
Radicals and Republicans of the Left . . . . .	167	149
Progressives . . . . .	83	69
Liberal Action . . . . .	34	34
Right . . . . .	29	34

We can scarcely overestimate the significance of these figures. In the first place, the groups which had made public declaration of their hostility to the three years'

military service had a distinct majority in this Chamber, a circumstance which in itself was probably regarded with satisfaction by the ruling circles beyond the Rhine. But the results of this election have an importance far transcending the scope of party programs. For the importance of the results of the Great War may consist, not so much in which individual states triumph, as in what kind of states are the ultimate victors. About one-fourth of the French war-chamber was made up of Socialists; and more than one-half, of Socialists and those whose policy was very closely related with that of the Socialists. The Chamber was overwhelmingly democratic; the reactionary groups had been almost eliminated. Furthermore, the prime minister at the outbreak of the war was a Socialist by profession. The most important positions in the subsequent coalition ministry, the so-called Administration for National Defense, were filled by Socialists or those who professed their doctrines. Consider what all this would mean in the event of ultimate victory for France. It would mean that the ancient military glory of France, forfeited by decadent imperialism, had been regained by democracy and Socialism, the avowed foes of militarism. It would establish the ability of a free people to defend its liberty by self-imposed discipline and common action. It would destroy the validity of all the political arguments which the Berlin government can bring against the German Socialists. It would be the victory of all that the German rulers regard as irreverent, contemptible, and subversive.

The Doumergue Ministry resigned on June 1st. On the 2d the Republican Socialist Groups adopted a resolution declaring that they would support no government which was not resolved to return as soon as possible to the two years' service. President Poincaré sent for M. Viviani



The Ribot Cabinet, the French Ministry which lasted three days in June, 1914.



Mme. Caillaux.

M. Caillaux.

The Caillaux Trial.



to form a ministry. He had voted against the Military Law, and could therefore plausibly claim the support of the opponents of the three years' service by declaring himself to be in favor of repealing it as soon as conditions permitted. M. Viviani accepted the task but abandoned it a day or two later. His lack of success in constituting a ministry was largely due to failure to secure the support of M. Jaurès who held the balance of power.

M. Alexandre Ribot, a very estimable statesman of a somewhat different political complexion, next undertook the difficult task. His ministry, composed of trustworthy, moderate elements, was completed June 10th; on the 12th it underwent the supreme test by submitting its attitude on the military question to the Chamber, in the following terms:

“The law regulating the duration of military service, which was adopted in the last legislative session after long debates in which all views were thoroughly discussed, has only just begun to be applied, and cannot straightway become the subject of renewed discussion. Of all laws those relating to the military organization ought to have the greatest stability. If we commit the blunder of disturbing this new law in any way while the balance of military power in Europe remains the same, we sacrifice both our security and the moral success which has been gained by our adoption of this law and its reception by the country.”

The Chamber made short shrift of this commendable declaration and its worthy authors. A resolution was immediately passed by a vote of 374 to 167, declaring that “the Chamber, faithful to the wish of the electors is resolved to grant its confidence only to a government which can unite the political forces of the Left.” In consequence of this vote of lack of confidence the ministry, of course, resigned.

In the meantime M. Viviani had come to an understanding with the elements whose support was indispensable, and his efforts a second time to form a ministry were crowned with success. This Viviani Cabinet which held the reins of government at the outbreak of the Great War was the forty-ninth ministry in the course of forty-three years. Compare this record with the stability of German administration, only five different Chancellors during the same period!

M. Viviani's statement, that he would retain the recruits of 1913 for their third year of service in the autumn of 1915, indicated that he did not contemplate an immediate abrogation of the three-year law; and yet, strange as it may seem, the new prime minister obtained a vote of confidence on June 16th of 362 votes against 132. The violent anti-militarism of the United Radicals had apparently been disarmed very suddenly.

The declaration of policy of the Viviani Cabinet contained the following statement:

“Parliament has accepted the law of August 7, 1913, regarding the prolongation of military service. The discussion of the bill was long and violent; but it was finally passed. The law in itself is not sufficient to insure the defense of the country. The government will shortly introduce a number of proposals, the most important of which will deal with the military training of the youth, and the reorganization of the reserves. Not before these proposals have been adopted and applied, and have given actual proof of their practicability, will any government be able to propose a partial alleviation of the burdens of military service on the basis of experience and with due consideration for the necessities of the national defense. Until then the government will make loyal application of the present law, subject to the control of parliament.”

Thus the staunchest Radical leaders, though impelled by popular bitterness to condemn in principle the service for three years, when face to face with responsibility found themselves constrained, in spite of their unqualified professions, to make their conduct conform to the exigencies of the actual situation.

Two particular occurrences within a month of the outbreak of the war undoubtedly discredited France in the estimation of her present enemies. One of these, the Cailiaux Case, has already been considered. The other was Senator Humbert's disclosure.

The government's request for the granting of additional sums for war material at the conclusion of the discussion of the budget in the Senate on July 13th was the signal for this unexpected incident, an exclamation of alarm which aroused anxious emotion throughout France, and attracted interested attention beyond the Rhine. Senator Humbert advanced to the tribune and in forcible terms depicted the lamentable condition of the nation's military equipment, to which the artillery alone constituted relatively an exception. While his allegations were undoubtedly exaggerated, they just as certainly rested upon a considerable basis of truth. The minister of war himself did not contradict them. The publicity given to the deficiencies in this sensational way inevitably created a profound impression.

The International Socialist Bureau met on July 30, 1914, in Brussels, to consider the threatening international situation. M. Jaurès and Mr. Keir Hardie were present among the thirty-two delegates from different countries. A resolution was adopted urging the proletariat to organize demonstrations against war, and to exert pressure to prevent armed intervention by Germany and Russia. And it is significant to recall that martial law was proclaimed throughout Germany the next day, isolating the people

and cutting off the action of international forces; a merely casual coincidence, no doubt.

M. Jaurès was editor of *l'Humanité*. He employed the pen as well as the organs of speech as weapons in his defiant war on warfare. He had been one of the leading advocates of the project of forestalling war by means of a general strike throughout the prospective belligerent countries. He advocated this plan at the convention in Brussels on July 30th. He straightway fell a victim to his own benign doctrines. The cause of peace demanded a martyr in a last vain effort to exorcise the awful curse of war.

A crazed fanatic youth, impelled by distorted metamorphic apparitions of patriotism and nationalism, Raoul Villain, shot and killed M. Jaurès on the evening of July 31st, as he sat before a café in the Rue du Croissant, a little street leading off the Rue Montmartre in Paris.

In spite of the stupendous international situation the obsequies of M. Jaurès were celebrated in parliament, August 4th. The Chamber listened standing to a glowing tribute expressed by M. Deschanel, who declared that the whole of France was united over the coffin of the murdered leader, and that on this solemn occasion there were no political adversaries, only Frenchmen.

M. Jaurès had advocated the establishment of a universal citizen militia, which would guarantee the security of the country but discourage wars for aggrandizement. He published a short time before his death an exposition of his doctrine of national defense in a book entitled *L'Armée nouvelle*,—"The New Army,"—in which he forecast with an amazing degree of accuracy the initial stages of a Franco-German conflict, the French recoil and recovery in the face of invasion. The success of his plan depended upon the capacity of the French to act effectively on the



Louis Barthou.

*Barthou, in 1913, formed the French Ministry which secured the passage of the three-year military service law and, to provide funds to carry it out, proposed a loan. This bill being defeated they resigned, and were succeeded by the Doumergue Cabinet, which professed the United Radical program embracing the repeal of the three years' service.*



Gaston Doumergue.



defensive. The almost unchallenged tradition that the French were temperamentally disqualified for acting on the defensive has been completely overthrown by the events of the Great War; while the discovery of the almost impregnable character of trenches, which can be defended as effectually by a citizen militia as by a standing army, lends powerful support for the kind of military organization which M. Jaurès elaborated.

The French had a full measure of sensational material at home to absorb their attention in July, 1914. The rapidly developing international crisis, as it irrepressibly obtruded itself, created a remarkable unanimity of feeling. The war was accepted with unexpected calmness and with a quiet spirit of determination. The mobilization was attended with an enthusiastic outburst of patriotic fervor.

Herr von Schön, the German Ambassador in Paris, while systematically protesting the pacific intentions of Germany steadfastly insisted that the contest between Austria-Hungary and Serbia should be localized by the abstention from interference of all other powers as the only means of avoiding incalculably disastrous consequences. He repeated that Germany associated herself with France in the earnest desire of maintaining peace, and urged that France utilize her influence in St. Petersburg for the purpose of restraining Russia, but evaded every definite proposal respecting any corresponding action on Germany's part by pleading lack of instructions.

Herr von Schön created in this way the impression in Paris that he was endeavoring to compromise France in the eyes of Russia by inducing her to become a party to a one-sided conciliatory enterprise in applying pressure to Russia, while Germany obviously abstained from exerting any corresponding pressure on Austria-Hungary. He called on M. Viviani on July 31st, at seven in the evening, to

inform him of the declaration of the so-called state of "danger of war" (*Kriegsgefahr*) in Germany, and of the ultimatum to Russia, and to request that he be informed by one o'clock the next day what would be the attitude of France in the event of a conflict between Germany and Russia. As has already been noticed, the only reply was that France would act as her interests dictated. Beginning on August 2d there were frequent complaints of the violation of the French frontier by German troops. The French government made formal protest.


But the only communication that it received in reply from the German government was the declaration of war, transmitted by Herr von Schön, August 3d, at 6.45 P. M., in the form of a note to the President of the Republic (see text in Volume I, page 243) declaring that the German civil and military authorities had observed a number of unmistakably hostile acts committed on German territory by French military airmen, in consequence of which Germany considered herself in a state of war with France, and the German ambassador demanded his passports and left Paris the same evening at ten in a special train.

The German government asserted that French military airmen had violated the neutrality of Belgium and had flown over the Eifel region and dropped bombs at Wesel and near the Carlsruhe-Nuremberg railway line. The French government denied these allegations categorically. Which government was most likely to be "misinformed?" The problem will probably resolve itself into the subjective question of individual sympathy. The allegation of aerial violations would be a convenient pretext for war because aeronautic vehicles leave no tracks. One may readily surmise that in future this may become the usual diplomatic formula of politeness in declarations of war, the real sense of the words becoming merely perfunctory.





The Palais Bourbon, Paris, where the French deputies sit.



The Chamber of Deputies.

On the day following the declaration of war the Chambers convened for voting war supplies and taking such other action as the situation required. In a long address delivered before the Chamber of Deputies, which was interrupted at intervals by tremendous outbursts of applause, Prime Minister René Viviani set forth the development of the crisis and the part taken by the French government.

He began by recapitulating the events which led to the outbreak of the European war, and showed why the republic was constrained to defend her frontiers against German aggression. He declared that Serbia, in accordance with the prudent counsels of the powers of the *Triple Entente*, had accepted nearly all the demands of Austria-Hungary. The unjustifiable refusal of the Austro-Hungarian government to accept the Serbian reply was aggravated by an arrogant communication of the German government to the powers of the *Triple Entente* stating that the Austro-Serbian conflict ought to be localized, and that the intervention of a third power would have incalculable consequences. Germany thwarted the conciliatory activity of the *Triple Entente*; and Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Serbia made the situation much more acute. Upon the failure of the British proposal for mediation by the four powers not immediately concerned, Russia proceeded to partial mobilization, July 29th, as a precautionary measure. The declaration of martial law by Germany, July 31st, threw a veil of secrecy over military preparations which had been under way since July 25th, and whose progress was then greatly accelerated. Germany sent an ultimatum to Russia demanding demobilization within twelve hours, although Russia was maintaining a conciliatory attitude and had accepted a formula for a peaceful settlement of the controversy. This was accompanied by acts of

hostility against France, making French mobilization necessary on August 1st. On the next day the German troops crossed the French frontier in three places. These incidents were multiplied on the 3d. The French frontier was violated in more than fifteen places; but instead of expressing regret, the German ambassador presented a declaration of war making absurd allegations that French aviators had dropped bombs on German soil. The British Foreign Minister had promised the help of the British navy to defend the coasts of France if they were attacked by a German fleet. The victors of 1870 had wished to redouble their blow dealt at that time; but thanks to her rehabilitation and friendships France had thrown off the yoke imposed by Bismarck.

The prime minister continued: "Germany has nothing with which to reproach us. We have, to secure peace, made sacrifices without precedent, and have borne for half a century in silence the wound opened by her in our side. We have submitted since 1904 to systematic provocation, whether in 1905, 1908, or 1911. Russia has given proof of great moderation in the events of 1908 and the present crisis. All our sacrifices have been useless, our compromises sterile, our efforts vain; for, while engaged in the work of conciliation, we and our allies are attacked by surprise. No one can believe in good faith that we are the aggressors. Italy, with the clear conscience of her Latin genius, has notified us that she intends to remain neutral. This decision has roused throughout France an echo of sincere joy. I have interpreted this to the Italian *chargé d'affaires*, in letting him know how I congratulated myself that the two Latin sisters, who have the same origin and same ideals did not find themselves opposed to each other.

"I declare, gentlemen, that our independence, dignity, and security, which the *Triple Entente* has regained in the

equilibrium for the service of peace, are now attacked. The liberties of Europe, of which France and her allies are the proud defenders, are attacked. These liberties we are going to defend, for it is they that are in question, and all the rest has been but pretext. France, unjustly provoked, did not want war. She has done all in her power to avoid it. Since it is imposed upon her, she will defend herself against Germany and any other power which, not yet having made known its decision, should take her part in the struggle between the two countries.

“A free and strong people, supported by an ancient ideal and united in every way for the protection of its existence, a democracy which has been able to discipline its military effort and which did not fear last year to add to its burden in response to neighboring armaments, an armed nation struggling for its own life and for the independence of Europe—such is the spectacle we have the honor to offer witnesses of this formidable struggle which for some days past has been prepared in the most methodical way. We are without reproach; we shall be without fear.

“France has often shown in less favorable conditions that she is the most redoubtable adversary when she fights, as is the case to-day, for freedom and for right.

“In submitting to you our acts, gentlemen—to you who are our judges—we have, in bearing the weight of our heavy responsibility, the support of an untroubled conscience and the certainty of duty performed.”

The expectations, hopes or fears, respecting the probable action of the Socialists in the event of a European conflict, based, quite legitimately, as it would seem, upon their avowed attitude of militant pacificism, their bitter opposition to military service, and their drastic proposals for the prevention of war, were deceived in all the belligerent

countries. But nowhere did the Socialists respond with greater alacrity to the national cause than in France. The Socialists and Syndicalists alike rallied to the national defense. The Socialist deputies voted the war credits because they regarded them as indispensable for the salvation of their liberty and freedom. During the early days of the war friendly relations were reestablished between the Socialist party and the C. G. T. and a Committee on Action composed of delegates from both, was invested with full power to act in all circumstances in behalf of the common interests of the two bodies.

The war crisis resulted in fundamental changes in the cabinet. As early as August 3d, M. Gauthier, Minister of Marine, resigned, and was replaced by M. Augagneur, while M. Viviani relinquished the portfolio of foreign affairs to M. Doumergue. On August 26th the ministry was converted into a coalition cabinet, the Administration of National Defense, as it was called, by the admission of M. Ribot, M. Briand, M. Millerand, and M. Delcassé, and two members of the United Socialist party, M. Sembat and M. Guesde. The latter entered the ministry with the consent of the permanent directing board of the party. M. Jules Guesde made the following public declaration of his attitude on August 29th:

“I go into the cabinet as an envoy of my party, not to govern but to fight. If I were younger, I would have shouldered a gun. But as my age does not permit this, I will, nevertheless, face the enemy and defend the cause of humanity.

“I am confident of final victory, and without hesitation as to its subsequent rôle in France, the party will never deviate from the line of conduct laid out. As the solidarity of workmen does not shut out the right to defend themselves against traitor workmen, so international solidarity

does not exclude the right of one nation against a government traitor to the peace of Europe.

“France has been attacked, and she will have no more ardent defenders than the workmen’s party.”

In his memorable speech before the Chamber, the French Prime Minister, M. Viviani, alluded with satisfaction to the sympathy of Italy and France, the two Latin sisters with the same origin and the same ideals. This vision of Latin solidarity has been frequently proclaimed by idealists, but it has rested upon a rather insecure foundation of fact.

The slight ethnological community that exists between the two nations is probably due not so much to the presence of Latin blood in France as to the ancient Gallic stratum in the racial composition of Northern Italy. The English and the Germans are racially more closely connected than the French and the Italians. Italy owes very much to the assistance of France in her process of unification, although this debt has been somewhat obscured by the subsequent jealousy and suspicion of the two nations. Their intimate cultural relationship, which is mainly due to historical causes, lends sentimental fervor to the hope that from association in the trials and convulsions of the present there may spring an abiding fellowship uniting these two gifted peoples on the basis of tolerance, candor, and practical sympathy.

Two noteworthy speeches delivered in the days that followed the declaration of war by Italy presented in a striking manner the official view regarding this fateful step in Germany and Italy respectively.

In addressing the German Reichstag on May 28, 1915, Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg introduced his discussion of the subject with the following statement:

“Nobody threatened Italy; neither Austria-Hungary nor Germany. Whether the Triple Entente was content

with blandishments alone, history will show later. Without shedding a drop of blood or endangering the life of a single Italian, Italy could have secured the long list of concessions which I recently read to this Chamber, territory in Tyrol and on the Isonzo as far as the Italian speech is heard, the satisfaction of the national aspirations in Trieste, a free hand in Albania, and the valuable port of Valona."

Distrust of Austria's promise, he averred, was manifestly no valid reason for Italy's conduct, because Germany had guaranteed that the concessions would be fulfilled. Perhaps the final offer came too late. There were evidences, he declared, that while the Triple Alliance was still in existence, Italian statesmen "had engaged themselves so deeply with the Triple Entente that they could not disentangle themselves." He continued:

"To have two irons in the fire is always useful. Before this Italy had shown her predilection for extra dances. But this is no ballroom. This is a bloody battlefield upon which Germany and Austria-Hungary are fighting for their lives against a world of enemies."

He said that early in May four-fifths of the Senate and two-thirds of the Chamber had been opposed to war and that the people generally supported the attitude of the majority in parliament, which included all the most reliable statesmen. But the cabinet, corrupted by foreign gold, had favored the instigators who by inflaming the passions of the mob revolutionized the course of events. Germany had accomplished the ungrateful task of persuading her faithful ally, Austria-Hungary, to go to the utmost in making concessions, the extent of which was entirely disregarded in the debates of the Italian Parliament. The activity of Prince von Bülow and his diplomatic ability and thorough knowledge of the Italian situation and of Italian personages were proof that Germany had done all she could for





Aristide Briand, Prime Minister of France in 1910-1911.



Alexandre Millerand, French Minister of War in the Coalition Cabinet formed at the outbreak of the war.

reconciliation. The Italian people had been deceived by their own rulers.

In conclusion the Chancellor declared that Germany would not be dismayed by what had happened:

“The greater the danger that we have to confront, surrounded on all sides by our enemies, the more deeply does the love of home grip our hearts, the more must we provide for the future of our children and grandchildren, and the more must we endure until we have conquered and have secured every possible guarantee and assurance that no enemy alone or combined will hazard again a trial of arms.”

With characteristic Italian feeling for majesty of setting, the Prime Minister, Signor Salandra, selected a national festival on June 2d and the Capitol in Rome, with its imposing tradition of civic and imperial splendor, as the time and place for replying in public to the statements and charges of the German Chancellor. He began as follows:

“I address myself to Italy and to the civilized world in order to show, not by violent words, but by exact facts and documents, how the fury of our enemies has vainly attempted to diminish the high moral and political dignity of the cause which our aims will make prevail. . . . I shall speak with the respect due to my position and to the place in which I speak. I can afford to ignore the insults written in imperial, royal, and archducal proclamations. Since I speak from the Capitol and represent in this solemn hour the people and government of Italy, I, a modest citizen, feel that I am far nobler than the head of the Hapsburgs.”

Referring to the hatred and calumny of Italy's opponents, the speaker declared: “An atavistic degeneration to primitive barbarism is more difficult for us who have twenty more centuries behind us than they have.” He

believed that it was very questionable whether a statesman has any right to speak "of alliance and respect for treaties who, representing with infinitely less genius, but with equal moral indifference, the tradition of Frederick the Great and of Bismarck, proclaimed that necessity knows no law, and consented to his country trampling under foot and burying at the bottom of the ocean all the documents and all the customs of civilization and international laws."

He showed that Italy had made known her disapproval of Austria-Hungary's aggressive movement against Serbia from the first. The Italian government had expressed the view as early as July 25, 1914, that the proceedings of Austria-Hungary without previous accord with her ally were contrary to the spirit of the alliance. That the designs of the Dual Monarchy were not purely defensive was revealed by the Austro-Hungarian ambassador's remark to the Marquis di San Giuliano on July 29, 1914, that Austria-Hungary could make no binding engagement regarding the integrity of Serbia, because she might find it necessary during the war to retain Serbian territory.

Signor Salandra did not deny that the Triple Alliance had been beneficial to Italy, but this did not prove that Italy had been ungrateful to her partners, because the benefits had been common to all of them. He cited the opposition to Italian operations against Turkey in the Aegean and Adriatic Seas as proof of the jealousy of Austria-Hungary. The final concessions offered by Austria-Hungary did not respond to Italy's justifiable aspirations, and in part, at least, they were merely specious. The proposed administrative autonomy of Trieste under the Hapsburg Crown might at any time be withdrawn under some ostensible pretext, and Italy would in that event have to depend for redress upon the untrustworthy guarantee of Germany. If the Triple Alliance had been renewed on the basis of Austria-Hungary's

final proposals, the conditions would have been much less favorable for Italy; "for there would have been one sovereign state and two subject states."

Continuing, Signor Salandra remarked that the German Chancellor had apparently represented Prince von Bülow as the authority for his insulting insinuations. He did not doubt that Prince von Bülow had been inspired by good intentions, but he had committed great mistakes. "He thought that Italy could be turned from her course by a few millions ill-spent and by the influence of a few persons who have lost touch with the soul of the nation."

Since the preparation of Volume I, Chapter IX, the text of article 7 of the treaty by which Italy and Austria-Hungary were united in the Triple Alliance has been published. This now famous article, of which the significant provisions were described in Volume I, page 328, on the basis of an inductive analysis of the discussions with regard to its bearing and interpretation, is as follows:

"Austria-Hungary and Italy, who have solely in view the maintenance, as far as possible, of the territorial *status quo* in the East, engage themselves to use their influence to prevent all territorial changes which might be disadvantageous to the one or the other of the powers (which are) signatories of the present treaty. To this end they will give reciprocally all information calculated to enlighten each other concerning their own intentions and those of other powers. If the case should arise, however, that in the course of events the maintenance of the *status quo* in the territory of the Balkans, or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic or Aegean Sea, should become impossible, and that, either in consequence of the action of a third party or for any other reason, Austria-Hungary or Italy should be obliged to change the *status quo* for their part by a temporary or permanent occupation, such

occupation would only take place after previous agreement between the two parties which would have to be based upon the principle of a reciprocal compensation for all territorial or other advantages that either of them might acquire over and above the existing *status quo*, and would have to satisfy the interest and rightful claim of both parties."

It must seem astonishing that a document in which the sense is in other respects so carefully elaborated should have failed to specify the nature of the compensation which either of the contracting powers might legitimately claim in the circumstances indicated. But the reader will probably agree that by her unequivocal violation of the letter and spirit of the covenant, in failing to come to a preliminary agreement with her ally, Austria-Hungary exposed herself quite logically to a disadvantageous interpretation of the nature and conditions of the necessary compensation. It is significant, moreover, that in his condemnation of the action of the Italian government before the Reichstag, Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg did not deny in principle the justice of Italy's claim to compensation in Austrian territory.

Italy's assertion of a right to sovereignty and influence eastward of the Mediterranean is the crucial, and at the same time the difficult, element in the judgment of Italian policy to the minds of many impartial observers. Were the Italian pretensions in this quarter "an ignoble exploitation of the needs of an ally fighting for her existence" or an indispensable effort to defend the position of Italy from practical submersion? There is little doubt that the responsible chiefs of the Italian Cabinet and Foreign Office regarded the situation as really serious. We are apt to regard the Adriatic as an absolute barrier to logical penetration eastward. We Americans are a continental people and in our imagination the land unites and the sea divides,





Demonstration in Rome in favor of war.



Italian Parliament.

whereas in the economy of commercial intercourse, and consequently in large measure of political relationship, the contrary is nearer the reality. Practically, Smyrna and Constantinople are nearer to Naples and Genoa than to Vienna; while on the other hand, Italy would almost inevitably fall under the political tutelage of a great power that possessed the undivided mastery east of the Adriatic.

The sudden movement in the middle of May, 1915, which stands out as the decisive factor in determining the final policy of the Italian government has been described by some as the thoughtless frenzy of an irresponsible mob, by others as an artificial manifestation designedly formulated and engineered. Both these views are undoubtedly erroneous. No merely ephemeral ebullition or political intrigue could have stirred the nation so profoundly. It was an irresistible outburst of public feeling, unreflecting perhaps in large measure, but genuine, spontaneous, determined. It was due to the coincident action of various forces.

Allusion was made in Volume I to the recent development of Nationalism in Italy, whose imperialistic doctrines and program had been gaining very rapidly in popularity. The nationalistic doctrines, which were expressed quite as dogmatically and sensationally as the views of the more conspicuous exponents of the corresponding school of political philosophy in Germany, are the manifestation of a violent epidemic which has invaded many of the civilized countries in recent years. Gabriele d'Annunzio made himself the apostle of this movement in Italy. The central organ of Nationalism was *L'Idea Nazionale*. Academic Nationalism taught the characteristic doctrine that the state is a thing apart with its own independent existence, the only truly real, absolute social entity, that nations are by nature mutually antagonistic, and that war is prolific of

the necessary civic virtues. Nationalists regarded the doctrines of Liberalism with hatred and contempt.

The great movement was partly the consequence of an instinctive reaction against the cultural and economic supremacy of Germany. Italians conscious of their past leadership in civilization, proud of their traditional prominence in art and letters, regarded with jealousy the tremendous intellectual prestige of Germany.

The peaceful penetration of Italy by German financial and industrial enterprise had been in progress for many years. The most influential agency for promoting German economic interests in Italy was the Banca Commerciale Italiana of Milan, the foundation of which, in 1894, was encouraged by Prime Minister Crispi as a means of securing the support of the German banks for Italian bonds. The capital of this institution grew from 5,000,000 lire (\$965,000) to 156,000,000 lire (\$30,108,000) in twenty years. This capital was chiefly Italian; but the bank turned the financial resources of Italy to account in contributing to the supremacy of German industry. Of its directors the majority were foreigners, and trained financiers of the leading banks in Berlin were prominent on the board and in the management of the bank. The Italian element on the board of directors was chiefly ornamental. It consisted of prominent members of the aristocracy and distinguished representatives of the social and political world. This bank practically controlled the principal steamship lines and possessed a very great influence over leading manufacturing interests, which it is said to have exercised to restrain Italian competition with German industry.

Italy seemed to be threatened with a German economic hegemony.

Prince von Bülow committed the mistake of associating his cause with a losing political faction. Signor Giolitti

was morally neither better nor worse than most of the politicians among whom he had risen to power; but he excelled them in ability. Political methods like those of Giolitti were long regarded with indulgence or even approval in our own country. For he was the great director and manipulator of the spoils system. Von Bülow submitted the final concessions of Austria-Hungary to Giolitti's consideration before they were presented to the government. He negotiated with this adroit political boss, and together they contrived a plan whereby the nation's foreign policy might be captured. But Italy was tired of Giolittism or had outgrown it. The publication of von Bülow's unconventional intrigues irritated Italian sensibility. It created a great revulsion of feeling, and the decision to intervene in the European war seemed, therefore, to a large part of the nation like an act of liberation from Giolitti and his whole system.

## CHAPTER III

### THE MORAL IMPULSES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

The British Cabinet in 1914; its leading personalities, Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Churchill. The cabinet's aversion to war. Various methods for preserving peace; the proposed "naval holiday." British attitude regarding the European crisis until August 1, 1914; views of the Labor party, the press, French anxiety as to British policy. Criticism of Sir Edward Grey's conversations on July 29th. M. Cambon presses Sir Edward Grey for assurances, July 30th and 31st. The "fateful days of the century," August 1st and 2d; conflicting impulses. First British promise to France. Memorable session of parliament, August 3d. Sir Edward Grey's statement of foreign policy; the two cardinal factors, the security of the French coast and the neutrality of Belgium. Mr. Bonar Law responds for the opposition. Mr. John Redmond for the Irish Nationalists, "the coast of Ireland will be defended from foreign invasion by her armed sons," the outburst of enthusiasm. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald for the Laborites. Criticism of Sir Edward Grey's speech. Formal statement of the German proposals for British neutrality. The Belgian appeal, August 5th. The resolution for extraordinary supply, involving a vote of £100,000,000. Prime Minister Asquith opens the discussion, August 6th. Lord Kitchener as Minister of War, a non-political member of the cabinet. The debate on supply; Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. Dickson, and other speakers. Resolution for increasing the army. The prompt adoption of the necessary measures.

The British Cabinet which was in office in 1914 not only rendered itself conspicuous by its undeniable capacity displayed in the face of the unprecedented problems imposed by the war, but it holds a unique position among British ministries in that its record combines the accomplishment of a series of remarkable domestic reforms with the vigorous prosecution of warlike operations abroad on a scale unparalleled for Great Britain. It demonstrated for the first time in generations the fact that a Liberal administration did not necessarily involve a weak or capricious foreign policy. Its leading members met the test of adaptability



GEORGE V  
KING OF GREAT BRITAIN





to the requirements of a very unusual situation when the nation was unexpectedly drawn into the vortex of a gigantic struggle.

The really dominating personalities in the cabinet at the outset of the war were four in number: the Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, the Right Honorable Herbert Henry Asquith; the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey; the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Right Honorable David Lloyd George; and the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Right Honorable Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill. Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey are sedate in appearance and indifferent to popularity, while Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Churchill possess a more ardent temperament, which instinctively finds expression in a genial, expansive manner, appealing strongly to popular enthusiasm.

Mr. Asquith was born September 12, 1852. Like Sir Edward Grey, he was a Balliol College man at Oxford. He entered the House of Commons in 1886, and became Home Secretary in the Gladstone-Rosebery Cabinet of 1892-1895. He was Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1905 until 1908, when he succeeded Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman as Prime Minister. Reference has been made in Volume I (page 283) to the sensational circumstances in which he assumed, during a short time in 1914, the secretaryship of war in addition to his duties as head of the cabinet.

Mr. Asquith is naturally unpretentious, practical, judicious. He possesses intellectual, rather than imaginative or emotional, power. His mental forces act with precision. He is convincing, but not brilliant, in debate. His speeches are clear and incisive, but usually plain. Nevertheless, abundant reserve forces of passionate feeling and energy lie concealed beneath the calm exterior, which break forth in moments of emergency and when impelled by indignation.

Sir Edward Grey was born April 25, 1862, and has been in parliament since 1885. He has held the portfolio of foreign affairs since 1905. His manner and associations are essentially insular, but without compromising the breadth and detachment of his intellectual apprehension. He has travelled very little; and it is even reported that he is not master of the French tongue, the customary medium of diplomatic intercourse. His most conspicuous intellectual endowments are clearness and self-possession. His presence conveys an impression of firmness and well-considered conviction. He arouses a feeling of respect, rather than enthusiasm. His speeches are unembellished in style, even rugged at times, as we shall have occasion presently to observe.

Sir Edward Grey was the dean of the foreign ministers of the Great Powers at the time of the world-convulsing crisis. During nearly ten years he had guided the course of British policy through an unusual succession of international tempests. He had zealously fostered the cohesive force of the *Entente Cordiale*, and his most noteworthy achievement was the consummation of an understanding with Russia. All Europe owed him a debt of gratitude for his earnest efforts in preserving peace between the Great Powers at the time of the Balkan crisis in 1912-1913.

The ambassadors' conferences held at that time in London were his conception, and their deliberations were conducted under his judicious guidance. Their effect within the Balkan peninsula itself was limited; but they were an effective means for mitigating the acuteness of the mutual suspicion of some of the powers by facilitating a dispassionate interchange and correlation of views. In consequence of Sir Edward Grey's policy, British statesmanship acquired a high position in the esteem and confidence of the chancelleries of Europe.

Sir Edward Grey's present enemies paid eloquent tribute to his reputation in 1913. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg declared before the Reichstag on April 7th: "Europe will feel grateful to the English Minister of Foreign Affairs for the extraordinary ability and spirit of conciliation with which he conducted the discussions of the ambassadors in London, and which constantly enabled him to reconcile divergencies of view. Germany shares all the more sincerely in this gratitude, because she knows herself to be at one with the aims of English policy, and, standing loyally by her allies, has labored in the same sense."

Count Berchtold declared before the foreign affairs committee of the Austro-Hungarian Delegations on November 19th, that "all Europe can find only words of gratitude and recognition" for Sir Edward Grey, and that "the strictly objective course of the British foreign policy had greatly assisted in making possible the removal of numberless difficulties in the situation without serious discord being thereby produced."

But within little more than a year the Germans had discovered in Sir Edward Grey the arch-conspirator, the embodiment of treachery, who had deceived the world by his specious devotion to peace. A widely-accepted theory in Germany explains the great war as the consummation of a premeditated design, with Sir Edward Grey as the modern Machiavelli, whose apparently friendly attitude was an ingenious disguise for lulling Germany into a deceptive feeling of security. We have already examined the German conviction that Germany was the victim of a deliberate, hostile plot, and discovered that, on the basis of the evidence at hand, this belief is at best no more than a conjecture, without positive, incontrovertible proof. None of Sir Edward Grey's actions during the anxious period of discussion before the war are necessarily incompatible with

sincere devotion to peace and a conviction that the most effective means for the settlement of international difficulties is a frank statement, dispassionate consideration, and patient adjustment of the conflicting pretensions.

It is true that Sir Edward Grey's conduct has been very severely criticised even in Great Britain and by members of his own party on account of his concealment of the Anglo-Russian understanding, which was not made public until after the closing of the session of parliament in 1907, and his silence regarding the famous exchange of letters with M. Cambon in 1912 and the conversations between British and French military and naval experts, which were not revealed to the House of Commons until August 3, 1914. We shall be governed in our judgment with respect to this criticism by the opinion which we adopt regarding the real character of the *Triple Entente*. For, if we accept the German view that the purpose of this combination was aggressive, we cannot absolve Sir Edward Grey from severe blame for concealing from the House of Commons the existence of agreements binding Great Britain to participate in a continental war of aggrandizement. But if the purpose of the *Triple Entente* was pacific, the foreign minister's conduct in not directly informing parliament of the existence of agreements for the elimination of the causes of international friction is not necessarily reprehensible.

Sir Edward Grey's silence concerning the conversations with France gains in gravity if we adopt the opinion that Great Britain was thereby morally bound to intervene in certain circumstances in favor of France, even if this obligation was limited to cases in which France was the victim of unprovoked aggression. The foreign minister's reticence in these matters accorded with his natural spirit of reserve. But his secrecy regarding the French "conversations" may be explained in part as the consequence of the intense

suspicion excited in Germany by the disclosure of the Anglo-French understanding in 1904, and the Anglo-Russian agreement in 1907. Sir Edward Grey was probably convinced that the best way to make the military understanding unnecessary was to keep it secret.

Mr. Lloyd George was born of Welsh stock in 1863, entered parliament in 1890, and succeeded Mr. Asquith as Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1908. His native briskness of temperament and lively imagination have made him the principal creative force in the cabinet. His freedom from all traditional restraints and his directness of method are appropriate qualities in a statesman whose function has been to translate into a concrete program of legislation the aspirations of the rising British democracy. For he brings a message to the cabinet direct from the heart of the people.

Mr. Churchill came to the cabinet with the impetuous energy and restlessness of youth. He too is free from academic restriction. He is a man of varied and active experience. Born November 30, 1874, the grandson of the seventh Duke of Marlborough, he passed through the military school at Sandhurst, and entered the army in 1895. An enumeration of the widely-scattered scenes of his military career would illustrate the ubiquity and boundless variety of British imperial interests. We may note only that he was present with Kitchener at the Battle of Khartoum in 1898, and served with distinction in the South African War. He became a member of parliament in 1906, and directly entered the ministry as Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies. He was President of the Board of Trade, 1908-1910, Home Secretary, 1910-1911, and First Lord of the Admiralty, 1911-1915. He distinguished himself in the admiralty by his fearlessness in retiring the less efficient admirals.

Our examination of the evidence in the first volume led us to the conviction that the idea of war was extremely distasteful to the British Cabinet, although it does not follow from this observation that the administration was disposed to sacrifice any British rights or opportunities for the sake of more cordial relations. But a further consideration of a few characteristic incidents in the years just before the war will exhibit a noteworthy diversity of opinion among the leaders of the Liberal party as to the most effective method for assuring peace.

Mr. Winston Churchill delivered a much-commented address in Glasgow, February 9, 1912, in which he made the following striking remarks:

“The British navy is to us a necessity, and for some points of view the German navy is to them more in the nature of a luxury. Our naval power involves British existence. It is existence to us, it is expansion to them. We cannot menace the peace of a single continental hamlet nor do we wish to do so, no matter how great and supreme our navy may become. But on the other hand, the whole fortunes of our race and empire, the whole treasure accumulated during so many centuries of sacrifice and achievement would perish and be swept away if our naval supremacy were to be impaired. It is the British navy which makes Great Britain a great power. But Germany was a great power, respected and honored all over the world, before she had a single ship.”

He declared that Great Britain would be the first power to welcome and respond to a slackening of naval rivalry; but if there were to be increases on the continent, she would have no difficulty in meeting them. It is a characteristic fact that this speech was received with more general satisfaction by the opposition than by the Liberal party.

We shall presently observe how the name of Lord Haldane, then British Lord Chancellor, became associated with an attitude toward Germany of quite a different tone.

Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg declared in his speech before the Reichstag on December 2, 1914, that he had in past years endeavored to bring about a frank understanding with Great Britain. The truth of this statement can no more be refuted than can that of the counter-vailing proposition that the British government was equally desirous of arriving at a friendly accord. A peculiar element in the situation and the existence of mutual suspicion are chiefly responsible for the failure to achieve what was desired by both parties.

At the beginning of 1912 information reached the British government that it would be agreeable to the Kaiser if a member of the cabinet could go to Berlin to discuss relations informally between the two countries. Lord Haldane's intimate acquaintance and sympathy with German life and thought, and his admiration for German philosophy and literature suggested him as a suitable envoy for this mission. He arrived in Berlin, February 9, 1912.

It was reported that Lord Haldane entered into conversations with regard to important territorial adjustments in Africa. We may observe in this connection that about the same time Professor Hans Delbrück discussed in the *Preussische Jahrbücher*, of which he is the editor, the aims of German colonial policy. Although sturdily nationalistic in his general views, an advocate of German expansion, Professor Delbrück may be regarded as a reliably representative German of the influential intellectual circles, a personality free from extreme and exaggerated political views. His leading characteristic is his independence. As professor in a Prussian university, and therefore an official, he criticised so sharply the government's treatment of the

Danes in Schleswig, alluding in March, 1899, to "the brutality which exhibits us to the abhorrence of the civilized world," that his removal from the chair of history was demanded. He was actually fined 500 marks (\$119) for his contumacious behavior, and this incident may be regarded as evidence to show about how far the alleged tendency in Germany to curtail academic freedom by government interference may be expected to go. In spite of his independence Professor Delbrück is in close touch with the government and this invests with special importance all that he writes on current political topics.

Lord Haldane's visit in Berlin had no apparent results; but the rumored discussion of the African situation is significant. The present war will almost certainly be followed by territorial adjustments in Africa. The holdings of the European powers in the Black Continent are scattered in fragments like a mosaic of irregular pattern. It is obviously desirable that a more logical apportionment should take the place of the present patchwork system. For this reason Professor Delbrück's article cited above furnishes valuable testimony regarding Germany's aspirations. He declared that national, not economic, considerations should dominate in colonial policy; trade and commerce should be regarded as means for the extension and consolidation of the German nationality. The existing German colonies were ill-suited as a basis for a national, colonial development. The first essential condition, an extensive, uninterrupted expanse of colonial territory was lacking. He proceeded to suggest plans for securing the necessary basis of compactness for the African colonies. He assumed in the first place that the Portuguese colonies would eventually be apportioned between Germany and Great Britain. In making such a division he thought that Germany might at least expect to receive Angola, Cabinda,

and Zanzibar. Germany could then exchange Togo for the remainder of the French Congo territory between Kamerun and the mouth of the Congo, with the French privilege of eventually purchasing Belgium's rights in the former Congo Free State. In this way Kamerun, the present French Congo, Angola, and German Southwest Africa would constitute a practically unbroken German colonial domain of large extent. He suggested a second, and possibly even more satisfactory plan for the event that Great Britain desired to obtain a continuous route from the Cape to Cairo, which is at present interrupted only by German East Africa. Germany should in that case cede this colony to Great Britain and receive in return the British territory of Nigeria and the French territories of Dahomey and the Congo with the eventual right of purchasing the Belgian Congo, Great Britain indemnifying France by ceding to her Gambia, Sierra Leone, and the Gold Coast. In this way the three powers would convert their dependencies into compact blocks, Germany's African empire extending from the western extremity of Togo to the southern limit of German Southwest Africa.

Suggestions had already been made before Lord Haldane's visit in Berlin regarding a retardation in the rate of naval construction by Germany and Great Britain. But Germany wanted a comprehensive political agreement with Great Britain before considering the proposed naval understanding. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg commented in his speech at the opening of the Reichstag, August 19, 1915, on his efforts to place Anglo-German relations upon a permanent basis of friendship. From his words and other evidence it appears that he suggested an agreement in 1912 in essentially the following terms: (1) that neither country had any idea of aggression against the other, and that neither would make an unprovoked attack upon the

other or join in any combination for the purpose of such an aggression; and (2) that in the event of an unprovoked attack made on either party by a third power or group of powers, the party not attacked would stand aside; but (3) that the obligation of observing neutrality should not apply in cases where it would be incompatible with existing agreements made by the contracting parties.

Great Britain was prepared to accept the first part of this proposal and gave assurances that she had not entered into any engagement to attack Germany and would not enter into any, but refused to bind herself absolutely to maintain an attitude of neutrality in case Germany were involved in war with any other power or powers.

The Chancellor interpreted this refusal in the sense that Great Britain was not willing to pledge her abstention from assisting France in an aggressive enterprise against Germany. The British government, on the other hand, regarded the proposal as a disguised attempt to bind Great Britain's hands while Germany crushed and despoiled France. The position of France was therefore the key to the situation. While Great Britain was not disposed to back France in an aggressive attempt to recover Alsace-Lorraine, she could not afford to see France weakened, and deprived of her position as a great power. In consequence of the difficulty of ascertaining which party in a conflict is really the aggressor, the promise to stand aside in any case in which Germany was attacked might compromise Great Britain's interest in the preservation of France. For a statesman of Bismarckian dexterity might conceivably arise in Germany capable of saddling France with the apparent responsibility for provoking a war which was really contrived for German aggrandizement.

Suppose the formal inception of hostilities rested with Austria-Hungary. If Austria-Hungary and Russia were

at war Germany would probably feel bound by her treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary to go to her assistance. The moment this occurred, France would doubtless be under obligation, in accordance with the terms of the Dual Alliance, to aid Russia by attacking Germany. A situation would thus be created in which, according to the terms of the proposed Anglo-German agreement, Germany, ostensibly the victim of an unprovoked attack, might crush France and help herself to the latter's colonies, while Great Britain would be pledged to stand by inactively and watch the spoliation of her neighbor. The acceptance of the proposed agreement by Great Britain would presumably have eliminated her participation in the campaign of 1914. It would have removed the element which many regard as decisive in turning the balance against the success of the great drive on Paris.

Count Andrassy for instance declared:

"It is as clear as sunlight that without the intervention of England, France would long ago have been beaten to the ground and perhaps forfeited her position as a great power for generations."

Great Britain's rejection of Germany's offer was analogous to Germany's renunciation of the Re-insurance Treaty with Russia. In each instance the rejection was due to a relationship of peculiar intimacy between one of the principal parties in the case and a third power, and to suspicion in consequence of the difficulty of defining with precision an attitude of aggression. These proposals made in 1912 throw light upon the allusions to general neutrality arrangements made just before the war both by Sir Edward Grey and Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg.

The disparity of opinion within the Liberal party in Great Britain regarding the absorbing topic of Anglo-German relations may be illustrated by a circular letter

sent by Sir J. Brunner, President of the National Liberal Federation, to the chairmen of Liberal associations throughout the country. In this communication he claimed that the Liberal government in its policy had not been faithful to its election pledges. The Liberal victory in 1906 had been won on a program of peace, retrenchment, and reform. But the false naval panic of 1909 had, in his estimation, swept away the spirit of prudence and economy. The invention of the *Dreadnought* had proved a curse to mankind. British friendship with France had been twisted into an entanglement injurious to Anglo-German relations. The success of Lord Haldane's mission to Berlin had been thwarted by Mr. Churchill's warlike speeches. In consequence of these mistakes, he urged that the Federation should demand a change in policy.

A conference on Anglo-German relations was held in Caxton Hall, October 30 to November 2, 1912, where the sympathy and views of many leading men of both countries found expression. It is significant to note that the right of maritime capture in time of war, persistently adhered to by Great Britain, was condemned by prominent international lawyers as the principal cause of Anglo-German discord. The dangerous influence of the press on international relations, and the possibilities for an understanding regarding German colonial expansion were discussed, and a permanent committee was appointed for carrying on the business of the conference.

In introducing the naval estimates, March 26, 1913, Mr. Churchill suggested the idea of a "naval holiday," that is to say, a suspension of all naval construction by Great Britain and Germany for the period of one year. In the course of his speech he stated that according to the program adopted in 1912 the progress of naval construction in six years would produce a total of twenty-five



Ulster volunteers, armed and drilling preparatory to forcibly rejecting Home Rule.



Lord Haldane, Lord Chancellor and former Minister of War, arriving with Lord Kitchener at the War Office.



capital ships in the United Kingdom against fourteen in Germany. For any German keel in addition to the program already adopted, he said that Great Britain would lay down two. If Germany wished to modify this program for 1914, she had only to say the word.

But on April 7th the German Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, said that the German government must await definite proposals from Great Britain before considering such a cessation of construction.

Accordingly, Mr. Churchill renewed his proposal for a "naval holiday" in a speech delivered at Manchester, October 18th. After alluding to the statement of the Chancellor that the German government awaited definite proposals, Mr. Churchill said that in 1914 Great Britain was to lay down four new keels and Germany two. He offered, therefore, that, if Germany would defer laying down her two keels for a year, Great Britain would postpone her four for the same period. In this way large sums of money would be saved for social improvement.

This proposal did not receive Germany's assent. Many people in Germany regarded it as a deceptive stratagem; others, as a confession of weakness on the part of Great Britain. German authorities declared, moreover, that the proposal was impractical for Germany, because Great Britain could build ships more rapidly, and also because the German dockyard employees would be left without work during the vacation year, while the men in the British yards could be employed on foreign orders.

These incidents illustrate the diversity of opinion among British Liberals as to the most effective means for preserving peace. Some urged that formidable preparations for defense were the most reliable guarantee of safety, while others maintained that a cordial, conciliatory attitude was the essential requirement.

As late as August 1st very few people in Great Britain believed that the country would be drawn into the war. They regarded the conflict as a Balkan question in which they had no concern. One may almost say that the nation as a whole was very strongly opposed to the notion of intervening in any European war.

The Labor party drew up a resolution on July 31st, expressing the hope "that on no account will this country be dragged into a European conflict, in which, as the prime minister has stated, we have no direct or indirect interest," and stating, that "the party calls upon all labor organizations to watch events vigilantly, so as to oppose, if need be, in the most effective way, any action which may involve us in war."

The anti-war feeling was vigorously expressed by a considerable portion of the press. Thus the *Daily News and Leader* in an editorial of July 29th declared that Austria-Hungary could not be blamed for her determination to put a stop to a continual menace to her prosperity, or even existence. Austria-Hungary was apparently resolved "to take the utmost risks in order to end the machinations of Russia in the Balkans, and to test the readiness of that power to back her Serbian instrument even to the point of war." The article asserted that Russia is no true champion of freedom, and that her claim to be the protector of the Slav peoples is unfounded. Russia had intervened in Balkan affairs for entirely selfish ends, and her attitude at the present was determined by her own far-reaching designs. Neither France nor Great Britain could have any sympathy with these designs. France should declare plainly that she would have no part in saving Serbia from her deserved chastisement. The suggestion that Great Britain should spend lives and treasure "to establish Russia in the Balkans would be an inconceivable outrage to a democratic country."

On the 29th the *Daily Graphic*, while acknowledging that the contest between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was being waged near a powder magazine that might explode and involve Europe in a terrible catastrophe, declared:

“That this risk has been duly weighed by the Austrian Emperor and his sagacious advisers we do not doubt, and it is in that circumstance that we find the best grounds for hope. There is, indeed, not the slightest reason, apart from incomprehensible wrong-headedness, why, at this stage, at least, any other state should interfere. Even if Austrian action were less justified than it is, the idea of plunging the whole of Europe into war on that account would be an act of madness.

“There is, then, no reason whatever for enlarging the area of the war, and if so incendiary an initiative should come from one of our own allies, we trust that Sir Edward Grey will not shrink from denying it all countenance on the part of Great Britain.”

As late as August 1st the same paper maintained that by remaining outside the fire zone Great Britain could do a great deal of good in the way of protecting the minor states such as Belgium and Holland, and preserving the peace in the Balkans.

The *Nation* on the same day, while admitting that Austria-Hungary deliberately provoked the war with Serbia by her excessive demands, stated that British public opinion was definitely opposed to war. The general panic throughout Europe was a sufficient explanation for the pacific spirit of the world of finance and commerce. The British working classes had as much reason to dread a general war as the Socialists of Germany, who were holding monster meetings to protest against it. The conclusion was drawn from these observations, that “a minister who led this country into war would be responsible for a war as

causeless and unpopular as any war in history, and that he would cease to lead the Liberal party." The article maintained that Great Britain's proper rôle was that of mediator. "The suggestion conveyed in the articles of the *Times* and *Morning Post* . . . that the appalling contingency of a general war might make a case for our own armed action, is the language of sheer insanity. We do these writers the credit of supposing that they argue that the fear of our armed intervention might conduce to the general peace. On the contrary, the knowledge that we were prepared to back her is the one thing which might induce Russia to make war, and there the whole danger lies. . . . That our statesmen should even dream of sharing with one ship or one battalion in the immense and irrational crime of a general war for a local end that touches no real interest of Western Europe is an absurdity which we need not discuss."

The London *Times*, the traditional mouthpiece of the more emphatic British spirit, was expressing itself in a distinctly different tone. On the 30th it declared:

"This government and this nation reserve for themselves, it need hardly be said, the most complete liberty of action in such an event. If France is menaced, or the safety of the Belgian frontier, which we have guaranteed with her and with Prussia by treaties that Mr. Gladstone's government in 1870 confirmed, we shall know how to act. We can no more afford to see France crushed by Germany, or the balance of power upset against France, than Germany can afford to see Austria-Hungary crushed by Russia, and that balance upset against Austrian and Hungarian interests. Upon that issue, should it become an issue to be determined by arms, our friends and our enemies will find that we think and act with one accord."

The *Times* expressed itself even more strongly and unequivocally on August 1st. After summing up the situation



Cheering crowd surrounding the car of Mr. Asquith, the British Prime Minister.



British interest in the war. A crowd in Whitehall, opposite Downing Street, waiting for a glimpse of ministers and other notables.



it declared that the action demanded of the British Empire in the impending conditions was clear:

“If France and Russia are involved in war, the Empire must support them with all its strength and without delay.” The editorial proceeded to unfold the threefold reason:

“In the first place we must stand by our friends. . . . The character of nations is weighed by the world at moments like this. We should be judged, and rightly judged, unworthy of the friendship of any civilized power, if we were to repudiate the claim of France and Russia upon our support now that events, against their will as against ours, have brought our coöperation to the decisive test of war. . . .”

“In the second place we have a vital interest in seeing that France is not overwhelmed by Germany, however friendly we may and do feel to the German people. The power which dominates France will dominate Belgium and the Netherlands and threaten, as did Louis XIV and Napoleon, the very basis of the Empire’s existence—British sea-power. . . .”

“In the third place, the Empire stands for civilized relations between peoples and the utmost regard for the spirit of international law. It stands also for peace, and it must resist at all costs a revival of the doctrine that war is merely an instrument of policy, not the last resort when policy has failed.”

With few exceptions the German dailies do not employ special correspondents in London, but receive their British news reports through the Wolff Agency (Wolff Telegraphische Agentur), which is said to have been subsidized by the German government. The statement has been made that during the fateful days from July 31st until August 4th, when Great Britain’s policy hung in the balance, this German agency transmitted only such extracts

from the British press as would convey the impression that Great Britain's attitude was unconditionally pacific. Such a statement, if authenticated, would constitute a historical fact of considerable significance. It suggests that the whole subject of the influence of the press in its relation to the causes of the war is a field whose subsoil conceals incalculable opportunities for profitable historical investigation.

As the war clouds loomed blacker and ever more menacing on the eastern horizon, France turned her gaze with increasing anxiety across the Channel, and French statesmen contemplated with ever greater solicitude the probable attitude of their *entente* associate in case the threatening hurricane should break. Sir Edward Grey encouraged them with no specific assurance of help before August 2d.

Some hostile critics, it is true, claim that the British Foreign Secretary virtually gave his promise of British support to France as early as July 29th, and that the assurance given at that time was the decisive factor which precipitated the general conflict. The importance of this assertion requires a somewhat detailed explanation of the circumstances upon which it is based.

In an interview with M. Paul Cambon in the morning of July 29th, Sir Edward Grey announced his intention of telling the German ambassador that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of their conversations into any sense of false security that Great Britain would stand aside, if all the efforts to preserve peace should fail. Sir Edward Grey added, however, that British public opinion "approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago." The British idea was to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. The British government had not decided what they would do in case Germany and France became involved. Great Britain was free from

engagements, and they would have to decide what British interests required them to do. Sir Edward Grey considered it necessary to say this lest M. Cambon be misled by the naval precautions and warning to Prince Lichnowsky into supposing that British policy in the event of war had been determined.

The same day Sir Edward Grey told Prince Lichnowsky "in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on his mind," that so long as the situation was restricted to the present issues, he had no thought of interfering, but that, if Germany and France became involved, he did not wish Prince Lichnowsky to be misled "by the friendly tone of their conversation into thinking that they should stand aside." If British interests should require them to intervene, the decision would have to be very rapid. Sir Edward Grey "did not wish to be open to any reproach" that the friendly tone of their conversations had misled the German ambassador.

These steps, particularly the conversations with M. Cambon, have been assailed from the most opposite points of view. For British Jingoës regarded the remarks to the French ambassador as the expression of an attitude of disloyalty, whilst German critics not only burden Great Britain with the responsibility for the war, on the ground that she could have prevented it, but point to this very conversation as an unmistakable intimation that Great Britain would take her stand by the side of France and Russia. We may follow the alleged course of the fateful current set in motion by Sir Edward Grey's remarks, as traced by a prominent German observer.

Our guide reminds us that M. Sazonoff had declared to the British ambassador in St. Petersburg on July 25th that if Russia felt sure of the support of France, she would face all the risks of war. But France, as he informs us, hesitated

to commit herself unreservedly until she was sure of Great Britain's support. Sir Edward Grey's announcement on the 29th furnished precisely the desired assurance. France immediately communicated her resolution to perform her duty as an ally of Russia, and this was all that was required to incline the scales in favor of war. Corroborative evidence is furnished by the letter of the Belgian chargé d'affaires from St. Petersburg on July 30th, which was intercepted in Germany and reserved for publication. This letter declares that Russia had received definite assurance of British support, and that this had greatly strengthened the war party, giving it the upper hand.

The author of the theory which we are discussing does not find in the published correspondence the report of the conversation between Sir Edward Grey and M. Cambon which must have been sent by the latter from London to Paris, as a necessary link in the chain of causality, or even the resulting communication from Paris to St. Petersburg. He intimates that these messages have been suppressed from considerations of policy. But as proof that such communications did pass between the capitals, bearing the contagion of encouragement to hostile action, he quotes a passage in a message from M. Sazonoff to the Russian ambassador in Paris, contained in the Orange Book, number 58, probably dispatched on the evening of July 29th, as follows: "Please inform the French government of this, and add that we are sincerely grateful to them for the declaration which the French ambassador made to me on their behalf, to the effect that we could count fully upon the assistance of our ally, France."

Although the actual French communication, of which this is an acknowledgment, is not included in the published correspondence, a parallel communication, undoubtedly identical with it in substance, is reproduced in the

Orange Book, number 55, a telegram from the Russian ambassador in Paris, dated July 29th, disregarded by our German authority, containing the following passage:

‘M. Viviani has just confirmed to me the French government’s firm determination to act in concert with Russia. This determination is upheld by all classes of society and by the political parties, including the Radical Socialists, who have just addressed a resolution to the government expressing the absolute confidence and patriotic sentiments of their party.’

The resolve of the French government to act in concert with Russia was probably communicated concurrently to the Russian ambassador in Paris and to the French ambassador in St. Petersburg, the latter being instructed to transmit the message to the Russian Foreign Office. If we assume, as seems perfectly justifiable, that the communication in the Orange Book, number 55, is virtually the same as that to which M. Sazonoff alludes in number 58, we perceive that the expression of solidarity by the French government, for which M. Sazonoff sends thanks, is self-explanatory without implying any previous message of encouragement from London. For President Poincaré and Prime Minister Viviani returned to Paris on July 29th, and a first consideration after their arrival might naturally impel them to confirm the assurances of French support for Russia which had been given in their absence.

There is some indication, on the other hand, that Sir Edward Grey’s conversation with Prince Lichnowsky on July 29th exercised a transitory influence on the attitude of the Teutonic powers. For on July 30th Austria-Hungary expressed a willingness to resume conversations with Russia, and M. Jules Cambon reported as follows from Berlin:

“The Chancellor’s attitude is very probably the result of the last interview of Sir Edward Grey with Prince Lichnowsky. Up to these very last few days people have flattered themselves here that England would remain aloof, and the impression produced by her attitude upon the German government and upon financiers and business men is profound.”

A communication from Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador in Rome, to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 30th, states that “the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs believed that Germany was disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria-Hungary, as she seemed convinced that Great Britain would act with France and Russia and was anxious to avoid an issue with her.”

After examining the two conversations of Sir Edward Grey from all points of view we shall probably conclude that his words were a fairly approximate statement of the position of the British government on that date, that they were not intended as an assurance or a threat, and that any effect produced by them on the conduct of the other powers was incidental and probably not decisive.

On July 30th M. Cambon reminded Sir Edward Grey of the correspondence which had passed between them November 22, 1912, as reproduced in Volume I, pages 269-271, and urged him to state what Great Britain would do in case Germany attacked France. Sir Edward Grey promised to see him the next afternoon, after the cabinet meeting which was to be held in the morning. But on the afternoon of July 31st Sir Edward Grey could only tell him that the cabinet had decided that they could not give any pledge. He said:

“Up to the present moment we do not feel, and public opinion does not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country are involved. Further developments might

alter this situation and cause the government and parliament to take the view that intervention is justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude."

M. Cambon repeated his question whether Great Britain would help France if Germany made an attack on her, and Sir Edward Grey replied that he could make no such engagement. M. Cambon asked whether he could not submit this question again to the cabinet, but the foreign secretary offered no assurance in reply.

The importunity of M. Cambon, which can only be explained on the assumption of extreme anxiety, is hardly compatible with the view that the British Foreign Secretary's words on July 29th had really conveyed an assurance of assistance.

It may safely be affirmed that as late as August 1st the British public was opposed to war, and the British government saw no reason for promising to intervene in any other than a diplomatic sense. But the current of events glided suddenly into a cataract sweeping along the government and nation alike with bewildering velocity. Saturday and Sunday, August 1st and 2d, have been called the "fateful days of the century." They will pass into British history as the memorable week-end. They were days of intense suspense and mental conflict. On Saturday came the news of Germany's ultimatum to Russia, and of her message to France, which, if not strictly an ultimatum, was an almost certain indication that war between Germany and France was inevitable. Contradictory impulses surged to and fro in the popular imagination. Antagonistic views with regard to public policy were sustained with passionate conviction. A monster peace meeting was held in Trafalgar Square on Sunday afternoon at four o'clock, where

Mr. Keir Hardie, the Laborite parliamentary leader was the principal speaker. A similar public demonstration in favor of participation in the war took place only a few rods away. Cabinet meetings were held throughout the greater part of the day, and dissension threatened to disrupt the ministry, so that a coalition cabinet would have to be created in its place.

Great Britain had not been engaged in war with a great power for nearly sixty years, or in any war creating a really critical situation for a hundred years. The tradition of non-intervention in continental affairs had taken deep root in the political instincts of the people. A contest demanding the utmost exertion of every national faculty, a struggle in which national existence itself might be hazarded, would rend the very warp and woof of inveterate habits. The nation still wavered before the fateful leap and the world hung breathlessly on a decision in which the outcome of the whole tremendous conflict might very likely be involved.

What a theme for tragedy of the classic type! A dramatic situation of unsurpassed intensity; a collision of motives and personalities of compelling distinctness; a development complying with the Aristotelian conditions, unity of time, of place, and of action; confined within a period of about twenty-four hours and a restricted area in Westminster; with the great political and Laborite leaders as characters and the multitude of interventionists and pacifists as chorus; the *dénouement* consistently produced by intelligence of Germany's ultimatum to Belgium. All the millions of the British Empire may be regarded as the very interested spectators of this unusual drama which might influence their whole future condition to remotest ages.

After hours of discussion and controversy nearly all the members of the cabinet were convinced that a violation of





Andrew Bonar Law, leader of the Opposition.



J. Keir Hardie, a Laborite parliamentary leader.

Belgian neutrality or a German naval attack on the undefended French coast should be regarded as a *casus belli* and gave their assent to the general statement of policy which Sir Edward Grey was to make before parliament the following afternoon.

After the cabinet meeting on Sunday afternoon, Sir Edward Grey gave M. Cambon the first partial promise of eventual support, in the following words:

“I am authorized to give assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.

“This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty’s Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty’s Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place.”

The House of Commons had adjourned, July 31st, after the prime minister’s statement that news had been received of Russia’s general mobilization and Germany’s proclamation of martial law.

The House reassembled on Monday, August 3d, at a quarter before three, for its most memorable session since the passage of the first Reform Bill. Practically every member was present, the galleries were crowded, and a vast concourse of people, estimated at 50,000 persons, awaited outside the decision of the nation’s representatives on a question which involved incalculable consequences. The eyes of the whole nation seemed to be turned to the British Foreign Secretary as he arose to unfold the international situation.

Sir Edward Grey declared, in the first place, that the government had worked with all its power to preserve

peace. The preservation of peace had been universally recognized as its aim in the Balkan crises in 1912-1913. But at that time the powers had been willing to devote time and patience to the adjustment of the problems growing out of the situation. In the present crisis, on the other hand, there had been a tendency in some quarters to force matters to a speedy issue. He wished, therefore, to consider dispassionately what policy British interests, honor, and obligations demanded.

As for British obligations, he recalled the fact that when the Russian Minister Iswolsky came to London in 1908, he told him that public opinion in Great Britain would not support the British government in offering more than diplomatic support in the question which arose in consequence of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, since it was solely a Balkan problem. He assured the House, furthermore, that no other promise had been made in the present crisis until the day before. No definite promise had been made to France in 1905-1906, although he had expressed the opinion at that time, that if war between Germany and France grew out of the Moroccan situation, in which an agreement between Great Britain and France was involved, British public opinion would rally to the support of France. The French government had made the observation that such support could not be very effective without some preliminary conversations between naval and military experts regarding common action. Accordingly, Sir Edward Grey had authorized these "conversations" with the distinct understanding that they should not in any way restrict the freedom of either government. The British Foreign Office retained the same attitude at the time of the Moroccan crisis in 1911. Later, on November 22, 1912, letters were exchanged between the foreign office and the French ambassador containing the

definite agreement confirming the informal, non-restrictive character of the "conversations" of the military and naval experts. This correspondence was the starting point for the British government's policy in the present crisis.

The present situation was quite different from the Moroccan crisis in its origin; for it grew out of a dispute in which France was not primarily concerned. The French were only involved in consequence of an obligation of honor established by their definite alliance with Russia. But the British government was not a party to the Franco-Russian alliance, of the very terms of which it was ignorant. As to how far British friendship for France entailed an obligation, he said: "Let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself." . . . "The House individually and collectively may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my own feelings in the matter."

"The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the northern and western coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet being concentrated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us.

"The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside, and see

this going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing. I believe that would be the feeling of this country. There are times when one feels that if these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling which would spread with irresistible force throughout the land."

The speaker went on to show that material as well as sentimental considerations were involved in the situation in regard to France. For the partial withdrawal of the French naval forces from the Mediterranean might eventually endanger British vital interests. In view of the urgent position of affairs for the French government, he informed his hearers that he had, on the previous afternoon, given the French ambassador assurance, subject to the approval of parliament, that if the German fleet should come down the North Sea or through the Channel to attack the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet would "give all the protection in its power."

"I understand," continued Sir Edward Grey, "that the German government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the northern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came to the House, but it is far too narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir, there is the more serious consideration—becoming more serious every hour—there is the question of the neutrality of Belgium."

Sir Edward Grey proceeded to review the history of Belgian neutrality, and to define the attitude of the British government towards it. He submitted the replies of the French, German, and Belgian governments to the communications of the British government on the present occasion regarding the preservation of Belgian neutrality as guaranteed by treaty. The following reply came from France:



Lord Morley, Lord President of the Council.



John Burns, the first representative of the Labor party in the British Cabinet.

*Lord Morley and Mr. Burns were opposed to Great Britain's entering the war and resigned their places in the British Cabinet on August 5, 1914.*



“The French government is resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure the defense of her security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day.”

From the German government the reply was:

“The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor.” Later Herr von Jagow intimated that Germany could not give any answer at all, “as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing, to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign.”

The Belgian reply was contained in a telegram from Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister in Brussels:

“Belgium expects and desires that other powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, the Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbors were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies.”

Sir Edward Grey informed the House that information had just arrived indicating that Germany had sent an ultimatum to the Belgian government offering friendly relations on condition that the Belgian government would

facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium. Just before he reached the House, Sir Edward Grey had heard of the receipt of an appeal for diplomatic intervention sent by the King of the Belgians to King George. He reminded the members of the House that Great Britain had already intervened diplomatically, but apparently to no purpose. If the territory of one of the smaller states should be violated in this war, its independence would be practically destroyed, whatever the destiny of its integrity might be. The independence of Holland and Denmark would eventually follow that of Belgium.

Sir Edward Grey pointed out that it would be very doubtful whether, if Great Britain stood aside, and husbanded her resources, she would be able to use her material force decisively for putting things right at the termination of the war, after her moral prestige had been diminished by shirking manifest obligations. On the other hand, Great Britain would inevitably suffer great material losses during the war, alike as neutral or belligerent, in consequence of the curtailment of international trade. At the close of the war it would be too late for Great Britain "to prevent the whole of the West of Europe opposite falling under the domination of a single power, if that had been the result of hostilities."

He assured his hearers that the government had as yet taken no engagement binding them to send an expeditionary force out of the country. But the fleet was already mobilized, and the army was in process of mobilization.

Continuing he made the encouraging observation, that "the one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. The general feeling throughout Ireland—and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad—does not make the Irish question a consideration which we feel we have now to take into account."

It followed from the speaker's statement thus far, that the commitment to France and the consideration of Belgium rendered impossible a policy of unconditional neutrality. Such being the case, the country had to be prepared to take its part in the war at any time. "The most awful responsibility is resting upon the government," he declared, "in deciding what to advise the House of Commons to do." . . . "The situation has developed so rapidly, that technically, as regards the condition of the war, it is most difficult to describe what has actually happened. I wanted to bring out the underlying issues which would affect our own conduct, and our policy, and to put it clearly. I have now put the vital facts before the House, and if, as seems not improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, to take our stand upon those issues, then I believe, when the country realizes what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the West of Europe, which I have endeavored to describe to the House, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the whole country."

When Sir Edward Grey had finished speaking, Mr. Bonar Law rose to his feet to respond as parliamentary leader of the opposition. He said that he did not believe that any member doubted that the government had done everything in its power to maintain peace, and that if any other course was taken, it would be because they had no alternative. He continued:

"The government already knows, but I give them now the assurance on behalf of the party of which I am leader in this House, that in whatever steps they think it necessary to take for the honor and security of this country, they can rely on the unhesitating support of the opposition."

Mr. John Redmond, leader of the Irish Nationalist party begged the indulgence of the House to intervene with a few remarks. In order to appreciate the electric effect of Mr. Redmond's words it is necessary to remember how in bygone years the Irish Nationalist benches in the House had been associated with the spirit of bitter opposition and the most exasperating obstructionist proceedings; that the Home Rule agitation had led to a division of Ireland into two armed camps; that the conference for conciliation summoned by the king had turned out to be an ignominious failure only ten days before; that there had been bloodshed in Dublin in consequence of partisan violence eight days before; and, above all, that the leaders in Germany regarded an outbreak of civil war in distracted Ireland as practically inevitable, and were doubtless encouraged in their attitude by this conviction.

Mr. Redmond alluded to the foreign secretary's declaration "that the one bright spot in the situation was the changed feeling in Ireland." He admitted that in crises in the past the sympathy of Irish Nationalists had not been with Great Britain. But the altered views of the British democracy had brought about a great change, so that now the democracy of Ireland would "turn with the utmost anxiety and sympathy to this country in every trial and every danger that may overtake it." Then he showed how history might repeat itself in the case of Ireland. For when Ireland was threatened with invasion in the darkest days of the American War, in 1778, "a body of 100,000 Irish volunteers sprang into existence for defending her shores." "To-day," he said, "there are in Ireland two large bodies of volunteers. One of them sprang into existence in the North. Another has sprung into existence in the South. I say to the government that they may to-morrow withdraw every one of their troops from Ireland. I say that

the coast of Ireland will be defended from foreign invasion by her armed sons, and for this purpose armed Nationalist Catholics in the South will be only too glad to join arms with the armed Protestant Ulstermen in the North. Is it too much to hope that out of this situation there may spring a result which will be good not merely for the empire, but good for the future welfare and integrity of the Irish nation? I ought to apologize for having intervened, but while Irishmen generally are in favor of peace, and would desire to save the democracy of this country from all the horrors of war, while we would make every possible sacrifice for that purpose, still if the dire necessity is forced upon this country we offer the government of the day that they may take their troops away, and that, if it is allowed to us, in comradeship with our brethren in the North, we will ourselves defend the coasts of our country."

These words were received with a general outburst of enthusiasm. It seemed for the moment that the impulse of patriotism and a common danger had fused the discordant feelings of all parts of the British Islands into a harmonious unit.

But Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, Laborite leader, straightway rose to express the conviction of his associates and himself that the position of the government was wrong. He said that if the safety or honor of the country was in danger they were ready to make any sacrifice, but he had not been persuaded that the country was in danger. His party was ready to support the government in a conflict confined to the defense of a small nationality like Belgium, if it were endangered. But the government was engaging in a whole European war. His misgivings were aroused as to the result of such a war for the power of Russia; and he maintained that no such friendship as the foreign secretary

described as existing between Great Britain and France could ever justify one nation entering into war on behalf of the other. "If France is really in danger," he declared, "if as the result of this, we are going to have the power, civilization, and genius of France removed from European history, then let him (Sir Edward Grey) so say. But it is an absolutely impossible conception which we are talking about to endeavor to justify that which the right honorable gentleman has foreshadowed. I not only know, but I feel, that the feeling of the House is against us. I have been through this before, and 1906 came as part recompense. It will come again. We are going to go through it all. We will go through it all. So far as we are concerned, whatever may happen, whatever may be said about us, whatever attacks may be made upon us, we will take the action that we will take of saying, that this country ought to have remained neutral, because in the deepest parts of our hearts we believe that that was right and that that alone was consistent with the honor of the country and the traditions of the party that are now in office."

The sitting of the House was suspended until evening, when the discussion was resumed upon the motion to adjourn. Sir Edward Grey read the following communication from the Belgian Legation in London:

"Germany sent yesterday evening at seven o'clock a note proposing to Belgium friendly neutrality, covering free passage on Belgian territory, and promising maintenance of independence of the kingdom and possessions at the conclusion of peace, and threatening, in case of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time limit of twelve hours was fixed for the reply. The Belgians have answered that an attack on their neutrality would be a flagrant violation of the rights of nations, and that to accept the German proposal would be to sacrifice the honor of a nation.

Conscious of its duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel aggression by all possible means." Sir Edward Grey said that the government would take this information into grave consideration; but he made no further comment upon it.

During the evening session the foreign secretary's policy was severely censured by representatives of a minority group of Radicals and Laborites, who clung to the doctrine of non-intervention in continental affairs, which had generally prevailed throughout the country, but was on the verge of a fatal collapse in consequence of Germany's procedure respecting Belgium. While the speeches in opposition to Sir Edward Grey's attitude were not of sufficient importance individually to require examination in detail, a summary of the arguments employed will help us to test the relevancy of the foreign minister's speech and the soundness of his views.

His critics observed that Sir Edward Grey took as the basis of his policy the two obligations which duty and interest alike imposed, the protection of the northern coast of France and of the neutrality of Belgium. But they noted, straightway, that Germany had promised, in return for British neutrality, to abstain from attacking the northern coast of France and to respect Belgian integrity. The margin between the range of the alleged obligations of Great Britain and the scope of Germany's offer appeared to be so slight, consisting solely in the difference between *preserving the neutrality* and *respecting the integrity* of Belgium, that the view was expressed by several speakers that the German proposals ought to be made the basis for further negotiation, that Sir Edward Grey ought to make a definite proposition that Great Britain would remain neutral in return for the two assurances required by British honor and interests. Hesitation to adopt Sir Edward Grey's attitude was largely due to the impression that he

had not exhausted the possibilities for a satisfactory understanding with Germany.

Besides the causes of the failure to effect a definite agreement between Great Britain and Germany in 1912, a conversation between Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, on August 1st, is significant in connection with the above proposal about an offer to Germany, because on that occasion the subject of possible conditions for British neutrality was broached. Sir Edward Grey had explained to the German ambassador that the reply of the German government to his note of inquiry concerning Germany's attitude with regard to Belgian neutrality was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feelings in Great Britain. At that, Prince Lichnowsky asked him whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, Great Britain would engage to remain neutral. Sir Edward Grey replied that he did not think that Great Britain could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone. Then the German ambassador urged him to formulate conditions on which Great Britain could remain neutral. He suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed. But Sir Edward Grey refused to make any promise to remain neutral on such terms.

On the basis of this interview the statement has been made that Great Britain refused all terms of neutrality, even the condition that Germany would respect the French colonies. It is not irrelevant to recall the fact that earlier, on July 29th, the Chancellor had made no promise as to the integrity of French colonial territory in the event of German victory. For Prince Lichnowsky's words on August 1st were only a suggestion, not an official proposal. It is not strictly accurate, therefore, to affirm that Great Britain rejected all terms of neutrality, even the condition

that Germany would respect the integrity of the French colonies. It is safe to assume, however, on the basis of the interview just mentioned, that Sir Edward Grey would have rejected such apparently liberal conditions, even if they had really been offered.

Dr. Bernhard Dernburg in alluding to this conversation remarked that "it is clear that public opinion in England, while being strongly influenced by the Belgian case, had other grudges against Germany. That is why Sir Edward Grey would not even formulate conditions to remain neutral if Belgian neutrality were guaranteed."

It may be observed throughout the article (in the *North American Review*, December, 1914) from which the above passage was quoted that the motives of the Teutonic powers are called "interests," while those of their opponents are "grudges." It would not be difficult to prove, however, that the "other grudges" as motives of British policy, to which Dr. Dernburg referred, may quite as legitimately be classified in the more dignified category of "interests."

A comparison of the conversation of August 1st and the debate in the House of Commons on August 3d proves that in the opinion of the British government the security of the French coast and the maintenance of Belgian neutrality were not alone sufficient as security for British interests or as a basis for British policy. And this conclusion involves the one important criticism which may be brought against Sir Edward Grey's otherwise adequate exposition of the fundamental features of British policy. He did not emphasize the cardinal fact that the preservation of the position of France as a great power was a vital British interest.

In commenting upon the Chancellor's proposals of July 29th, Sir Edward Grey had remarked that without being

deprived of further territory in Europe, France could be so crushed as to lose her position as a great power and become subordinate to German policy. He might have gone even further and declared that without losing territory anywhere, either in the colonies or at home, the vigor and independence of France might be fatally impaired. For history teaches by many examples that territorial integrity alone is not an adequate guarantee for political independence.

It is unfortunate for some reasons that the British government never formulated the conditions on which it would have remained neutral, although the results would undoubtedly have remained the same. For the conditions required by British interests would never have been accepted by the German government. An arrangement acceptable to the British government as a basis for neutrality would necessarily have contained some kind of a provision intended to guarantee the preservation of the strength of France against serious impairment. It would have excluded the captivating prospect of a large indemnity as the prize of an eventual German victory. It might very likely have confined the Germans to a purely defensive warfare on their western frontier.

Sensitiveness as to the fortunes of France threatened to drag British policy into a position very difficult to defend before the nation. It is thoroughly justifiable to assist a friendly neighboring state in defending itself against an unprovoked attack. Yet the solicitude on the part of Great Britain for France was likely to involve the former in a false position. France was associated in an alliance with Russia, the very terms of which were unknown to the British government. But in consequence of this alliance France might become involved in a war originating in some motive of Russian policy which could by no means

commend itself to British opinion. Nevertheless, British interests demanded apparently that France should be shielded from any disastrous consequences of such war-like action, as well as of provocative conduct at her own initiative. Great Britain virtually demanded exemption for France without being able herself to assume any corresponding responsibility for French conduct. This attitude was manifestly illogical.

Thus as late as August 3d there was the awkward possibility that, in spite of an apparently conciliatory attitude on the part of Germany, Great Britain would be drawn into a war which grew out of a quarrel in which she had no concern, solely for the purpose of protecting France from any fatal consequences of her alliance with Russia. The British government stood face to face with the embarrassing alternative of supporting France, and therefore Russia, in a conflict with regard to which public opinion would be dangerously divided, or of adhering to a rather ignominious neutrality, and thus permitting her interests in the preservation of France to be imperilled.

From this distressing situation British policy was rescued by the decision of the German General Staff to invade Belgium. In consequence of this measure British interests and duty were harmonized, a commendable cause of war was provided, and public opinion was marshalled to the support of the government's foreign policy.

Nevertheless, two members of the cabinet, Lord Morley and Mr. Burns, and an under-secretary, Mr. C. P. Trevelyan, resigned their posts, since they could not bring their views into conformity with the attitude of the government. Mr. Burns was the first representative of the Labor party who had sat in a British cabinet.

The German proposals for securing British neutrality, together with their alleged advantages, were first made

known to the public of Great Britain when published in the evening papers of August 3d, as formulated by Baron Kuhlmann, Councillor of the German Embassy, in the following terms:

“The maintenance of British neutrality would in no way injure France. On the contrary, it might be argued that by remaining neutral Great Britain could give France exactly as much strategic assistance and a good deal more effective diplomatic help.

“As, according to all reliable information, there is no intention of sending British troops to the continent, and as a few British divisions, considering the enormous numbers engaged, could hardly alter the balance of power, all England can do for France is to protect her North Sea coast from invasion and to prevent the neutral ports of Belgium and Holland being used as bases of armed aggression against France.

“Germany would be disposed to give an undertaking that she will not attack France by sea in the North, or make any warlike use of the seacoast of Belgium or Holland, if it appeared that Great Britain would make this undertaking a condition of her neutrality for the time being.

“Thus England, without going to war herself, could render to France the maximum of assistance she could give by going to war. That England, as a neutral power, maintaining an armed neutrality, would diplomatically be a greater asset for France for the termination of hostilities at an early moment than if herself involved in war, is self-evident.”

Like some other German statements made before the war, the carefully studied tone of this document reminds us somewhat of the reassuring remarks of surgeons and nurses to patients or their friends on the eve of serious operations. The contemplated measures of Germany were

an unfortunate necessity, involving a modicum of pain, it is true, but quickly accomplished, if all those who were indirectly concerned would only keep their heads, after which everybody would experience a grateful sense of relief, and the world would be a more cheerful place of habitation for countless generations, because the civilizing, beneficent function of Germany would hereafter be unrestricted.

Baron Kuhlmann's version of the German offer was too plausible in tone. For how could it be believed that Germany was sincerely consulting for the eventual welfare of France? It may be observed that the German view expressed in this communication rated the effective military power of Great Britain on a par with that of Belgium. The German authorities evidently did not believe that the British would intervene in force in the continental theater of hostilities, in the early stages of the war, at any rate, which was about equivalent to no intervention at all, as they viewed the situation at the time. Baron Kuhlmann's communication confirms the view already expressed on page 60 regarding the German forecast of British conduct.

We may remark further that Germany offered to bargain away what she did not possess, namely, the right to use the seacoast of Holland and Belgium as bases for armed aggression against France. We need not be surprised at such a proposal appearing, as it did, on August 3d; for already, nearly twenty-four hours before, the German government had presented its ultimatum at Brussels, demanding the free traverse of Belgian territory for the German armies.

Many of the arguments in defense of Germany have assumed that the appropriate equivalent for an engagement on Germany's part to respect the neutrality of Belgium would have been a promise of general neutrality by

Great Britain, not simply a confirmation of Great Britain's treaty obligation not to violate Belgian territory. Germany did not at any time say to Great Britain, "I am prepared to respect Belgian neutrality, if you will do the same," but the German ambassador in London hinted that Germany might be willing to respect Belgian neutrality if Great Britain agreed to abstain altogether from hostilities against Germany.

In the session of the House of Commons, August 5th, the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, reported that the British ambassador at Berlin had received his passports at seven, the evening before, and that since eleven, the same night, a state of war had existed between themselves and Germany. He read the following communication from the British ambassador in Brussels:

"I have just received from the (Belgian) minister of foreign affairs a note of which the following is a literal translation:

"Belgian government regret to have to inform His Majesty's government that this morning armed forces of Germany penetrated into Belgian territory in violation of engagements assumed by treaty.

"Belgian government are further resolved to resist by all means in their power.

"Belgium appeals to Great Britain and France and Russia to coöperate, as guarantors, in defense of her territory.

"There would be concerted and common action with the object of resisting the forcible measures employed by Germany against Belgium, and at the same time of guarding the maintenance for future of the independence and integrity of Belgium.

"Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will assume defense of her fortified places.'"

Mr. Asquith gave notice that he would move a vote of credit of £100,000,000 (\$486,000,000) the next day in committee of supply.

Accordingly on August 6th, before the House of Commons in committee of supply, the following resolution was presented and discussed:

“That a sum, not exceeding £100,000,000, be granted to His Majesty, beyond the ordinary grants of parliament, towards defraying expenses that may be incurred during the year ending March 31, 1915, for all measures which may be taken for the security of the country, for the conduct of naval and military operations, for assisting the food supply, for promoting the continuance of trade, industry, and business communications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk, or otherwise for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war.”

In opening the debate on the resolution, Mr. Asquith referred to the terms which had been offered by Germany on July 29th, in return for British neutrality. Germany had been willing to promise not to make any territorial acquisitions at the expense of France (but not of the French colonies), to respect the integrity and neutrality of Holland, and to respect the integrity of Belgium when the war was over, if Belgium had not sided against Germany. In return for “a free license to Germany to annex, in the event of a successful war, the whole of the extra-European dominions and possessions of France,” and the renunciation by Great Britain of her obligation with respect to Belgium, they would have received “a promise—nothing more; a promise as to what Germany would do in certain eventualities; a promise, be it observed,” . . . “given by a power which was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treaty, and inviting us to do the same.”

Mr. Asquith declared that Sir Edward Grey had by his moderate reply confirmed his reputation gained in the Balkan crisis as the Peacemaker of Europe. He had "persisted to the very last moment of the last hour in that beneficent but unhappily frustrated purpose."

The prime minister proceeded to emphasize the government's realization of the incalculable calamity which a war between the Great Powers would entail, and the cabinet's deep feeling of responsibility as follows:


"There is no man amongst us sitting upon this bench in these trying days—more trying perhaps than any body of statesmen for a hundred years have had to pass through,—there is not a man amongst us who has not, during the whole of that time, had clearly before his vision the almost unequalled suffering which war, even in a just cause, must bring about, not only to the peoples who are for the moment living in this country and in other countries of the world, but to posterity and to the whole prospects of European civilization. Every step we took, we took with that vision before our eyes, and with a sense of responsibility which it is impossible to describe. Unhappily, if in spite of all our efforts to keep the peace, and with that full and overpowering consciousness of the result, if the issue be decided in favor of war, we have, nevertheless, thought it to be the duty as well as the interest of this country to go to war, the House may be well assured it was because we believe, and I am certain the country will believe that, we are unsheathing our sword in a just cause."

Great Britain was fighting, as he affirmed, "to fulfil a solemn international obligation," and "to vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, and by the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering power. I do not believe any nation ever entered into a great controversy—and





John Redmond, leader of the Irish Nationalist party in Parliament.



J. Ramsay MacDonald, the leader of the Labor party in Parliament, 1913.

this is one of the greatest history will ever know—with a clearer conscience and stronger conviction that it is fighting not for aggression, not for the maintenance even of its own selfish interest, but that it is fighting in defense of principles the maintenance of which is vital to the civilization of the world.”

In asking for a vote of credit of £100,000,000, the government had extended the traditional scope of such votes of credit, which are usually confined to strictly naval and military operations. On this occasion the government asked for a free hand to employ the money generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war.

In his capacity as secretary of state for war, a position which he had occupied until that morning, Mr. Asquith asked for a supplementary estimate for men for the army. After an allusion to the conditions under which he had undertaken the duties of the war office, and which were now, happily, entirely altered, he announced that the state of war made it impossible for him to continue to divide his attention between that department and his other responsibilities.

“I am very glad,” he continued, “to say that a very distinguished soldier and administrator in the person of Lord Kitchener, with that great public spirit and patriotism that everyone would expect from him, at my request stepped into the breach. Lord Kitchener, as everybody knows, is not a politician. His association with the government as a member of the cabinet for this purpose must not be taken as in any way identifying him with any set of political opinions. He has, at a great public emergency, responded to a great public call, and I am certain he will have with him, in the discharge of one of the most arduous tasks that has ever fallen upon a minister, the complete confidence of all parties and all opinions.”

Mr. Asquith asked for power to increase the number of men of all ranks in the army, in addition to the number already voted, by no less than 500,000. India was prepared to send a contingent, and the self-governing dominions had spontaneously made generous offers of men and money. The Mother Country must, therefore, "set the example, while she responds with gratitude and affection to those filial overtures from the outlying members of her family."

A noticeable feature of the debate in the committee of the whole of the House of Commons on the vote of credit for the war was the unqualified support of the opposition, the members of which regarded with far greater sympathy the policy of the government than did a considerable fraction of the Radicals.

Mr. Bonar Law rose to speak in behalf of the Conservatives, saying: "No minister has ever fulfilled a duty more responsible or in regard to which the responsibility was more acutely felt than that which has been fulfilled by the right honorable gentleman." He went on to declare that the opposition had dreaded war and longed for peace as strongly as any portion of the House. But in the circumstances Great Britain would inevitably be drawn into the war, and it was only a question whether they "should enter it honorably or be dragged into it with dishonor." Every member knew that the "*Entente* meant this in the minds of this government, that, if any of the powers were attacked aggressively, the others would be expected to step in to give their aid." The main question was whether the war had been provoked by any of their allies. He referred to the statement of the German ambassador at Vienna, as reproduced in the British correspondence: "As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about in backing Austria-Hungary in this matter." This was an illustration of the very obvious fact that for years past the key of peace

or war lay in Berlin. Germany could have prevented the war. The German plan of traversing Belgium was not of to-day or yesterday. The speaker expressed his satisfaction with a recent article in the *Manchester Guardian*, which, while still holding to the view that the war should have been avoided, declared that now they were in it, there was only one question, and that was to bring it to a successful issue.

"I have felt sympathy," he continued, "far more than at any other time, for the prime minister and for the foreign secretary. I can imagine nothing more terrible than that the foreign secretary should have a feeling that perhaps he has brought this country into an unnecessary war. No feeling can be worse. I can say this, and whether we are right or wrong, the whole House agrees with it I am sure, that that is a burden which the right honorable gentleman can carry with a good conscience, and that every one of us can put up unhesitatingly this prayer, may God defend the right."

He commended the statement of the prime minister that in such a country as Great Britain the development of industry and the supply of food at home is as much an operation of war as is the conduct of the armed forces. He thought that trade would be much more nearly normal than many feared. For five-sixths of British production was employed in the home trade; and if Great Britain kept command of the sea, they could count on the continuation of the greater part of the remaining sixth.

The subsequent course of the debate brought out the rather illusory, but certainly very common, view that there were virtually two distinct German peoples: the overbearing military caste, "that battens on the lust of aggrandizement, and is always aiming at and preparing for war, which has no regard for men's rights, and no respect for international rules," its motto being "Might is Right"; and the

great mass of honest, industrious, peacefully-minded citizens, who have been deceived, hoodwinked, and oppressed. After a year of the great struggle, we look back with a feeling of compassion for the trustful simplicity which derived confidence from such convictions, which fondly believed that German power would crumble like the walls of Jericho before the Allies' solemn invocation to liberty. These views, like the German expectation that the British Empire would fall to pieces at the first hostile impact, have been dispersed like foam on the billows of war and adversity.

That Great Britain ought to approach her task in a spirit of sober humility and of charity for the misguided German people, whose aberration it was her appointed function to correct, and without vainglory or self-complacency, was the general sense of the opinions expressed. One speaker deplored the deceptive influence of artificial notions of national honor.

Sir W. Lawson remarked that they had heard a great deal in the last few days about honor, and something about morality and self-interest.

"As to honor," he said, "that is a very elusive term. I see nothing honorable whatever in our present proceedings. The House will remember a very true saying of Mr. John Bright, that 'a nation dwells in its cottages.' We are—or ought to be—the guardians, as well as the representatives, of the millions of people who live in the cottages of this country, and surely the greatest and most supreme of British interests for them, and for us, lies in peace, and not in war, and their happiness is more important than all the so-called honor in the world. As far as the morality is concerned, when we are engaged, as we are now, in organized murder, I think the less said about morality the better. All that is bad enough. What is as bad as anything, from my point of view, about it is that it comes from a Liberal government,

which I was sent here to support. One of the principles I was sent to support was Free Trade. Why, Sir, there is no Protectionist tax which the wit of man could devise which would raise the prices of food and other articles to the same extent as a fortnight of serious war. Then I was sent to support—as I understood—a policy of peace, retrenchment, and reform. Where are they all now? All swallowed up in the bloody abyss of war!”

The speaker had felt heretofore sincere admiration for the foreign secretary. But his loyalty had been strained to the breaking point.

Mr. Falconer closed the debate by saying: “I think it right on behalf of members on this side who do not agree with much that has been said to say that we keep silent because we think that the words of the prime minister require nothing to be added to them, and that any attempt on our part to discuss any phase of this question would only detract from the impressive effect in this House, in our country, and throughout the whole civilized world. I desire to say for myself and for many others like myself that we entirely endorse and support the action of the government in this matter. We are fighting to maintain the peace of Europe, and I cannot understand people who make special profession of peace not being prepared to maintain it.”

The resolution was unanimously adopted.

At the same time the following resolutions were introduced:

“That an additional number of 500,000 men of all ranks be maintained for service at home and abroad, excluding His Majesty’s Indian possessions, in consequence of war in Europe, for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1915;”

“That an additional number not exceeding 67,000 officers, seamen and boys be employed for the year ending 31st day of March, 1915;” and

“That, towards making good the supply granted to His Majesty for the service of the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1915, a sum of £100,000,000 be granted out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom.”

These resolutions were all reported the next day, August 7th, and agreed to, and the Committee on the Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) Bill was instructed to make provision in the bill, which was then before parliament, in accordance with these measures. The bill as thus amended was straightway read the third time and passed. Thus the necessary measures for providing the “sinews of war” for the great struggle were adopted in less time than might normally be required to read the minutes or listen to the report of a committee in a legislative body.





NICHOLAS II, TSAR OF RUSSIA, AND THE TSAREVITCH,  
GRAND DUKE ALEXIS



## CHAPTER IV

### THE MORAL FORCES AND THEIR MANIFESTATION IN RUSSIA

Arrival of the French President and Prime Minister at Peterhof, July 20, 1914. The festivities. Departure and hastened return of the presidential party to France. Serious labor troubles in St. Petersburg. Magic effect of news that Serbia had been threatened, July 24th. The grand council, July 25th. Demonstrations in St. Petersburg on August 1st. The solemn service in the Winter Palace, August 2d. The session of the Duma on August 8th; M. Sazonoff's address; expressions of loyalty; the discordant note from the Social Democrats.

The record of the days that preceded the war in Russia is a discordant medley of sublime and distressing occurrences. The superb festivities in honor of the nation's distinguished guests, like an ostentatious screen concealing the seething discontent in the capital, might have suggested the proverbial whitened sepulcher.

At 1.15 on the afternoon of July 20th, the splendid armored cruiser *La France*, bearing the president and prime minister of Russia's republican ally, saluted Russian territory; and an hour later, President Poincaré and M. Viviani, escorted by M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, descended to the deck of the imperial yacht *Alexandria*, which conveyed them to the landing-place at Peterhof, where the Tsar and M. Sazonoff waited to welcome them.

The coöperation of energy, imagination, and good taste, no less than lavish wealth, since the days of its illustrious founder and namesake, have endowed the imperial estate

of Peterhof with a rare combination of alluring features. The austere countenance of the northern landscape has been cajoled into a smile by the imperial enchantment which has summoned the terraces, the fountains, and the profusion of varied watercourses of an Italian villa to the somber depths of a fir-wood forest on the Gulf of Finland. In the palace at Peterhof, where elegance and comfort reign supreme, and with a harmony peculiarly Russian, the rulers of the republic were received with magnificent hospitality.

A program of elaborate entertainment followed. The 21st was spent by the imperial party in St. Petersburg, the 22d at Peterhof and Krassnoye-Selo, where the summer camp and maneuvering field of the imperial guards is located. There the Tsar and his guests witnessed the review of 60,000 guards on the afternoon of the 23d, and in the evening the president entertained his recent host at dinner on board *La France*. The French squadron steamed away in the night, only a few hours, as it may be observed, before the news reached St. Petersburg that Austria-Hungary had dispatched her peremptory summons to Belgrade. Not only were the heads of the state absent from France at the moment when the crisis was precipitated, but by this slight unfortunate interval they were deprived of the advantage of conferring personally with their ally. It may be assumed, however, that the ministers responsible for the foreign policy of the two nations had not neglected the opportunity for a thorough discussion of the possibilities of the situation that might arise, if Austria-Hungary adopted a forcible policy.

The presidential party arrived in Stockholm a little before noon on the 25th, their progress up the Salsjö was greeted with thundering salutes, and their debarkation in the ancient royal barge was made a stately ceremony witnessed by

thongs along the banks. A circumstance is not entirely without interest: Prince Eitel Frederick, the German Kaiser's third son, travelling incognito, witnessed the reception of the president and the enthusiasm of the crowd with apparently idle curiosity from the Grand Hotel, which stands directly opposite the palace across a small inlet of the harbor.

Upon learning of the threatening international situation, the presidential party left Stockholm the same evening at 11.30, postponing their contemplated visits in Denmark and Norway, and hastened back to France. The cruiser *La France*, carrying the president and prime minister, passed the Belt early on the morning of the 27th, a few hours after the Kaiser, returning to Kiel from his Norwegian cruise, traversed the same waters in the *Hohenzollern*. The president and his suite reached Dunkirk Wednesday morning, July 29th, and arrived in Paris about noon.

During the presidential visit the Russian authorities, to save appearances, endeavored to conceal the dangerous situation created by labor troubles in St. Petersburg by limiting as far as possible the scope of repressive measures. Yet, even before the departure of President Poincaré, matters were rapidly approaching a crisis. It was feared that the industrial strikes in St. Petersburg might extend to the railways, as in 1905, and paralyze the internal communications of the empire.

The centres of discontent and violence were in the factory districts north of the Neva. Barricades were thrown up in the Sampsonyeffsky Prospect on the 22d, which were attacked by Cossacks armed with rifles, and fighting continued until midnight. In the evening the strike committee and the editorial staffs of two labor newspapers were arrested. The strike spread throughout the 23d; and directly after the military review at Krassnoye-Selo, a small

army of horse, foot, and machine-guns departed for the capital sixteen miles away. Cavalry pickets were posted in all the manufacturing districts during the night. It was reported on the 24th that 110,000 workmen were idle, the support for almost a quarter of the city's entire population being thus involved. Forty-four workmen were said to have been wounded and six killed, while seventy-six police were wounded. But the number of strikers killed was probably greater, their bodies being removed and concealed by their comrades.

The spirit of sedition was promptly transformed by the international crisis which animated national sentiment. The labor troubles seemed to adjust themselves spontaneously. The news of the Austro-Hungarian note, published in St. Petersburg on the 24th, excited an intense feeling of indignation. The cabinet, called to meet at three o'clock to discuss the labor troubles, was unexpectedly confronted with this far graver problem. The question was on everybody's lips: "Could Russia remain a passive spectator, while Austria-Hungary destroyed the independence of Serbia?" The cabinet council was held in the suburban villa of M. Goremykin, the Prime Minister. The meeting lasted five hours, and fundamental differences of opinion were disclosed which led to the distinction of a war and a peace party among the ministers and other dignitaries. But the council agreed that the Austro-Serbian conflict was not a matter which could be confined to these two nations themselves, but a European affair, like the controversy which was settled in 1909 under the auspices of all the powers.

After the meeting one of the members of the cabinet declared: "The ministers are unanimously agreed that Austria-Hungary has thrown down a challenge to Russia, and that, in M. Sazonoff's words, there could be only one answer."





The Tsar of Russia tasting soldiers' soup, Grand Duke Nicholas on the right.



Russian cavalry in manoeuvres.

A grand council was convened on Saturday, the 25th, to confirm the provisional decisions of the 24th. This larger body included members of the imperial family and other high dignitaries besides the ministry, sitting under the presidency of the Tsar at Krassnoye-Selo. In the grand council the Tsar is reported to have exclaimed, in reference to the defiant attitude of Austria-Hungary backed by Germany: "We have stood this sort of thing for seven and a half years. This is enough."

On the evening of the 26th a demonstration of sympathy took place in front of the Serbian legation; while the police prevented a hostile demonstration before the German and Austro-Hungarian embassies.

The news of the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war against Serbia stimulated the popular excitement in St. Petersburg, and intelligence of the bombardment of Belgrade coming on the 30th raised the feeling of resentment to fever pitch. A Reuter dispatch from St. Petersburg on the 30th contained the following communication: "The sailing of the British fleet from Portland has created an immense impression, and, coupled with Japan's pacific assurance, has more than confirmed Russia's determination to stand by her guns."


All day on August 1st eager crowds absorbed the contents of the bulletins exhibited outside the newspaper offices, especially those of the *Novoye Vremya* in the Nevsky Prospect. The streets displayed a holiday aspect. Long processions of enthusiasts with the flags of Russia and Serbia intermingled, bearing aloft large portraits of the Tsar and Tsarina like sacred pictures, made their way through the crowded thoroughfares in remarkable self-imposed order considering their frenzy of patriotic ardor. They stopped from time to time to perform the improvised rites of their nationalistic cult, the singing of patriotic songs, a

fiery address, and perhaps a prayer;—and woe to the indifferent passer-by who failed to remove his hat! A manifestation of contrasted hue was the groups of peasants in sordid attire and with stolid, insensible countenances, filing along with rude bundles in their hands to the recruiting stations. They went in a spectacle of disorderly indifference; they came out clad at least in the uniform habiliments of organized activity. The commercial circulation of the city was already feeling the effect of the withdrawal of horses and motor-vehicles which were being requisitioned in large numbers for the army, and the congestion at the railway terminals created more than ordinary confusion.

Count Pourtalès, the German Ambassador, called upon the foreign minister about seven in the evening and asked whether Russia accepted Germany's final demand. M. Sazonoff replied that the silence of the Russian government implied a refusal. Count Pourtalès repeated his question, and again M. Sazonoff replied in the negative. The German ambassador asked a third time, with similar result. Thereupon Count Pourtalès, unable to control his emotion, handed M. Sazonoff the written memorandum of the words of Germany's declaration of war, forgetting apparently that the same paper contained, as an alternative communication, written on the reverse, the expression of the satisfaction of the German government at Russia's hypothetical surrender.

News of Germany's declaration of war spread through the capital like wildfire on the evening of August 1st. Crowds thronged the Nevsky Prospect, where receptacles were set up for beneficent and patriotic contributions, into which many ladies threw the gold and gems of their personal adornment.

The British ambassador motored into St. Petersburg from his summer residence in post haste to present an urgent



The winter palace, St. Petersburg.



message from King George offering mediation, but arrived after war had been declared.

On Sunday, August 2d, the imperial family attended a solemn *Te Deum* in the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg, and it is estimated that fully 300,000 people stood waiting in the vast open place which extends in front of the building. Doubtless many who had defied the Cossacks from behind the barricades only ten days before were now awaiting the conclusion of these religious ceremonies in a spirit of fervent devotion to the dynasty. The Grand-duke Nicholas, recognized by the black and yellow striped pennant of the commander-in-chief flying from his motor-car, was greeted upon his arrival at the palace by a storm of enthusiastic applause. The thunder of cannon announced the completion of the religious service, when the Tsar appeared at the central balcony of the palace, clad in khaki field-uniform, the sky-blue ribbon of the decoration of St. Andrew, the most distinguished order in Russia, forming a diagonal band across his chest. He bound himself before the vast concourse of witnesses by the following engagement: "War has been forced upon us. I hereby take a solemn pledge not to conclude peace so long as a single enemy remains on Russian soil." After these words the great throng kneeled to invoke the divine blessing on their sovereign. After all reasonable discount has been made for the susceptible, unstable character of the masses, and for the cynical indifference towards such exhibitions common among the ruling classes, this ceremony remains an impressive indication of a solidarity of sentiment uniting the Tsar and his people in the great crisis.

The historic sessions of the Russian Imperial Council and the Imperial Duma, called together for giving the necessary legislative sanction to the indispensable war measures, were inaugurated with impressive solemnity in a hall in the

Winter Palace in the presence of the Tsar, who addressed the members in the following terms:

“I greet you in these significant and troubled times which Russia is experiencing. Germany, and after her Austria, have declared war on Russia. Such an uplifting of patriotic feeling, love for our homes, and devotion to the throne, which has swept over our land like a hurricane, serves in my eyes, and I think in yours, as a guarantee that our Great Mother Russia will by the help of our Lord God bring the war to a successful conclusion. In this united outburst of affection and readiness for all sacrifices, even that of life itself, I feel the possibility of upholding our strength, and quietly and with confidence look forward to the future.

“We are not only protecting our honor and our dignity within the limits of our land, but also that of our brother Slavs, who are of one blood and faith with us. At this time I observe with joy that the feeling of unity among the Slavs has been brought into strong prominence throughout all Russia. I believe that you, each and all, in your place can sustain this heaven-sent trial and that we all, beginning with myself, will fulfil our duty to the end. Great is the God of our Russian land!”

After the storm of applause had subsided, the President of the Imperial Council responded, expressing the feeling of devotion and patriotism which animated the upper chamber. Again the hall resounded with shouts of applause and the words of the national anthem. The President of the Imperial Duma in his turn announced the determination of the popular chamber to bear unflinchingly the sacrifices of the struggle until the dignity and safety of the country was assured. After the assembly had sung the hymn, “God save the Tsar!” the emperor thanked them very graciously for their hearty demonstration of loyalty.



Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaievitch, generalissimo of the Russian armies in the field.



The Duma assembled for business a little later in its own hall in the Tauris Palace, where the presence of the ambassadors of the allied powers in the diplomatic box was greeted with much enthusiasm. During the address of the president, the reading of dispatches, and the speech of Prime Minister Goremykin, the hall rang repeatedly with cheers, and the assembly broke forth from time to time in the notes of the national hymn. The words of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonoff, in his statement of Russian policy during the crisis, deserve repetition:

“Gentlemen of the Duma, at critical moments when unalterable decisions have to be made, the government feels itself strengthened by the knowledge of its full accord with the popular conscience. When the time comes for the impartial judgment of history to be given, I firmly believe that her decision will be no other than that by which we have been guided. Russia could not refuse the challenge of her enemies. She could not abandon the greatest traditions of her history. She could not cease to be Great Russia. Our enemies attempt to place upon us the responsibility for the disaster into which they have plunged Europe, but their calumnies cannot mislead anyone who has conscientiously examined the policy of Russia during recent years and during these last few days. Recognizing the great problems bound up with her internal development and prosperity, Russia has for a long time given numerous proofs of her sincere love of peace. It was only through this love of peace that a conflagration, on the point of breaking out in Europe in 1912-1913, when trouble arose in the Balkans, was prevented. Not from her, not from Russian policy, came the threat to European peace. The dignity of mighty Russia did not need the ostentatious rattle of the sword, attacks on the self-respect of others, or neglect of

the rights of the weak. Calm and peace-loving Russia has not been left in peace by her enemies.

“Is it necessary to remind you of all the attempts of Austria-Hungary to undermine the historical position of Russia in the Balkans? The time has come when I do not hesitate to say that, by her intrigues, she [Austria-Hungary] has succeeded in sowing fratricidal strife between Bulgaria and her allies. But in spite of heavy trials, the unity of our brother Slavs cannot, thank God, be destroyed. Torn by internal strife, Austria-Hungary decided to take a step which would at the same time create an impression of strength and humble Russia. For this purpose she singled out Serbia, with whom we are linked by ties of history, origin, and faith. The circumstances in which the ultimatum was delivered to Serbia are known to you. If Serbia had given way she would have become the vassal of Austria. It was clear that if we drew back it would be the beginning, not only of the abnegation of Russia’s historical rôle as the protector of the Balkan people, but of the recognition that the will of Austria, and behind her that of Germany, is law in Europe. We could not agree to that, neither we, nor France, nor England. No less than we, our brave allies have done all in their power to preserve the peace of Europe. Our enemies were deceived, taking these efforts for a sign of weakness. After the challenge thrown down by Austria, Russia did not renounce her attempt to bring the conflict to a peaceful solution. In this aim all our efforts and those of our allies were exerted up to the end. You will be convinced of this by the documents which are to be published, and which present the course of the negotiations. We stood firmly by one condition. Ready to accept any possible compromise which could be accepted by Austria without loss of dignity, we refused





Ivan Longinovitch Goremykin, Prime Minister of Russia.

anything which could encroach on the integrity and independence of Serbia.

“From the beginning we did not hide our point of view from Germany. Undoubtedly at one time, if the Berlin cabinet had wished, it could by firm words have held its ally back, as it did at the time of the Balkan crisis.

“But Germany, who to the end did not cease to express her readiness to influence Vienna, refused one after the other the proposals which were made, and offered us in return only empty assurances. Time passed; the negotiations did not advance. Austria bombarded Belgrade. It was an organized government massacre. It was a natural continuation of the massacre of the defenseless Serbian population of Sarajevo after the famous murder of June 15th [28th]. The evident object of all this was to gain time, in order to place before us and Europe the humiliation and extinction of Serbia as a *fait accompli*. In such circumstances we could not do otherwise than take elementary measures of precaution, all the more as Austria had already mobilized half her army. When the mobilization of the army and navy was declared in Russia, our Lord the Emperor was graciously pleased to inform the German Emperor that Russia would not proceed to forceful measures as long as there was any hope for a peaceful solution of the negotiations which were being conducted with the moderation which I have mentioned; but his voice was not heeded.

“Germany declared war on us and then on our ally. Losing all self-control, she persisted in trampling on the rights of neutral states guaranteed by her own signature, together with that of other states.

“The manner in which Germany has proceeded has aroused the deepest indignation of the whole civilized world, and especially of noble France, which, together with us, has stood for the protection of right and justice.

“Is it necessary to say that the same sentiments inspired the English people, who, like one man, have united in a common resolve to resist the effort of Germany to lay on Europe the heavy hand of her hegemony?”

“But now the events leading to this war are obscured by the significance which it has acquired for all of us and for our allies. Germany declared war on us on July 19th [August 1st], and five days later Austria took the same step, alleging as her motive our interference in her quarrel with Serbia and the fact that we had commenced hostilities against Germany. This would also appear to be the *casus belli* of the latter against us. In reality, hostile troops invaded our territory.

“We are fighting for the defense of our country; we are fighting for our dignity and status as a great power. We cannot allow Europe to be dominated by Germany and her allies. That, too, is what our allies have felt. We have shown no empty pride. We know that perhaps we shall have to submit to heavy trials. Our enemies have calculated on this. Not knowing Russia and her history, they have counted on the possibility of national apathy. But God will not desert Russia in the darkest hour of her history, and will not forsake our children united around their Tsar in common feelings of love and self-sacrifice. In the humble hope of God’s help in their unshaken faith in Russia, the government turns to you, the representatives of the people, confident that in you is reflected the spirit of our great country, which our enemies will discover to be no object of derision.”

The representatives of various parties and nationalities, Right, Nationalists, Octobrists, Constitutional Democrats, Germans of the Baltic Provinces, Poles, Lithuanians, Jews, Tartars, etc., expressed their unswerving devotion to the cause of Russia.

But it is a noteworthy circumstance that the Russian Duma and the British House of Commons were the only legislative assemblies of all the belligerent powers in which voices were raised denouncing the war in unequivocal terms. The following speech of M. Khaustoff, in the name of the Social Democratic party, will be variously interpreted as an indication of disunion or enlightenment:

“A terrible, unprecedented evil has fallen upon the people of the whole world. Millions of workmen are dragged from their peaceful labor to ruin; they are being hurled into a bloody whirlpool, while millions of families are condemned to starvation. When the governments of Europe were getting ready for war, the European proletariat, including the German, united in a common protest against this war which was being prepared by the ruling classes. Various circumstances prevented the Russian workmen from openly making the same protest. But at the time of the enormous demonstration against the war on the part of the European proletariat the hearts of the Russian workers beat in unison with those of their comrades. The present war, the result of a policy of greed, is a war the responsibility for which will be borne by the ruling classes of all the countries now fighting. The proletariat, the constant defender of freedom and the interests of the people, will always protect the welfare of the people against all attacks, from whatever quarter they may come. The workers of the fighting countries were unable to prevent the outbreak of the war and the orgy of barbarism which it carries with it. But we are deeply convinced that it is in the international unity of all the working masses of the whole world that the proletariat will find the means of bringing the war to the quickest possible termination. And let the terms of peace be dictated not by diplomats but by the people itself. At the same time we express the

deep conviction that this war will, once and for all, open the eyes of the European masses to the true source of the persecution and oppression under which they are suffering, and that the present outbreak of barbarism will be at the same time the last outbreak."

Before the vote was taken the Social Democrats left the chamber of the Duma in a body; as the final demonstration of their abhorrence of war.

There is food for reflection in the circumstance that among the members of the Duma, whose support in this hour of trial was so gratefully received by the Russian government, sat members who had once been serfs. In the corridor of the Tauris Palace, where the Duma holds its sessions, there is a bust of Tsar Alexander II, and under it the dedicatory inscription:

"To the Tsar Liberator, the grateful peasant members of the State Duma; 1861-1911—Slaves then—Lawgivers now."

A retrospective view over the course of half a century, away from the calamities which obscure the present, reveals the fact that the general movement of the Russian people, though faltering and attended with bloody crises, is upward towards the light of a higher civilization.

We have thus far investigated with reasonable thoroughness the nature of the moral factors, the impulses and feelings of society in the different countries, which once released, like uncontrollable torrents, rolled on through national, political, and social channels with increasing volume and imposing energy towards the awful catastrophe which the world is now enduring. We must now turn to the physical instruments, the armies and navies of the belligerent powers, which were impelled to frenzied activity by the forces already analyzed.



The Duma in session.



The Tauris Palace, Petrograd, where the sessions of the Duma are held.



# THE PHYSICAL FORCES



## CHAPTER V

### THE GERMAN ARMY

Unity of spirit of army and people. Traditional warlike spirit of the Germans. Origin of the German army. Emergence of principalities. Beginning of the Hohenzollern rule. The birthplace of the German military ideal. The Great Elector. Frederick William I and his military organization; his regiment of giants; art treasures trafficked for tall men. Military training of Frederick the Great; prowess of his army. Decline of military prestige under Frederick William II. Napoleon's supremacy over German states. Army reorganization in Prussia under Frederick William III; universal service. War of Liberation, 1813. Persistence of Frederick's system and its success in 1866 and 1870. Prussia's army the model of the army of the German Empire after 1871. Term of service and strength. Military increases in 1881, 1887, and 1890. Mobilization strength in 1893. Further modification, improvements, and increases in 1899, 1905, 1911, 1912, and 1913. Opposition to Bismarck's military program. Supremacy of the military party. Political divisions of the empire. Growth of population. Term of military service. Strength of the army in 1914. Military training schools. Education of officers for the line of the army. Technical schools. Reserve, Landwehr, and Landsturm officers. Peace and war strength and equipment. Chief command. The General Staff. An army corps. The available reserve. Quality of the German soldier.

An army always represents the spirit of the people by whom it is maintained. A people who early in their development have established a separate national existence, and who by their isolation, the weakness of their neighbors and other kindred causes have been able to develop along the lines of individualism, without interference and with little assistance from the state, soon forgets that the benefits of national life have been secured by victories on the field of battle. They maintain professional armies only because they have found it impossible to dispense with armed forces altogether. Such an army represents a negative military spirit, being the result of the efforts of the people to avoid

military service. On the other hand, peoples who, like the Germans, have achieved their national unity only after centuries of struggle as separate small states and principalities, do not soon forget the benefits and use of military service. The realization of the modern German State, composed of peoples possessing a community of race and language surrounded by powerful and jealous neighbors, was made possible by the dominating influence of a strongly centralized government supported by a national army. Thus the value of the military virtues has never been lost sight of by the German people. The German army represents the spirit of the people in a positive, superlative degree.

As the Germans first appear in history they are a warlike race. Their earliest literature is composed of folktales of their war heroes—their highest ideals of manly virtue. And this ideal, in one form or another, under varying circumstances and conditions, has persisted throughout the centuries. If at a later date we think of the German as the musician, the poet, the scientist, we still cannot fail to see the warrior by his side. The whole race is so imbued with the military spirit, in its influence reaching out to every phase of national life, that it is not too much to say that all that is best in the nation, all that has raised it to such marvellous heights of efficiency, is due to the discipline of the military ideal. The German nation is the supreme expression of the military spirit in its noblest form.

The history of the German army began when Henry the Fowler, A.D. 928, “essentially the first sovereign of United Germany,” improved and developed the system of margraves, or wardens, to guard the frontiers of his kingdom; fortified all his towns, and required every ninth man to serve as a soldier. He also forced all robbers to become soldiers or to be hanged. Life being sweet even in those dim days and robbery not infrequent, his army

never lacked recruits. From this time on the margraves, and the military leaders under them, grew in importance and power, the offices tending to become hereditary, and gradually Germany was divided into small principalities, each maintained by force of arms. This system of what may be called military rule, continued without any important change for about four centuries. It was a troublous time, and in many parts of the empire anarchy prevailed. Such was the state in Brandenburg in 1412, when Emperor Sigismund appointed Burgrave Frederick of Nuremberg as Statthalter, or vice-regent. It was a happy day for Prussia that saw the Hohenzollerns established in Brandenburg, and it is of particular interest to us since it fixes the birthplace of the modern German military spirit and marks the beginning of its history. Other princes of the German Reich maintained armies, many of which attained a high degree of efficiency, but it remained for the genius of the Hohenzollerns to imprint upon a whole nation the military ideal.

Although Burgrave Frederick tried all the arts of peace, it was only with an army of Franks and some artillery that he was able to batter down the castles of the defiant robber lords and bring order out of chaos in Brandenburg. Once established in Brandenburg, work became constructive in character; but work of another sort was constantly demanded of the Hohenzollern electors, trusted high constables of the emperors, as it were, fighting here and there unfriendly neighbors and quarrelsome princes within the Reich. In fact, for many a year war was the normal state of being in Germany, even before the Thirty Years' War turned the whole country into one vast battlefield and left it devastated. Well it behooved a prince to keep his own house in order, and to guard that house securely. For such work an army was indispensable, and to the country

possessing an efficient army would fall the spoils—peace and prosperity.

It was no small task, that of setting his house in order, which confronted the Great Elector, after the close of the Thirty Years' War. But with the support of 24,000 well-drilled soldiers, maintained at a great sacrifice, he was able to free his country of foreign armies. Standing firm with his army always, and fighting when it could not be avoided, which was often enough, he paved the way for his successor, Frederick I, to become the first King of Prussia. This king had more of the love for pomp and ceremony and less of the soldier in him than any other ruler of this family of soldiers either before or after him. It was his son and successor, the second king, the father of Frederick the Great, the great Prussian drill-master Frederick William I, who organized the Prussian army on the lines of economy and efficiency maintained to this day.

A Spartan king with a passionate love for soldiering, he organized and administered every part of Prussia with military exactitude and rigor. No extravagance or wastefulness in time or material was tolerated. The whole nation was drilled and molded into his own likeness. A small country of less than 5,000,000 inhabitants, Prussia under this careful "Drill-Sergeant" soon had an army of 75,000 men, the best drilled and equipped in Europe. Over this army he watched as a father would watch a beloved child, training, correcting, improving, but always cherishing. His military ardor often led him into bitter controversy with his neighbors, especially when his fondness for tall men to be turned into soldiers for his giant Grenadier Regiment led to his kidnapping any likely men wherever they were found. If in Prussia, good; but if in other states, they must be taken at all costs, even if friction between governments result. This giant regiment became the pride of his heart, and no other

way to his favor was so certain as by a gift of a few abnormally tall men.

Russian Peter, called "The Great," once visited Berlin, and being charmed with a work of art in the museum, one of the treasures of the late King Frederick I, was graciously presented with it by Frederick William, who was glad to rid himself of it and to please his neighbor. A luxurious barge which his pleasure-loving father had built was likewise bestowed on Tsar Peter, whose gratitude, as long as he lived, expressed itself in the gift of a number of giants each year. Art-loving princes with soldiers to barter could strike ready bargains in Prussia. A fine collection of Chinese vases to be seen in Dresden was sent to August of Saxony in exchange for a regiment of soldiers.

A king of such tastes over a people of such fiber was sure to be surrounded by soldiers of fine quality. Foremost among his military chiefs was the Prince of Anhalt-Dessau, a ruler in his own right, but, like his fathers, a soldier of Prussia. It was he who invented the iron ramrod, and evolved a system of drill for the infantry much of which is used to-day. Frederick William had great admiration for this rugged old prince and hoped that his son Frederick, afterwards "The Great," might find in him the inspiration to be a soldier.

That such a king should wish his son to be a warrior was natural; and at the age of seven the Crown Prince Frederick was taken from the hands of women teachers and, under the supervision of trusted officers, was subjected to the most rigid military discipline. When still too young to be a soldier he must have a company of cadets, small sons of nobles, whom he was required to drill daily; and at the age of fourteen he was appointed captain in the Potsdam Guards, the king's own regiment of giants. Thus, from his earliest infancy was Frederick the Great made

familiar with military tactics and administration; and this in spite of his own bitter opposition and distaste for the military life. That the man who later developed into one of the greatest generals should have shown so bitter a dislike of soldiering in his youth is surprising. That he soon learned to value the training he had received, soon perceived that "all things in Prussia must point towards his army" is certain. And when in 1740 he became king, and the necessity arose, he found the army a marvellous instrument ready to his hand.

Throughout his long reign this instrument never failed him. With it he fought such battles and made such marches as the world had never seen. He developed and perfected it into the most wonderful army in existence, and with its aid held at bay for long, long years all Continental Europe armed against him. Many improvements in organization, tactics, and administration were made by him. Many new methods and inventions were evolved, important among them being the first use of horse artillery.

On the death of Frederick, the army, so long animated by the unflagging spirit of the great warrior king, became disorganized. His successor, Frederick William II, a man of very different mold, was incapable of maintaining the Prussian army at the same high level. The example of Frederick the Great had exerted a very salutary influence upon the smaller states of Germany. Their rulers had begun to employ some of his methods in the administration of civil and military affairs; but nowhere in all Germany, now that Frederick was gone, was there a leader strong enough to meet the new force recently born in Western Europe, the French Revolution.

The history of the German army for the next few years is one of defeat and humiliation, a period of trial in which the German states felt the crushing weight of the





The Kaiser at trials of rapid fire guns.



The Death's-head Hussars. The German Crown Prince is the figure at the left of four officers on white horses on the right.

conqueror's yoke. The force of the French Revolution, directed by Napoleon, broke over Germany, and neither in the numerous small states nor in Prussia was there a leader ready to withstand it.

In 1801 Scharnhorst, a Hanoverian, entered the Prussian service. He became the devoted supporter of King Frederick William III, who in 1797 had succeeded his father on the throne, and with a group of other loyal and devoted men undertook to reorganize the Prussian Army after the Peace of Tilsit in 1807, the darkest night of Prussian history. The fundamental idea for the new army was that of the nation in arms. Liability to service, the duty of all citizens to defend the country, had been established by Frederick William I, when for the purpose of recruiting he divided the country into cantons and districts, and recruited each regiment in its own canton. "There all males as soon as born were enrolled, liable to serve when they had grown to years and strength." Selection of the men was made by the captain of the regiment and the *Amtmann* of the canton. Later, exemption had been allowed, and it was now Blücher, who, in 1807, urged his friend Scharnhorst to "take thought for a national army; no one must be exempted, it must be a disgrace to a man not to have served." He also begged the king to return to the custom which his ancestor had established, which had made Prussia great, and which France and Austria had borrowed from her, the practice of universal service. As a result Scharnhorst undertook the reorganization, and the first draft of his work began with the words of the old king: "All dwellers in the state are born defenders of the same."

Work thus begun was carried on with devoted loyalty, resulting in the War of Liberation in 1813, which freed Germany from the foreign rule in 1815. From that time

on the history of the army was one of improvement and progress.

The Prussian army which had hitherto depended so largely on the character of the king, and which, as we have seen on the death of Frederick the Great, might fall into disorder under a ruler who did not possess the genius to maintain and direct it, was by the edict of emancipation attributed to von Stein, and by the reorganization of the commission headed by Scharnhorst, placed on a real national basis, and henceforward to be directed by the genius of the best distinguished soldiers which the new system might produce. The king was still supreme commander and might personally lead his troops in campaign; but the field armies would in future be operated by a group of officers of superior ability and special training, under the direction of the head of the nation, or with his acquiescence, depending on his quality as a leader.

The army has now become a part, and the life-giving part, of the nation itself. There is no more uprooting. The hardy plant is now firmly rooted in the very soul of the people as well as of the king. There is steady, healthy, vigorous growth through a long period of peace. It has elsewhere been accepted almost as an axiom that prolonged peace takes the heart out of any army, that its various branches gradually fall into decay, leaving it a helpless parasite. This fatality, like every good quality, depends on the character of the people. When after fifty years of peace and prosperity the Prussian army produces such a general staff as that directed by Moltke and his chief assistants, Bronsart, Verdy du Vernois, and Brandenstein; such army commanders as Steinmetz and Prince Frederick Charles; such staff officers as Blumenthal, Stiehle, and Sperling; corps commanders like Alvensleben, Manteuffel,

Werder, and Goeben; when fifty years of patient, painstaking training results in two such campaigns as that of 1866 against Austria, and that of 1870 against France, the Prussian military system needs no further justification.


After the formation of the empire at Versailles in 1871, which placed the King of Prussia at its head, the army developed without interruption according to the Prussian model, with the emperor as supreme commander in war. Bavaria retained the administration of her two army corps in peace, subject to the right of inspection by the emperor. Saxony provided one corps and had a minister of war, but no separate general staff. Württemberg and Baden each furnished an army corps.

The "Constitution of the German Empire" made every German a member of the Active Army for seven years, and of the Landwehr for five years. Service with the colors was for three years, and with the reserve four years. Beginning with 1875 there were 18 army corps, 12 of which were Prussian. The strength as fixed by the law of 1874 was about 400,000. In 1881 the peace establishment was increased by 34 battalions of infantry, 40 batteries of field artillery, and other slight increases. No one understood better than Bismarck that the unification of Germany, the great work which he had pursued with such singleness of purpose, was the work of the Prussian army, and that the safety of the empire depended on the maintenance of adequate land forces. He found it necessary in 1886 to dissolve the Reichstag on account of its opposition to an increase of the army, and after the elections (1887) 31 battalions of infantry and 24 batteries of artillery were added. Two new army corps were organized in 1890. The infantry was increased to 538 battalions and the field artillery to 434 batteries. In 1893 the color service was decreased to two years for all but the mounted

service, bringing the peace strength up to more than a half million, and providing for the mobilization of not less than 4,000,000 trained men.

The population of Germany, 41,000,000 in 1871, was increasing at the rate of a half million a year. There was not room in the army to train the available recruits. The reduction of color service to two years made it possible to pass annually one half of the active army into the reserve. In 1899 two new Prussian and one new Bavarian army corps were organized, bringing the number of corps to twenty-three. In 1905 and in 1911 there were further increases; a small number of men were added, but great improvements were made in technical troops, and in the facilities for training. The increases provided for by the law of 1911 were to extend over a period of four years, but a law passed in 1912 added two more army corps, one for the eastern and one for the western frontier, and provided for the immediate accomplishment of the provisions of the law of 1911. This brought the peace establishment up to a strength of 725,000 of all ranks. The law of June, 1913, created no new army corps, but the peace strength of all units was increased, especially of those on the frontier; the infantry was finally equipped with a full complement of machine-guns, and several new cavalry regiments were formed. Three years were required to put this law fully into operation, but its most important provisions were accomplished before the outbreak of the great war. Provision was made for 669 battalions of infantry, 550 squadrons of cavalry, 633 batteries of field artillery, 55 battalions of garrison artillery, 44 battalions of engineers, 31 battalions of communications, and 26 battalions of train troops—a grand total of 870,000 men in the peace strength of the active army.

These several increases extending over a period of forty years of peace were logical developments of the principle



German Red Cross squad with dogs used to assist in finding the wounded.



German infantry on the march.



that every German capable of bearing arms should be trained for the defense of the Fatherland. They were not accomplished without great political struggles, resulting twice during Bismarck's official life in the dissolution of the Reichstag. Notwithstanding the development of Socialism, however, no such arbitrary measures have been necessary in recent years. The military activity of France and Russia during the same period, the Franco-Russian alliance to which Great Britain later became a party, enabled the government again and again to secure the legislation considered necessary for national defense. The combination of Russia's great army on the east, with a peace strength equal to that of Germany and Austria combined; the French army on the west, always following closely the strength of that of Germany; and the great British navy with unquestioned command of the sea; above all, the spirit of the German people, who have never hesitated to assume the burdens of a military training, the educational and economic value of which they well understand, made possible the German army of 1914, which merits consideration in some detail.

Germany is composed of twenty-six States: Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Saxony, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Oldenburg, Brunswick, Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Altenburg, Waldeck, Lippe, Schaumburg-Lippe, Reuss (elder line), Reuss (younger line), Anhalt, Schwarz-Rudolstadt, Schwarzburg-Sondershausen, Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, and the Reichsland,—Alsace-Lorraine. Its area is less than that of Texas. The population increased between 1900 and 1910 at the rate of 1.41 per cent per annum. This increase, and the limited normal emigration, which for 1911 amounted to only 22,000, indicates a healthy growth and an economic development well abreast of the increasing population. Educationally

the German soldier was the best developed in Europe. Among the recruits there was only one analphabetic in five thousand.

Universal compulsory military service dates in Prussia from 1814. Substitution or other means of evading this national duty is unknown. Every German is liable to military service between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. He actually belongs to the national army from the beginning of his twenty-first year until he is thirty-nine years old. Those who enter the service before they are twenty years old pass into the Landsturm (general levy) after nineteen years. All remain in the Landsturm until they are forty-five. Service in the first line is for seven years. The cavalry and horse artillery serve three years with the colors and four in the reserve. For other arms, service with the colors is for two years, and in the reserve, five years. Reservists are subject to two musters annually, and to two periods of training not to exceed eight weeks' duration. From the reserve the soldier passes into the first category of the Landwehr where the cavalryman and the horse artilleryman remain three years; the men of other arms, five years. With the exception of the cavalry, the first ban of the Landwehr is subject to an annual muster and two periods of training of from eight to fourteen days' duration. The soldier passes from the first to the second category of the Landwehr, where he remains until March 31st of his thirty-ninth year.

The first category of the Landsturm is composed of untrained men between the ages of seventeen and thirty-nine. It includes youths who have not yet reached the age for active service, and those who have not been incorporated because the army was not large enough to accommodate them. The second category of the Landsturm includes trained and untrained men who have passed through the

other divisions of the land forces—all men between the ages of thirty-nine and forty-five.

The sons of well-to-do Germans who do not become officers of the active army serve, as a rule, as one-year volunteers (*Einjährig-Freiwillige*). Young men who possess the required qualifications are passed into the reserve after one year in the arm of the service which they themselves select. They clothe and equip themselves and provide their own quarters and board. Those found qualified are permitted, after completing an additional training of eight weeks, to take the examination for appointment as reserve officers. If successful in the examination, they are appointed as superior non-commissioned officers (*Vize-Feldwebel*). After a second period of training those qualified are appointed officers of the reserve.

Medical students who apply for appointment in the Sanitary Corps serve six months with the armed forces, and six months as assistant surgeons. Chemists or apothecaries serve one year with troops, or, after six months, are transferred to the Sanitary Corps, if they pass the required examination. There are corresponding provisions with respect to the veterinary and supply services.

The minimum height for service under arms is five feet one inch. The Guard and certain regiments of other corps accept recruits of not less than five feet eight inches. There is no minimum height established for the non-combatant services, nor for the Landsturm. Men who are not of good moral character serve in working organizations, and criminals are not permitted to serve. Recruiting is territorial by corps districts, except for the Guard Corps and in Poland and Alsace-Lorraine, where, beginning with 1904, the recruits were drawn partially from the corps district.

The field armies (first line) had in 1914 a strength of about 1,750,000; the Landwehr 1,800,000; the Landsturm

4,500,000. There was in addition the *Ersatz-reserve*, comprising all men liable to service who were not included in any of the categories already mentioned.

Horses for the use of the army were bought, usually when young, by commissions. They were assembled in remount depots, of which there were nineteen in Prussia, one in Württemberg, three in Saxony, and four in Bavaria. All horses in the empire were inspected every eighteen months as a basis for requisition in case of war.

The German army requires, in peace, more than 100,000 non-commissioned officers. Universal service makes the problem of securing suitable non-commissioned officers a comparatively simple one. Prussia and Saxony have each a school for the education of the sons of soldiers for the service. There are nine preparatory schools where boys are prepared for the grade of non-commissioned officer, and nine other state schools where young men between the ages of seventeen and twenty are given a course of two to three years as a preparation for the non-commissioned officer's career. These schools furnish about one-fourth of the number required for the dismounted services. In addition, there are regimental schools where selected men are trained. The non-commissioned officers are an excellent body of men, generally of long service, who receive appropriate civil appointments when they leave the color service. The relations of confidence and mutual support between the officers and the non-commissioned officers, the only professional soldiers in Germany, are such as one would expect to find between men who have dedicated their lives to the military education of the nation, with no hope or desire for other reward than that of a sense of national duty faithfully performed in the sphere in which their respective attainments and social relations naturally place them. The German first sergeant, called



German general (Alexander von Kluck) and staff at army maneuvers.



*Feldwebel* in the Infantry and *Wachtmeister* in the Cavalry, is a tower of strength, enjoying the confidence and support of his superior officers and subordinate non-commissioned officers to a high degree. A large measure of responsibility is placed on the non-commissioned officer, but he is never left to shoulder this responsibility alone. There is no disposition on the part of the German officer to leave the training of the unit entrusted to him to his subordinates however capable the latter may be.

The officers for the line of the army serve first in the ranks, or they may be appointed from the several Cadet Corps. Young men who are socially and physically acceptable and who possess the necessary educational qualifications—such, in general, as would admit them to a university—are accepted as *Fahnenjunker* with the grade of private at a minimum age of seventeen years. The *Fahnenjunker* who completes six months' service before he is twenty-three years old, and demonstrates his fitness, may receive the designation of *Fahnrich, aspirant*, or candidate for a commission. The *Fahnrich* is sent normally to a war school and, if before he is twenty-five years old he has completed a minimum of six months' service as such and has passed the officer's examination, he is eligible for appointment as a commissioned officer. But before he receives his commission he must be elected by a vote of the officers of the regiment in which he seeks appointment. The young officer must be acceptable to the regiment in which he is to serve before he is appointed by the Kaiser. This is an important factor in the unity and homogeneity of the corps of officers of the German army. It was what the minister of war had in mind when, asked in the Reichstag whether the government would commission a Jew in the army, he replied that he was not prepared to say what would be done

if a Jew should comply with the requirements for appointment as an officer.

The second source from which officers are drawn is a Cadet Corps, of which there are eight in Prussia, one in Saxony, and one in Bavaria, besides the Principal Cadet School at Gross-Lichterfelde West, near Berlin. The sons of officers are admitted as cadets, beginning at the age of ten, and those who complete the required courses are, when of suitable age, qualified for appointment as officers without further service in the ranks. These are the officers of the fighting army from which the operating staff is selected. The latter is not to be confounded with the officers of the auxiliary services and the supply staff, who are charged with duties of great importance, but who are neither responsible for the military training of the German people, nor for the leading of the fighting units on the field of battle.

Officers of the Sanitary and of the Veterinary Corps are taken from doctors and veterinarians who either remain in the service after they have completed their training, or may be accepted later. They serve one half-year under arms, and complete their service with their special corps. Many officers of the Sanitary Corps receive their training in the *Kaiser-Wilhelms-Akademie* in Berlin. The Military Veterinary Academy in Berlin is for the training of veterinary officers.

The German army is well supplied with schools for the instruction of officers and non-commissioned officers of the technical services, and for the technical instruction of officers and non-commissioned officers of the line. These schools are in general models on which have been built similar institutions in most of the armies of the world. The Prussian *Kriegs-Akademie* (War Academy) in Berlin trains officers for the General Staff. The course is for three years and is highly competitive. The normal career

of an officer who finally is appointed to the General Staff is full of hard work. Lieutenants who are recommended by their regimental commanders are permitted to take the examination for entrance to the *Kriegs-Akademie*. This examination is professional in character, and requires of the applicant proficiency in one foreign language. It is said to be exceptional that an officer is successful in his first examination on account of the keen competition for the appointment. For one of the recent classes there were 1,200 applicants, of whom 120 were selected. During the school course student officers are assigned for the summer training and maneuver periods to regiments of arms of the service other than their own for instruction. Thus an officer of cavalry receives practical instruction with the infantry and artillery to supplement his technical studies; and officers of the infantry and artillery are given corresponding opportunities for learning the practical work of the other fighting arms. Competition continues throughout the course, so that an officer who is appointed to the General Staff has demonstrated his fitness by a long period of close application that has made the officers of the German General Staff masters of the profession of arms. Even the General Staff itself is a trying-out school for the Great General Staff, which is a permanent corps. The Bavarian army has in Munich a *Kriegs-Akademie*, modelled on the lines of that of the Berlin school, which draws officers from the rest of the German army. The Military Technical Academy (*Militär-Technische Akademie*) in Berlin trains not only the officers of the garrison artillery (*Füßartillerie*), of engineers, of the Pioneer and Communication Corps, but also gives officers of the line training in the technical branches. The Artillery and Engineer School in Munich is for the superior education of officers of artillery, engineers, and pioneers of the Bavarian army. The course is

from nine to twenty-one months. The *Kriegsschulen* (War Schools) at Anklam, Cassel, Danzig, Engers, Glogau, Hanover, Hersfeld, Metz, Munich, Neisse, and Potsdam prepare candidates for commissions for the officers' examinations. The Prussian School of Fire for Infantry at Wunsdorf has annual training courses for general officers and other officers and non-commissioned officers. There is a corresponding school for the Bavarian army at Lechfeld. The Prussian schools of fire for field artillery and garrison artillery are at Jüterbog, near Berlin. The Jüterbog reservation is utilized also for field exercises of troops of the line. There are riding schools in Soltau and in Paderborn for training young officers of the mounted services. The Imperial Riding School (*Militär-Reitinstitut*) at Hanover includes a school for officers of the cavalry and field artillery, and one for non-commissioned officers. The course is two years. Each regiment sends one lieutenant to Hanover. Bavaria and Saxony have riding schools in Munich and in Dresden.

There are many other technical schools of less general importance, but nevertheless necessary for the efficient training of the various elements which make up the nation in arms. It is not in the character of a people who have triumphed over all the disadvantages of a rigorous climate and an indifferent soil within, and of everlasting menace from without, to leave anything to chance. The greatest blessing which climate, soil, and rival nations have conferred on the German people is the burden they have imposed, creating a nation which counts not on the favors of fortune, but is ready, not only in war, but what is much rarer, also in peace, to make such sacrifices as the national idea demands.

The highly technical training given to officers of the active army was, of course, not possible for the officers of

the reserve formations. The officers of the Reserve (used in a technical sense) come principally from the one-year volunteers by a process which we have already noted. These young men, who come from families in comfortable circumstances, are, in large part, of the same class as the officers of the active army. They are for one reason or another unable to devote their entire time to the army, but would feel that they were doing less than their full national duty if they did not prepare themselves to take the places in the battle line in war to which their social standing and mental training entitle them. They remain three years longer than the legal period in the reserve, and complete three periods of training as reserve officers. The annual contingent of one-year volunteers had increased in the last years before the war to nearly 20,000, forming a body of reserve officers which was a real national treasure. A single regiment, just before the war had some fifty such reserve officers.

The officers of the Landwehr came by transfer of officers of the reserve, by appointment of candidates who did not attain the grade of reserve officer, and from former non-commissioned officers. The officers of the Landsturm had previous service as officers with the active army, with the Landwehr, or as non-commissioned officers of the active army.

The peace strength of the infantry of the first line was 217 regiments; of these 166 regiments were Prussian. The Guard Corps stationed in Berlin and Potsdam included 11 regiments. Württemberg furnished 10 regiments and Saxony 17 regiments. With the exception of the infantry of the Prussian Guard, the regiments were numbered serially from 1 to 182, except in Bavaria, which maintained 1 *Leib-Regiment* and 23 infantry regiments numbered 1 to 23.

The regiments were uniform throughout with three battalions of four companies of three platoons each and a machine-gun company. Thus the first line infantry numbered in war 651 battalions with provision for forming one *Ersatz* battalion for each regiment. In war one or two of the youngest reserve classes are required to bring the peace establishment of the infantry to a war footing. The second line infantry battalions are formed by the remaining classes of the reserve reënforced by the youngest classes of the Landwehr. There still remain a large part of the Landwehr and the whole of the Landsturm for the formation of the third line. More than half of the infantry battalions were maintained at a peace strength of 19 officers and 642 men. The remainder, including the infantry of the frontier corps, were maintained at a peace strength of 19 officers and 720 men per battalion. The battalion at war strength numbers about 1000 rifles. The peace strength of a machine-gun company was 4 officers, 73 men, 27 horses, 6 two-horse machine-gun wagons, and three ammunition wagons. The company has a war strength of 100 men. Officers and superior non-commissioned officers of the infantry carry the saber and automatic pistol model 08. The man in the ranks carries the German repeating rifle (Mauser type) caliber 7.9 millimeters (.30), sighted to 2000 meters. This model 1898 rifle, weighing about nine pounds, is a most excellent modern rifle. The infantryman carries about 150 rounds of ammunition and the company ammunition wagon carries an additional supply of 16,000 rounds. The ammunition section of the corps train carries a reserve of 140 rounds per rifle. The battalion carries about 450 portable intrenching tools, which are supplemented by heavier tools in the battalion and regimental wagons.

Each regiment attached annually one officer, and each battalion two non-commissioned officers, to a pioneer

battalion of the same army corps for technical instruction. These men became instructors for the training of one non-commissioned officer and eight men per company in pioneer duties. The regimental sanitary service consisted of one sanitary officer with the staff of the regiment and two to each battalion. The battalion had a sanitary wagon with equipment. To each company was assigned one non-commissioned officer of the sanitary service, and five men of the company were trained as wounded carriers. Every man carried two first-aid dressings. The troops themselves established the dressing stations which gave first-aid to the wounded. The infantryman carried, besides his rifle with bayonet and intrenching tool, a knapsack with rations, his individual cooking and messing kit, aluminum drinking-cup and canteen, and shelter tent, of a total weight of fifty-eight or sixty pounds.

The battalion was equipped with range finder, field glasses, and signal flags. Two bicycle-men per battalion carried, in addition to the infantry equipment, blank forms for reports and waterproof capes. The regimental train was made up of 1 ammunition wagon, 1 baggage wagon, 1 ration wagon, and 1 field kitchen per company; 1 sanitary wagon, 1 baggage wagon, and 1 market wagon per battalion; and 1 baggage wagon and 1 tool wagon per regiment. It was divided into two sections; one of which, composed of ammunition wagons, sanitary wagons, and field kitchens, followed the troops into battle, while the other section, composed of heavy baggage wagons, followed some distance to the rear, and was only available in camp or cantonment.

The Jäger and Schützen battalions were really battalions of selected riflemen, not differing in any essential from infantry of the line, except that they had machine-gun companies similar to those belonging to infantry regiments, and bicycle sections numbering in peace 3 officers and 113 men.

In addition to the machine-gun troops attached to the infantry regiments there were 11 machine-gun sections, of which 9 were Prussian, 1 Saxon, and 1 Bavarian; and 15 fortress machine-gun sections. The peace strength of the section was 4 officers, 91 men, 54 horses, 6 four-horse machine-gun wagons, 2 four-horse ammunition wagons, and 1 ammunition wagon and 2 supply wagons without teams. The war strength was 115 men, 6 machine-gun wagons, 3 ammunition wagons, 2 supply wagons, 1 forage wagon drawn by four horses; 1 baggage wagon and 1 ration wagon, each drawn by two horses. Each section had one reserve gun with the ammunition column. The fighting section was divided into 3 gun platoons of two rifles each, and 1 ammunition platoon. The officers were armed and equipped as infantry officers. The non-commissioned officers and drivers carried the artillery saber and automatic pistol; other men the carbine with bayonet. The machine-gun is a Maxim rifle of the same caliber as the infantry rifle, and can be fired from the gun-carriage or dismounted. The gun-carriage and limber contain 10,500 rounds of ammunition in belts of 250 cartridges, and the 3 ammunition wagons carry 8,100 rounds. Further reserves of ammunition are carried in the ammunition columns. The individual equipment includes 60 cartridges per carbine. The section is provided with intrenching tools, axes, saws, range finder and field glasses, and a tent and cooking outfit for each ten men.

The peace strength of the cavalry was 110 regiments, of which 86 were Prussian, 12 Bavarian, 8 Saxon, and 4 were from Württemberg. There was no longer any difference in the cavalry regiments except that those designated as heavy cavalry and cuirassiers were made up of the largest horses and tallest men, while the uhlans received the medium horses and men, and to the dragoons and hussars





A German 21-centimeter siege mortar with caterpillar wheels.



The new Krupp aerial gun.

were assigned the small horses and light men. The organization, equipment, and training were the same for all. The cavalry regiment was composed of five squadrons, each of four platoons. The regiment mobilized only four squadrons, one being a depot squadron. Unlike the French cavalry, the squadrons were uniform in material and training, a different squadron being designated each year as *dépôt* squadron. The second and third line cavalry was to be organized in war from the reserves, Landwehr and Landsturm. The regiment was commanded by a colonel, lieutenant-colonel, or major, and the squadron by a captain (*Rittmeister*) with three or four subalterns and 146 men, and 142 horses in peace. The war strength of the squadron was about 150 troopers.

The officers and superior non-commissioned officers carried saber and automatic pistol. The men in the ranks were armed with the lance, saber, and carbine. The lance was of steel, seven feet four inches long. The carbine was of the make and caliber of the infantry rifle, but shorter and lighter. The regiment had a telegraph detachment of one officer and eight men, with one packhorse for the material; two six-horse bridge wagons carrying four half-boats of steel and bridge material for the construction of a bridge sixteen meters long and two meters wide; and a telegraph wagon with telegraph material, including thirty miles of wire. Each squadron carried twenty small intrenching tools on the saddle. The regimental train carried a supply of larger tools. The bridge wagons carried a supply of explosives for demolition work. There were three sanitary officers and two non-commissioned officers, with a sanitary wagon (ambulance) for each cavalry regiment, and one non-commissioned officer for each squadron. Four men in each squadron were trained as litter-bearers. The regiment had also two packhorses with sanitary

equipment. The squadron had one baggage wagon, one ration wagon, and one forage wagon. The regimental train included a forge wagon and forage wagons in addition to those already enumerated.

The cavalry was trained to fight mounted whenever possible, using the lance, which was considered superior to the saber. The saber was also carried, but there was little faith in it. The importance of dismounted fire action for the cavalry was not overlooked in training, but cavalry commanders were loath to dismount in maneuvers. This disinclination to dismount is easily explained by the fact that the lance could not be carried by the dismounted cavalryman or his mount; nor could the led horses be maneuvered without abandoning the lance. Considering the German cavalryman's faith in mounted action for the cavalry, the careful attention given to intrenching was surprising. One of the features of the squadron inspection was the organization and intrenching of a section of the firing line.

The strength of the first line army in artillery was 101 regiments. The normal strength of the regiment was 6 field batteries, but a number of regiments had also horse or howitzer batteries, giving a total of 525 field batteries, 33 horse batteries, and 75 howitzer batteries. Two regiments of 72 guns were assigned to each infantry division, and 1 section and 3 horse batteries of four guns each to a cavalry division. The field gun was a 3-inch quick-firer, provided with steel shields for the protection of the cannoneers. The battery carried 96 shrapnel and 42 high explosive shells for each gun, and the light ammunition column carried 119 rounds per gun, 104 of which were shrapnel and 15 shell. The field howitzers were caliber 10.5 centimeters (4-inch) carrying 90 shells per gun with the battery, and 70 in the ammunition column. Officers

and men were armed throughout with the automatic pistol. The enlisted men of the field batteries carried a short rifle and those of the horse batteries were provided with intrenching tools and field telephones. In addition to the normal equipment the batteries were provided with a wagon carrying an observation tower which was erected from the wagon. The sanitary personnel and equipment was similar to that of the infantry. The *Füßartillerie* included the heavy artillery of the field armies, siege artillery and fortress artillery. The peace strength of the first line army was 24 regiments.

The Engineer Corps consisted of a highly trained body of officers with suitable assistants who had charge of the construction and maintenance of the fortresses both in peace and in war. The engineering operations of the field armies were entrusted to the Pioneer. The peace strength was 35 battalions, 26 of which had each a searchlight section. The first line was to be largely increased on mobilization, and there were a number of *Reserve*, *Landwehr*, and *Landsturm* battalions destined for the second and third lines in war. The peace strength of a pioneer battalion was 29 officers and 610 men. The strength of the searchlight sections, 2 officers and 38 men, was additional.

The Communication Troops numbered in peace, 34 railroad companies, 37 telegraph and wireless companies, and 5 traction companies. The aerial service included 16 airship companies and 15 aeroplane companies. A number of other aeroplane organizations were to be incorporated in the army on the outbreak of war. The War Office controlled 11 dirigibles in 1913 and there were 5 or more under construction. Of these 10 were Zeppelins; the others were either Parseval, Schütte-Lanz, or a type constructed by the flying service in the war office. There were 25 battalions of the train, in addition to one train

depot and field bakery for each army corps of the active army. Since the army corps was equipped with its own transport, the train was intended to forward the baggage, the technical and sanitary material, and the general supplies of the field armies.

The Kaiser, as supreme commander of the armed forces of the empire, controlled the army through the *Militärkabinett*. The Prussian Ministry of War was charged with the administration of the war office, not only for Prussia, but also for the empire. The war minister exercised, however, no command over the troops, to whom he could give no orders. The German General Staff, whose chief was independent of the war ministry and responsible directly to the Kaiser, was charged with the theoretical and practical instruction of the army, with the plans for mobilization and preparation for war. Although the largest peace command was the army corps, these corps were grouped into eight "army inspections" under the direction of general officers, some of whom would, without doubt, command armies in case of war.

The Army Corps consisted of two divisions, 1 rifle (Jäger) battalion, 1 foot-artillery regiment, 1 pioneer battalion, 1 train battalion. In addition to the machine-gun companies of the regiments, there were, as we have seen, numerous machine-gun organizations, which were available for assignment to the corps. The machine-gun is an inexpensive arm and, under proper conditions, a very effective one, delivering a volume of fire equal to a section of individual riflemen. Machine-guns open from concealed positions sudden blasts of fire of such intensity that well-launched attacks may break down completely under their withering effect. But they are particularly vulnerable in the open, and once located by hostile artillery, must quickly shift their positions or be destroyed. There is reason to




*Balloon inflated on deck.*



*Captive balloon rising for observation.*

*Naval balloon carrier.*



*Zeppelin Victoria Luise flying over the Sachsen, which is at rest on the ground.*



believe that the German army had a large reserve supply of machine-guns, and it is certain that they were ready to sacrifice these gun sections freely whenever the sacrifice was justified. Communication troops, though not a part of the permanent force, were also attached to the army corps as occasion demanded. The peace corps was a simple but effective working organization, not encumbered with any unit that was not absolutely necessary to make it a well-balanced fighting force. The staff included no superfluous officers. The commanding general had a chief of staff with two or three assistants, who were general staff officers; 2 adjutants; a proper complement of supply and sanitary officers; 3 judge advocates; a chaplain and a veterinarian, for the administration of his corps in peace. In war the corps headquarters was more numerous furnished, since the corps was a small army complete in itself, including pay and field supply officers, corps bakeries, pioneer commander, train commander, gendarmerie, and field post. The headquarters numbered about 330 men, 260 horses, and 30 wagons for impedimenta. The war equipment included also a corps bridge-train with a personnel of 8 officers, 200 men, 250 horses, and 38 wagons carrying material for a bridge 140 yards long; a telegraph section carrying 80 miles of wire and capable of establishing some fifty telegraph and telephone stations; 2 ammunition columns; 12 field hospitals, each with a receiving capacity of 200 men; supply columns; reserve park; and two horse depots. The total strength of the corps is 25 battalions of infantry, 8 squadrons of cavalry, 24 batteries of field artillery, and 3 pioneer companies, or 44,000 men, 16,000 horses, and 2,700 wagons. The fighting strength is 30,000 rifles, 1,200 sabers, 126 field guns, and 18 field howitzers. The Infantry Division, composed of 2 brigades of infantry, 4 squadrons of cavalry, 2 regiments of field artillery, 2 pioneer companies with a division

bridge-train, 2 sanitary companies—a total of 12 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 12 batteries—had a ration strength of 17,600 men, 3,900 horses, and 500 wagons; and a fighting strength of 12,250 rifles, 24 machine-guns, 600 sabers, and 72 field pieces. The war strength of the 25 army corps, 25 reserve divisions, the mobile Landwehr, and Special Troops is reckoned at 2,300,000 men, 775,000 horses, 6,000 light field guns, 1,500 heavy field guns, and 2,200 machine-guns. This was an army of trained men, fully equipped, capable of rapid mobilization, and fit for first line service.

The reserve strength that the empire could develop in a long war is difficult to estimate. The peace establishment was never large enough to absorb more than fifty or sixty per cent of the available annual contingent of recruits; so that, at the outbreak of war, there must have been some 3,000,000 untrained or only slightly trained men in Germany, most of whom would find their way to the front if the struggle became such as to test the ultimate strength of the nation. The training of these men under the German system would require about one year, since only half of the men in the ranks, except in the cavalry and horse artillery, were at any time of more than one year's service.

The annual draft of recruits reported to their regiments on the first of October in each year. To see these men assembling at the regimental barracks in any of the garrison towns was a sight to delight the heart of a soldier. Here was raw material for the making of soldiers unsurpassed—and it may be stated without fear of contradiction—without equal in the world; a fine, strong, hardy, self-respecting, uniform body of men, ripe for the intensive training they were about to receive. Professional armies receive individuals who are the equal of the best of these German recruits, but the location of the recruiting offices in the large cities of Great Britain and the United States is indicative of

the character of a large proportion of the recruits they receive. During periods of prosperity recruits are difficult to obtain, while in time of financial depression applications are numerous, when with few exceptions the most unfit are the first to apply. Rigid examination excludes the physically unfit, attempts to reject moral degenerates, but accepts after all only the best of the great army of unemployed, who must suffer a weeding-out process for two or three years before the wheat is separated from the tares. Of the national armies of Europe, few possess the high physical, and none the educational standards of the German recruit. Unsympathetic observers have failed utterly to understand the character of the man they like to describe as the German conscript. They have no conception of the quiet strength and simple dignity of the man who wears the uniform of a country where Blücher's words: "It must be a disgrace for a man not to have served," have been so nearly realized. These frugal sons of soldiers, trained from childhood in habits of industry, economy, temperance, and self control, have only to put on the uniform to present a soldierly bearing. They do not chafe under the rules of barrack life, with which they have been familiar from childhood. The long hours of drill and instruction come as no hardship to men who have never been idle. The ration is simple but nourishing and in accord with the national standard of living. Discipline and obedience to the constituted authorities are national characteristics. It is rarely necessary to inflict punishment, and penalties imposed by the military code are mild. Confinement in the guard house is seldom necessary, and desertion is unknown.

The enthusiasm and pride with which officers and non-commissioned officers train every year a new class of such recruits is easy to understand. It is their life work and they go about it with a zeal which could not be more

intense if war were imminent. The instruction is systematic and uniform throughout the army. The recruits are assigned to companies and divided into groups under selected officers and non-commissioned officers for individual training. At the end of this period of training these instructors must present their recruits for inspection. The requirements are definite and the test is thorough. The reputation of the instructor is determined by the results he obtains. The responsibility is on him, and if his work is well done he receives generous praise from his superiors. After this inspection the recruits are first incorporated into the companies. After the company training the battalion training begins. The regiment, the brigade, and the division all have their definite training periods, each followed by an inspection before passing to the next higher unit. For the final test the troops are assembled by corps for autumn maneuvers. Generally two or more corps are united for the Kaiser maneuvers, which take place under the personal supervision of the Kaiser. The maneuvers are over by the end of September. The year's work is then complete. The class that has finished its color service passes into the reserve. The soldier goes to his home with a highly developed sense of national duty and a training which renders him not only a useful member of the body politic but an efficient unit of the army of the national defense, fully trained, armed, and equipped.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE ARMY OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Decadency of the Holy Roman Empire. Mercenaries and feudal service. A permanent force. Momentary glory under Charles V. The Thirty Years' War. Passing of the imperial power. The Seven Years' War. Dissolution of the empire. Austria becomes a separate empire; its many nationalities and languages. The Kingdom of Hungary. Austro-Prussian War, 1866. Universal military service; a triple-headed army. Slow reorganization after 1870. Military force under law of 1889. The problem of nationalities. The Landwehr and the Landsturm. Exempted classes and period of military service. The Ersatz Reserve. Training. Military strength under law of 1912. Instruction of non-commissioned officers. Officers of the Active Army and the Reserve. Forces constituting the first and third line armies of 1914. The cavalry force and its equipment. The artillery and equipment. The high commands. Organization of the land forces on a war footing. Supplementary forces. Popularity of the army.

When in August, 1806, Francis II, by Napoleon's command, declared the dissolution of the German Empire and gave up its crown to assume the title of Emperor of Austria, the ghost of the Holy Roman Empire was finally laid to rest. The tie which had bound the various states of the old Empire had long been a loose one, the emperor at its head had little real power, while the confederation had become "neither Holy, Roman, nor Empire."

The glamor of the title of Roman Emperor, for centuries so great that kings of France vied with German princes for its possession, had passed from men's minds. It was now an empty honor dependent upon the personal resources of the emperor and held together by dissensions and jealousies among the vassal princes and by dangers from without. The power once so real under its founder Charlemagne, and for a time revived under Charles the

Fifth, had vanished. The time when the emperor could demand troops, when disobedience brought prompt punishment, when the ban of the Empire had real meaning, had passed.

As early as the beginning of the thirteenth century, when the Hohenstaufen emperors held the scepter, "the dignity rather than the authority was unimpaired." No longer could the emperor call to his standard the ducal and princely vassals who held their estates directly from him; nor could he undertake any war involving the interest of the whole empire without the consent of all the states, and often the expenses of a war were borne by the emperor from his own private resources. Love of adventure incited many to rally around the imperial standard, while the desire of booty led others to its support; but a homogeneous, well-ordered, imperial army was impossible.

By the fourteenth century the love of money had outrun the love of adventure and mercenary armies came into existence, gradually supplanting the old imperial forces. Money and personal estates became indispensable to an emperor and each prince and noble strove to increase the importance of his own house at the expense of the Empire, while each bent all his energies towards self-aggrandizement. Feudal service fell into disuse, troops became disorganized masses lacking training or discipline. During the reign of Maximilian I,—1493-1519,—an attempt was made to establish a military constitution by which a permanent force should be maintained on the basis of a general assessment, and in 1507, at the Diet of Constance, it was agreed that troops and money should be contributed to the emperor as a permanent supply; "all the electors together, including the Bohemian, had to place in the field 760 horsemen, 557 infantry, and to pay 16,230 gulden; the

cities had to provide 632 horsemen, 1,335 infantry, and to pay 39,942 gulden."

In 1520, when Charles of Spain, the grandson of the Emperor Maximilian, was elected as Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire, the Spaniards opposed his acceptance of the imperial crown, for "what else was the Empire become," they said, "but the mere shadow of an immensely overgrown tree." But Charles V brought the wealth of Spain and her rich possessions to the support of the imperial dignity, and during his reign much was accomplished towards strengthening the emperor's position and increasing his power. In this reign the Empire attained an imposing dignity and influence unequalled since the time of Charlemagne. It was not destined long to enjoy this high position, however, for religious and social unrest were at work; and the Reformation, gathering momentum with the passing years, culminated finally in the next century in the Thirty Years' War, which shook Europe to its foundation. The Peace of Westphalia, which ended this period of devastation, struck the death-blow to the Holy Roman Empire. Reduced in extent, it yet held the remaining estates in a semblance of its old form, but "the supremacy of the emperor and with it the unity of the body of the state sank to a mere shadow."

In the period following, wars with France robbed it of many valuable possessions and the support of many of its princes, which further weakened the Empire. The eighteenth century saw it divided into three hundred sovereignties, ecclesiastical states, and free cities, with many more imperial knights who exercised undisputed jurisdiction over their subjects. The emperor's leadership was almost nominal, "a loose thread for preserving the political unity." He might, by the constitution of the Empire, call upon each free city and sovereign for soldiers and

subsidies, but they obeyed the summons only when it suited their pleasure and convenience. Separation of the states into independent kingdoms and principalities had so far progressed, when, by the death of Charles VI, the male branch of the house of Hapsburg became extinct, and the electors chose Charles of Bavaria as Emperor Charles VII, who claimed the Austrian succession against Maria Theresa; hence Austria stood without the Empire and at war with it. Although the House of Austria, the Hapsburgs, again held the imperial scepter the separatist policy of Maria Theresa tended towards the development of the hereditary estates and the regarding of the imperial dignity as the natural and inalienable right of the rulers. The Seven Years' War, carried on with the Reich, hastened the work of disruption so that by the end of the eighteenth century Germany was a loose Confederation lacking unity or cohesion. Such was the condition when the "waves of the French Revolution came surging into Germany."

The war which soon engulfed Europe and the rise of Napoleon put an end to the old order. From the Empire various states were created under the protection of France, and Francis II laid down the scepter of Charlemagne to take up that of Austria, as Francis I. The Hapsburgs had so long worn the imperial crown that it is not unnatural to think of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as the outgrowth, the legitimate descendant, of the Holy Roman Empire.

The Hereditary Estates comprised many nationalities and races. The monarch was described as King of Hungary, Bohemia, Croatia, Slavonia, and Galicia; Archduke of Austria; Grand Duke of Transylvania; Duke of Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola; and Princely Count of Hapsburg and Tyrol. This "Mosaic of political curiosities" he united under the title of Emperor of Austria. Eleven distinct languages were spoken in the Austrian Empire,

and all efforts to establish German as the common means of communication have failed.

Of the non-German races the Hungarians were by far the strongest, and were possessed of an ardent national and racial feeling, but loyal withal to the House of Hapsburg. The awakening of political consciousness throughout Europe, in 1848, aroused in the Hungarians a desire for a separate national life, but it was not until many years had passed that, in 1867, it finally reached its long-sought goal, and the Empire became known to the world as Austria-Hungary, each a separate kingdom, with its own national army, yet each supporting the dual monarchy and owing allegiance to the one head, the reigning Hapsburg.

The armies of 1866, inferior in organization and training, arms and equipment, suffered decisive defeat at Königgrätz, and were able to offer no further effective resistance to the victorious Prussians. The result was a new army law which established universal service, made provision for a first-line army of 800,000 on a war footing, and created a Landwehr for Austria and one for Hungary. Thus the new double monarchy had an army which was divided into three parts, each dependent on a separate legislative body for its support. The joint army was maintained at a greatly reduced strength, and the Landwehr, or second-line forces, were scarcely more than paper organizations. The events of the War of 1870 demonstrated clearly the weakness of an army maintained at a low peace strength and the absurdity of a reserve without adequate training and which possessed neither the numbers nor the equipment to make it an effective force. An effort was then made to bring the Landwehr up to the requirements of first-line troops. The problem was one which under most the favorable conditions would require a long period, and the difficulties which the

military authorities experienced were greatly increased by the obstacles placed in their way by Hungary. Much progress had been made by the military, but the Hungarian opposition to reform was not overcome until the crisis of 1908-1909, when Austria-Hungary formally annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, which she had occupied since 1878. The Russian mobilization and the imminent danger of war brought the two monarchies to a realization of the folly of their policy of internal strife and the needs of the army began to receive consideration.

It was not, however, even then without great difficulty that the needed reforms were brought about. The army law of 1889 was still in force. The annual contingent of recruits amounted to 103,000 for the active army, 20,000 for the Austrian Landwehr, and 12,000 for the Hungarian Landwehr which, excluding the artillery, is the *Honvéd*. This force retains the title of the revolutionaries of 1848-1849, *Honvéd* (Defenders of the Fatherland). The annual draft once fixed was not to be changed for ten years, except that in case of emergency the crown could modify it. Two ten-year periods had passed and the number of recruits was the same as in 1889. The population had increased during this time not less than 10,000,000, with a corresponding increase in the number of men capable of military service, but the surplus could not be utilized, and had to be passed into the general levy. These men belonged, of course, to the ultimate reserve strength of the army, but received so little training that they were of doubtful value. There had been many changes in the tactical and technical requirements of the army. The field artillery had been increased and the machine-gun organizations as well as new units of communication troops had been created. This had resulted in a dangerous decrease in the peace strength of the other units.

The two-year service was already firmly established in Germany and there was a popular demand for a corresponding reduction of color service in Austria-Hungary. This would require a still further increase in the annual draft, which was not to be secured without a political struggle. Short service imposes heavy burdens on the officers and non-commissioned officers responsible for the training of the recruits. Without a numerous staff of professional instructors and a class of recruits capable of intensive training it is not possible to maintain a short service army on a basis of modern efficiency. This standard had been established on a high plane by Germany, which had solved the problem of providing suitable non-commissioned officers before adopting the two-year service; but no such solution of the problem had been reached by the Dual Monarchy. The educational standard of the people was not so high as in Germany and, besides, the problem of a number of different languages presented particular difficulties. The effort on the part of Austria to introduce German as the language of command was persistently combated in Hungary, and army orders and regulations which were to reach all the troops had to be published in many different languages. It was a delicate task that confronted the military administration, that of creating a national army out of many different peoples, but observers at the autumn maneuvers of 1912 and 1913 testified to the efficiency of the troops and, according to the estimate of a former minister of war for Austria-Hungary, the Landwehr divisions were, in 1914, not inferior to the divisions of the active army. The Landwehr, still maintained by each monarchy as a separate force, formed, with the joint army, the first line in war; the Austrian and Hungarian Landsturms made up the third line. There was, strictly speaking, no second-line force.

Like the other armies of the continent, this was a national army based on universal compulsory service. Members of the priesthood and teachers were exempt, and men who were the sole support of dependent families were assigned to the *Ersatz Reserve*, or general levy, without service with the colors; as were certain others, for economical reasons. Those, however, who escaped service paid a tax in lieu thereof. Service, except for the mounted branches, was for two years in the active army and ten in the reserve. The cavalry and the horse artillery served three years with the colors and seven in the reserve.

Young men possessed of the required educational qualifications passed into the reserve after one year with the active army. Liability to serve began with the twenty-first year of age and ended with the completion of the thirty-fifth year. Men fit for service were divided between the active army and the Landwehr; those in excess of the requirements of these establishments and the favored classes were in the *Ersatz Reserve*. Volunteers were accepted beginning with the eighteenth year of age, but only with the consent of their parents or guardians. Foreigners were also accepted with the consent of their own government and approval of the emperor. Reservists who had completed two years with the active army were subject to be called out for four periods of training not exceeding a total of fourteen weeks. Those who had served three years with the colors were liable only to eleven weeks' reserve training, divided into three periods; while four-year men, such as marines, were not subject to be called out for further training. One-year volunteers received four periods of supplementary training, each of four weeks. The *Ersatz Reserve* received ten weeks' continuous instruction and were called out later for three periods of four weeks each.

Service in the Landsturm was for twenty-four years, beginning with the nineteenth year of age. The first category of the Landsturm included men not over thirty-seven, and was destined to fill the ranks of the active army and the Landwehr in case of war. The unfit paid an annual tax so long as they were of military age. This tax was based on income and applied also to the parents of a son who was subject to a tax. The minimum taxable income was for the son, 1,200 kronen (\$240), and for the parents, 4,000 kronen (\$800).

Recruiting was territorial, not only for the active army, but also for the Landwehr and the Landsturm. The new army laws of 1912 were expected to produce for the first year 136,000, for the second year 154,000, and for the following nine years 159,000 recruits for the active army. The annual contingent for the Austrian Landwehr was estimated for the same period to increase from 20,000 to 27,000; that of Hungary from 17,000 to 25,000; and that of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 6,400 to 7,800. The peace army amounted to 414,000 officers and men. The war strength without the Landsturm and Ersatz Reserve was estimated at 2,000,000.

The non-commissioned officers for the army came from the ranks and had no special schools for their instruction, except such as were maintained by the regiments. The introduction of the two-year service brought up, as we have seen, a serious problem with respect to the non-commissioned officers. Many solutions were discussed in military circles. The number of long-service non-commissioned officers decreased from year to year, while the needs were greater than ever before. In order to meet the demand, the military administration planned to establish schools where boys should be taken at the age of fifteen or sixteen, after they had finished the public school course, and prepared for the grade of non-commissioned officer as a

profession. There was no difference of opinion as to the value of such schools but it would be some years before they produced results, and the demand was immediate. The provision of the two-year law which proposed to retain in the service for another year those who before the end of the second year had been appointed non-commissioned officers would impose an additional burden on the very men who were deserving of the greatest consideration. It was recognized that proper provision should be made not only for the social and material condition of the non-commissioned officer while in the service, but that he should be provided for after he left it. In this way selected men could be induced voluntarily to give the best part of their lives to a profession which was already endeared to them by tradition and through patriotic spirit. It was not necessary that the career should offer great material advantages; a merely decent maintenance in the sphere in which they found themselves honored defenders of the fatherland was sufficient. This was accomplished in 1912 and would without doubt furnish the army with a high class of non-commissioned officers, without which a trained citizenry, or national army, is not to be created. These men are no less important than professional officers of a superior quality; no army worthy of the name, much less a trained citizenry, can exist without both.

The officers of the active army were drawn from a number of military academies or cadet schools, by appointment of officers of the reserve, or by direct examination. Non-commissioned officers who had served not less than six years were appointed officers in the supply departments, subject to examination. Officers of the reserve were drawn from the one-year volunteers or from the officers of the active army, by transfer to the reserve. Officers of the Landsturm were only appointed in case of need.

The army of Austria-Hungary, composed of so many elements and nationalities, imposed burdens on its officers not experienced by the officers of the other Great Powers of Europe. These officers were drawn, as a rule, from the classes best suited for the military training of the nation, and were, in general, well qualified by education and training for their important duties. Tradition and devotion to the crown made them worthy servants of the state. The schools maintained for the theoretical and practical instruction of the officers were ample and of the same character as those of Germany. The German military system was a model for all modern armies, but the influence was more potent in Austria-Hungary than elsewhere, and this influence was sure to be a most powerful factor if the armies of these two allied nations should operate together in joint campaigns against a common enemy. While the professional officers of the active army measured up to the standards of modern military efficiency, the same could not be said of the reserve officers. These officers came, as in Germany, from the class of one-year volunteers; but in Germany, the one-year volunteers existed for the benefit of the state,—if possessed of the high qualities fitting him to command men, a volunteer might become an officer; otherwise not. In Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, the appointment as a reserve officer was his normal career; if the young man completed his one-year volunteer service in a fairly satisfactory manner, he was sure of his commission. The result was a large percentage of reserve officers who were neither socially nor professionally acceptable in military circles.

Thus, the first-line army of 1914 was made up of the joint army, the Austrian Landwehr, and the Hungarian Landwehr. The joint army included 102 regiments of infantry from regiments of Tirolese Jäger (hunters), 26 battalions of

field Jäger; 4 infantry regiments and 1 battalion of Jäger furnished by Bosnia and Herzegovina. These regiments were all of 4 battalions. The Austrian Landwehr was made up of 37 infantry regiments and 3 Tirolese regiments. The Tirolese regiments and 2 of the infantry regiments were mountain troops with special organization, equipment, and arms. There were 28 regiments of infantry and 1 independent company in the Hungarian Landwehr. Of these regiments 10 had 4 and the other 18 only 3 battalions each. All battalions except the mountain troops had 4 companies. The strength of the Austrian company was about the same as that of Germany and France, and the battalion of 4 companies corresponded to that of the other armies. The regiment, however, was of 4 battalions, making it larger by one-third than the German regiment, and numbering slightly more than 4,000 rifles. In addition to 4 field battalions, the regiment had also 1 depot-battalion, which was only a skeleton organization in time of peace, but which on mobilization formed 2 battalions, one of which was destined to take the field and the other, which remained a depot-battalion, was to supply reserves to replace the casualties in the regiment in the front. The Jäger battalion was, like the infantry, of 4 companies, and had a depot-company which bore the same relation to the battalion at the front as did the depot-battalion to the infantry regiment. All armies have recognized the desirability of maintaining skeleton organizations which in peace have only the officers and non-commissioned officers, and in war are quickly recruited to full strength. This is a very plausible scheme, because the greatest obstacle to the creation of new units after the outbreak of war is the difficulty of obtaining suitable officers and non-commissioned officers. A very serious objection is that these officers, having no commands in peace, are not likely to be efficient





Austrian infantry on dress parade.



Portable cooking stoves, used in the Austrian Army, which enable cooking to be done while the troops march.

commanders in war. On mobilization each regiment formed a reserve battalion, and the Jäger battalion formed reserve companies. All regiments had in peace two machine-gun detachments and the Jäger battalion had one. Several Jäger battalions had organized bicycle companies. It should be remembered that the Jäger did not differ in any essential from the infantry of the line. The regiments were located in peace either in or near the districts in which they were recruited.

The third line was made up entirely of Landsturm troops, whose organization was not uniform and their training was mediocre; hence they would require some training after the outbreak of war before they would be a dependable force. The infantry was armed with a repeating rifle, caliber about .32, model of 1895, 1890, and 1888. It compared favorably with the French, but was inferior to the German rifle in muzzle velocity. A high initial velocity and a pointed bullet gave a flat trajectory, the importance of which lies in a decrease of the dead space. The ideal rifle would be one the path of whose bullet would at no range be higher than a man's head; that is, a rifle that would eliminate the dead space. The ammunition supply, the technical equipment, and the regimental sanitary service did not differ materially from those of the other armies of Europe.

There were 42 regiments of cavalry in the joint army, 6 in the Austrian Landwehr, and 10 in the Hungarian Landwehr. They were classed as dragoons, hussars, and uhlans, but, as in other armies, they did not differ except in name. The cavalry was equipped with saber and repeating carbine, and the regiments were supplied with machine-guns. The machine-guns were carried on pack animals, not only in the cavalry, but also in the infantry, because of the mountainous character of the country, especially on the frontiers.

There were in the joint army 42 regiments of field artillery, 14 regiments of field howitzers, 8 divisions of horse artillery, and 14 divisions of heavy howitzers. The rifle regiments had 5 and the howitzer regiments 4 batteries, all of six-guns. A division of horse artillery was composed of 3 four-gun batteries and a howitzer division of 2 four-gun batteries. One field howitzer and 3 field artillery regiments formed a brigade of corps artillery. The horse batteries were attached to the cavalry divisions.

There were 8 field howitzer divisions in the Austrian Landwehr and 2 field regiments and 8 divisions in that of Hungary. The regiments were of 4 and the divisions of 2 batteries, all of six-guns. In addition there were 10 regiments of mountain artillery, composed each of 1 rifle division and 1 howitzer division.

The mountain gun was a 2.9-inch rifle carried on pack animals, and the 4-inch mountain rifle was mounted on a low carriage drawn by two horses placed one behind the other. The Austro-Hungarian artillery differed from that of Germany and France principally in the large percentage of mountain guns. The field guns, in caliber, in rapidity of fire, and in the non-recoil equipment, were not unlike those of the other European armies.

The supreme command of the army was vested in the emperor, and the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand was, at the time of his assassination, Inspector-General of the Land Forces. Directly responsible to him stood the Chief of the General Staff. Then followed the chiefs of the six army inspections, and the inspectors of the cavalry, artillery, and the various technical corps.


In war the land forces were to be formed into field armies of 3 to 4 corps and 1 to 3 cavalry divisions. There were 16 army corps, composed normally of 2 army and 1 Landwehr division and the technical troops and equipment necessary

to make them independent organizations. There were 49 infantry divisions, each of which was normally composed of 2 brigades of infantry, 2 or 3 squadrons of cavalry, the divisional artillery, ammunition pack train, sanitary service, and field bakeries. The fighting strength was 15,000 rifles, 8 to 10 machine-gun sections, 450 sabers, and 42 field guns. The cavalry division was composed of 2 brigades of cavalry, horse artillery and machine-guns—a total of 3,600 sabers, 4 machine-guns, and 12 field pieces.

The organization and equipment of the engineers, pioneers, and sappers, of the communications troops and the train, and of the sanitary and the supply service were normal and well adapted to the needs of the line of the army. There is less available information about the fortress and siege artillery than about any other part of the armed forces. It was known that Austria-Hungary had some large-caliber rifles, howitzers, and mortars, but it was not known whether these large pieces could be successfully transported and made available for field operations. If there was one weak point in the army it was in the aerial service. There was such a service charged with the development of airships and aëroplanes for military use, but little practical progress had been made.

Much had been accomplished in organization and equipment since 1912. Although the army had suffered greatly from the political opposition of Hungary, this opposition was never aimed at the army itself, and the approval of the law of 1912 eliminated its stifling effect, at least, until new legislation should be required. The strongest tie that united the two monarchies was the ruling family. Loyalty to emperor and king was as strong in Hungary as in Austria, and the army under his personal command was the one national institution which more than any other could rely on the united support of all the people. There was no

division of opinion that the safest guarantee not only for national existence, but for the uninterrupted development of the national ideals, was the strength of the armed forces. The army at least received the support to which it was entitled by the place it held in the affections of the people, but which it had long been denied by their representatives in the parliaments of the Dual Monarchy. An army which triumphed over party politics in time of peace, was not likely to fail in its duty when war made it the nation's sole support.



Russian armored train.



Siege gun used in the Austrian army. On the right is the motor-tractor, on the left, the gun, and in the center is the mount, which must be placed on a concrete base before the gun can be used.



## CHAPTER VII

### THE ARMIES OF TURKEY AND BULGARIA

Western migration of the Oghuz Turks; they settle in Asia Minor; adopt crescent as their device. Foundation of the Ottoman Empire by Osman. The first Vizier. Permanent military organization. The "Janissaries." Suleiman, the Magnificent; his feudal forces; his navy; curbed power of the Janissaries. Decline of the Ottoman power. Destruction of the Janissaries. Introduction of Western military and naval ideals. Foreign military advisers. Army reform by the German General von der Goltz. The German the army model; the British the naval pattern. German officers in Turkish army service. Universal military service. Quota of non-Mohammedan troops. Peace and war strength. Training of non-commissioned officers. The General Staff. Military Law of 1910. Military schools. General reorganization under a German commission, 1913. State of organization in 1914; first, second, and third lines; equipment; aviation section; the gendarmerie; military council; army inspection; train troops; sanitary service. German commission enlarged. Quality of the army. Bulgaria: Advent of the Bulgars. A mingled people. Original limits of the Bulgarian Kingdom. Periods of decline and recovery. First incursion of the Russians. Under the Byzantine Empire. A second Bulgarian empire. A Turkish province. Russia restores the nation. Under Russian influence. Eastern Rumelia incorporated in Bulgaria. The modern army: service, military schools and training, annual contingent of recruits; organization, strength, and equipment. Qualities of the forces and approximate strength in 1914.

The history of the Turkish army and the history of the Ottoman Empire are one and inseparable, and its beginning reads like an old Eastern romance, so full is it of dramatic incidents and unexpected situations. Early in the thirteenth century a tribe of Oghuz Turks driven from their homes in Khorasan started westward. When they were crossing the Euphrates their leader, Suleiman Shah, was drowned, whereupon the members of the tribe separated, were scattered, and lost to history, except a small number who remained loyal to their dead leader's son, Er-Toghrul. Under

his leadership, this small body of four hundred families continued their journey, hoping soon to reach the land of the Seljukian Turks, and there to find a home under Aladdin, Sultan of Iconium. As they rode westward they came upon a battlefield where two armies of unequal strength were contending for the mastery. Without stopping to learn who the combatants were, Er-Toghrul with quick chivalry decided in favor of the weaker side and threw his whole armed strength with such force upon that side that he soon won a glorious victory for it. When the battle was done it was found that a strange fate had led them to the very man whom they sought, and by their assistance they had saved his small army from the host of the Mongols, the most implacable enemies of the Turkish race. In gratitude for his timely aid Aladdin received Er-Toghrul and his hardy band of warriors most gladly and gave him a principality in Asia Minor.

Once settled here his small force of fighting men was quickly augmented by volunteers from the kindred tribes who always flocked about the standard of an able leader. The crescent, the device which Aladdin bore on his banners, Er-Toghrul, as his vassal, adopted; and it was reserved to his descendants to make it known throughout the world. Fighting on the frontiers was incessant, and Aladdin had cause for gratitude to his faithful vassal on many occasions; nor did he fail to show his appreciation of his services, but showered him with honors and bestowed upon him much valuable territory. Thus was the foundation of the Turkish Empire laid, but it was reserved for the son of Er-Toghrul, for Osman, a warrior chief who extended his possessions far beyond the borders of his father's principality, to mold his tribe into a nation which should be known by his name as the Ottoman Empire. Although Osman never assumed the title of Sultan, he is considered the founder of the

empire and it is his sword which is girt about each new sultan when he ascends the throne,—a custom corresponding to the coronation of the western sovereigns,—and the people, upon his accession, pray “May he be as good as Osman.”

It was in the fourteenth century, during the reign of Osman’s son, Orkan, that the military organization of the empire was undertaken which for so many years made the Turkish army the most efficient and powerful in the world. Er-Toghrul and Osman had fought at the head of armed vassals and volunteers who were disbanded when the wars were ended; but Orkan felt that the future welfare of the empire demanded a permanent force well-disciplined and at all times ready to do the sultan’s bidding. On his accession Orkan had created his brother Aladdin his “*Vizier*” (“the bearer of burdens”), an office destined to become permanent, and from the beginning one of great influence and power. It was to the ability and loyalty of his brother, Aladdin, that the laws providing for the organization and maintenance of a standing army of regular paid troops, both infantry and cavalry, are due. Thus a century before Charles VII of France created his fifteen companies of men-at-arms, which have been considered the first standing army of modern times, the Ottoman Empire had a force of permanent highly trained and disciplined troops. They were called “*Yaya*” and “*Piade*” and were “divided into tens, hundreds, and thousands, under their respective decurions, centurions, and colonels.” This force, highly paid and privileged, soon became a source of anxiety to the sultan, lest they should be a danger rather than a protection to the empire. A means of curbing this independent and haughty host was sought and it was then that Tschen-dereli suggested to the sultan and his brother, the *Vizier* Aladdin, the plan which resulted in the organization of the famous corps known as the *Janissaries*.

This force, for centuries the terror of Europe and Asia, was composed entirely of the children of Christian parents who had been taken as prisoners of war. A thousand boys were chosen each year from among the year's prisoners; and when a thousand suitable boys could not be found among the captives the deficiency was made up from the sons of the sultan's Christian subjects. They were taken entirely away from their parents when very young, forced to become Mohammedans, and brought up under the severest discipline. Their pay, however, was high and rich rewards fell to ability and faithfulness. This system of taking Christian children, a thousand each year, was continued for three centuries until the reign of Muhammed IV, at which time the corps was recruited from among the sons of the janissaries and native Turks.

The name *janissary* is a corruption of two words, *yeni tscheri*, which mean "new troops." The story is told that the Sultan, soon after the first enrollment of his young soldiers was complete, led them to the house of the dervish, Haji Beytasch, and begged that he bless and name them. The dervish laid his sleeve over the head of one of the boys and said: "The troops which thou hast created shall be called *yeni tscheri*, their faces shall be white and shining, their right arms shall be strong, their arrows sharp. They shall be fortunate in fight, and they shall never leave the battlefield save as conquerors."

In addition to the janissaries, Aladdin organized other corps of the army, which he divided into regular and irregular forces. The regular forces were paid in land in order to create among them the desire of retaining all that they had conquered. The irregular forces, on the other hand, were paid neither in land, as the regular troops, nor in money, as the janissaries, but in plunder. They were called

out at the beginning of a war and disbanded at its close, and were used in great swarms in advance of the regular troops to weary and wear out the enemy before the main body of the army came up for the fight. The sultans, true warrior kings, led their troops in person, and the effect of this custom upon the morale of the soldiers, who looked upon their rulers as the divine representatives of the Prophet, cannot be exaggerated. So long as this practice was adhered to the history of the Ottoman army is one long chapter of successes, reaching its zenith with Suleiman, the Magnificent, in the sixteenth century. It was at this time that the two great empires, the Holy Roman Empire, under Charles V in the west, and the Ottoman Empire, under Suleiman in the east, attained a degree of splendor and power never before possessed by either, and which neither was again destined to hold. Under Suleiman all branches of the Turkish government received careful attention and revision. The feudal system, which in the west became a source of weakness to the empire, was in Turkey, by the laws of Suleiman, molded into an effective military weapon under the direct control of the sultan, who alone could receive homage from holders of fiefs, either of the large *ziamets* or of the small *timars*, and who alone had the power to bestow a lapsed *ziamet*. The total feudal force at this time reached the strength of one hundred and fifty thousand horsemen, who must come together when summoned and serve without pay until the close of the campaign. In addition to these feudal troops there were the regular and irregular forces of the standing army and the squadrons of Tartar cavalry which the Khans of the Crimea furnished to the sultan. The total forces formed an army with which none of that day could compare. At this time, also, the Turkish navy reached a high degree of efficiency and was supreme in the Mediterranean.

Although the army and the empire reached the height of its power under Suleiman, and although he proved himself an able and devoted ruler, yet the germs of decadence were sown in his reign that were to prove the ruin of his army and empire. The janissaries, the flower of the Ottoman forces, had until his time held the privilege of not taking part in a campaign unless the sultan was commanding the army on the field of battle. This law was altered by Suleiman, thus opening the way for weak and inactive sultans to avoid and shirk their hereditary responsibility, and for the nation to lose its warrior chiefs. The troops were, after this time, with few exceptions, such as during the reign of Murad IV, commanded by the grand vizier, while the sultan remained in his palace in Constantinople. Also, at this time, the fame of the janissaries began to attract many adventurers, who were admitted to their ranks, the severe discipline was relaxed, the communistic life abandoned; they were permitted to marry and engage in various business enterprises, while the pay and privileges remained the same as of old. They grew to be a haughty, overbearing, and unruly body of men, a source of disturbance to the state and of weakness to the army. From this time insurrections among them became frequent, and they were as great a scourge to their rulers as to their enemies.

Disaster abroad and disturbance at home followed the army for the next century. There was a period of revived glory under the four great Köprülü viziers, but this was not lasting; and in the eighteenth century the Turkish domination in the Crimea was lost, its marine destroyed, and, in 1774, when the treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji granted to Russia the protectorate over all Greek Christian subjects of the sultan, the dissolution of the empire seemed unavoidable.

In order to stem the tide of ill fortune, efforts were made to introduce reforms into the army, but all plans failed;

every innovation being bitterly and effectively opposed by the janissaries. When French officers were brought to Constantinople to found an engineering school, to build arsenals, and to form an army on European models, the janissaries rebelled and deposed the sultan.

Defeats by the French armies of Napoleon and by Mehemet Ali, vassal of the Porte in Egypt, convinced the enlightened members of the government that Turkey could maintain her honor on the field of battle against Europe only by opposing European methods to the European forces. Heroic measures alone could cure the ills of the army; and when Mahmud II came to the throne he had determined on the destruction of the janissaries. On the 15th of June, 1826, they expiated their haughty insolence and blind selfishness with their blood; and a new regular army, devoted to reform and progress, was established.

Throughout the whole nineteenth century the policy of the Sublime Porte in military and naval affairs was that of devotion to western ideals and methods, with European officers for teachers and advisors. Napoleon, when he was still little known, conceived the idea of crippling Great Britain by striking her empire in the east, and asked the French government to send him to Turkey to reorganize the armies of the sultan; but fate had other work in store for him. The great von Moltke, as a young man, was in Turkey as military advisor; during the Crimean War many British officers were attached to the Turkish army; and at the time of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 British officers were still at work with the armed forces of the sultan. The foreign officers found the task of reforming the Turkish army a thankless one. The sultan generally failed to give them any authority, and in the army they met with little sympathy and coöperation; neither Turkey nor the army was ready for reform. After the Russo-Turkish war

of 1877-1878, however, Abdul-Hamid II called the German General von der Goltz to his aid. Von der Goltz is a veteran of the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, was a general staff officer in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, and is the author of various military and historical works. He was engaged in the reorganization of the Turkish army from 1883 to 1893. A man of such character and ability could not have wasted ten years of his life. He must have found a more fertile field for his labors than the many other foreign military advisors who had tried to reform the Turk. Turkey along with all other nations had turned to Germany as a model for military virtues, and when, later, the "Young Turk" revolution had established a new régime in Turkey, Enver Bey went to Berlin. That the "Young Turks" applied to Great Britain for naval advice and to Germany for military counsel indicated a genuine desire for reform along lines of real efficiency. The calling of a score of German officers to Turkey in 1909 confirmed the establishment of the German ideal in the Young Turk government as it had already been recognized under the old régime. Enver Pasha, as minister of war, largely extended the German influence, and a numerous commission of officers under the leadership of General Liman von Sandars took charge of the Turkish forces with prospects of enjoying the full support of the government in creating a new army. It is then to Germany that we must attribute the organization of the Turkish land force, as we know it, in 1909.

Since that time universal service has been applied to the Christian as well as to the Mohammedan population. Service is for three years in the active army, six years in the reserve of the active army, nine years in the first category, and seven years in the second category of the general reserve. Numerous classes are exempt from service in the active army and pass directly into the general reserve,





Turkish artillery.



Turkish infantry.

in which they remain for eighteen years and receive from six to nine months' training with the colors. They then pass into the second category of the general reserve in which they remain seven years. Service begins with the twenty-first year of age, but volunteers are accepted between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, if they are qualified for service. It is provided that the number of non-Mohammedans in any body of troops shall not exceed twenty-five per cent of the total strength of the organization. Men who display special aptitude may be furloughed before the expiration of the prescribed period of service, even after one year's service. All men, Mohammedans and others, may purchase their discharge after three months' service with the colors for about \$230. They do not, however, escape service in the general reserve. Reservists of the active army are liable to be called out for one period of training not to exceed one month in duration, and members of the general reserve are subject to be called every two years for one month's training.

The peace strength of the active army was about 10,000 officers and 230,000 men; but since 1906 Turkey has so often engaged in hostilities, and mobilized preparatory to war, that the strength of the army probably exceeded the authorized peace establishment by large numbers. The war strength is estimated at 24,000 officers and 600,000 men.

The non-commissioned officers are drawn in part from the troops and in part from non-commissioned officers' schools. Under the new régime careful attention has been given to the development of suitable non-commissioned officers, and each of the model regiments under the supervision of German officers maintained schools for the education of non-commissioned officers.

The officers of the General Staff were drawn exclusively from military schools. Most of the officers of the technical

services and about half of those of the line of the army came also from the military schools; all others were promoted from the ranks. The Turkish army possessed no trained corps of reserve officers such as existed in the armies of Europe, but the proportion of active officers was large. The law of 1910 made provision for the creation of a corps of reserve officers to be divided into two classes. The first class included officers who had completed their service with the colors, retired officers and those who by reasons of physical defects fell below the standard required of active officers. The second class was to be made up of non-commissioned officers who had completed their service and of high school graduates with military training who passed a prescribed examination. Provision was also made for the establishment of a school for the training of reserve officers in Constantinople. A law of 1909 was intended to regulate promotion and to eliminate from the army many officers who through favoritism had reached grades for which they were not qualified; but the great demand for officers due to the mobilizations of 1911, 1912, and 1913 either prevented the contemplated eliminations or made it necessary to recall those who had been dropped. There were more than thirty state military schools in Turkey for the education of young men for the grade of officers in the army. Graduates of these schools went to the School of War near Constantinople for a two years' course and were commissioned directly in the army. The General Staff Academy in Constantinople prepared officers for the General Staff. On the completion of the three-year course in the General Staff Academy officers served two years with troops, and were then available for service on the General Staff. In addition, there was a school for the superior training of officers of artillery and engineers, a school of application for officers of cavalry and infantry, schools

of fire for both infantry and artillery, and a military riding-school in Constantinople with a course for non-commissioned officers.

As a result of the Balkan War of 1912-1913 a general reorganization of the army was undertaken under a numerous commission of German officers with General Liman von Sandars at its head. Many reforms were doubtless instituted, but no important units could have been created before the outbreak of the Great War. The Turkish army of 1914 was in organization and numbers substantially that of 1909.

The first-line infantry consisted of 130 regiments, 43 rifle battalions, 9 rifle regiments, and 13 battalions of frontier guards,—a total of 473 battalions, each of 4 companies. The second line included 342 battalions of the general reserve, made up of men who had been trained in the line of the army, and 170 battalions of second reserve men, who had passed directly into the general reserve, and who had received only six or nine months' training. The third line included the seven oldest classes of the general reserve and was not under organization in peace. The infantry was provided with machine-guns on the basis of a company of 4 guns to a regiment. The first line was armed with the Mauser repeating rifle, caliber .30, and the second line with the Mauser, caliber .38. The third line was provided with the Martini-Henry rifle, caliber .45. The officers were armed with pistol and saber.

There were in the first line 208 squadrons of cavalry and in the second line 120 squadrons. Five squadrons formed a regiment. On mobilization the fifth squadron in each regiment was to fill the other four to war strength, and then serve as a reserve squadron. The Mauser repeating carbine, caliber .30, was prescribed for all the cavalry; but a large part of it was probably armed with the older model

Mauser, caliber .38, and the Martini-Henry carbine. The cavalry carried, also, the saber or lance, and in some cases a pistol.

The first-line army comprised 35 regiments of field artillery with 2 or 3 batteries to the regiment, 23 battalions of mountain artillery with 3 batteries to the battalion, 5 divisions of horse artillery with 2 batteries to the division, and 6 battalions of heavy artillery with 3 battalions to the division. There seems to have been no artillery provided for the second and third-line armies. The field artillery was in process of change from six to four-gun batteries. The four-gun batteries were armed with the rapid-fire field piece, the Krupp 3-inch gun. The remaining field guns, as well as the field howitzers, were of the older Krupp models. There were some 150 companies of coast or fortifications artillery, making a total of about 400 officers and 15,000 men. The seacoast guns were of various types; some modern guns were introduced during the Balkan War, including a number of rapid-fire howitzers. Technical troops, in the proportion found in European armies, existed on paper, but, certainly, those to be allotted to the second-line army had never been formed.

The war ministry maintained an aviation section and there was a training ground established near Constantinople. The aërial park consisted of one or two dozen machines of various types. Foreign instructors were engaged and Turkish officers were attached to some of the European armies for instruction in aviation.

The Turkish gendarmerie was a numerous body of men with a military organization, the total force amounting to about 45,000, 8,000 of whom were mounted. The dismounted gendarmes were armed with Mauser or Martini-Henry rifles; while the mounted men carried the Winchester repeating carbine and the saber.





*Machine guns.  
Infantry at drill.*



*Field artillery.  
Field gun unlimbered ready for action.*

Bulgarian Army.

The sultan was the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces. The Superior Military Council was created in 1909 under the presidency of the minister of war; the other members of the council being the commanders of the Army Inspections and certain other superior officers.

Thirteen army corps of the Turkish army were grouped into Army Inspections, each supervised by an inspector general; the fourteenth corps and 5 divisions were independent. The corps consisted of 3 infantry divisions, a rifle regiment, 1 cavalry brigade, 6 to 9 batteries of heavy artillery, 1 battalion of engineers, 1 train battalion, and 1 telegraph company. The division was made up of 3 regiments of infantry, 1 rifle battalion, 1 regiment of field artillery, 1 company of pioneers, 1 train company, and a telegraph section. The estimated strength of the field armies available for a European war was 620 battalions of infantry, 163 squadrons of cavalry, 200 batteries of artillery, and 360 machine-guns, with a strength of about 450,000 rifles, 21,000 sabers, and 1,000 field guns.

The army organization provided for one battalion of train troops for each army corps. The three companies of the battalion were, in war, designed to form ammunition columns for the three divisions of the corps. It appears that with the exception of the ammunition columns, the entire army train would have to be improvised in war. Transportation facilities in the Turkish empire and in the army are primitive and meager, which accounts in a measure for the tardy mobilization of the armed forces on the outbreak of the Balkan war of 1912-1913.

With the exception of twelve field hospitals with a capacity of 500 beds, there was but little provision made for a sanitary service; a deficiency, which, as well as many others in the peace organization, would seriously cripple the armies in an offensive campaign, but which might be supplied by

improvising, so long as the army stood strictly on the defensive.

Theoretically the Turkish army organization does not differ essentially from that of other modern armies, but little is generally known of the actual state of the units with the colors. That the armies in the field fell far below the standards of European efficiency was clearly demonstrated by the campaigns of 1912-1913. The German commission of 1913 was later increased by a large number of German officers who entered upon their work under most favorable auspices, and, probably, with full powers to make and mend to the limit of the resources of the empire.

The disasters in the field in recent years cannot be charged to the quality of the man behind the gun. The material in the ranks is good; the great deficiency is in the character and training of the officers, and in the training of the non-commissioned officers. The efficient training of these leaders is a long process. Tradition plays an important part in their creation. No people can boast of more brilliant feats of arms than the Turks; but their brilliant leaders belong to a dim past, and are separated from the present generation by a long period of decadence. The Turks had the discernment and the good fortune to secure the assistance of a carefully selected body of the foremost military leaders of all time, who came with a precedence recognized around the world, but the outbreak of the Great War interrupted their work in its very beginning. The new Turkish army was probably not ready for an offensive campaign, but it should have been equal to a stubborn defense; and the Turk has, even in defeat, always proved a dangerous enemy.

A prominent Bulgarian statesman is reported to have exclaimed on the conclusion of the peace of Bucharest, "Call

us Huns, Turks, Tartars, but not Slavs;" and yet it is by the Slavonic element in the race that the Bulgarians are known to the world. For when, in the seventh century, the Slavs of the Balkan Peninsula were conquered by a tribe of Finnish Bulgars the Slavs lost their liberty and their name, but the Bulgars lost their nationality. The conquerors were less numerous than their subjects and were soon absorbed by them; and from this mingling of the two races sprang the Bulgarians of the present day. While they are classed as Slavs the strain of old Bulgar blood has fashioned a people very different from the Slavs of other nations and given them a distinct individuality among the peoples of the earth.

In the latter half of the seventh century Asparuch, having subdued the Slavs, founded a powerful kingdom in Moesia, once a Roman province lying south of the Danube, west of the Black Sea, and north of the Balkans, which corresponds to the present day Servia and Bulgaria. The old Bulgars were a martial race loving war for war's own sake, and the organization of their state, an aristocracy with a prince at its head, had a military character. Their frontiers were well guarded, and no one was allowed to leave the country. If, by chance, some one escaped, the sentinel was put to death. Just before going into battle the chiefs would send a trusted follower to examine each man's horse and arms, and should fault be found with either, the delinquent promptly paid the penalty with his life. Should one show disobedience to a commander he was visited with barbarous punishment. Such was the character of the state founded by the Bulgars in 679, which for centuries engaged in perpetual warfare with the Byzantines.

Under Simeon the dominions were enlarged, the ruler assumed the title of tsar and the church was made independent of the patriarchate of Constantinople, the Bulgarian

archbishopric being elevated to a patriarchate. On his death in 927, the Empire, torn by internal dissensions and attacked by the Byzantines from without, began to decline; but once again in the last decade of the tenth century it was united and extended under Samuel. It was during this period, between the death of Simeon and the accession of Samuel, that an event took place which exerts an influence upon the history of Bulgaria even to the present time, the appearance of the Russians under Sviatoslaff. Called by the Byzantine emperor against the Bulgarians, he conquered the people but was finally driven out by his own ally, who occupied the country and on returning to Constantinople offered up the crown of the Bulgarian tsars upon the altar of Santa Sophia. Thereupon the eastern part of the Bulgarian Empire, the old Moesia, became a province of the Greek Empire. There was for a time a struggle for independence in the west, but finally in 1018 it, too, passed under the rule of the Greeks and for nearly two centuries Bulgaria almost ceased to possess a national history.

In 1086 two brothers, Peter and Ivan Asên threw off the Byzantine yoke, and in spite of domestic discord and foreign wars a second Bulgarian Empire was founded and extended until it touched the three seas, and threatened Byzantium. It was not to enjoy its greatness for many years, however. Soon, civil wars broke out and the exhausted country fell an easy prey to the invader when, in 1396, Bulgaria became a Turkish province, and the church lost its national autonomy and became dependent upon the Greek patriarchate at Constantinople. Thus began a double slavery for the country which lasted five centuries.

The nineteenth century was marked by many uprisings in the Balkan Peninsula, but it was not until the revolt of 1876 had been put down with savage cruelty by the

Turks that Russia came to Bulgaria's aid, and by her victorious arms wrung from Turkey the peace of San Stefano "which realized almost to the full the national aspirations of the Bulgarian race." Here, however, the Powers of Europe intervened, and fearing the influence of Russia, divided the "Great Bulgaria" into three parts.

It was after this time that Russian influence bore heavily upon the Bulgarians. The country was occupied by Russian troops and administered by Russian officials. Russian officers surrounded the prince and filled the high positions in the army. The Russian General Kaulbars, Minister of War, decreed that no officer should be appointed who had not served two years in the Russian army. Thwarted in their efforts to establish a national army and subjected to interference in every department of government, it was inevitable that the Bulgarians should rebel against their Russian patrons as fiercely as against their nominal masters the Turks.

When in 1885 Eastern Roumelia, which had been torn from Bulgaria by the Congress of Berlin, was reunited to her, Bulgaria became the largest state of the Balkan group; and when a conspiracy fostered by the Russian military attaché in Sofia forced Prince Alexander to abdicate it was the militia of Roumelia which saved the country and established a national regency. The election of Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, a lieutenant in the Austrian army, to rule over Bulgaria in 1887 may be taken as the beginning of the modern Bulgarian army, which stands to-day as the creation of this soldier prince. Based on the laws of 1897, 1903, and 1908, the army is divided into the Active Army with its reserve, and the Territorial Army. As in the other armies of the continent, service is universal and compulsory for all men able of body and sound of mind between the ages of twenty and forty-seven, or for a period of twenty-six

years. The infantryman belongs to the active army and its reserve for twenty years, then passes into the territorial army for the remaining six years of his obligatory service. In the cavalry, the artillery, and the technical and auxiliary services the soldier belongs for nineteen years to the active army and seven years to the territorial forces. Young men between the ages of seventeen and twenty-one may be called to the colors in case of war and volunteers may be accepted between the ages of fourteen and eighteen.

Service with the colors is for the infantry two years, and for the other branches of the army three years; so that the infantry has eighteen year-classes of reserves to draw on while the other arms have only sixteen classes. For educational and family reasons color service may be reduced to one year, or to six months, or, under certain conditions, the subject may pass directly into the reserve without color service. Those who pass directly into the reserve, however, for whatever reason, pay an annual military tax according to income for twenty years. Mohammedans are excused from service on payment of an annual tax in lieu thereof, or, in case of immigration, on payment of a sum equal to the annual tax for ten years.

The non-commissioned officers of the army were drawn from the schools for the reserve officers, from the Military School in Sofia, and from the regimental and divisional schools maintained for the training of non-commissioned officers. About fifty per cent of the total number of non-commissioned officers were long service men who had taken a course in the special schools maintained for their particular training. The importance of highly trained non-commissioned officers was fully recognized, and in every organization an experienced and competent officer was intrusted with their education and training.

The officers of the army were drawn from the Military School in Sofia or by competitive examination of aspirants from other schools. A reserve for the officers of the active army was created by the transfer of professional officers to the inactive list where they remained subject to call to the colors until they were sixty years old. The Reserve Officers' Corps was made up of men who, possessing the necessary educational qualifications, became, after one year's special training, "Aspirants." The following year they had three months' training with troops, after which they were appointed reserve officers. The appointment of non-commissioned officers with not less than fifteen years' service formed another important class of reserve officers.

The recently created School of War in Sofia provided a three-year course for the training of captains or lieutenants for the General Staff. The Cavalry School in Sofia trained officers of the cavalry for squadron commanders. There was at the same school a course for the newly-appointed officers and for non-commissioned officers. There was also a school of fire for the officers of all arms, with a special machine-gun course.

The population of less than 5,000,000 furnished an annual recruit class of about 50,000 men. Of these, 33,000 were enrolled in 1912, of whom 6,000 belonged to the favored class who served short periods. The remainder of the contingent passed directly into The territorial forces. The reserves of the active army were called out annually for from two to four weeks' training. Long service non-commissioned officers received one month's training annually after they passed into the reserve, and reserve officers took two months' training annually. The territorial forces were divided into first and second classes. The first class received seven days' and the second class three days' training every year.

The Active Army was organized into nine infantry divisions and one cavalry division. Each active division had a reserve brigade organized in peace and the two forces together formed the field armies. The divisions were grouped in peace into three army inspections, which in war became three field armies of three divisions each. The division was made up of two brigades of infantry, each of two regiments, two squadrons of cavalry, nine batteries of artillery, one pioneer battalion, a half company of technical troops, bridge train, telegraph section, ammunition column, sanitary column, supply train, and a platoon of gendarmes. On mobilization the reserve brigade of each division took its place beside the two active brigades, making a division of three brigades of twenty-four battalions, with a fighting strength of 24,000 rifles, 24 machine-guns, 200 sabers, 72 field guns, 4 field howitzers, and 12 mountain rifles.

The peace strength of the cavalry was three brigades and the guard regiment. The third brigade was broken up on mobilization and furnished the divisional cavalry of two squadrons for each division. The other two brigades formed a cavalry division of 16 squadrons with a fighting strength of 2,400 sabers and 16 machine-guns. The guard regiment was left unassigned. The cavalry was maintained on a war footing.

The total strength of the field armies amounted to 216 battalions, 37 squadrons, 158 batteries, and 58 machine-gun companies, with a fighting strength of about 225,000 rifles, 6,000 sabers, 722 guns, and 232 machine-guns. The Territorial army formed in war 72 battalions with a total strength of about 50,000.

The army was uniformed throughout in blue-gray trousers or breeches; the infantry and artillery wore a dark brown coat, while the coat of the cavalry was dark blue.

The infantry was armed with the 8-millimeter repeating rifle, model of 1888, and the Mannlicher rifle, model of 1895. The cavalry carried the saber and the 8-millimeter repeating carbine, model of 1895. The rifles of the field artillery were Schneider-Canet rapid-fire guns, model of 1903; the mountain artillery was armed with 7.5-centimeter Krupp rifles, model of 1905; while the heavy field artillery had both Krupp and Schneider-Canet guns.

The organization of the army, as we know it, is that of 1912, just preceding the Balkan wars. It was a strictly modern organization and has not been changed in any essential feature; it can, however, give no true estimate of the strength of the army of 1915. The campaigns of the first Balkan war were everywhere victorious for Bulgarian arms; it was an ideal culmination for the making of an army which had enjoyed a period of intelligent peace training. While in the second war Bulgaria was forced to make peace by an overwhelming combination of her neighbors, her army suffered no crushing defeat; it was in no sense disorganized, the spirit of the army was unbroken. During these two wars the entire male population of military age was called to the colors and stood under arms for a year. It is estimated that the strength of the armed forces approached 400,000 men in the summer of 1913. The field armies of 1914 numbered fifteen divisions and three independent volunteer corps. There can be no doubt that King Ferdinand made good use of the year intervening between the outbreak of the Great War in Europe and Bulgaria's entrance into the conflict to put his army in order. In his proclamation to the army after the Peace of Bucharest, he said, "Exhausted, but not vanquished, we have to furl our glorious standards in order to wait for better days." The Bulgarians are a patient, plodding, persevering people, and in waiting they have been

preparing to take full advantage of the first development in the European situation which would give promise of uniting the Bulgarian people in an empire that would secure for them their dream of independent national existence. To this end Bulgaria should have been able to put in the field an army of half a million men, largely veterans, with competent leaders trained in war.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE ARMIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Military retrospect: original defensive forces,—the fyrd, a general levy; personal troops; Norman system, military tenure; scutage; contract service. The Honorable Artillery Company. Bowmen and archery. The first cavalry. Yeomen of the Guard. Sergeants-at-arms. The London Trained Bands. The militia. Dispute between Charles I and Parliament. Cromwell's army. Beginning of a Regular force. Historic background of famous regiments: Coldstream Guards; Grenadier Guards; Life Guards; Home Guards and others. First modern Standing Army. Standing Army under James II. Parliamentary control. Contract enlistment. Reserve forces. Reforms after Franco-Prussian War. The Indian Army: origin, development, and strength. The Canadian Army: origin, organization, service, and strength. Citizen armies of Australia and New Zealand: service, training, and number. South African citizen army: service, training, and strength. The Expeditionary Force: Regulars, Special Reserve, and Territorial Army,—organization, service, strength, officers' training, chief command, and equipment. General considerations.

In spite of the crusade of Lord Roberts, Great Britain's famous soldier and patriot, the British army remained in the summer of 1914 the only professional army in Europe, as opposed to the national armies of the great continental powers. The United Kingdom, by its insular situation, was able, as a rule, to abstain from interference in continental affairs, and, by the supremacy of its navy, has long been secure from invasion and able to carry out its national policies without maintaining armies for use on the continent. In considering the character, strength, and organization of the British army at the opening of the most momentous crisis in the history of Great Britain a brief history of that army's development appears not only to be of considerable interest, but also of importance. Moreover,

the traditions of the small British army and its varied services are of so great influence on its morale that a short review of its past, at least in so far as its origin and growth are concerned, seems advantageous, if not indispensable.

The first defensive force of England established in the Saxon period was, strange to say, under compulsory service, at the call of a civil authority. Every freeman between the ages of fifteen and sixty was bound, as one of the conditions of holding land, to bear arms for his country's defense as well as for maintaining the peace. The sheriffs of the several shires were authorized to make the levy which was known as the *fyrd*. The forces so raised could not be used outside of their respective counties for military purposes, except to meet an invasion; and in no case could they be required to serve out of England. Additional forces were raised by princes and earls, a sort of personal household troops of a more permanent character, and it is interesting to note that at the Battle of Hastings these two classes of defenders fought together.

The next stage of military development was a system of military tenure, instituted under William the Conqueror, which required that barons, in consideration of their holding estates, should furnish armed knights for the king's service for forty days each year. Owing to the violent, oft-recurring troubles between the barons and the king this personal service system was commuted in 1159 by Henry II for a money payment or *scutage*. The old system of levies was not abolished, however, but by this payment of *scutage* the hire of mercenaries for foreign wars was facilitated, as well as a prolongation of the stipulated feudal service for pay by those who were willing to continue to serve. In 1181 Henry II revived the *fyrd*, or militia system, by the Assize of Arms; it was still further extended under Edward I by the "Statute of Winchester."

The feudal service became less relied on as time went on and in the war in France under Edward III the troops of all ranks were paid for their services. The soldiers were chiefly raised by contract made with some prominent leader to furnish a stipulated number of armed and equipped soldiers to serve for a given period at a fixed charge. Thus for a long period contract troops were employed to serve during war, at the close of which they were disbanded. The professional soldier was not hard to secure in view of his remuneration, but to ensure his service for the contract term it became necessary to punish desertion. The first Parliamentary Act authorizing this was enacted under the last Lancastrian King, Henry VI, and the next under the first of the Tudors, Henry VII.

To the reign of Henry VIII belongs the famous chartered organization known as the Honorable Artillery Company. The king's charter is dated August 25, 1527, although the claim is made that the company originated in 1087 in "an armed company" to protect the London merchants against robbers. Since 1908 it has become a regiment of the Territorial Force. Henry VIII shared the English predilection for the bowman. Had not the English archers won eternal fame under Edward I? And now the ancient yeomanry vanquished the Scots at Flodden, 1513, in spite of the assumed superior French organization of the northern foe. It is not surprising, then to find that archery was promoted, indeed enjoined, by Parliamentary Act requiring people to practise archery and provide horses and arms. But the king carried military organization further; besides the artillery, a permanent force, the militia or general levy,—to be used only in the home counties,—and the mercenaries, for foreign service, were placed on a more efficient basis, and legislative enactment was secured providing for the improvement of the breed

of horses so that a stronger cavalry force might be created. The Yeomen of the Guard (Beefeaters) had been established by Henry VII in 1485 and may be regarded as the germ of the standing army of Great Britain. This body-guard of the king, as well as the Corps of the Sergeants-at-Arms, established under Henry VIII became a permanent force. In the reign of Mary the old General Levy was further readjusted, but James I caused the repeal of the arming laws of Henry VIII and also replaced the General Levy by Commissions of Muster under which the celebrated Trained Bands were organized. These consisted of persons selected from those liable to provide arms, horses, or soldiers. They were to serve personally in defence of the crown and to be trained at the cost of the parishes to which they belonged. The bill and the bow no longer formed part of the soldier's equipment, and if the home soldiery had but little to recommend it in the eyes of war experts, there had grown up since the beginning of the wars in Holland in the last quarter of the sixteenth century a large body of English soldiers trained in the foremost science of war.

It was during the reign of Charles I that the term *Militia* came into general use. It was the army of the people and the landowners, was under command of the lord-lieutenants of the counties and was a popular force, but the troops raised by the sovereign were regarded with distrust. Thus the troops billeted on the inhabitants by Elizabeth and, later, by Charles I, particularly the latter, greatly irritated the people. The king made strenuous efforts to maintain a standing army in face of parliamentary opposition, but finally granted the Petition of Rights. It was not a little due to his designs in a similar way that the final breach and the Civil War occurred. This event demanded a remodelling of the military system and Cromwell

adopted the method of regular enlistment, soon organized a strong cavalry force, and his foot soldiers formed upon the London Trained Bands were recruited with great care. The reorganization was effected in February, 1645, and from this time it is not uncommon to date the beginning of the Standing Army of Great Britain. Except for a comparatively few impressed men, the parliamentary soldiers were enlisted voluntarily. Finally, in 1663, the Trained Bands, except in London, were disbanded and the Militia was organized.

In 1660, on the Restoration of the Monarchy, Charles II assented to the abolition of the feudal right of knight-service, etc., in lieu of an annual income to the crown. The army numbering about 80,000 was disbanded. Cromwell's army was, however, to retain a representation in the permanent force established under Charles, which may be regarded as the real beginning of the Regular Army. Two detachments of the Protector's regiments and Monk's regiment, raised in 1650, were consolidated into the Regiment of Foot Guards later and now known as the Coldstream Guards. Besides this regiment, there was formed, chiefly from the loyal English and Irish who had followed Charles into exile, that other household regiment of guards known as the First, which in 1815 was designated the First or Grenadier Regiment of Foot Guards—the first on the roll of British infantry. Two regiments of cavalry were now also established as household troops, the First Life Guards and the Second Life Guards, both composed of Cavaliers who had shared the king's exile. In the following year, 1661, the household cavalry regiment known as the Royal Horse Guards (The Blues) was officially established; it had been a regiment of the Commonwealth Army, and before it was paid off under the disbandment order, the king took measures which resulted in its reorganization. The other

permanent bodies were the Yeomen of the Guard and the Sergeants-at-Arms, whose establishment has already been noted. Insignificant in number, not over 3,000, this home force was, however, viewed with no little mistrust by Parliament, and additional forces that became necessary were granted to the king for special service and disbanded when their duties ended.

With the acquisition of Tangier and Bombay as part of the dower of Charles's queen, Catherine of Braganza, a troop of dragoons, the Tangier Horse, now called the First (Royal) Dragoons, and an infantry regiment, the Second Foot, known then as the First Tangerines and now as the Queen's (Royal West Surrey) Regiment, were raised. It may be noted that seniority to this regiment is given to the Royal Scots (Lothian Regiment) which had won fame on the Continent long before it was brought to England in 1661. It was first stationed in Ireland and next served in Tangier. From 1661 to 1662 dates the establishment of another regiment of household troops, lately the Scots Fusilier Guards, now the Scots Guards, but called then the Third Guards, which for many years previously had served in Scotland. The Third Foot Regiment, now called the Buffs (East Kent Regiment), originated in a volunteer force of 1572 from the London Trained Bands for service in Holland. The survivors of the "Holland Regiment," as it was called, returned to England in 1665 and were established as a regiment of the British army. The foot regiment called the Second Tangerines was established in 1680, and on its return to England in 1684 was incorporated with the first as the Queen's Regiment; in 1705 it acquired the title of "The King's Own." Its old regiment number was the Fourth and its present territorial designation is the Royal Lancaster Regiment. The Northumberland Fusiliers originated in 1674 as a British auxiliary force to serve



British Territorials: the London Scottish at bayonet charge practice.



British cavalry: the Scots Greys.



in Holland; in 1685 the regiment returned to England and was incorporated in the British army.

A standing army as it is known to-day was first established in France under Louis XIV. During the Middle Ages and after, bodies of men who made war a profession, under adventurous leaders without regard to nationality, were to be had by belligerents who were willing to pay for their services. In the revolt of the Netherlands, English troops served against Spain in the wars under Alva in 1567 and later, and during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) several thousand Scotchmen were employed in Germany. The Rules of Neutrality permitted this practice, even as a result of treaty stipulations made in time of peace. England made use of such troops still later in her struggle with the American colonies.

The Regular or Standing Army of Great Britain then at the accession of James II comprised about 8,000 men of all ranks, forming three troops of Life Guards, a regiment of Dragoons, two regiments of Foot Guards, and five regiments of Infantry of the Line. The numerical strength was greatly added to by the persistent James II, who took advantage of the Monmouth Rebellion to raise eight cavalry and twelve infantry regiments, but at the end of the Revolution in 1688 these accessions were in a large measure disbanded.

During the reign of William and Mary, the right of raising or maintaining a standing army was asserted in the Bill of Rights of 1689 to be against the law unless consented to by Parliament. Foreign and domestic conditions, however, led Parliament to sanction such a standing army, the pay of which was to be under its control. Under this new or constitutional regulation the army was increased temporarily by William to 65,000 for the French War in 1691, to be reduced in 1698 after the Peace of Ryswick. Still later,

during the War of the Spanish Succession, the British army proper numbered about 70,000, to be again reduced at the close of the war of 1713 to less than 20,000 serving at home and abroad. This continued to be about the peace strength till the close of the eighteenth century.

The great battles of that century were fought by an army enlisted under the contract system of earlier centuries, the soldiers being furnished to the crown by a distinguished military leader or person of importance, who obtained enlistment and furnished bounty money, one result of which, in large measure, was the scandalous and depreciatory purchase system of promotion. Enlistment was legal only when a "beating order" was given to the colonel of a regiment by the crown and the recruits raised by "beat of drum." In the case of the voluntary enlistments the contract was usually for life-service, though exceptionally it called for a term of years or for the war. Under pressure of war impressment of persons of "unsettled mode of life" was still resorted to. The contract system was abolished in 1783. As the crisis in the relations with France developed, intense interest in the condition of the army was created and numerous and salutary reforms were introduced; the regimental roll was increased and especially was the strength augmented by adding to the battalions. At the close of the war with France the added regiments were continued and the peace footing was reached by the reduction of battalions. The permanent establishment was now about 80,000 as compared with the peace footing of 20,000 before the War.

In 1847 the term of enlistment was changed from a life service, which had usually prevailed, to a period of ten years for the infantry and twelve years for the cavalry and artillery, with right of re-engagement to complete twenty-one and twenty-four years, respectively, and the further

privilege was granted to the soldier of remaining in the service subject to three months' notice on his part of his desire to be discharged. The experiences of the Crimean war led to great administrative reforms and improvements, and the French threat of 1859 still further stimulated efforts, while the Indian Mutiny in 1857 added an Indian army to the forces of Great Britain.

Notwithstanding the Enlistment Act of 1847 as amended in 1849, it was not till 1870, after the efficiency of the German army had been demonstrated by its successes in 1866 and 1870, that commensurate reforms were introduced. In that year an Enlistment Act provided for a term of service with the colors and a certain period in the reserve, a popular measure that greatly stimulated recruiting and created an efficient reserve force. The Army and Militia Reserves date from this year. In 1871 the purchase of commissions was abolished; the control of the Militia, hitherto vested in the lords-lieutenant of counties, was transferred to the crown, and the Auxiliary forces came under the direction of the generals commanding districts. In 1881 a further reform was made affecting the infantry of the line. Hitherto, this branch had been known as regiments of foot, numbered in consecutive order, and consisting of a single battalion. Now a system of "linked-battalions" provided for two or more battalions to the regiment, which henceforth bore a territorial name in place of the old number. The aim of this system was to enable the garrisons abroad to be kept at peace strength, one battalion being on foreign service, and the other at home, the latter to act as a feeder to the former and in turn to fall back on the reserve for its complement in war. Before the South African War, in order to create a reserve for the Regular Army, the term of service had been fixed at twelve years, about half with the colors and half in the reserve. In addition there was

the Auxiliary Army (the Militia and the Volunteers) formed only in the smaller units, poorly trained, without field artillery, and the special service corps, to make an effective force in war. But the demands in South Africa were too great, the system failed, and the result was a long and costly war.

Of the forces of Great Britain, the army in India comprises a large and important part. The origin of the Indian Army may be traced to the small protective forces permitted by native rulers to guard the British settlements and factories, which were, at first, limited to about thirty men. Very gradually the European forces were increased, but not until near the close of the seventeenth century were native soldiers enlisted. For a long period the military companies remained independent, but, before the tragedy of the Black Hole at Calcutta, the three great presidencies, Bengal, Bombay, and Madras, had consolidated their forces and had important armies in which the native element largely predominated. It was for the defense of Calcutta that the first British regiment to serve in India, the Dorsetshire, formerly 39th, was sent in aid of the Bengal army by the Madras government. It formed part of the army under Clive that defeated Suraj-ud-Dowlah at Plassey in 1757. At the close of the eighteenth century the armies of the East India Company were made up of about 3,500 European and 24,000 natives in the presidency of Bengal; about 2,500 Europeans and 24,000 natives in that of Bombay, and 3,000 Europeans and 34,000 natives in that of Madras.

In 1796 a general military reorganization was carried out, and two years later the native infantry numbered 122 battalions; in 1808 the army comprised about 25,000 European and 155,000 native soldiers. The extension of the dominion of the British in India and military requirements during





Sudanese infantry.



Sikh infantry of the Indian Army.

the first half of the nineteenth century brought a steady augmentation in the army and the addition of horse artillery and irregular cavalry. At the outbreak of the Mutiny in 1857, the forces of the East India Company numbered 386,000 men, of whom 38,000 were British. These forces were taken over by the British government in 1858, and reorganization became indispensable. The native artillery, except a few mountain batteries, was abolished. The army thus taken over had been chiefly recruited within the presidencies to which its territorial components belonged. The native troops of Bombay and Madras had stood loyal for the most part, but a considerable reduction in the native army was made as a whole, while the British Government troops were augmented. The superior command was given to British officers, of whom seven were attached to each native regiment and battalion, the immediate command being entrusted to native officers. This condition remained until 1881 when the regimental strength of the native forces was increased, and the number of the regiments reduced, leaving the number of troops unchanged, while the strength of the royal artillery was reduced by eleven battalions. Soon, however, trouble on the Afghan border, due to Russian activity, led, in 1885, to the addition of a squadron of British cavalry to each of the nine British regiments; three battalions were added to the British infantry and each battalion was increased by 100 men; a fourth squadron was added to each regiment of native cavalry; and of the four regiments disbanded four years earlier three were again raised; the native infantry was increased and nine new battalions of Gurkhas, Sikhs, and Punjabis were enlisted. These changes effected an increase of over 10,000 British and 21,000 native troops, bringing the strength, in 1890, of the British to 73,000 and of the native troops to 147,500, including irregular forces. In 1891, the Indian

Staff Corps was established, which replaced the three separate Staff Corps of Bengal, Bombay, and Madras; the unification of the three Army Departments of the Presidential Armies was completed and placed directly under the Supreme Government.

Many important changes were effected during the next few years after 1885. For service in Burma, 1885-1887, seven Madras infantry regiments were converted; six Bengal and Bombay regiments were converted into regiments of Punjabis, Pathans, and Gurkhas; an increase of the mountain batteries made the total nine. In 1900 garrison service in Mauritius and other stations oversea was allotted to Indian troops, for which five battalions of Sikhs, Punjabis, Jats, and hillmen were raised. Later, 1903, the Indian Staff Corps became known as "The Indian Army," and finally, the further or new organization of the army placed it under the control of the governor-general and the commander-in-chief in India.

At present the native army is formed into "class" corps and companies, in order that the prejudices of caste may not cause conflict among the members, drawn from many races of different religions and languages. The strength of the native troops is about 160,000, and that of the British force serving in India about 75,000, of all ranks. The brigades are proportioned in one British to three native battalions of infantry and one British to two native regiments of cavalry. Among the native troops there is no native artillery. The loyalty of these troops does not seem, for a long time, to have been questioned by the officers who knew them best, but they have not been entrusted with artillery service since the Mutiny, except the small mountain gun which they have handled with excellent results. Indian troops have served in Egypt, China, the Soudan, and in some of the islands of the

Pacific; they have fought against European troops, but in the war in South Africa, which was called a "white man's war," they were used only in the capacity of non-combatants. It remained to be seen whether the color line would prevent their employment in a European war.

Great Britain during the period subsequent to the Treaty of Paris maintained troops in Canada until a few years ago, when the last garrison was withdrawn. The Dominion possesses a military force whose origin was the parochial militia, which was established as early as 1665, mainly, of course, for the protection of the settlers from Indian attacks. Later, this force fought against the British troops and those of the North American colonies. At the siege of Quebec in 1759 the militia shared in the defense. After the Treaty of Paris in 1763 when Canada was surrendered by France to Great Britain the old militia was not abolished, and is found again at Quebec in the defensive forces in 1775 at the time of Montgomery's attack. This militia was embodied on a permanent footing in 1787 and was further organized in succeeding years. It was this force that maintained largely the frontier defense in the war of 1812 between the United States and Great Britain. During the unsuccessful rebellion of 1837-1838 the militia was again in active service. With the growth of the western country the organization and the strength of the active militia were extended and increased, so that the available force was 25,000 by 1863. During the Fenian disturbances of the next two years the Canadian forces were again embodied and by the terms of a Militia Act in 1868, following the unification of Canada, the entire force was fully organized and raised to 40,000 men under control of a Department of Militia and Defense. In the Red River Rebellion in 1869 and 1870 the expedition of Lord Wolseley included a contingent of the militia and 6,000 of

this body took part in the military operations against the Indians in 1870.

The organization of cavalry and artillery was effected in 1871, when two troops were formed together with a regiment of infantry. In 1873 was formed the Northwest Mounted Police. In 1876 the need of instruction and training was recognized by the establishment of the Royal Military College at Kingston. The importance and efficiency of the Canadian militia were tested in 1885 in the operations necessitated by the second Riel rebellion, during which the forces operated successfully without the aid of regular troops. The Canadians participated in the Nile expedition under Lord Wolseley in 1885, and again from 1899 to 1902 in the South African War, when the Dominion supplied contingents of all arms and a special corps of 1,000 mounted troops, "Strathcona's Horse," recruited almost entirely from the active militia and the Northwest Mounted Police, an unexcelled constabulary of riflemen, one of the finest fighting units in the world.

The experiences in South Africa led to the reorganization of the Canadian military system, and in 1904 the Militia Act created a Militia Council patterned after the British Army Council. Under this measure and the reforms that attended it the Canadian militia was brought up to a strength of 70,000 of all arms, comprising (*a*) the permanent militia, with a three-year enlistment period; these troops, about 3,000 officers and men, are kept in training and have target practice annually; (*b*) the active militia, nominally a force of about 50,000 officers and men (the actual strength is much below these figures); they were supposed to be called out annually for training for twelve to sixteen days. In addition the reserve militia consisted of all the adult males between the ages of eighteen and sixty who are not serving in the active militia. There were

two schools of artillery, one of cavalry, and five of infantry, and at Kingston was the military college.

Australia and New Zealand have had no British army garrison for almost a half century. Both colonies, before the war, had adopted the principle of universal service, but too recently to have provided an army. Military instruction was to begin for all boys at twelve years of age. This included gymnastics, marching and target practice for one hundred and twenty hours a year in Australia and fifty-two hours per year in New Zealand. These were the Junior Cadets. From fourteen to sixteen they were Senior Cadets and received preparatory military training; in Australia twelve-and-a-half days and twenty-four night exercises; in New Zealand six whole days, twelve half-days, and twenty-four night exercises per year. The Australian belongs to the citizen force from sixteen to twenty years of age; he undergoes annually, for seven years, twenty-five days' training, seventeen of which must be continuous in camp. From twenty to twenty-six the citizen belongs to the reserve, and has to appear for one muster. The strength of the Australian Defense Force (Army) at the beginning of the war of 1914 was 252,000, including 48,000 riflemen and 157,000 cadets. In New Zealand young men remain for three years (eighteen to twenty-one) in the General Training Section; from twenty-one to thirty subject to muster, and from thirty to thirty-five in the Militia, without liability to service in peace. This system was only introduced in 1911, so that it has not yet produced any mature soldiers. It was estimated that after eight years there would be for Australia 206,000 and for New Zealand 40,000 partially trained men. The citizen army of New Zealand at the opening of the war was 30,000. In adopting the principle of enforced training of the citizen for the defense of his country the greatest, and only insurmountable,

obstacle to national preparedness had been overcome, but the training required was not yet sufficient to produce an efficient force.

The South African Union, which by an Act of Parliament, in 1909, received an autonomous government, passed, in 1912, a national defense law which also recognized the principle of universal service. All men between sixteen and twenty-one were to register by districts for training for four years from the ages of twenty-one to twenty-five. Such numbers as were required were chosen by volunteering or, if necessary, by draft. Those who did not volunteer were to pay a tax of five dollars, and, in addition, were subject to be drafted. It was not likely that South African troops would be used in Europe in case of war in the immediate future. There still remained in South Africa a force of 6,000 regulars, but the Union undertook at the outbreak of hostilities to provide for its own defense. Great Britain maintained in Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt and Cyprus, Ceylon, Straits Settlements, and China Stations about 30,000 regular troops.

After the South African War the War Office constantly urged the introduction of needed reforms, which resulted, under the administration of Viscount Haldane, in the organization of an Expeditionary Force, complete in all its parts, with provision for maintaining this force in the field at an effective war strength. But it remained a force of volunteers. The efforts of such patriots as Lord Roberts had many supporters, but the British were not ready to adopt the principle that the individual owes it to his country to make of himself in time of peace an efficient unit of a national army ready to defend the home in case of war. That only such an army can meet the requirements of great emergencies is beyond question; but the wars of the British have long been fought by their professional

army. If, when that army proved unequal to the task, it became necessary to call into service untrained men, the conflict was too far from home to disturb the peaceful pursuits and pleasures of the great mass of people, who preferred to ignore the cost of unpreparedness and pay the price, rather than undergo the training necessary to fit them for the responsibilities that must fall on them in case of war with a great modern power.

The British armies up to 1910 consisted of the Regular Army, the Militia, the Yeomanry, and Volunteers. Under Secretary Haldane the Regular Army at home was organized into six Infantry Divisions and one Cavalry Division; the Militia became a Special Reserve for the regular establishment; and the Yeomanry and Volunteers became the Territorial Army.

Service in the Regular Army was for twelve years; in the cavalry and infantry of the line, seven years with the colors and five with the reserve. The infantry of the Guard served three years with the colors and nine in the reserve; while the cavalry of the Guard served eight years with the colors and four in the reserve. The field artillery served six years with the colors and six in the reserve, and the garrison artillery eight years with the colors and four in the reserve. Technical troops served two or three years with the colors and ten or nine in the reserve. The service with the colors could be extended to twenty-one years provided a man was not more than forty-two years old at his last enlistment. The majority of the men were, however, transferred to the Regular Army reserve after the completion of their original enlistments. For the purposes of recruiting, the regiments were localized and Great Britain was divided into sixty-seven recruiting districts, each of which furnished the recruits for one infantry regiment of the line. The Guard, the cavalry, and the artillery, as well as the Rifle Regiment

and Rifle Brigade, were recruited at large. The Guard was not employed on foreign service in time of peace, which made a shorter color service possible. The infantry of the Guard had a large reserve as a result of the short service (three years) with the colors.

The earlier history of the Militia has already been briefly outlined. In 1757 that force was reorganized on the system of balloting, and much inconvenience resulted in recruiting for the Regular Army through the substitution for persons drawn for the militia of men hired to take their places who would otherwise have entered the army. The system of balloting for the militia has not been abolished, although the last ballot held was in 1810. In aid of the ballot, voluntary enlistment was authorized, at first individually and later whole companies were organized. After the peace following the overthrow of Napoleon the militia was neglected; annual training was abandoned and only the permanent staff was retained. In 1852 an Act was passed which provided for the militia by voluntary enlistment, a system that was continued until 1908, when, under the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act, the units of the militia were converted into units of the Special Reserve, save twenty-three battalions which were disbanded. This reserve is divided into Sections, A and B; the former is limited to 4,000 men, liable to serve anywhere when war is being prepared for or is in progress; the latter includes all other men in this branch, and they may also be required to serve anywhere, but can be employed permanently only after royal proclamation in the event of imminent national danger or of great emergency. The Special Reserve was fixed at 87,000 men, who engaged for six years and received five months' training the first year; thereafter they were to be called out each year for a training period of fifteen days. They could, after the expiration of their terms of service and until they were



British Regular Army: Coldstream Guards in field uniform.



Interior of a British ambulance train.



thirty years old, reëngage for periods of four years. The infantry was trained with the reserve battalions of the Regular Army, and the artillery with the reserve field artillery, which consisted of six reserve brigades of two batteries each.

Other volunteer forces were raised for defense at the time of Napoleon's threatened invasion. Volunteer and Yeomanry regiments were authorized in 1802, and in 1804 an act consolidated the existing enactments as to volunteers. Of these forces, the Volunteers fell rapidly away after the peace in 1815 and almost ceased to exist till 1859, when the force was revived and became very active, many new corps being formed, chiefly of rifles, but also of artillery, light horse, and engineers. In 1908 this force was affiliated with the Territorial forces. The Yeomanry served under the law of 1804 until 1901 when it was placed on a footing similar to that of the militia. It had already been enacted, in 1888, that this force could be called upon whenever the militia was embodied, and it also was subjected to military law when engaged in military service. In 1908, the Yeomanry was also merged in the Territorial forces.

The Territorial Army was divided into fourteen infantry divisions and fourteen cavalry brigades and was to number 315,000 men. The enlistment period was four years and reënlistments were for the same period, up to forty years of age. It could not be used outside the United Kingdom unless it volunteered for such service. What the actual numbers of this army were is not a matter of great importance. It had very little real training and its arms were not of the latest type; but it would answer the purpose of a home guard so long as the British Navy controlled the sea and there was no need for such a force.

At the close of the South African war a three-year color service with nine years in the reserve was adopted for the

whole army for the purpose of creating an adequate reserve, but the conditions of the Indian service made this impracticable. The Indian service required fairly mature and, at least, partially trained men. The conditions were that a man should not be under twenty years old and have had one year's training, and he should still have not less than four years' color service when called to India. It was thought that a sufficient number of men would voluntarily extend their service to meet the demands. This hope was, however, not realized, and to make up the deficiency it became necessary to adopt a nine-year color service with three years in the reserve. Finally, the former plan of seven years' color service and five years in the reserve was re-adopted. The Expeditionary Force numbered about 4,200 officers and 125,000 men, divided into six infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and two brigades of cavalry unattached. With the army and line of communications troops it had a ration strength of about 170,000 men and 70,000 horses.

The officers of the Regular Army were appointed from the Cadet Corps. The Corps at the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich trained officers for the engineers and the artillery, while the Royal Military College at Sandhurst furnished the officers for the cavalry and infantry. Officers were also appointed from civil life, being taken from the universities after a period of training in the Officers' Training Corps, and subject to examination. In addition, appointments were made from the Royal Military Colleges of some of the colonies. There were also a number of service schools for the higher training of officers. The Staff College for the training of captains and lieutenants was at Camberley. The course was for one year, with a second year's course for General Staff training. The Engineer School at Chatham and the Artillery School at Woolwich

were for the special training of officers of the engineers and artillery. There were Schools of Fire for the artillery, infantry, and cavalry, for the training of officers and non-commissioned officers as instructors. The Riding School for the training of riding instructors was at Netheravon and the Central Flying School was at Salisbury Plain. The Schools of Instruction for the Signal Corps and Train were at Aldershot. The School of Application for Military Surgeons and Veterinary Surgeons completes the list of the most important service schools.

The king, as Commander-in-Chief, commanded the army through the medium of the War Office, which was presided over by the secretary of state for war. The army was operated, administered, supplied, armed, and equipped by means of the Army Staff, which was divided into four principal groups: the General Staff *operated* the army; the Adjutant-General's Department dealt with the *personnel* and *administration*; the Quartermaster's Department *supplied* the army; and the Ordnance Department *furnished the armament*.

The Expeditionary Force was all of the British army which was immediately available for overseas service, unless it were found practicable to withdraw the imperial troops in part from some of the colonies and even these would hardly be immediately available. This force was organized into a field army. The army commander had a staff of some 55 officers. The headquarters included more than 200 non-commissioned officers and men, with a corresponding number of riding and draft horses.

The cavalry division, commanded by a major-general, who had a staff of 26 officers, consisted of 4 brigades of 3 regiments each; 4 batteries of horse artillery of 6 guns each, a field squadron of engineers, a signal squadron, and a cavalry field ambulance. Each brigade consisted of 3 regiments and a section of signal troops. The regiment was of


3 squadrons of 130 sabers each, and 1 platoon, or section, of 2 machine-guns. The total strength was about 475 officers, 9,300 men, 24 field guns, 12 machine-guns, 10,000 animals, riding, draft, and pack, and 700 wagons.

The infantry division, commanded by a major-general, who had also a staff of 26 officers, consisted of 3 infantry brigades, each of 4 battalions; 9 batteries of field artillery and a battery of howitzers, each of 6 guns; a battery of 7 heavy field guns; 1 squadron of cavalry; 2 field companies of engineers; 1 signal company; 3 field ambulances; the divisional train and the divisional ammunition column. The total strength was about 590 officers, 18,000 men, 6,000 horses, 76 field guns and howitzers, and more than 1,100 wagons.

There were attached to the Army Headquarters the Army Troops, including 2 cavalry brigades and 1 cavalry regiment not otherwise assigned, 6 battalions of infantry, 6 telegraph companies, 3 squadrons of the Royal Flying Corps, 2 bridge trains, 1 army transport and supply column, 2 field hospitals, automobile and motor trucks.

To the foregoing should be added the Line of Communications Troops designed to maintain and guard the line of communications of the field army. These include special service troops such as railroad, post and telegraph, supply and sanitary, remount, as well as infantry and machine-guns. The allotment to the field army was about 1,100 officers, 15,000 men, 6,000 horses, and 1,000 wagons. This gives the complete field army a strength of about 5,600 officers, 150,000 men, 70,000 horses, 456 guns and howitzers, 172 machine-guns, and 9,000 wagons.

The infantry was armed with the .30 caliber Lee-Enfield repeating rifle with bayonet, which was carried by all enlisted men, including non-commissioned officers. The soldier carried 150 cartridges. The battalion ammunition



British warship with starting platform for aéroplane.



British aviation camp.



wagons carried 100 rounds per man, and the brigade and divisional ammunition columns each carried 100 rounds per man, making a total of 450 rounds per man. The battalion machine-gun section carried with the 2 machine-guns 3,500 rounds of ammunition. The battalion ammunition column carried 16,000 rounds for the machine-guns, and the divisional ammunition column could be further drawn on for 30,000 rounds. Each man carried a small intrenching tool; each company carried a supply of hand-axes, axes, knives, and a cross-cut saw. The battalion train carried a full supply of picks and shovels on pack animals. Each man carried a first-aid packet and two men in each company were trained as litter-bearers. The field uniform was of grey-green color. Cartridge belt and belt suspenders were of webbing and of the same color. In marching order the infantry carried fifty-eight pounds.

The cavalry was armed with the Lee-Enfield rifle with bayonet, carried on the saddle, and a light straight sword also carried on the saddle. The ammunition supply corresponded to that of the infantry. Some regiments had the lance, but it was not probable that it would be used, except for parade. Each squadron had four men equipped for pioneer service and one pack animal loaded with explosive cartridges for demolition work.

The field artillery had a 3.3-inch quick-firing rifle, and the horse artillery a 3-inch quick-firer. Both were provided with steel shields for the protection of the cannoneers, and each piece was provided with two extra ammunition caissons. All officers and enlisted men carried pistols. Officers and non-commissioned officers carried also the saber.

The Flying Corps consisted of a selection of dirigibles, and seven aëroplane sections. The latter had not all been formed at the end of 1913. The dirigibles, three or four


in number, were small as compared with continental airships. The personnel of the Flying Corps was trained at the Salisbury Plain Aviation School.

This is an army of trained, professional soldiers, ready for service in any part of the world. The reorganization after the South African War seems to have made it an almost ideal force developed to meet the needs of a great colonial empire. No other country possessed such an army. Perhaps no other country needed such a force, but Great Britain needed it, and she had paid dearly for not having such an army. It was, however, not an army of national defense. The largest and best strictly professional army in the world, it would, standing alone, exercise little influence in a struggle with the great national armies of the continent. There were indications that Great Britain expected to have to abandon her policy of non-interference in continental wars. In her foreign policy she had prepared for such an emergency, but the government at home had not kept pace with her diplomacy. She was not prepared for a great European conflict.

All armies to-day are national in character, but the British army, as it existed in July, 1914, had not developed as a result of any broad policy of national defense. It had been created piecemeal to meet immediate needs in the colonies and other possessions. It was strictly professional in character, the service being purely voluntary. Such an army has always given a good account of itself; it meets as no other kind of an army can, the needs of a colonial empire, but it is expensive and, of necessity, relatively small. Its excellence is dependent on a long service with the colors, which of itself precludes the creation of a trained reserve. A large reserve is required to replace the inevitable casualties of the peace units of the Standing Army in war, to say nothing of the creation of the new units required to



Indian cavalryman with campaign kit.



Highlanders in service uniform.



prosecute a war of any magnitude, and the replacing of casualties in these units.

The military strength of Great Britain is not to be measured by the area of the United Kingdom, which is about equal to that of New Mexico, nor by the fact that she governs one-fifth of the earth's surface and one in every five of the inhabitants of the world. Colonies may be a support, but they are generally a weakness to a country in war. Without her great navy controlling the seas the British Empire could not exist; her colonies would fall an easy prey to the sea power of her enemies. The ultimate military strength of a nation is made up of all able-bodied males of an age suitable to bear arms, say between eighteen and sixty. The immediate military strength is determined by the number of soldiers with the colors and in the trained reserves, organized, armed, and equipped. It may be safely stated that untrained men cannot be drafted, mobilized, trained, armed, and equipped ready to take the field against a worthy enemy in much less than one year. Arms, ammunition, and equipment are very important considerations. A country maintaining only a small army will probably have as much difficulty in equipping and arming her raw levies as in training and organizing them. If she is restricted to home markets the difficulty becomes much greater. Artillery is constantly assuming a more important place in the battle line. It takes much time to produce field guns and the ammunition for them. The 6 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division of the Expeditionary Force had 470 field guns to say nothing of the artillery of the field army. These are quick-firing guns, able to fire 10 or more shots per minute, or nearly 300,000 shots in an hour. The quick-firer has been developed at great expense, the old guns being again and again replaced by an improved model; all to no purpose, if the ammunition is not available, and it

will not be, if it is not held in reserve in time of peace. The Expeditionary Force required about 75,000,000 rounds to go into battle, with no general reserve. Provision had been made for mobilizing the Expeditionary Field Army at full strength in animals, about 70,000 riding, draft, and pack. Our own experience in the Civil War showed that horses often had to be replaced many times in a year. To maintain an army in the field is no small task; that of creating a new army after the outbreak of war can only be accomplished by a country that by its isolation, the protection of its fleets, or the support of its better-prepared allies, enjoys immunity from invasion. The modern army works at high power; the days of summer campaigns and winter quarters are long past; the individual soldier must work at severe tension. To do this he must be well cared for; he must have suitable clothing and an excellent quality of food at regular intervals. He will make marches that Napoleon's armies never equalled, but he should be accompanied by travelling kitchens serving hot soup when he halts for rest. Such things are not to be had at a moment's notice; they must be provided in time of peace.

There is no shortage of men in the British Empire; the United Kingdom has a population greater than that of France; besides which there is abundant raw material in men and animals in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. No other country has so large a leisure class as Great Britain; nowhere else is there to be found so much wealth and so much sport. Outside the Regular Army, among the well-to-do classes, the British Islands must contain one million men who could easily give sufficient time to military training to become seasoned soldiers. They are seasoned sportsmen, but they are unwilling to take the training necessary to fit them for the position of responsibility which they would, without doubt, seek when war





Canadians at bayonet practice.



British marines at heliograph practice.

was upon them. There is no lack of patriotism, but the average Briton is accustomed to have his battles fought for him by a most excellent professional army far away from his own shores. The South African War, it seems, should have brought the lesson home. Many of the leading men of Great Britain, in the army and out of it, saw and urged the needs of the empire, but the great majority of Britons are too well satisfied with the model on which the world's greatest empire has been built and feel too secure in an undisputed control of the sea to wish to impose upon themselves the burden of "compulsory service." It is difficult to understand why the English-speaking people, so ready to take up arms in defense of their individual rights, and so ready to respond to the call to arms at any sacrifice when war is upon them, are still unwilling in time of peace to resort to the only means of making their war strength effective. Is it because a long period of pioneering without meeting any organized resistance has blinded them to the strength of the modern nations in arms, or has a long and unexampled prosperity sapped their vitality and rendered them unfit to maintain the world position which they now occupy? The needed reforms will not originate in the older civilization without bitter lessons. Australia and New Zealand, because of their exposed situations and their proximity to an ambitious and aggressive modern power, have, in spite of race traditions, recognized the only means of securing the uninterrupted development of their national aspirations.

Canada and Australia could be depended on to offer men and money, but money was not needed and the men were not soldiers. They were neither trained, armed, nor equipped, save forces too small to justify even a naval convoy. There would be volunteers who, after perhaps one year, could be used. In South Africa there were many veterans, and

veteran leaders of the revolution undertook, in 1912, the formation of a national army, but it was not probable that such an army would be available for service outside the newly constituted South African Union. From British India, with her 300,000,000 people, a part of the regular garrison of 75,000 might be withdrawn, and possibly a small proportion of the 160,000 native troops might be used elsewhere in case of war. Both conditions depended on the loyalty of India. In case of war, therefore, Great Britain would have immediate need for a large army, but she had only the Expeditionary Force, certainly the most inadequate, and possibly the most excellent army in Europe.





## CHAPTER IX

### THE FRENCH ARMY

Napoleon's great army. Degenerated military state in 1870. Universal service, 1872. Frontier defenses: coast, eastern, central, and southern. State of fortifications in 1914. Universal compulsory service law of 1913: classification of conscripts; volunteers; the colonial service; recruiting districts; remount service; officers of the active and reserve forces. Home and African establishments. First and second lines on war basis. Infantry arms and equipment. Care of the wounded. Organization and training of the infantry. Cavalry organization and equipment. The French cavalry officer. Saumur School of Equitation. Artillery equipment and strength. Supplementary equipment. Technical troops, Engineers and Train. The Flying Corps. The Gendarmerie. Forest and Customs forces. Peace and war strength. Chief command. The General Staff. A defensive force.

The armies that, under Napoleon, marched repeatedly into Italy and Austria, tried to cripple Great Britain, occupied Prussia, imposed rulers on Spain and Sweden and the smaller states of Europe, were not so much armies of France as of the incomparable leader who created them. The coalitions which threatened France made it possible for Napoleon to convert the brutal violence of the Revolution into the splendid energy of the troops with which he conquered the supporters of the monarchy and the enemies of the revolutionary movement.

Decimated on the retreat from Moscow, these wonderful armies suffered their first crushing defeat in the Battle of the Nations at Leipsic, and were finally destroyed at Waterloo.

That the remnants of that once invincible force should disintegrate completely with the disappearance of Napoleon was inevitable. France, likewise, deprived of his dominating

personality and iron government, weakened and impoverished by his wars, was prostrate. Old discontents and revolutionary ideals once more held dominion. The individual and his rights were exalted. The state and its organized support were despised, and the army, as its strong arm, grew in disfavor.

Voluntary service failed to fill the ranks of a modest military establishment, and conscription had to be resorted to. But large classes of the better elements were exempt, and the vicious principle of substitution further degraded the army until by 1870 more than fifty per cent of the men in the ranks were substitutes who placed least value on their services. Although the officers represented the best families of France, they could accomplish little when the army was denied the support, moral and material, that the men responsible for national defense have a right to expect from the people. The result was stagnation in all grades. All effort towards progress was stifled and the proud title of "A Soldier of France" remained only a tradition. Such were the conditions at the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870.

In the short campaign of 1870-1871 the French field armies were captured or destroyed and Paris was invested. The conqueror dictated terms from Versailles. It was the inevitable result. The penalty was great, but if it sufficed to revive the national spirit it was none too great a price to pay.

There were immediate indications of the power of recuperation left in the people. The apparently crushing war indemnity was paid off in two years and France at once set about to prepare for national defense with a liberal and resolute hand.

In 1872 the principle of universal service was incorporated into law, but it was at first very defective. Large classes

were exempt from the operation of the law and a tax of 1,500 francs was accepted in lieu of service. It was not until 1899 that a three-year service with the colors was imposed on all alike.

In addition to developing a national army an extensive system of frontier fortification was undertaken. The north and east frontiers were divided into five sections, three of which were fortified and two left unfortified. On the northern frontier the important fortresses of Lille and Maubeuge were planned to meet a German invasion through Belgium. Military students, not only French and German, but also Belgian, have had this plan of campaign constantly in mind. Along the coast the fortifications of Dunkirk and Calais gave the necessary flank protection and the defense of this section was made much easier by the Sambre, Scheldt, and Scarpe rivers and the district which could be inundated by them and the Lys. The Valley of the Oise was closed by Fort Hirson, and that of the Meuse by Fort Charlemont and the Fortress of Mézières. The Chiers Valley was guarded by Forts Montmédy and Longwy.

The northernmost sector of the eastern frontier, from Mézières to Verdun, about forty miles in a straight line, was left unfortified.

Next to the south followed the defensive sector of the Middle Meuse, about forty miles long, guarded on the flanks by the great fortresses of Verdun and Toul, which were connected by a number of barrier forts.

The next sector to the south, from Toul to Épinal, was left unfortified. In front of this sector, near Luneville, stood Fort Manonviller protecting the Saarburg-Luneville-Nancy railroad. Behind it were forts guarding the crossings of the Meuse.

The last sector of the eastern frontier, the upper Moselle, had on its flanks the fortresses Épinal and Belfort. Both

are surrounded by double lines of forts and the two are connected by a chain of barrier forts, an arrangement similar to that of the Middle Meuse. This completes only the first line of defense.

Behind the opening left between the fortified sectors of the northern frontier and the Middle Meuse lies the fortified region of La Fère-Laon-Rheims. Another fortified region further south is formed by the fortresses of Langres, Dijon, and Besançon.

In the third line lies the central giant fortress of Paris. Paris is surrounded by a double line of forts, and, even in 1870-1871, after the destruction of the French field armies, held out until peace was declared.

On the Italian and the Spanish frontiers the Alps and the Pyrenees were similarly organized for defense, though the natural barriers made the defense much easier. Lyons, in southern France, as a fortified city, bears the same relation to the southern frontier fortifications that Paris does to the northern and eastern defenses.

The fact that these defenses were practically completed by 1885, at enormous cost, showed that France had awakened to the dangers of unpreparedness and that the French people were ready at last to assume the burdens necessary to guarantee their national existence. The interests of the individual were no longer to dominate the national life. It was finally realized that *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité* are only possible in a state strong enough to protect the home from foreign aggression. The great strength of the German people, now united under the empire formed at Versailles, forced plans for a defensive campaign in the next war, but this great system of fortifications was designed to neutralize the advantages of the aggressor.

A reduction of the great fortresses flanking the fortified areas would require much time and give opportunities for



French tank motor-trucks for carrying pure water.



French Army : pontoons used for ferrying troops across a river or for constructing a floating bridge.



a French offensive. Whether the German armies advanced north or south of the fortified zone of the Middle Meuse, the French armies could assemble behind the Verdun-Toul line and from there fall on the invaders, or take a flank position, facing north or south, and await attack. If the invasion came from the north through Belgium, and the northern defenses were reduced, the field armies would still occupy a strong position facing north, with their flanks resting on Paris and Verdun.

Fortifications are, however, like battleships in that they have a limited useful age. The improvements in arms and explosives made a complete rearrangement and reconstruction necessary. It was recognized, too, that such an extensive system of defensive works would require more fortress troops than France could afford to take from her field armies in view of the rapidly increasing population of Germany. The system here outlined was elaborated by many smaller forts occupying salient points in advance of the fortified regions and covering roads and railways which crossed the frontier.

In order, then, to reduce the cost of reconstruction and the garrisons necessary for the defensive works, it was decided to abandon many of the smaller forts and to divide the remaining fortifications into those considered indispensable to the national defense, those which were of value only under particular circumstances, and those which were only important as centers of military activity. The first class included the fortified sectors of the Middle Meuse and the upper Moselle and were to be made impregnable at all cost, provided with complete garrisons, and equipped with all the auxiliaries of modern defense. The third class, such as Lille, Rheims, Langres, and Dijon, were not to be rebuilt, but maintained as they were. The second class, lying between the first and third in importance, were to

be equipped in a less expensive manner than the first class. After the construction of the Belgian forts at Liège and Namur the northern frontier was thought to be well protected, and the defensive sector Lille-Maubeuge lost some of its importance. Such was the state of the fortifications of France in 1914. If the annual allotments of funds were honestly and intelligently applied, the fortifications left little to be desired.

But fortifications alone were not sufficient to neutralize the advantages of the growing population in Germany, who maintained her military strength on a par with her increase in population by enlarging her military establishment from time to time so as to train and pass into the reserve her constantly augmented annual contingent of recruits. Both countries had reduced the color service to two years, although Germany held to three years for the mounted service. France was already utilizing the full annual contingent of recruits furnished by her stationary population, and, in order to meet the German increases, was compelled to extend service with the colors to three years. This was accomplished by the law of August, 1913, which created the most drastic form of universal compulsory service known.

Three years in the active army, eleven years in the reserve, seven years in the territorial army, and seven in the territorial reserve, made a total of twenty-eight years that every Frenchman, save only the physically and mentally unfit, was to belong to the armies of France. Men convicted of serious crimes could not belong to the national army, but must serve in a Special Corps in Algiers. During the three years' service with the colors the soldier was entitled to one hundred and twenty days' furlough, but the absentees at any one time were in no case to exceed ten per cent of the established strength of the unit to which they belonged.



French infantry in field kit at army maneuvers.



Turcos : French Colonial forces of the Nineteenth Army Corps in Algeria.



The male population was classified into those suitable to bear arms, those who could be employed in the auxiliary services, the temporarily unfit, and the wholly unfit. The classifications were based on careful examinations at the age of twenty. The temporarily and the wholly unfit had to submit to further examinations at the ages of twenty-five, twenty-nine, and thirty-five, and were subject to assignment to any class of military service for which they were found qualified. A temporary rejection did not alter the obligation to serve three years with the active army; but after the second rejection only two years, and after the third rejection only one year with the colors were required. Whoever after that was found fit for service entered the proper class in the reserve. No shortening of the term of service was permitted.

Families left in need received twenty-five cents per day and ten cents for each child under sixteen. All men were permitted to reënlist, non-commissioned officers until they had served fifteen years, others until they had served, in the cavalry, ten years, and in the other arms, five years. The number of reënlisted men was, however, not to exceed 74,000.

Volunteers were accepted from their eighteenth year if they were provided with a certificate of aptitude from the proper military commission for the arm which they selected. Beginning with nineteen years, volunteers were accepted without a certificate of aptitude, but without the right to choose a particular arm of the service.

The service in Tunis was, for the colonists, two years. Natives served four years. Natives of Tunis were permitted to volunteer for service in the French national army for from three to five years, after naturalization. France was utilizing more and more the strength of her colonies to make up the deficiency in men due to a declining birth rate

at home. In the home corps of the Colonial army volunteers were accepted for from three to five years and drafts were made from the annual contingent to make up the deficiencies.

For the purposes of command, administration, and recruiting, France was divided into twenty districts in each of which there was garrisoned an army corps. One corps stood in Algiers. Six corps districts, including the newly created twenty-first, border on the northern and eastern frontiers. In addition to the infantry regiments, each drawn from its regimental sub-district, the corps districts furnished the rifle battalions, corps cavalry, field artillery, garrison artillery, and train. The cavalry divisions with their complements of horse artillery, the line of communications troops, and the Colonial army were drawn from the country at large. The Alpine riflemen were recruited in the mountain regions of the Alps and the Pyrenees.

The remount service for supplying the necessary riding, draft and pack animals was organized in the same careful manner as the recruiting service, and the breeding, under government supervision, was so successful that an ample supply of animals of excellent quality was assured for mobilization.

The officers of the active army were drawn, as to about one-half, from the military school at Saint Cyr and the *École Polytechnique* of Paris; the other half came from the ranks by promotion. The latter class seldom reached a grade higher than that of major, beyond which promotion was by selection. As seems to be inevitable in a republic, promotion in the higher grades was not free from political influences, and the outbreak of war was sure to result in a weeding-out process that could not be accomplished in time of peace.

Candidates for commissions as reserve officers were, after six months' service with the colors, permitted to take the





French artillery. A 75 millimeter rapid-fire field gun with caisson.

examination for entrance to the regimental schools of the arms of the service to which they belonged. If successful they served the second year at the regimental schools and completed their service as second lieutenants of reserve. Second lieutenants were qualified for promotion to first lieutenants after completing three periods of field training. First lieutenants were promoted to captaincy after six years in that grade, with the same requirements as to field training.

In France, there were 185 infantry regiments, mostly of 3 battalions of 4 companies each (a few regiments had 4 battalions) and 31 rifle battalions of 6 companies each. Each regiment and battalion had an extra complement of officers for forming on mobilization an equal number of reserve regiments and battalions.

In Africa, there were 4 Zouave regiments, 5 battalions of light African infantry, and 12 regiments of Turcos; 3 Sahara companies of natives, mounted partly on horses and partly on camels; 2 six-battalion regiments (Foreign Legion); and 12 battalions of Senegal riflemen.

On mobilization the youngest reserves filled the ranks of the active army to war strength and the remainder formed regiments and battalions. The two together formed the *first line* in war. The youngest classes in the territorial army formed about 180 territorial regiments (*second line*). The older classes were to be used as railway guards, telegraph troops, and for general service behind the fighting line.

All officers and certain non-commissioned officers were armed with the saber and pistol. All other men carried the Lebel repeating rifle, caliber .32 (nearly), models of 1889 and 1893. It had neither the initial velocity nor the corresponding flat trajectory of the more modern high power army rifles.

The infantry regiment had normally 2 Puteaux machine-guns, a single-barrel rifle of the same caliber as the Lebel, capable of delivering 600 shots per minute. The regiments belonging to the army corps stationed on the frontier had each 3 machine-guns.

With all the improvements in arms and equipment no army has been able to reduce the load carried by the soldiers to less than about fifty pounds and the French infantryman was no exception to the rule. With his rifle and bayonet, belt cartridges, intrenching tool, rations, toilet articles, change of underwear, individual messing and cooking kit, canteen of water, and a great coat, he carried about fifty-eight pounds. These articles were the minimum required to meet his immediate daily needs when, under campaign conditions, access to the train was not possible. The regimental train carried an additional supply of rations, forage, ammunition, medicines, a supply of tools for constructing defensive works, and included a kitchen on wheels for each company.


For the care of the wounded each regiment had a surgeon attached to the regimental staff and one for each battalion. Every surgeon had one or more assistants, and every company had men trained to render first aid to the injured and as wounded carriers, or litter bearers. The surgeons and assistants carried the most essential remedies and dressings and each officer and man carried a first-aid dressing.

The organization of the infantry was almost identical with that of the other European armies. The training in garrison and in the field was not inferior to that of the great armies. The French infantry has long enjoyed a wide reputation for excellence, and careful observers found this reputation well justified. But it was not a prepossessing force in appearance; the individual was not well "set up";





French motor-trucks carrying gun crew and drawing heavy artillery and ammunition wagons.



French 200 millimeter (8-inch) howitzer mounted on specially constructed railway carriage.

there was nothing "smart" about him. There was abundant evidence that he took his training seriously, as a national duty to be performed earnestly and conscientiously, but he displayed no pride in being a soldier. His service was not made attractive, and in spite of the most thorough preparation for national defense, the individual soldier had the appearance of being and of feeling neglected. His uniform was substantially that adopted early in the last century. Recent wars have pointed out clearly the necessity of clothing an army in neutral colors, and endurance in the field requires that the soldier be clothed in comfort. Still the French trousers were of a most conspicuous red and the great coat of blue, with skirts falling well below the knees, was worn in midsummer as well as in winter. It was only a few weeks before the beginning of hostilities that a suitable field uniform was adopted, the change to which it was estimated would require some ten years. Notwithstanding the handicap of a long overcoat in a temperature which made the civilian population resort to light flannels and linens, foreign military observers have testified to the excellent marching qualities of the French infantry.

Of the 81 cavalry regiments in France 60 were organized into cavalry divisions, and the others were assigned to the army corps. The regiment consisted of 5 squadrons of 150 sabers each, but the fifth squadron was composed largely of inferior horses and men assigned to special duties, and did not mobilize with the regiment. There were 12 regiments of cuirassiers, 32 of dragoons, 23 of chasseurs, and 14 of hussars. The cuirassiers are heavy cavalry and still wore the cuirass. The dragoons are medium, and the chasseurs and hussars light cavalry. There were in Africa, 4 regiments of chasseurs d'Afrique, and 6 regiments of spahis, making a total of 91 cavalry

regiments. Each regiment had 2 machine-guns mounted on two-wheeled carts, and drawn by four horses. They could be fired from the carriage or dismounted.

The cavalry officer was armed with a saber and a pistol and the trooper with a saber and a light, short carbine (weight, six and a half pounds), carried on the back. It took the same ammunition as the infantry rifle, but was an inferior weapon of old model. A part of the cavalry had been armed with the lance shortly before the outbreak of the war. The regiment had four telegraphers with telegraph and telephone equipment, and a light bridge train. The bridge pontoons could be used as row boats, carrying about a dozen men. Two pontoons lashed together would carry a field gun. The cavalryman carried three days' rations and one-half forage ration for his mount.

The regimental train consisted of forage wagons, supply wagons, medicine carts, and bridge wagons. The cavalry division had a light wagon for carrier pigeons, a unique equipment.

The French cavalry officer is the type that should inspire his men to great efforts; his ideals are high. His pride in his profession is no longer based on tradition alone; his own best efforts have created a body of troopers in whom he has confidence, and he leads them with pride. As horsemen they are unsurpassed, and all are trained in the School of Equitation at Saumur, where the art of military riding has been developed to great perfection. Through the courtesy of the French government most of the nations of Europe send cavalry officers there to be trained. North and South America and Asia are well represented in the classes of this institution, whose influence extends around the world. It is the French theory that the horse is the principal weapon of the cavalry in attack, and based on this theory they have made their cavalry officers masters of the

art of horsemanship. Careful breeding has produced a type of horse well suited to the requirements of war. Of great mobility, capable of long-sustained effort, and guided by a master hand, the French cavalry officer believed that his horse had the heart to respond at the moment of delivering the charge with a dash that was irresistible. Only war can show whether his faith was well founded; but in martial spirit, confidence, courage, and devotion to duty the French cavalry officer had no superior.

To one who knew the skill of the officer, the riding of the man in ranks and the training of his horse were disappointing. This condition was recognized by the officers. They found that one year was not sufficient to develop riders capable of training remounts. With only two years' service neither men nor horses could be properly trained. The law of 1913 corrected this defect.

In the development of modern armies the artillery has, in the last few years, by reason of improvement in guns and in the powers of explosives, assumed a rôle of increasing importance. Inventions and improvements in aiming devices have made it possible to place the guns in secure positions, concealed from view of the enemy, and to control and direct their fire from central observation stations. The observer from a clock tower, tree, or other position affording good observation may, by telephone, direct the fire of groups of guns placed in quarries, or behind hills or hedges, so as to destroy forces of the enemy who have never been seen by the officers and men who serve the guns. The non-recoil inventions have made it possible to fire repeatedly without the necessity of correcting the aim, so little time is lost in aiming and the field gun has become a true quick-firer.

While the infantry rifle and the cavalry carbine of the French were not of the latest types, the French field gun

was considered second to none. It is a 3-inch gun capable of delivering 12 to 16 shots per minute. France took the lead in reducing the number of guns in a battery from 6 to 4; this was a natural result of the increase in rapidity of fire; the extra pieces were replaced by ammunition wagons. The battery carried for each gun 312 rounds of ammunition. The 6-inch howitzer delivered 6 shots per minute. The mountain gun was of 2.6-inch caliber. The horse batteries to accompany cavalry divisions were equipped with the same gun as the field batteries, except that, in order to save weight, they were built without shields for protection of the gunners.

France had at home 618 field batteries, 20 horse batteries, 21 howitzer batteries, 15 mountain batteries, and colonial regiments of 15 batteries; and in the colonies there were about 50 batteries. To be effective, an army must be well-balanced, that is, it must be composed of the three great fighting arms in proper proportions. Of these the infantry forms the greater part. Cavalry and artillery are indispensable supplementary arms, but battles are won and wars are decided by the infantry.

The fighting arms are themselves trained to do a large proportion of technical work. The cavalry regiment is supplied with light telephone equipment; the cavalry division carries a field telegraph, both wire and wireless, with trained operators; the infantry regiment is prepared to connect its battalions with the commander of the regiment by telephone. The brigade connects the regiments with brigade headquarters and the brigades must remain at all times in wire or wireless communication with the division. The artillery connects its observing stations with the guns of the battery by wire, and the battalion and higher commanders coördinate the fire of their tactical units by the same means. Roads must be opened or obstructed and bridges repaired or





Range finding with the telemeter as used in the French army.



Field telegraph as used by the French army.

destroyed; defensive works must be promptly designed and hastily executed; temporary shelter must be provided for the fighting man and his horse whenever time permits, so as to conserve their strength. Improvised field kitchens and bakeries supply the needs of the troops when the travelling kitchens and division bakeries are not available; pure water is furnished by hastily constructed filters and condensers, or bad water is boiled when sterilizers are not to be had; ammunition must be constantly forwarded to the firing line and the wounded carried to the rear. All these and many other such services fall necessarily on the fighting units. Peace training makes them independent of all auxiliary services on the battle front.

Behind the battle line, however, technical troops, whose primary duty is not fighting, maintain the lines of communication, construct, repair, and operate railroads, canals, and telegraph lines, construct and equip permanent or semi-permanent defensive works, and purchase and deliver at the front every class of supplies that an army requires. These duties are performed by the engineer troops and the train. There were 8 engineer regiments, 1 of which was a railroad regiment of 12 companies, and 1 a telegraph regiment of 8 companies,—7 wire and 1 wireless. Of the battalions of engineers pertaining to the peace establishment, 1 was assigned to each army corps. Bicycle sections composed of 2 officers and 30 enlisted men were to accompany the cavalry divisions in campaign. The engineers were armed and equipped as infantry. For each army corps there was in France 1 squadron of train troops, which consisted of 230 men and 3,500 horses, and furnished the complete transport of the army corps, exclusive of artillery and technical troops. The men were armed with saber and carbine.

The Flying Corps was under the administration of the engineers until 1912, when it was created a separate corps

under a chief who was responsible directly to the minister of war. The personnel consisted of 1 general, 6 staff officers, 170 other officers, 230 non-commissioned officers, and 1,500 men; and the equipment included 8 large, 5 small, and 8 reconnaissance dirigibles.

Each Army Corps had an *aéroplane* squadron: there were 5 squadrons for the fortresses and 6 for seacoast service; to each cavalry division was assigned a section, and 7 squadrons were reserved for the army commander. The squadron, or flotilla, consisted of 6 *aéroplanes* and the section of 2.

Although the *aéroplane* was produced in America its most rapid development was in France. Flying became very popular and the army quickly recognized its value in war. It was a Frenchman who said: "Germany aspires to control the land and England the sea, but France will control the air." Although France had lost the endurance records in the air, she had many accomplished and daring pilots in the summer of 1914 who were destined to play an important rôle in war.

The Gendarmerie formed an important body of élite troops, numbering 2,500 officers and men, nearly half mounted. They performed, in peace, duties corresponding to those of mounted police and rural guards.

The Forest and Customs services were also regularly organized troops and numbered more than 20,000. They were well-trained, having been in large part non-commissioned officers, but the superior officials who formed the corps of officers were less well-qualified, many being without military training.

Under the army law of August, 1913, the infantry companies on the frontier were to be maintained in peace at 200 men, in the interior at 140; the field artillery battery was to be 140 on the frontier and 110 in the interior; and the cavalry regiment was to be maintained at 740 sabers

and the horse battery at 175 men, both at war strength. The same law prescribed 742,000 men as the minimum peace strength of the army. In case of war the first line would mobilize at once 1,200 battalions, 600 squadrons, and 1,000 batteries, a force of 1,500,000 men, 90,000 sabers, and 4,000 guns, leaving sufficient reserve to maintain this force at the front. The Territorial Army would form a second-line army of nearly the same strength, with its own reserves. France had not less than 5,000,000 trained men.

The president of the Republic is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and may take command in the field. He exercises command, normally, through the minister of war, who may or may not have military training. The General Staff, whose chief is directly responsible to the war minister, trains the army in peace and operates it in war. The officers of the General Staff come from the line of the army after passing through the Superior School of War. After passing the required examinations they are attached for two years to the General Staff, where they are tried out. Those not finally selected are returned to the troops and form a reserve for the General Staff in war. Every General Staff officer served two years with troops in each grade from captain to colonel inclusive. The General Staff was the body of experts to whom the safety of the country was entrusted in war; it defined the policies of the army and directed its training. Its officers were drawn from the several branches of the service by a system of competitive selection extended over a period of years; a system designed to bring to the General Staff officers of the best intellect and highest character that the country produced. Even after they were permanently assigned to the General Staff, these officers served periodically with the line to keep them in touch with its needs. They returned to their staff positions with first-hand knowledge of every

reform that was needed. The General Staff did not always receive the support of the government to which its high character entitled it. It would however, in war, if the danger were great enough, take its rightful place, for it had the confidence of the army, which it truly represented. To say that the General Staff represented the army is to designate it as representative of the military spirit of France, and therein was to be found its weak point.

In her whole preparation for national defense France followed the lead of her more vigorous neighbor; there was no independent development of military strength such as should accompany the normal development of a country. France was growing rich but not strong. Military measures and training were adopted as an insurance against a real or supposed menace to the national existence and not as a means of creating a healthy, self-reliant, orderly, and well-ordered population, simple of taste and strong of heart. France had a great army of well-trained men, led by intelligent, energetic, patriotic officers, and directed by a General Staff whose technical training and high character made it fit for the task, but an army prepared beforehand to assume a defensive rôle in the initial campaign of war. There was much talk of the offensive return, but there was nothing in the national character to indicate that the battles of France would be fought on any other than French soil.

## CHAPTER X

### THE RUSSIAN ARMY

Racial elements in Russia. Rise of the Slavs. Early territorial extension. Tatar invasion: An autocracy established. Tatar dominion ends. The *Strelitz*, the first permanent military force. Conquest of Kazan. Ivan's army. Organization under Godunoff. The Cossacks. Reforms of Peter the Great. Revolt of the *Strelitz*. Cossack revolt. Defeat by the Swedes at Narwa and victory over them at Poltava. Army reforms. Victories over Finland, Sweden, and Persia. The Seven Years' War. Victories over Turkey and Poland. Defeat by France. Reconstruction; military colonies. Campaign against Turkey, 1828-1829. Reorganization of 1833-1834. The Crimean War. Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878. The Russo-Japanese War. Organization under law of 1912: service; the Cossacks; annual enrollment of recruits; strength, officers, and training; infantry, cavalry and artillery, and equipment. Supreme command. General Staff. Army corps, peace and war strength. Infantry division, war strength. Cavalry division. Retrospect of ameliorations. Quality of the modern force.

The race which forms the base of the Russian people came into the great plains lying between the Arctic Ocean, the Black Sea, and the Ural Mountains following the Celts and Teutons, the Hungarians, the Bulgarians, and many other peoples who have formed empires in Europe, in the great waves of emigration flowing from east to west succeeding each other at irregular intervals from the earliest times of which we have any record. The three great principal elements in the race are the Finns, the Tatars, and the Slavs, but the latter have largely absorbed the other two.

The Slavs have been traced from the Carpathian Mountains to the marsh district midway between the Baltic and the Black Sea which is drained by the great rivers flowing northwest and southeast. The name Slav, in its old form appears as early as the fifth century, but as late as the ninth

century the Slavs had no political organization beyond the clans, villages, or cities, and they seemed to have had no military system. With no central authority and no regular armed forces to support such authority as existed, the domains of the Slavs were subject to invasion from every frontier, with no natural boundaries or barriers between clans or tribes internal strife paralyzed all progress. It was not until the second half of the ninth century, however, that the Slavs, realizing their helplessness, invited the Varangians, the same people as the Normans who conquered England, to come and rule over them. Thus it was the military chiefs of the Scandinavian Peninsula with their fighting men who laid the foundation of the great Russian empire. Even its name is taken from the Norseman whom the Finns called Russ. They taught the Slavs the art of war and organized the armies that extended their frontiers and made them secure against invasion. These armies were not only a bulwark against the foreign foe, they were the means of introducing the enlightenment of the west by opening communication and establishing commercial relations with the rest of Europe.

In 865 Askold and Dir led an expedition against Byzantium. Although more than 300 ships were destroyed by a tempest in the Sea of Marmora and the expedition proved a failure, it was an important event as it established "the first certain date in Russian history."

In 882 Oleg assembled an army of Varangians and subjects from the conquered tribes, moved victoriously down the Dnieper extending his dominions, and made Kieff the capital of the eastern Slavs. In 907 Oleg, at the head of another and greater expedition of 2,000 ships and 80,000 men, reached Constantinople and opened trade relations with the Greeks. Sviatoslaff, who was the first of the Varangians to bear a Slavonic name, led an army of 60,000 men

into Bulgaria in 970. He crossed the Danube in the face of the enemy, put him to flight, and took possession of all towns and villages, including Pereislavl, the Bulgarian capital. His troops who had displayed such excellent fighting qualities lacked the great military essential of discipline. Yielding to their barbarous love of plunder they scattered throughout the country. This proved the ruin of the expedition. Sviatoslaff was forced to sue for peace, and, collecting some of his scattered forces, he started for Kieff, but was surprised on his homeward march and killed by the Petchenegs. It was his successor, Vladimir, who was baptised, married a daughter of the Byzantine Emperor, and made Greek Christianity the state religion. This was an important epoch for the Russian army, for it was the Greek priests who were responsible for the "introduction of the idea of an empire governed by a tsar supported by a permanent army."

When, in 1064, Yaroslaff died and his empire was divided among his five sons, a period of constant strife for supremacy and the possession of the throne of Kieff began between some two hundred ruling princes. The effect of these civil wars was the destruction of the united forces, leaving the country in a condition not unlike that preceding the advent of the Varangians, so that when another wave of emigration from Asia appeared Russia was ripe for invasion.

The Tatars first appeared in 1224, but after some successes retired for thirteen years. When they next appeared in 1237, several hundred thousand strong, they defeated the forces of the Russian princes one after another, burned Moscow in 1238, and in 1240 rased Kieff to the ground. The invasion of the Tatars cut Russia off from the rest of Europe for three hundred years, during which time a new era was inaugurated in the west. This period, which in western Europe witnessed the nationalization of states,

leading to the emancipation of the serfs and the organization of permanent armies, saw Russian arms and methods become Tatarized, saw the principalities created by the Varangians transformed into autocratic Russia under the Tsar of Moscow.

Ivan III was the first independent monarch of Moscow. He encouraged the arts which created materials of war and did much towards the organization of a permanent army. He was not a brilliant soldier, but, encouraged by dissensions among the Tatars, he refused to pay tribute to the Golden Horde, the Mongol Kingdom founded by the descendants of Jenghiz Khan, and raised an army of 150,000 men to resist the invasion of Khan Ahmed who marched against Moscow in 1480. The two armies met in a light engagement, after which Ivan proposed peace to Ahmed who insisted on terms so degrading that the negotiations failed. The two armies stood facing each other for a fortnight, when in order to secure his line of retreat Ivan decided to retire. Believing that the withdrawal was the result of defeat, a panic broke out in the army and the retreat became a precipitate flight. Strangely enough, the Tatars believing this maneuver, which they did not understand, a ruse of war, also retreated. Thus ended the period of Tatar domination in Russia.

Vasili Ivanovitch, the son and successor of Ivan, raised the army to a strength of 360,000, composed principally of cavalry. Of this force 300,000 were furnished by the possessors of fiefs who served without pay and equipped and maintained their soldiers. The military training of these armies was not sufficient to permit them to maneuver in the face of the enemy; their tactics were of the simplest kind and their strength lay in their numbers rather than in the quality of their soldiery. Their inferiority was clearly demonstrated in Vasili's attack on Smolensk in 1514 against



Troop of Cossacks.



Russian infantry.



the Lithuanians, who had already come under the influence of Western Europe.

Ten years elapsed after the death of Vasili before Ivan IV, at the age of thirteen, put an end to the intrigue of the *boyards* by taking the scepter into his own hand. He created the first permanent military force in the pay of the state by organizing the *Strelitz*, recruited among his subjects who were exempt from the *corvée*. They were soldiers for life and from father to son. This force, called the "Janissaries of Russia," played an important part in the history of the Russian army until it was abolished by Peter the Great. It was at this time, also, that the Cossacks appeared in the Russian army, and they continue to be an important element in the military forces of the Russian Empire to the present day. Although Ivan III established the independence of Moscow by refusing to pay tribute to the Golden Horde, the Tatar menace was far from removed; the Mongolian frontiers have been a constant source of anxiety to Russia almost to the present time. Ivan IV, "The Terrible," the grandson of Ivan III, undertook the conquest of Kazan in 1552. Elaborate preparations were made for the campaign. An advance guard of light infantry was sent ahead to occupy the crossings of the Volga; the northern flank was protected by a force placed at Nijni-Novgorod and by the *Strelitz* and the Cossacks on the Kama; the artillery was sent down the Volga. The great armies marched without commissariat, living on fish and game, fruits, roots and herbs. When the armies were concentrated across the Danube, Ivan found himself at the head of 150,000 men. The siege of Kazan and the storming of the fortress was one of the bloodiest in history, but the Russians were finally successful and Ivan returned to Moscow a conqueror. The second part of the reign of Ivan was marked by wars against the Swedes

and the Poles, by the burning of Moscow by the Tatars of the Crimea in 1571, and by an attempt to conquer Siberia by the Cossack hetman Yermak with a small body of adventurers (Russian, German, Lithuanian, and Tatar). He captured the capital of the Khan, Koutchoum, but Ermak was drowned while swimming a river and his composite force had to withdraw from Siberia, which was finally conquered during the reign of Ivan's successor.

Ivan continued to increase his army and to improve its organization. He formed a bodyguard of 8,000 horsemen, young nobles, sons of the great lords. The boyards, the lesser nobility, formed a force of 100,000 horsemen. Every holder of land who produced three thousand pounds of grain was bound to serve, mounted, armed, and equipped at his own expense. All soldiers were allowed pay for campaign service and the fief-holders who furnished more than the required quota of men were specially rewarded. By these measures the army was raised from 150,000 to 300,000 men. The basis of the permanent army was the Strelitz drawn from the freemen. Their strength is estimated at 40,000. Ivan used them to garrison posts on the Tatar frontier, took 2,000 of them into his guard, and kept 12,000 in Moscow. They were organized into companies of 500, divided into hundreds, fifties, and tens. Irregular troops were also raised in southern Russia among the Cossacks of the Don, of the Terek, and among the Tatars and the Bachkyrs. The tsar furnished them powder and lead and sent them presents of gold when he needed their services.

The field organization of the army was still that introduced by Ivan III, who divided it into main body, advance guard, rear guard, and right and left wings. The artillery had made great progress, cannon were imported and an arsenal had been established at Moscow. Ivan had as many

as 2,000 pieces of artillery. Much had been done for the army, but according to European standards it was still inferior to the armies of the west. The progress of an army is in ratio to that of the people. The yoke of the Tatars had not only stemmed the tide of civilization for three centuries, but had turned it back and away from Russia. The army became more Oriental than European in character.

Under Feodor Ivanovitch, the last of the Varangian dynasty, the weak-minded son of Ivan the Terrible, Godunoff, the regent, was the actual ruler of Russia. It was at this time that a system of periodical inspection of all the armed forces by able and experienced officers was instituted. The permanent army was maintained and augmented. The Guard of the tsar numbered 15,000 nobles all mounted. The cavalry, some 75,000 strong, was assembled every year on the banks of the Oka to keep the Tatars quiet. The Strelitz and the Cossacks were maintained and the foreign corps amounted to 4,300 Germans and Poles, 4,000 Lithuanian Cossacks, 150 Scotch and Dutch, and 100 Swedes, Danes, and Greeks. The Russians depended always on the weight of their masses to overcome their lack of skill in maneuvering. The cavalry attacked in a compact mass to the sound of the drums and the trumpet corps. The infantry took shelter behind a sort of movable fort, formed by a line of boards stuck into the ground and provided with loopholes through which they fired. The Cossacks performed the service of reconnoissance. They were disposed in pairs from five to twenty miles apart. One man of the pair took post in a tree suitable for an observation station, and the other remained mounted underneath ready to ride at all speed to the next station with reports. Every movement of the enemy was thus signalled to the central headquarters by these Cossack posts.

The Cossacks are a unique force in the history of armies and have been an important element in the Russian army since the sixteenth century. The name first appeared in the first half of the fifteenth century. It was applied to a class of laborers who were without homes, men who worked for others. They formed no distinct nationality, but drew their numbers from the villagers who sought a free existence, from fugitives, either from justice or serfdom,—in short, from all who by reason of prosecution or persecution or the heavy burdens of government, or because of the attractions of a life without restraint, took up their existence in the great Steppes which lay without the grasp of the governmental agencies of any state. It is true the Cossacks had a form of government of their own, which did not bear heavily on them. Their primitive manners, their crude social and political organization, the equality of all men under the laws of the Cossacks, attracted many Russians, who easily accommodated themselves to the pastoral life of the well-watered Steppes, stocked with game and fish. The *Ataman*, the supreme chief of the Cossacks, was elected by vote of all men of the age to bear arms. All Cossacks were soldiers. Their population was purely military, even tilling of the soil was forbidden by some tribes. They lived beyond the frontiers of Russia towards the lands of the Tatars, against whose invasions they were a measure of protection. There were two classes of Cossacks; those who lived on the exposed frontiers of the Cossack world were constantly at war and had neither family nor fixed abode, while those who lived in communities had fixed habitations of wood, grouped in villages and towns and protected by earth fortifications. They occupied a large territory and were divided into a number of groups, each of which was more or less independent of its neighbors.

The Cossacks of the Ukraine occupied the territory now known as Little Russia. They had treaties with the princes of Lithuania, and after Lithuania was united to Poland the same relations were continued with the kings of Poland, who supplied them with materials of war and money. In return they guarded the southeastern frontier of the kingdom against the Tatars. As early as 1410 they furnished troops to Poland in the war with the Teutonic Knights and, later, in that with Russia. Sigismund I gave them their first regular military organization, forming ten regiments of 2,000 men each.

The Zaporogues lived further south along the lower Dnieper. They lived entirely by pillage and were a terror to all their neighbors. They were recruited from the Ukraines, and those who wished to have families returned to the Ukraine. The Ukraines and the Zaporogues were able to put 40,000 men under arms. The atamans of these tribes lent their support first to Poland, then to Turkey, then to Russia, proving very troublesome to them all at different times. But towards the close of the seventeenth century the sultan renounced his claims, and the king of Poland acknowledged the supremacy of the tsar in the Ukraine, receiving in return a guarantee of Russian protection against the Tatars.

The Cossacks of the Don celebrated, in 1870, the three-hundredth anniversary of their incorporation into the Russian empire. They formally recognized the sovereignty of the tsar of Moscow in 1570 and have never given allegiance to any other sovereign; but they continued to elect their atamans and to send and receive ambassadors, so that the relation was really in the nature of an alliance. They supported the Monk Otrepieff, who had lived among them, when, on the death of Godunoff, he attempted with the aid of the Poles to occupy the throne of Moscow, and

several other pretenders received their support; but when Poland attempted to establish a Polish prince on the throne of the tsars they fought by the side of the Russians. When Michael Romanoff, son of Feodor Romanoff, who was banished by Godunoff, was proclaimed tsar, he was recognized by the ataman of the Don, who remained loyal to him.

The Cossacks of the Volga and the Astrakhan descended from some tribes which, in the fifteenth century, occupied Riazan on the Oka. When, in 1523, Riazan was incorporated into the kingdom of Moscow they migrated down the Volga. About the middle of the sixteenth century the Russians became established on the Kama river, and before the end of the century they crossed the Ural mountains and established posts on the Tobol river. About the same time the Cossacks of the Volga crossed into Siberia. This was the beginning of the conquest of Siberia, which the Cossacks completed within a hundred years.

Beginning with the frontiers of Poland we find that along the Dnieper, the Don, the Volga, the Kama, and across the Ural mountains, the Cossacks guarded every exposed frontier of Russia against the Tatars. They were everywhere and at all times tribes of warriors who lived by pillage, and gave Russia only less trouble than the Tatars, against whom they afforded a measure of protection. But they remained Russian; they spoke the Russian language, though corrupted by the language of the various Tatar tribes with whom they came in contact, and they maintained the orthodox religion. As they came, tribe after tribe, under Russian control they proved an effective frontier guard. Warriors of a type not unlike the American Indians, they were not effective when pitted against the civilized troops of western Europe, but were superior to the poorly organized Tatars.

When Peter, afterwards "the Great," at the age of sixteen, terminated the regency of his sister Sophia and assumed the reins of government, he found an army of 40 regiments of infantry, 25 regiments of cavalry, and some Cossack troops. The dominating factor was the Strelitz, a corrupt body capable of any crime and a ready tool in the hands of any leader whose power seemed to offer the greatest compensation. The Cossacks, if less dangerous, were more reactionary, and were becoming relatively of less value with every improvement introduced in the army from the west. He who would form a dependable army must first deal with the Strelitz and the Cossacks. That this was to be the task of the young tsar must have been foreseen by Lefort, the Genevese, who, more than any other man, was responsible for his early training. Though himself not a soldier, he lost no opportunity to develop the boy monarch in all things military. Two companies of young Russians were organized and trained by the German, Simon Sommer. In one of these companies Peter began his military education as a simple drummer boy, and took part in their maneuvers one against the other, which simulated actual war so nearly that dead and wounded were sometimes left on the field. These two companies became afterwards the two regiments "Preobraghenski" and "Semenovski" of the Guard, and in 1689 reached a strength of 4,000. The same year Lefort created two other regiments formed into a brigade, which gave the young tsar an army of about 15,000 men, exclusive of the forces inherited from Feodor. From the French immigrants, who left France as a result of a revocation of the Edict of Nantes, another regiment 5,000 strong was formed. Thus Lefort quickly surrounded the tsar with a new force which could be relied on to support him if the hostility of the Strelitz and the Cossacks to

the reforms he introduced from the west should lead to disaffection.

Peter found many foreigners already installed in the public service of Russia and his early training under foreign masters filled his young mind with schemes for the development of his country by the introduction of western progress. His desire to gain a first hand knowledge of European methods led him in 1697 to undertake a period of travel and study in the principal states of Europe; but his studies were interrupted by a revolt of the Strelitz. On his return he found that the revolt had been put down, four regiments disbanded, many of the mutineers hanged and the others put in prison. Not content with the measures already taken, Peter caused the prisoners to be produced and more than 2,000 were put to death—some, it is said, by the hand of the tsar himself. This was the beginning of the end of the Strelitz, and on the revolt of the Strelitz of Astrakhan in 1705 the entire force was abolished.

A system of conscription was instituted in 1699 which produced a levy of 32,000 men organized into twenty-seven regiments of infantry and two of dragoons. Here was the foundation of a national army, but the regiments were almost without exception commanded by Germans. Before this force was well organized the Russian army met the Swedes under Charles XII at Narva and was completely routed. The tsar was, however, far from being discouraged, and remarked that his troops would learn from the enemy how to beat him.

The new régime in Russia was bound to find opposition among the Cossacks, who belonged to a different order and whose prestige must suffer. The Cossacks of the Don revolted in 1706, but were promptly brought to submission. Those of the Dnieper under Mazepa joined the enemy in the next war with the Swedes, but the Russian

victory at Poltava in 1709 brought to an abrupt close the career of Mazeppa, and taught his Cossacks a bitter but well-deserved lesson. At Poltava the Russian forces numbered 55 regiments of infantry, 72 pieces of artillery, and 32 regiments of cavalry. Only the infantry, however, was an effective force; the artillery was poorly served, the cavalry badly mounted and insufficiently trained.

The wisdom of recreating the army along European lines was now demonstrated; the Russians had overthrown their masters in the art of war. But the commanders were still chiefly foreigners, among whom the Germans predominated, and opposition to foreign innovations had in no way abated. The tsar was, however, not to be discouraged in his reforms. He sought his officers among those best qualified to command, and answered the reactionary opposition of the nobility by ennobling all officers. He trained his young officers in the regiments of the guard under foreign instructors, or sent them to Germany, Austria, and France to learn the art of war. In 1715 he established the Russian war college after the German model in order to educate his officers and provide uniformity of instruction throughout the army. The foreign regiments had disappeared; the Cossacks were held in subjection; the new army, fashioned after the European model and trained by European officers, proved a power in the hands of its chief. With it and the navy, created also by him, Tsar Peter became master of Finland in 1714, overran Sweden in 1719-1720, adding to his empire Livonia, Esthonia, and Ingria; and as a result of the war with Persia, 1722-1724, annexed the provinces of Ghilan, Mazandaran, and Astrabad. The army which under the wise and courageous leadership of Peter raised Russia to the grade of a first class power in the concert of nations numbered at his death, in 1725, about 180,000 regular troops.

The character of the armies of Europe up to the nineteenth century depended almost entirely on the personality of the king or emperor to whom they owed allegiance. There was no conception of a national army; it was the monarch's army, maintained by him to keep his people in subjection, to secure them against foreign aggression, or to extend his domains and maintain his throne. This was particularly true in Russia where the whole machinery of government was centered in the tsar. With the death of Peter the Great, the army lost its chief. It was frequently, in the next hundred years, used by powerful and unscrupulous men to secure their own ends. It fought, too, in many wars; sometimes with credit, but seldom, if ever, with brilliancy. During the Seven Years' War the Russian army met the troops of Frederick the Great at Jägersdorf, at Zorndorf, at Kunersdorf; it occupied Berlin for a time during the period of six years that Frederick the Great never saw his capital. But Frederick was fighting the whole of Europe. The Russian soldier, and particularly the Russian commander, was no match for the Prussian under Frederick the Great. The Russian cavalry, poorly mounted and with little real training, was notably inferior to the cavalry of Seidlitz.

During the reign of Katherine II the wars in the Crimea, with Turkey, and with Poland, developed some able leaders, notably Dolgoruki, the conqueror of the Crimea, and Suvaroff. Paul I joined the second coalition against France, and Suvaroff further distinguished himself as an able leader; but he was recalled and disgraced by Paul. During the third coalition Russia put 400,000 men in the field, but they were badly organized, poorly trained, and their commanders were far inferior to the experienced leaders of Napoleon. The battles of Austerlitz, Eylau, and Friedland practically destroyed the Russian army.

With the experience of these disasters to guide him the tsar began the reconstruction of his army which in 1812 numbered 300,000 infantry, 70 regiments of cavalry, 100,000 Cossacks, and 1,000 field guns. The Army Corps appeared in the Russian army for the first time. These field armies opposed Napoleon's march to Moscow in 1812. The French army perished but was not defeated. Neither in the campaign of Moscow, nor in the battles of Grossgörschen, Lützen, and Dresden the following summer, nor in the Battle of the Nations at Leipsic, did the Russian armies attain the standard of the French. After the battle of Waterloo a period of comparative quiet reigned in Europe. It was a time when the bitter experiences of Napoleon's conquests should have taught the lesson of national preparedness. Prussia, at least, learned the lesson, and the advantage thus gained created the German empire. In Russia the time was not yet ripe for even the conception of a national army. The masses had not learned to think, the governing classes had shown little progress in constructive statesmanship, and Tsar Alexander no longer enjoyed the full mental vigor of the earlier part of his reign. But some improvements in organization were made and the ranks were filled. On the death of Alexander the infantry numbered 30 divisions and the cavalry 77 regiments. Fifty brigades of artillery provided a brigade of field artillery for each infantry division and 2 batteries of horse artillery for each cavalry division. The army was divided into 11 army corps. The corps was made up of 2 or 3 infantry divisions and a cavalry division, each with its proper complement of artillery. The new army was impressive in numbers, but in spirit it was the same old army. The only radical departure from the methods of the old régime for the development of the military strength of the empire was the visionary scheme of General Araktcheieff

for the establishment of military colonies. Such colonies were established in the provinces of Novgorod, Mohileff, Kharkoff, Kieff, Podolia, and Kherson. The crown-peasants in these colonies were relieved from their customary obligations to the crown and assumed the new burden of quartering troops. Every colonist more than fifty years old received forty acres of land. In return he had to maintain a soldier, and also his horse if he were a mounted man. The soldier was designated as a military peasant and had to assist in the farm work when not occupied with military duties. The entire male population found places in this military-agricultural organization. The first son of the master-colonist became his assistant, the second was a reserve man to fill the place of the military peasant in case of disability, the other boys under seventeen were classed as pupils and received military instruction. Colonists could not pass from one colony to another nor go beyond the limits of their own colonies without passes from the proper military authority. The entire administration was military; there was neither relaxation nor escape from the rigid rules of military life. The discipline and supervision, accepted as necessary by soldiers living in barracks, became intolerable when it penetrated the privacy of the home. This attempt to create an army was soon abandoned, but not before some of the colonies broke into rebellion. The experiment added another bitter chapter to the history of the already desolate life of the crown-peasants, without exerting the slightest influence on the army which it was designed to revolutionize.

The army of Nicholas I, inherited from Alexander on his death in 1825, which marched the same year against Persia, met an enemy so inferior in strength that the results justify no estimate of its efficiency, but the campaign of 1828 against Turkey failed to mobilize more than

a fraction of its paper strength. Supplies were scanty and of poor quality; sanitation was an unknown art. The army under Paskiewitch directed against Asia Minor achieved some substantial results, but the campaign of 1828 by the army of the Pruth was a dismal failure. The Russian commander Wittgenstein was a veteran of 1812 who had outlived his usefulness. The interference of the tsar did not improve matters. The Russian army, after some initial successes, found itself divided into three parts standing before as many Turkish strongholds, unable to produce decisive results at any point. The impatience of the tsar brought severe defeat on the troops of the Prince of Württemberg. The campaign closed with the advantage decidedly in favor of the Turks, who from the beginning had stood on the defensive. Wittgenstein was removed from command and Diebitsch, a Prussian, began to prepare the army for the campaign of 1829. Diebitsch crossed the Balkans and captured Adrianople, but his army had dwindled away until he had only a handful of men left. The conclusion of peace extricated the army from a very critical situation. Europe expected much from the Russian army, but it failed to demonstrate that it had made any progress since the Napoleonic wars. Had it met the forces of a first class European state, however, instead of the Turks, the demoralization could scarcely have been more complete than that due to its own inefficiency in organization, sanitation, and supply. The reorganization of 1833-1834 resulted in an army of 27 divisions of infantry, 66 regiments of cavalry, and 234 batteries of artillery—an organization which should have been able to put 1,000,000 first-line troops in the field. This was the organization which, in the Crimea, in 1854, lost the battles of Alma and Inkerman to the wretchedly mismanaged expeditionary forces of France, England, and Turkey, and allowed its

army to be besieged at Sebastopol, which was abandoned after a siege of three hundred and fifty days. The difficulties of the campaign in the Crimea should not, however, be underestimated. It cost the allies a hundred thousand men, and the losses to Russia have been estimated at three times that number. The tremendous distance which separated Sebastopol from its base of supplies made the maintenance of the garrison a stupendous undertaking. Russia was so crushed by the Crimean War that no recruits were called to the colors for several years.

In the Russo-Turkish War in 1877-1878, after a few preliminary successes in Asia and in Europe, the Russian military system showed its traditional weaknesses. The European campaign had hardly begun when the Russians in Armenia were everywhere in retreat followed by the Turks under Mukhtar Pasha. Three successive and costly defeats of the Russian forces at Plevna discredited the military administration in spite of the able leadership of some of the divisional generals and the stubborn fighting qualities of the Russian soldier. However, some changes in the direction of the campaign and the appointment of Todleben, the defender of Sebastopol, to command before Plevna, together with the assistance of the Bulgarian army and the heroic resistance of General Gourko's forces at Shipka Pass, turned the tide in favor of the Russians, who pushed the campaign with great energy. Two columns crossed the Balkans, surrounded and captured the Turkish army before Shipka Pass, defeated the only other force which barred the road to Constantinople, and entered Adrianople on January 20, 1878. The Russian forces showed an energy, a tenacity and unity in the severe winter campaign of 1877-1878 which established for the Russian General Staff an easy superiority over that of Turkey, in spite of its failure in the beginning of the war.

The events of the Russo-Japanese war are too fresh in men's minds to require repetition. The Japanese forces opened the campaign in a brilliant offensive which they maintained until the close of the war. The Russians yielded point after point; sometimes offering stubborn resistance but always yielding to their adversaries. The difficulty of maintaining an army several thousand miles from its base over a single line of railroad are great, but as the Russian armies withdrew Japan found the problem of maintaining her armies advancing through a country with neither roads nor railroads equally great. The progress of the Japanese army became very slow; for weeks at a time it was unable to move while supplies were being accumulated, but the Russian commander was never able to take the offensive. The army of 1904 was a great surprise and disappointment to the Russian people. Many needed reforms were undertaken, which resulted in the army of 1914.

The present army law dates from 1912. Service for the active army is for the infantry and foot artillery three years with the colors and fifteen in the reserve. In all other branches the color service is four years and the reserve service thirteen years. The reserve furnishes seven year-classes to complete the field troops, and the rest forms the second category. By special authority of the crown the transfer of the year class which completes its service may be delayed for six months, thus extending the color service for that period.

Service is universal and compulsory, but there are many exemptions which exclude the inhabitants of larger provinces from service. In other provinces foreigners only are exempt. Throughout Russia immigrants who come to the country after they are fifteen years old are excused. The favored classes included the Russian Orthodox, dissenting and Mohammedan clergy, professors and lecturers in

the universities and certain classes of art students. All forfeit their exemptions if they give up their professions before they reach the age of thirty. The exemptions for family reasons are liberal, and reduction of service on educational grounds is general. Students of schools of the first and second classes serve three years with the colors and fifteen in the reserve; those of schools of the first class, if they qualify as officers of the reserve, serve two years with the colors and sixteen in the reserve. Enrollment may be delayed for educational reasons, or high school students may volunteer at the age of seventeen, serving two years with the colors and sixteen in the reserve. Service with the colors for students who pass the officers' examination is reduced to one and one half years, and for students of medicine, veterinary medicine, or pharmacy, to one year and eight months. All men between the ages of twenty-one and forty-three who do not belong to the active army, either with the colors or in the first or second category of the reserve, form a sort of territorial militia or reserve. Men who have passed out of the active army and the four youngest classes of those who pass directly into the reserve receive two periods of field training each of six weeks' duration.

The Cossacks form a special corps in the Russian army, a class of troops which are not found in any other army of the world. Every Cossack is liable to serve from twenty to thirty-eight years of age. He has one year's preparatory service with four weeks in camp. His service is then divided into three categories each of four years' duration. The first period is color service; during the second period he is on furlough but must maintain his horse and arms. He may be called out at any time and has four weeks' training annually. For the third period he is not required to maintain his horse and has no training. Finally, he

passes into the general reserve where he remains during fitness, without age limit.

The number of recruits enrolled in the Russian army in 1912 was 455,100. This number is fixed annually by the Duma, but in case of failure the number for the preceding year is drafted. The enrollment of Cossacks numbered 19,000. The peace strength of the army was about 1,200,000, of which there were in Europe 850,000, in the Caucasus 70,000, in Turkistan 30,000, and in East Asia 250,000. To these numbers should be added the peace strength of the Cossacks, 60,000. The war strength of the first and second line formations is estimated at from 5,500,000 to 6,500,000. The territorial reserve amounted to probably 1,500,000.

The non-commissioned officers of the army come directly from the ranks. They receive merely nominal pay during the period of compulsory service, with substantial increases on reënlistment. After eighteen or twenty years' service they are transferred to the territorial force with pension or are appointed to a civil position.

The active officers come almost entirely from the Cadet Corps and military schools. The course in the Cadet Corps is for seven years. The last four years include six weeks' field training annually. The cadets then pass into the military schools, of which there are twenty, eleven for the infantry, three for the cavalry, two for the Cossacks, two for the artillery, and one for the engineers. The corps of pages for the tsar is a training school for officers of the Guard.

The special schools for the higher training of officers correspond in general to those of the other modern armies. There are schools of fire for small arms and for artillery, a cavalry school, a technical school for railroad and engineer officers, a fencing school, a school of law, a supply school, a school of flying, and a superior school of war for the higher scientific training of officers for the General Staff.

Promotion for officers in the lower grades was by seniority. To the grade of colonel a fixed proportion was by seniority, the remainder being reserved for the promotion of graduates of the superior schools and for distinguished service. There was also a graded age retirement. Subalterns and captains retired at fifty-five, regimental commanders at fifty-eight, brigade commanders at sixty, division commanders at sixty-two, and corps commanders at sixty-three. In the cavalry, commanders retired somewhat younger than the corresponding officers of the other arms.

The Russian infantry was divided into Guard, Grenadier, Line, Rifle, and Cossack regiments, and included one regiment which was the tsar's bodyguard. The 12 guard, 16 grenadier, and 208 line regiments had each 4 battalions of 4 companies. The 110 rifle regiments included 4 guard and 20 army or line regiments, while the remaining regiments had territorial designations: 12 Finland, 8 Caucasian, 44 Siberian, and 22 Turkistan regiments. To these are to be added 6 Cossack regiments, making a total of 352 regiments of infantry which made up the peace establishment. The guard regiments were designated by name; the grenadier and line regiments by number. The rifle regiments were also designated by number, with a separate series for each territorial group. The infantry of the peace establishment, as enumerated above, with the Frontier Guards,—72 companies in Europe and 96 in Asia,—formed the first line in war. The second line was made up from those reserves who were not required to complete the first line and 12 battalions of Cossacks of 4 companies each. The third line in war was composed of 704 battalions formed from the territorial forces. This does not take into account the great reserve of men of military age who were without training, organization, arms, or equipment. On mobilization, every

infantry regiment formed one or more reserve battalions whose function was to train men to fill up losses in the regiments at the front. The infantry regiments were of 4 battalions, while the rifle regiments had in peace only 2 battalions

The infantry was armed throughout with the model 1891 repeating rifle, caliber 7.6 millimeters, with a bayonet which was carried fixed in campaign. The guards carried a knapsack of sail cloth, while other regiments carried a bag slung over the right shoulder. Each man carried 120 rounds of ammunition and a shelter tent. In addition a certain number of light intrenching tools were carried. The average load carried by the infantry soldier was fifty-six pounds. The regiments were provided with 8 machine-guns taking the same ammunition as the infantry rifle. They were mounted on wheels but could be dismounted and carried by hand for short distances.

The Russian cavalry is made up of the same classes of regiments as are found in the other armies of Europe, with the Cossacks forming an important additional element peculiar to the Russian army. The guard is composed of 4 cuirassier, 1 dragoon, 1 grenadier, 2 uhlan, 2 hussar, 3 Cossack regiments, and the tsar's bodyguard. The line includes 20 dragoon, 17 uhlan, and 18 hussar regiments, 5 cavalry regiments bearing territorial designations, 7 squadrons of gendarmes, and the Cossacks. There are 51 Cossack regiments, and 25 separate squadrons. This force, with 18 regiments of mounted frontier guards, forms the cavalry of the first line in war. The second line was to be composed entirely of Cossacks, and more than 100 regiments were provided for. The cavalry regiment had 6 squadrons, and the Cossack regiment 4 or 6. All the cavalry, including the Cossacks, carried a short carbine on the back and a light curved saber. The regular cavalry

carried a bayonet attached to the saddle. Officers, non-commissioned officers and trumpeters carried the revolver. In 1913 the front rank of the entire cavalry was armed with the lance. The individual cavalryman carried 40 rounds of ammunition, and the regimental train carried 25 rounds per man. The squadron carried 20 small spades and 20 small picks on the saddle. The regiment was equipped with 2 telegraph stations, 4 hand telephones, and 2 heliograph stations.

The light field artillery was organized into brigades and divisions. Three guard, 4 grenadier, and 52 army or line brigades had 2 divisions of 3 batteries each. Eleven Siberian rifle artillery brigades had 2 mountain batteries in addition to 6 batteries of field guns each. One guard rifle artillery division and 10 other rifle divisions had 3 batteries each, but were not organized into brigades. Six Turkistan artillery divisions (rifle troops) had only 2 batteries, and there was 1 independent Siberian mountain battery. The horse artillery was made up of 1 guard brigade, of 5 army and 1 Cossack batteries, and 12 army divisions of 2 batteries each. There were 4 horse divisions of mountain artillery, each of 2 batteries, and 4 batteries belonging to the frontier guards. The Cossack artillery included 8 divisions of 2 batteries each, 21 independent batteries, 36 divisions of howitzers of 2 batteries each, and 1 independent battery. This completed the light field artillery of the army. Field and mountain batteries had generally 8 guns, and horse and howitzer batteries 6 guns. The heavy field artillery consisted of 8 divisions of 3 batteries each, for assignment to the field armies. The peace establishment of artillery formed the first line in war. Little is known of the reserve and the territorial artillery which should form the second and third lines. Eighty territorial batteries were carried in the army lists, but their mobilization was doubtful. The

field and horse batteries were armed with the model 1900 and 1902 rapid-fire rifle, caliber 7.62 centimeters. A new, lighter piece was projected for the horse artillery. The howitzers were the light Krupp model of 1909, caliber 12.19 centimeters. The armament of the heavy batteries was in process of change to the 10.6 centimeter rifle and the 15 centimeter howitzer of the Schneider system.

The tsar is supreme commander of all land forces, but may designate a commander-in-chief with full powers. The minister of war is the supreme military and administrative head of the army; all communication with the tsar is through him. Even the chief of the General Staff is entirely subordinate to him, a relation which it is important to note.

The several divisions or sections of the General Staff, as well as the administrative branches of the war office, correspond to those of the other armies of Europe with no important difference. The organization of the army into corps, divisions, and brigades presents nothing new. The corps, the largest peace unit, was composed of 2 infantry divisions; 1 division of howitzers as corps artillery; a company each of sappers and telegraphers; a telephone section; munition, artillery, and engineer parks; a field sanitary transport column and a veterinary hospital; a corps supply column and two mobile field bakeries. The fighting strength of the corps may be summed up as 32 battalions, 64 machine-guns, 6 squadrons, and 14 batteries, with a ration strength of 44,000 men and 12,000 horses. The peace establishment was 37 army corps.

The infantry division was a complete operative unit, made up of 2 brigades of infantry of 2 regiments each, 1 to 3 squadrons of cavalry, 1 artillery brigade, a sapper company, a telephone section, artillery park, sanitary transport column, and division supply column. The sanitary

transport included 1 division hospital and 2 mobile field hospitals. The supply column carried four days' rations. The fighting strength was 16 battalions, 32 machine-guns, 3 squadrons, and 6 batteries, with a ration strength of 20,000 men and 5,000 horses. The peace strength was 59 infantry divisions, 11 rifle divisions, and 17 separate rifle brigades. The rifle division was like the infantry division. The rifle brigade was composed of from 3 to 4 two-battalion regiments, 1 artillery division of 3 batteries, artillery park, sanitary transport, and supply column. The sanitary transport was made up of a brigade hospital and a mobile field hospital. The fighting strength was 6 to 8 battalions, 24 to 32 machine-guns, and 3 batteries.

The strength of the cavalry was 24 divisions and 8 independent brigades. The division was composed of 2 brigades of 2 six-squadron regiments, a machine-gun section, and a horse artillery division. The fighting strength was 24 squadrons, 8 machine-guns, and 2 horse batteries, with a ration strength of 4,500 men and 4,800 horses.

When Peter the Great abolished the Strelitz and drew men to the colors by a general levy he laid the foundation for a permanent regular army of Russian soldiers. Although the system of recruiting introduced corresponded to the primitive social conditions of his time, it was not without elements of weakness that would have to disappear before the army became worthy of the Russian people. Recruits were drawn from the rural districts and from the lowest elements of society in the cities. Both classes were inferior to the corresponding elements in the states of western Europe. But the most vicious feature of the system was the apportionment of the annual contingent of recruits among the political subdivisions of the empire, leaving the local authorities to furnish the numbers required without scrutinizing the character of the recruits received. If they

were physically qualified for service they were acceptable; the local governments were thus able to purge their communities of the worst elements in society. Even criminals were incorporated in the army with the sanction of law—a practice which has been more than once resorted to in Great Britain and which, to our shame, finds advocates at the present time among the judiciary of our own country.

Under such conditions, the severity of the corporal punishment inflicted in the army may be understood, if not justified. It was only through fear, drink, or hope of booty, that soldiers of such a type could be induced to sacrifice their lives on the field of battle. The conditions were well known and the evils recognized; but a system which imposed its burden on the serf, who had no political rights, gave little hope of reform by the privileged classes in whose selfish interests it operated.

The nobility, who were originally obligated to serve, were gradually exempted, so that long before the end of the eighteenth century they enjoyed an almost complete immunity from service. The officers were largely professional soldiers of fortune from many lands. It was not until after the death of Peter the Great that the term of service for the man in ranks was reduced from life to twenty-five years. Nearly a hundred years elapsed before there was another reduction, from twenty-five to twenty-two years, and then in the guard only. Finally, in 1859, came the first important amelioration of the conditions of military service, when the period of obligation to serve was fixed at fifteen years, twelve with the colors and three on furlough. The punishment of having the soldier run the gauntlet and be flogged through the lines was not abolished until 1863. Under such conditions it was, of course, out of the question that self-respecting, free men should serve in the ranks. It was a very primitive idea of

an army, but not foreign to the spirit of the times, and a distinct advance over earlier systems when the great nobles and landowners appeared at the call of the monarch with the stipulated numbers of their dependents, clothed, equipped, and armed according to the fancy, or the generosity and zeal of their masters.

The law of 1874 was the first step in the creation of a national army. It imposed the obligation of personal military service on every Russian subject. Certain provinces were exempted from the operation of the law and substitution was permitted between brothers. The men to be enrolled to fill the annual contingent were fixed by drawing lots. There were numerous exemptions and service could be postponed in certain cases where exemption from service was not authorized. The physically unfit were, of course, not drafted. Christian ministers and readers of the Orthodox church enjoyed a complete exemption. Doctors, pharmacists, veterinarians, those art students of the Imperial Academy of Fine Arts who were selected for study abroad, and an only son, or the eldest son of a widow or of a father incapacitated for work, were excused from service except in case of a deficiency in the number required for the annual contingent. Postponement of service was permitted to young men engaged in the administration of their estates or for the completion of studies. Reductions in the period of service for educational qualifications were generous. To stimulate voluntary enlistments volunteers were accepted beginning with the seventeenth year of age; they were permitted to choose their arm of service, but, in the cavalry and in the guard, volunteers equipped and maintained themselves at their own expense.

Recruiting was, in theory, regional except for the guard, the grenadiers, the chasseurs, the engineers, the cavalry, and the horse artillery, which were recruited throughout





Siberian infantry.



Russian artillery.

the whole territory of the empire; but the character of the population on both the eastern and western frontiers did not permit a strict application of the principle. Each corps had, in fact, two recruiting districts, one with an essentially Russian population which furnished three-fourths of the recruits, and a supplementary district lying on one of the frontiers, which completed the quota. Regional recruiting, or the practice of assembling the elements of the nation into local garrisons for military training, developed with the application of the principle of universal compulsory service to the creation of national armies. In the national army, however, as it has developed on the continent since the beginning of the nineteenth century, every man who is mentally and physically fit and morally worthy to be a defender of his country submits to a period of training in time of peace which will make him an efficient unit of the army of national defense in time of war. It admits no mercenaries. Only the corps of officers and non-commissioned officers necessary as instructors are professional soldiers. It excludes from its ranks the moral degenerate, the criminal, and all men who are not in full possession of their political rights. It is essentially the army of a free people. It is in this last conception of the modern army that the Russian army differed fundamentally from those of the other Great Powers of the continent. Before the period of the Tatar domination, Russia had established free intercourse with southern and western Europe and Russian civilization was essentially European. But three centuries of Mongolism destroyed the work of the Normans and obliterated the influence of Byzantium. When the tsar of Moscow threw off the yoke of the Great Khan, Russia was essentially a Mongol state. European progress took root slowly; even at the beginning of the eighteenth century there was little culture in Russia. An army cannot

be superior to the elements which form it; it was not until March, 1861, that the ukase of the tsar emancipating 25,000,000 serfs created, in theory, a free Russia. The emancipation of the serf produced no great organic changes in the country; improvements in political and social conditions have developed slowly. The modern army is a product of the national ideal, and may be judged by the same standards of progress.

There was no other army in Europe at the outbreak of the Great War that was likely to cause so many surprises as that of Russia. Its unprecedented numbers, equal to the combined forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary, gave it in the popular mind the character of invincibility. It was the only army in Europe which had met a first class modern army on the field of battle. No other army had such a large number of veterans. It had, however, suffered from many abuses, and still labored under many disadvantages. Dishonesty has been a great plague in the administration of the Russian army; it was of the character known in America as "graft." Katherine II said of one of her colonels that if he were poor, it was his own fault, for he had been long in command of a regiment. That there was misuse of the public funds in recent times is shown by the sweeping investigations following the late wars; but publicity of that sort is a healthy indication; there can be little doubt that great reforms had been accomplished.

Russia with all her wonderful resources imported large quantities of arms and munitions. Considering that war might easily cut off her sources of supply, the situation was a serious one, but one which may have received more attention than was generally known.

The Russian General Staff and the officers of the army have always been followers in the art of war; they have contributed little to military science. The Russian soldier

of the regular army has been patient, sturdy, devout, devoted to the tsar and to Holy Russia. He has been always stubborn, sometimes heroic in defense, but he is handicapped by a lack of intelligence. Six hundred recruits out of one thousand are analphabets. As for the irregular Cossack, he has been a plague, a scourge, a pest, a horror to every element of society except well organized, armed forces. He would, without doubt, fall on weak, defeated, or disorganized forces and pursue them to destruction, but if he possessed any offensive value against a modern foe, it was because he had been converted by careful discipline and training into a regular cavalryman and in spite of the fact that he was a Cossack.

The history of the Russian army justified the conclusion that the army of 1914 would prove inferior, man for man, to those of the other Great Powers of Europe; but much depended on the value of the experience in the war with Japan. Unless the lessons of that war had been well learned, unless there had been fundamental reforms, Russian arms were bound to prove a disappointment.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE ARMIES OF SERBIA, BELGIUM, AND ITALY

Advent of the Serbs into Europe. Separation from the kindred Croats. Early subjection of the Serbians. Serbian victories and greatness in the fourteenth century. Annexed by Turkey in the fifteenth century. Centuries of unrest. Momentary independence, 1804. Again under Turkish rule. Independence reestablished. Four decades of turbulence. Assassination of King Alexander and Queen Draga, 1903. Peter Karageorgevitch proclaimed king. Population and resources. Military inefficiency. Progress under Peter. Military service, peace and war strength, training and organization. Territorial increase in 1913. Augmentation of military strength. Campaign of 1912, against Turkey, and 1913, against Bulgaria. Belgium: Union of Belgium and Holland. Revolution of 1830. The nucleus of a national army. Military conditions under Spanish rule and development of national ideal. Independence under guarantee of the Great Powers. Neglect of the army. Defensive measures after Franco-Prussian War. Military system and defenses before law of 1909. Compulsory service and strength under 1909 law. Increased force enacted in 1913; organization and equipment. State of the army in 1914. Italy: State of army in 1815. The army of liberation. Causes operating against military efficiency. The army of 1914; service, strength, training of officers, quality of troops, the Carabinieri and Bersaglieri; organization and equipment; peace and war strength.

The events of July, 1914, turned the attention of all the states of Europe, if not of the world, to their armed forces, on which, in the final settlement, national existence depends. The great armies of the Old World stand out towering giants dominating the world-theater of operations, while around them are grouped the bristling bayonets of their weaker neighbors, each bearing its own peculiar relation to the great issue. Although the Great Powers hold the center of the stage, the lesser countries, Serbia, Belgium and Italy play important rôles.

The Serbs belong to a branch of the Slav peoples who appeared in southeastern Europe in the first half of the seventh century. The Croats, who belonged to the same branch and who spoke the same language, appeared along with them; but dispersion developed individual characteristics in the various people and tribes. The Serbs came under the influence of Byzantium and the Croats under that of Rome; so, by the tenth century, these two groups of the same people, isolated from and often hostile to each other, were finally separated and appeared later as distinct states.

As early as the ninth century the Serbs were involved in difficulties with the Bulgarians, and in the tenth century they fell under the power of Bulgaria. Before the end of the century the Bulgarians were driven out, but in 1015 Serbia passed under Greek dominion and so remained until towards the end of the twelfth century. Serbia had already, while under Greek dominion, acquired Bosnia, and now, in spite of the devastation of the country by the Mongols, was able to maintain herself in turn against Greeks and Turks. The Hungarians took Bosnia in 1319 but were two years later defeated by Stephen VII, who, in 1330, defeated both Bulgarians and Greeks and annexed Bulgaria and half of Macedonia.

Stephen Dushan, who in 1336 killed his father and ascended the throne, greatly extended the influence of his country and added Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Belgrade to the territory over which he ruled as emperor. He died at the beginning of a campaign which he inaugurated in 1356 for the purpose of driving the Turks out of Europe. His death marked the beginning of the end of his empire, which soon fell under Turkish influence and was formally annexed to Turkey in 1457. Serbia had, through the warlike qualities of her rulers and people, maintained her

independence for a long period and developed into a formidable empire, but she now succumbed to the advancing tide of the Turks in Europe, and lost her place in the family of nations for more than four centuries. During this period there was no end to internal strife. The Turkish rule never brought tranquillity. The spirit of unrest was displayed in many ways; thousands of Serbians left their country at one time to enter the German army; many more emigrated into Hungary in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. There was constant unrest but no organization. Leaders were murdered or forced to flee the country; uprisings and revolutions were frequent, but none had any lasting effect until the rebellion of "Kara George" in 1804. In 1809 Serbia gained her independence only to be reconquered by the Turks four years later. George fled to Austria, but returned in 1817, when he was assassinated by Milosh Obrenovitch, who again established Serbian independence. It was not, however, until 1862 that the Turkish garrisons were, through the intervention of the powers, finally withdrawn from Belgrade.

The next forty years form a very stormy period in Serbian history, offering little promise for the future development of military organization and strength. All was disorder and defeat. The Serbians made war in turn against Turkey and Bulgaria, suffering defeat on both occasions, and were only saved in the first case by Russia and in the second by Austria. The habit of assassination culminated in the murder in June, 1903, of King Alexander and Queen Draga, the premier, the minister of war, and two brothers of the queen. The ruling house of the Karageorgevitch was reinstated in the person of King Peter, and the development of the Serbian army may be said to begin with him, although based on a law of 1901, the date of the new constitution by King Alexander.

Serbia was a most primitive state, with a population of about 3,000,000, and very weak in financial resources. The budget of 1912-1913 amounted to only about \$25,000,000. Nearly one-fourth of the total amount was allotted to military purposes, but five or six millions is a paltry sum towards maintaining a military establishment according to modern standards. National spirit, patriotism, and valor are the only qualities on which an army can be founded; but a primitive, ignorant, poorly organized people are at a great disadvantage in the attempt to create a national army which must take its place in a struggle with the highly developed armies of the great modern powers. In conflict with her neighbors, Turkey and Bulgaria, Serbia in 1876 and in 1885 had shown herself incapable of developing a strength in the field commensurate even with her population and resources, meager as they were. There is nothing to indicate that the population was wanting in the primitive virtues on which military efficiency is founded; but her rulers and the government, either through incapacity or a vicious neglect of their powers and responsibilities, leaning first on one foreign support and then on another, viewed with apparent equanimity the activities and intrigues of dangerous agitators both in and out of the government service. Considering her national aspirations, the turbulence of the population, and the insecurity of her position as an independent state, the failure to make any adequate provision for national defense must be charged to ruler and ruling classes as a crime against the nation. So, the army, education, and every civic virtue were totally neglected. The assassinations of June 11, 1903, brutal as they were, delivered Serbia from a king and queen who had become insupportable to the people, but under the rule of King Peter the country settled down to a normal, peaceful development, fairly free from internal

dissensions and undisturbed by foreign menace until the crisis of 1909.

Serbian hostility to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria in 1909 was of such a nature that war was narrowly averted. Military preparation was then begun in a systematic way: arms and equipment were renewed, and great progress was made before the outbreak of the war against Turkey in 1912.

Under the army law of 1901, which is still in force, Serbians were required to serve thirty-two years. Service was divided into three categories: the first included the active army and its reserve; the second and third were composed entirely of reservists. The soldier served two years with the colors and eight years in the reserve of the active army; he then passed into the second category where he remained for seven years; thence into the third category to remain another seven years; then he completed his period of liability in the general reserve. The first and second classes formed the field armies; the third class was destined for service on the line of communications and as frontier guards; while the general reserve was to be used for garrison service or as a home guard.

Students served six months with the colors, and were then permitted to take the examination for appointment as reserve officers. If successful they served fourteen months longer. Recruits for the cavalry who provided themselves with serviceable horses served only a year and a half, and infantry soldiers who received the grading of "Very Good" were released at the end of fourteen months. The actual period with the colors was shortened by extensive furloughs.

The reserves of the active army were called out for training twenty days in each year; reservists belonging to the second and third categories received fifteen days' training



Heavy Serbian artillery.



Serbian commissary train.



annually, and the general reserves were called out for five days in the year.

The peace strength of the army of 1912 was 2,275 officers and officials, and about 30,000 men, including troops of the customs service and the gendarmerie, which together amounted to about 2,000. The war strength of the field armies was estimated at 180,000 rifles, 9,000 sabers, and 436 guns. The third category and the general reserve brought the number up to more than 350,000 men.

Serbia was poor in horses and depended largely on Russia for her supply for war. The government maintained a remount depot where officers could purchase mounts at reasonable prices.

Non-commissioned officers were trained in special schools or in the ranks. They were well paid and after twelve years' service received appointments to civil positions. Fourteen years' service entitled the non-commissioned officer to a pension and after thirty years' service he received the maximum pension.

The officers came from the military academy in Belgrade or by promotion of specially qualified non-commissioned officers. The grade of general officer was limited to graduates of the military academy. The corps of reserve officers was formed by transfer of officers from the active list and by appointment of students who served six months and passed the required examination; but they were not promoted above the grade of major. A superior military academy or school of war was maintained for the higher education of officers of the line. Specially qualified officers, selected by a system similar to that of Austria-Hungary, were detailed in the General Staff.

The first-line army comprised 20 infantry regiments, each of which on a peace footing had 3 battalions, but, on a war footing was increased to 4 field battalions with 1 or

2 depot battalions. In addition, 6 four-battalion regiments were formed from the reserves of the active army, making a total of first-line war strength of 104 battalions, to which should be added 1 guard company, 4 companies of frontier guards, and a battalion of gendarmes.

The second-line infantry was not organized in peace, but formed on mobilization 15 four-battalion regiments from the second-class reserves. The commanders of regiments, battalions, and companies, the regimental adjutant, and one platoon commander for each company were to be professional officers. The third-line infantry was formed from the reserves of the third category. It was without organization in peace, but formed in war 15 four-battalion regiments for duty as garrison troops, frontier guards, and on the line of communications.

The first and second-line regiments had 4 machine-guns to the regiment in war. The man in the ranks carried the Mauser repeating rifle with bayonet. The non-commissioned officers carried saber and revolver. The third category were not provided with modern arms; part of them had an old model Mauser repeater, and the others old single-shot breech-loading rifles of different types.

The cavalry consisted in peace of 4 line regiments of 4 squadrons each, 1 guard squadron, and a mounted platoon of gendarmes in Belgrade. In war, 5 additional four-squadron regiments were formed from reservists who furnished their own horses. The second category reserves were to form in war 5 two-squadron regiments, and the third class reserves 5 individual squadrons. The cavalry of the peace establishment and that formed from the first and second classes of reserves were armed with the Mauser repeating carbine and saber. The guard squadron carried, in addition, the revolver. The carbines of the third category were old model single loaders, and

the mounts of both the second and third classes were very inferior.

Five regiments of field artillery, 1 division of horse artillery, 1 howitzer regiment, and 1 regiment of mountain artillery formed the peace establishment. The field artillery regiment was composed of 3 sections, each of 3 four-gun batteries. The horse division consisted of 2 horse-batteries of 4 guns each. The howitzer regiment was made up of 2 divisions of 3 batteries each, making a total of 6 batteries, one of which was a mortar battery. Four of these were four-gun batteries in peace, but all were six-gun batteries in war. In addition, there were 10 batteries of field howitzers from the Schneider-Creusot factory which were to be taken over by the first-line artillery, while the older pieces were to pass to the second-line regiments. The second category artillery, like the first, was made up of 5 regiments,—1 for each division; 1 mountain regiment of 7 six-gun batteries; and 1 howitzer regiment to be formed with guns released by the first-line regiment, which took over the new guns. The third category consisted of some 50 batteries of old type guns which were from time to time transferred from the first and second categories upon receipt of new equipment. Field pieces, howitzers, mortars, and mountain guns of modern make were of the Schneider, Schneider Creusot, or Schneider-Canet systems. The field piece is the caliber 7.5 centimeter French rifle. The mountain gun weighs about 1,000 pounds and is carried dismantled on five pack animals. It is a 7 centimeter gun. The howitzers are caliber 120 to 150 millimeters, weighing with carriage about 5,000 pounds.

The technical troops consisted of 1 pioneer company, 1 telegraph section, 1 sanitary company, 1 train squadron, 1 bakery and butcher company, and 1 company of mechanics for each infantry division. In war, 5 division bridge trains,

1 large bridge train, 2 railroad companies, 1 mining company, and 2 reserve telegraph sections were organized.


As a result of the campaign of 1912-1913 against Turkey and the campaign of 1913 against Bulgaria, Serbia increased her territory by two-thirds of her original area. Steps were immediately taken to organize 5 new infantry divisions in the conquered territory with the corresponding auxiliary forces. This would give her in war 10 divisions of first-line troops, which were to be increased on mobilization by 5 divisions of the second-line and 60 battalions of the third-line troops. The infantry division counted 12 battalions of infantry, 2 squadrons of cavalry, and 9 batteries of artillery. The cavalry division was composed of 2 brigades of 2 four-squadron regiments each. The total strength of the field armies in war became 250,000 rifles, 8,000 sabers, 500 guns, and 150 machine-guns.

The Serbian campaign of 1912 against Turkey was undertaken under conditions so unfavorable to the Turks that the rapid successes of the Serbian forces cannot be said to have established any real superiority of the victors over the vanquished, but it demonstrated that the work of the Serbian war office had been well done. The mobilization was accomplished in ten days, and the troops that took the field showed that the Serbian army had taken its place among the first forces of the Balkan States. The first success, after a long period in which a series of wars had brought one defeat and disaster after another, created a confidence in the king and his military administration which only a successful campaign can accomplish. Cholera and a hard campaign against the Turks left Bulgaria in a poor state to meet the Serbian attack of the next year; but the Serbian victory is not to be attributed altogether to Bulgaria's weakened condition, for the Serbian troops proved that they were equal, if not superior, to those of Bulgaria,





Code message on wing of Belgian carrier pigeon.



Collapsible observation tower as used by the German army.

hitherto counted the best in the Balkans. Two victorious campaigns, coming quickly one after another, are an asset on which one can hardly place too high an estimate in summing up the fighting strength of an army. Due to inferiority in numbers, but particularly in resources and equipment, the Serbian army cannot be compared to the great armies of Europe; but it was, in 1914, an army of veterans such as none of the great armies possessed. Almost devoid of transport and the auxiliary services which make extensive operations of large armies possible, it could hardly take the offensive against a first class power; but, on its own ground, in a country so little developed and offering so many obstacles to the movements of large bodies of troops, the Serbian army was sure to prove a very dangerous adversary.

In uniting Belgium to Holland in 1815 the Congress of Vienna was not influenced by any consideration for the peace and happiness of the Belgian provinces. The Belgians themselves had no voice in their own fate; they were the victims of the national jealousies of the powers. A large percentage of the population was closely related to the Dutch, but the Catholic element, which predominated, was never reconciled to a Protestant king and constant friction was the inevitable result.

The excitement caused by the revolution in Paris in 1830 roused the smoldering discontent into a flame of rebellion, and the Belgians, after centuries of suffering under foreign rulers, awoke to national life. Insurrections and mob violence were quickly checked by a provisional government of responsible citizens who proclaimed the independence of Belgium and released the Belgian regiments from their oath of allegiance to the Dutch crown, and thus formed the nucleus of a Belgian army. These were highly trained and efficient troops, officered by patriotic and gallant men.

The Belgian soldier, always brave and loyal, had passed through a hard and exacting school of training, the school of actual war. During the time of Spanish domination the country was paralyzed under the weight of an iron rule. The people became mere spectators of their country's affairs, and the army, poorly equipped and rarely paid, was only a tool in the hands of Spanish officers. The jealousy and suspicions of the foreign governors permitted native Belgians to hold only subordinate positions, so that those best qualified to lead were forced to seek service in other countries. For the past hundred years, however, they had had an opportunity to develop into intelligent, resourceful troops. Under Austria and under Napoleon they gradually attained a position of self-respect, "well-clothed, armed, mounted, and equipped." The fifteen years following the union with Holland had been a period of normal development, when officers and men alike awoke to the dignity of independence and the ideal of national unity. With these troops, few though they were, the provisional government was ready to face the world and demand independence.

Through the efforts of Talleyrand, representing the French government as ambassador in London, Belgian independence was recognized; and due to favorable conditions in Europe, in which the revolution in Poland was not without its influence on Russia, the election, in 1831, of Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg as King of the Belgians was finally ratified by the powers. By the aid of the French army and the British fleet, the King of Holland was forced to surrender Antwerp; but it was not until 1839 that the treaty of peace between Belgium and Holland was finally executed and the little kingdom was able to begin the peaceful pursuit of its national ideals.

The creation of Belgium as a buffer state, with a guarantee of neutrality by the Great Powers, gave a measure of

relief to the rival nations by which she was surrounded. The same interests that created the state could be relied on to maintain it against the aggressions of Holland, the only neighbor whom she could hope to meet on anything like terms of equality. No one of the parties to the Treaty of London was in a position to defy the other signatory powers. Belgium was, without doubt, secure against foreign aggression so long as the states of Europe stood in the same relation to each other as they did at the time of her birth.

The armies of Europe were at that time largely professional. It is true that Prussia had, since the beginning of the century, nationalized her army; but Prussia had not yet attained the position that she was so soon afterwards to occupy, and the strength of the nation in arms had not been demonstrated. Professional armies were maintained for the security of the state against internal disorders, and of all the states of Europe Belgium seemed most secure against any other danger. The hatred which the French felt towards the army as a result of the Napoleonic wars was shared by the Belgians; the economic value of military training, still so little understood, could hope for no recognition in an atmosphere of such hostility; industrial development fully absorbed the energies of the people; finally, the apparent security of a guaranteed neutrality seemed to solve the problem of national defense. Except as a governmental agency for maintaining order within the state, the army found little support.

Under such conditions it is not strange that the idea of a national army was little favored even long after the system had become firmly rooted in the principal states of the continent. The impossibility of aggressive action on the part of so small a country restricted, quite naturally, the plans for national protection to purely defensive measures.

Fortifications as a means of defense still held a place of importance of which the development of modern high-power guns has since robbed them. Antwerp was already a fortified city, and according to the plans of the sixties it became the great bulwark of national defense. The development of Liège and Namur into great fortresses was undertaken by Brialmont, the foremost military engineer of his time, after the Franco-Prussian War and the formation of the German Empire. Germany's increasing population and military strength, and the relative weakness of France, as displayed in 1870, as well as the growing friendship between Belgium and France led to a concentration of the defensive strength in the direction of the German frontier. The fortified camps of Liège and Namur were designed to be impregnable against assault; they were remodelled at great expense to resist the fire of the most powerful field guns, and were considered impossible of reduction except by siege operations.

Belgium maintained until 1909 a professional army, in which enlistment was voluntary, only the deficiencies being supplied by draft. Substitution was permitted, the system being similar to that which prevailed in France until after 1870. The color strength of the army did not exceed 40,000 men, nearly all of whom were needed to garrison the fortresses. The reserve was small, so that there were few trained men to form field forces. The law of 1902 marked the first important increase in the strength of the army. It remained a professional army based substantially on volunteer service, but the number of men with the colors was almost doubled, and the period of liability was extended from eight to thirteen years. The law was expected to provide an army with its reserve which, on mobilization, should furnish 80,000 fortress troops and a field army of 100,000. The population was still less than 8,000,000 and





Belgian rapid fire guns in carts drawn by dogs.



Belgian battery screened by woods.

the system of voluntary enlistment proved a failure, as indeed it must always do when adequate numbers are required for military preparedness. Special inducements in pay and emoluments will produce neither the numbers required for national defense nor the class of recruits who will take the intensive training on which the creation of an efficient reserve depends.

The first step in the creation of a national army was taken when the law of 1909 provided for the military training of one son in each family. The peace strength remained about 40,000, and the period of liability was reduced to twelve years; but the compulsory enrollment of about 17,000 recruits annually and the corresponding elimination of long service men would rapidly create a valuable trained reserve. At this time, however, the new scheme of defense revived the importance of Antwerp as an intrenched camp without abandoning Liège and Namur, so that the new war strength of about 200,000, after providing garrisons for the fortresses, made no increase in the field army.

The problem of national defense was finally squarely met by the law of 1913, which extended the principle of compulsory service, introduced in the law of 1909, so as to provide an available annual contingent of 67,000 men, of whom forty-nine per cent were to be drafted. The draft was not to be made by lot, but with reference to the material situation of the individual, taking into consideration the military service already rendered by the family. The annual draft of recruits was increased from 17,000 to 33,000, exclusive of about 2,000 volunteers. Service began with the nineteenth year of age and lasted thirteen years, eight years of which were in the active army and five in the reserve. The actual service with the colors was, for the infantry, fortress artillery, and engineers, fifteen months; for the cavalry and

horse artillery two years; and for the field artillery and train twenty-one months.

The strength of the army was to be raised from 40,000 to 100,000, and by 1918 was to reach 150,000. The war strength was almost doubled. The field army was to number on mobilization 150,000. For the fortress of Antwerp, 90,000 men were provided, 22,500 for Liège, and 17,500 for Namur, with 60,000 reserves. The system of one-year volunteers was introduced so as to provide officers and non-commissioned officers from the educated classes. Young men who demonstrated by examination that they were mentally and physically qualified were sent to a special school to be prepared for reserve officers. Students of medicine, pharmacy, and veterinary science served only one year. Foot soldiers who passed the non-commissioned officer's examination were discharged at the end of one year in numbers not to exceed 5,000. The students' class was subject to three periods of field training of three weeks' duration each; the non-commissioned officers' class received one three-week period of field training, and the other men were called out for six or eight weeks according to the arm of the service.

The new Belgian army was to have the division as its largest organized unit, which was accordingly provided with proper complements of all arms, and the auxiliary services to make it an independent operative unit. It included 3 brigades of infantry, to each of which was attached 3 four-gun batteries of field artillery, 1 regiment of 36 guns, 1 regiment of cavalry, 1 battalion of engineers, and a section of aeroplanes. The cavalry division was composed of 3 brigades of 2 regiments each, and had 3 horse batteries and 1 bicycle battalion. The increases due to the new organization were to be distributed over a period of five years, so that by 1918 the army should number 120 battalions

of infantry, 1 bicycle battalion, 20 machine-gun sections, 117 batteries of field and horse artillery, 12 regiments of cavalry, and 1 gendarme regiment. The peace strengths were: for the infantry company 110; for the bicycle company 85; for the machine-gun section 55; for the fortress batteries 70 to 95; for the horse battery 105; for the cavalry squadron 140; for the field pioneer company 95, and the foot pioneer company 70.

The officers for the army were drawn from non-commissioned officers of not less than two years' service, subject to examination, from the cadet schools and from the military school in Brussels. The corps of reserve officers was made up of officers transferred from the active list to the reserve, and by appointment of non-commissioned officers of the active army or of those who had been out of service less than one year. Both classes were subject to examination. In fact, it may be said that promotion in all grades from private to captain was made only after successful examination. Exception was made of staff officers, officers of the artillery and engineers, and graduates of the School of War who were not appointed to the General Staff. In addition to the School of War, a school of equitation, a fencing school, and a school of fire for artillery were maintained for the higher training of officers. Non-commissioned officers were appointed from the drafts, from military schools, and from volunteers from the cadet schools. Long service men received civil appointments after eight years' service and pensions after twenty years' service.

The first and second-line infantry were armed with the Mauser repeating rifle, 7.65 millimeter caliber, with bayonet. The third line had either the Mauser or the Comblain 11 millimeter rifle. The cavalry carried a short Mauser carbine and lance or straight saber. The gendarmerie were

armed with carbine, automatic pistol, and saber. The artillery had Krupp guns, model 1905, 7.5 centimeter caliber.

The technical troops were sufficient for the peace organization. The train could be readily augmented by the use of motor transportation requisitioned in the country, and the excellent roads assured a maximum efficiency from this class of transport. The domestic supply of draft horses was sufficient for mobilization, but riding horses were largely imported, even in peace.

The gendarmerie formed in war a part of the armed forces and was immediately available. It numbered about 60 officers and 3,000 men. They were armed with the Mauser carbine and automatic pistol, and mounted men also carried the saber.

The army law of 1913 was calculated to produce a national army on a modern basis, but in men and material the Belgian army of 1914 was the product of the law of 1909. There was a large percentage of long-service men, and such men may be depended on to render first class service in war; but the reserves of trained officers and men fell far short of the number required to develop the full military strength of the nation.

When in 1815, at the fall of Napoleon, the states of Italy were again restored to their legitimate rulers, the Italian regiments found themselves in the strange position of supporting the very powers they had for years opposed. Under the sway of Napoleon the French system of conscription had been introduced, and it is estimated that the annual levies amounted in all, for the four years, to 98,000 men. Thousands upon thousands of these were sacrificed in Napoleon's many wars; but those regiments that were left were either disbanded or, transferring their allegiance to the restored monarchs, were retained in the service of

the petty principalities which made of Italy a mere "diplomatic expression." But the spirit of freedom and independence aroused and fostered by the French Revolution was still alive, never to be suppressed, and the lessons learned under Napoleon left their impression. In destroying the old governments and uniting the people under one strong central government, Napoleon planted the seed which eventually flowered in liberated Italy, united under the cross of Savoy. Nearly a half century must elapse before this could be, years of hard discipline for the lovers of national independence. It was a period of training, however, and when the time was ripe the army of Piedmont, 80,000 strong, was ready, while the great patriot Garibaldi attracted thousands of volunteers by the fire of his enthusiasm. When, after the many campaigns against the domination of Austria, of the Pope, and of the King of Naples, in which Piedmont was greatly aided by the subjects of these states, who clearly saw that only with union would freedom be possible, Italy became the "Italy of the Italians," these volunteers were first disbanded; but after a time some were made a part of the regular army.

Long centuries of slavery to foreign rulers, when their country was the battle ground of powerful armies contending for its possession, when their countrymen were sacrificed to the insatiable ambition of the stranger, had taught the Italians the bitter need of self-defense; and it was not likely that a people so schooled would neglect the strong arm of government, the army. In fact the army has had loyal support in United Italy, but the poverty of the country, intensified by the great financial burdens inherited from Austria and assumed towards the Holy See, has left the government without funds for its proper development, armament, and equipment. In spite of all difficulties, however, the summer of 1914 found the Italian army

following closely in numbers and training the greater armies of Europe.

The armed forces of Italy were divided into the active army, the mobile militia, and the territorial militia, forming, respectively, the first, second, and third lines in war. Service was compulsory and universal, beginning with the twentieth year of age and lasting nineteen years. The favored classes, at first very large, had, in recent years, been greatly reduced. Men were excused from active service mainly for family reasons, such as being the only son of a widowed mother. Service was postponed for educational reasons, and one-year volunteers were accepted under stipulated conditions.

The first category furnished the recruits for the active army and included all men who did not for family reasons pass directly into one of the other categories. Until 1907 this class amounted to about 90,000, of whom about 75,000 were enrolled; but since that time, due to the more rigid requirements, it has numbered about 135,000. Service for the first and second categories was eight years in the standing army and four in the reserve. The soldier then passed into the third category, where he remained for seven years. Under certain conditions the service in the first and second categories could be extended one or two years, in which case service in the territorial militia was correspondingly reduced. The third category remained for the entire period of nineteen years in the territorial militia.

A two-year color service for the first category was introduced in 1910 for the several arms of the line of the army; the Carabinieri, or military police, served three years. The second category, including that part of the annual contingent not required with the colors, received six months' training, either continuous or in several periods. In theory, the third category was subject to be called out for thirty

days every four years, but, in reality, their training seems to have been entirely neglected.

For recruiting purposes, the kingdom was divided into 94 districts corresponding to the 94 infantry regiments of the line. In time of peace, however, the recruits were not assigned to local garrisons, but were distributed among several garrisons remote from their home districts. The grenadiers, carabinieri, and cavalry were recruited at large; the Bersaglieri and field artillery from corps regions; the Alpine troops from the Alps districts. The mountain artillery was recruited in the mountain districts, while the horse artillery came from the valleys. The technical troops were recruited at large except the pontoon troops, who came from the Venetian coast. In war the system was different, the complements being drawn locally from the territorial districts. The peace strength was not maintained at the numbers required by the army organization, but depended on the annual budget. For the fiscal year 1913-1914 the strength was 14,121 officers and 250,000 men, while the strength according to organization was 15,105 officers and 290,318 men. The total strength of the land forces numbered somewhat more than 1,000,000 men, divided into a standing army with its reserves of about 500,000, a mobile militia of 250,000, and a territorial militia of 300,000.

The non-commissioned officers were drawn from the ranks and were permitted to remain in active service thirty or, conditionally, forty-seven years. After twelve years they were eligible to appointments in the civil service, and after twenty years they could be passed into the auxiliary services with clerical or other like duties. The officers were drawn from a number of military schools and from the ranks. The military colleges in Rome and Naples, with a capacity of 500 students, prepared boys for the military schools and the military academy. The military school

in Modena, for graduates of the military colleges and civil aspirants, with a capacity of 880 students, prepared young men to be sub-lieutenants of cavalry or infantry. There was also a special course for non-commissioned officers who were prepared to be sub-lieutenants or for clerical positions. The military academy in Turin trained aspirants for appointment as lieutenants in the artillery and engineers. One-fourth of the annual vacancies were held for non-commissioned officers who were appointed after a special course of instruction. Older non-commissioned officers were appointed without special training. To complete the corps of officers it was necessary to appoint also reserve officers as subalterns after six months' training at Parma and subject to examination. Promotion for officers was by selection from lieutenant-colonel up, there being a special test for promotion to colonelcy. Retirement from active service for age was graded, beginning with forty-eight years for subalterns; captains were retired at fifty, majors at fifty-three, colonels at fifty-eight, lieutenant-generals at sixty-five, and corps commanders at sixty-eight. The officers of the territorial militia were former professional officers, or were appointed from non-commissioned officers with not less than eight years' service who had passed out of the mobile militia. The deficiencies were made up by appointments from the territorial militia subject to examination and a short period of active service.

The schools for the higher education of officers followed in general the plan of the greater armies of Europe. The School of Application in Parma provided an eight months' "school of fire and pioneer service" for newly appointed lieutenants of infantry, a five weeks' course for line and pioneer officers, a course in explosives for officers of bicycle companies, and a course for officers of the machine-gun service. The Central Field Artillery School near Rome



Italian cavalry in training.



Italian Alpine Chasseurs.



held one-month courses in the "school of fire" for artillery officers. The Italian riding school is famous. It trained officers of the cavalry, of the militia, police, field artillery, and pioneers, as well as non-commissioned officers of the mounted service. The horseshoers for the cavalry and artillery were trained at the same school. The School of War in Turin trained officers for the General Staff and was modelled closely after the *Kriegs-Akademie* in Berlin. There are schools for officers and men of the sanitary service, of the telegraph and telephone services, of the railroad service, of the automobile service; and men of the cavalry and bicycle corps receive training in carrier pigeon service at the carrier pigeon stations.

The several classes of troops that go to make up the army and the proportions in which they are grouped are such as are found in any well-balanced modern army. The special designations applied to certain corps are retained more for historical reasons than because of actual differences in function or training. Cavalry, artillery, and infantry with the technical and auxiliary services make up the army, with slight variations in uniform and equipment to conform to differences in climate and terrain.

The Carabinieri forms an integral part of the army. It is composed of eleven legions with a total peace strength of about 650 officers and 26,000 men, 4,000 of whom are mounted. They perform police duties in peace but form field troops in war. The first-line infantry is composed of 2 grenadier and 94 line regiments of 3 battalions of 4 companies. Each regiment has 2 machine-guns and 24 regiments have an extra battalion for oversea service. The second line is made up of the mobile militia with a total of 40 to 50 three-battalion regiments. Some 200 battalions of territorial infantry form the third line. The Bersaglieri, or Corps of Sharpshooters, forms in war a first line of 12

regiments organized as infantry, with an additional bicycle battalion to each regiment. There is also a second line of 20 mobile militia battalions. They are armed and equipped as infantry except that the bicycle battalions carry the carbine instead of the rifle. The Alpine troops form a first line of 8 regiments of 26 battalions, and a second line of 38 mobile militia companies to be attached in war to the first-line battalion. There are in addition 26 territorial battalions. They are armed as infantry and equipped with a short great coat, woollen cap, neck cloth, and alpine stock. The first-line cavalry was composed of 29 regiments with a total of 150 squadrons; the second line was formed of 28 squadrons of mobile militia. The 28 field artillery regiments of 8 batteries each, were, in 1914, in process of reorganization into 12 corps artillery regiments and 24 divisional artillery regiments. The regiments were divided into two groups of 3 batteries each, and all were to be four-gun batteries. There was 1 regiment of horse artillery divided into four groups of 2 batteries each. Twenty batteries of heavy artillery and 24 batteries of mountain guns completed the artillery of the field armies in Italy. There were, in addition, a large number of batteries of the several classes of artillery in the colonies. There were 10 regiments of fortress artillery, one of which was designated as a siege regiment. This class of artillery is, however, from the nature of its use, not a subject of general information. The special services necessary to complete the first-line army were organized in peace.

As in some of the other states of Europe, the Customs Guards had a military organization and formed an important element of the land forces. They numbered in peace about 400 officers and 18,000 men. This force, organized in legions which were divided into companies and platoons and distributed over the forty or more customs districts of

the kingdom, formed, in war, regiments and battalions, and had been used as a field force in the Libyan campaign with satisfactory results.

The infantry of the line and the mobile militia were both armed with the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle, model of 1891, caliber .256 of an inch, with bayonet. It is a six-shot, clip-loaded rifle, weighing, without bayonet, eight pounds, six and a half ounces. Although it fires a round-nosed bullet and has a muzzle velocity inferior to the latest high-power rifles, the trajectory, due to the small caliber, is very flat; sighted for 750 yards, the path of the bullet does not at any point rise above the head of a dismounted man. The territorial militia was armed with the old model Vitterli-Vitali four-shot, magazine rifle, caliber .407 of an inch, which weighs nine and a half pounds and is provided with a bayonet more than two feet long. The cavalry carbine, carried also by cyclist organizations, is simply a short, light production of the infantry rifle, taking the same ammunition. It is only three feet long and is equipped with a short bayonet. It is sighted to 1640 yards, a range 600 yards less than that of the rifle.

The rearmament of the field and horse artillery with the Krupp quick-fire, 75-millimeter field piece, which was undertaken in 1909, had not been completed when the new French (Deport) rifle of the same caliber was adopted. It is probable that the old guns had been replaced by the Deport rifle before Italy entered the war, but that about 100 batteries still used the Krupp quick-firer. The Krupp is a satisfactory modern field piece, but the Deport rifle is considered the best field gun developed up to the outbreak of war. The old 70-millimeter gun of the mountain artillery was also being replaced by the new 65-millimeter, quick-fire rifle. The artillery was not well equipped with heavy guns for use with the field armies. The armament

consisted of 9, 12 and 15-centimeter rifles and 15, 21 and 30-centimeter howitzers. In view of the great importance of this class of artillery in modern warfare, there was a deficiency not only in the number but in the power of the guns.

The organization of the Italian army is similar to that of the other armies of Europe. The king is commander-in-chief but may delegate the command to a generalissimo. The war ministry is charged with the administration of the army and the General Staff has immediate control of peace training and war operations. The formation of not less than 4 field armies, of from 2 to 4 corps and 1 cavalry division each, was contemplated in case of war; but the largest peace organization was the corps made up of 2 or 3 divisions of infantry, 1 Bersaglieri regiment, 1 cavalry regiment; 1 corps artillery regiment, 3 heavy howitzer batteries, 1 telegraph company with park, artillery and engineer parks, ammunition columns, commissary and sanitary sections, field hospitals, field bakeries, and a transport park in which motor traction was an important element. The total fighting strength was 27 to 39 battalions, 5 squadrons, and 18 to 23 batteries; or 25,000 to 37,000 rifles, 650 sabers, 100 to 135 guns, and 18 to 26 machine-guns. The division was composed of 2 brigades of 2 three-battalion regiments of infantry, 1 regiment of artillery, 1 sapper company, a bridge section, and telephone park, without divisional cavalry. The cavalry division was made up of 2 brigades of 2 five-squadron regiments, 2 four-gun batteries of horse artillery, and a bicycle battalion. The total war strength of the kingdom is estimated at 750,000 men in the standing army and its reserves, 300,000 men in the mobile militia, and 3,300,000 in the territorial militia. Of the territorials about 2,000,000 are without military training.

The peace strength of the Italian infantry company was small compared to the war strength of 250 men. We have



Italian armored automobile.



Belgian armored automobile.



seen that the field artillery of all classes was in a state of rearmament in 1914. A large garrison had been maintained in Libya since the war with Turkey; but the lapse of almost a year after the beginning of hostilities before Italy joined the allies should have enabled her to repair all deficiencies and to develop her greatest military strength within a few weeks after the declaration of war.

## CHAPTER XII

### THE NAVAL FORCES OF THE BELLIGERENTS

Place of the navy in international affairs. The modern war vessel and her armament. The *Dreadnought*. Maximum tonnage of constructions in 1914. Turrets and their armament. Typical heavy guns. Defensive armor. The submarine foe. Relative strength of the warring powers in completed "capital" ships. Battleships in construction in 1914. Great Britain's preponderance in battleships. Other naval constructions of the Entente and the Teutonic allies. Auxiliary cruisers. Wireless telegraphy and aeroplane service. Dockyards. Personnel. Torpedo boats and destroyers. Submarine development. Mines. The automobile torpedo. Airships and their equipment. Naval expenditures of Great Britain, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Russia. Naval forces in the North Sea, the English Channel, and the Mediterranean. Review of British fleet off Portsmouth, July 18, 1914. Ships in Eastern waters. German raiders.

Men, after many generations have come to know that command of the sea is a very great, if not the greatest, element of power and control in international affairs. The ability to cut off an enemy's commerce and supplies, to drive his ships to the refuge of their own ports, or to overcome them at sea, means as much as, and often more than, the operations of armies on land. The old French phrase "*armée de mer*," conveys this meaning more forcefully than the one simple word, "Navy."

It was a navy, the French navy, which, by enabling the operations of Washington and Rochambeau at Yorktown, decided in our favor the War of the Revolution and our independence of Great Britain. Had de Grasse failed to come to our coast at the time he did; had he not been superior in force to the British fleet at this crucial moment, the United States (then, be it said, but a weak confederation bound by articles which scarcely constituted a government at all) would, beyond any reasonable doubt, have succumbed.

While naval operations in this war have not such supreme influence, due in part to new developments in war, above and under water, and in the air, and to the vast extent of the operations on land, they are yet of very great consequence and of very vital import; how vital, we must yet wait to see. The study which follows is but that of the relative powers on the sea of the combatants. The questions of the strategy and operations must be dealt with later.

The battleship of 30,000 or more tons and of 22 or 23 knots speed and the battle-cruiser of the same size and armament but of higher speed and lighter armor, 600 and more feet in length, 90 and even 100 feet beam, with a draft of about 29 feet, an armament of 8, 10, and even 14 heavy guns of uniform caliber, besides a number of smaller guns, is, and, so far as we can see, will be for a long time the decisive factor in establishing and holding the command of the sea. This type, the outcome of the Russo-Japanese war, which forecast the long ranges at which future naval battles would be fought, began as an all-big-gun ship. The naval world, however, has gradually come back to the secondary battery of 6-inch guns (5.5-inch in France), numbering even as high as 16, on the theory that if the battle approach the range of the lighter guns, the immense rapidity of fire of these may be decisive of the action. Hence, the new battleship is not the carrying out of the original idea, a ship with a number of heavy guns and a number of light ones for torpedo defense, but the old ship with the same secondary battery, enlarged to carry 8, 10, or even 14 heavy guns, instead of the former 4.

The British *Dreadnought*, launched and completed in 1906, of 17,900 tons displacement, with a battery of 10 twelve-inch and 24 twelve-pounders, was the first example of the new departure which has so developed as mentioned. The start upon this road to bigness was, however,

first proposed in a design by an Italian naval architect. The advance was strongly urged upon our Navy Department in 1903 by our Naval War College; had the advice been taken, the United States would have been among the first in the field and would have saved much money expended on what was soon to become an obsolete design.

Up to 1914 Great Britain had laid down no battleship exceeding 27,500 tons, the largest now building there; Germany none exceeding 28,000; France none beyond 25,000. Japan has followed the example of the United States and has laid down at least one ship of 31,000 tons: our own largest being the three of the *California* class of 32,000 tons.

In general practice two of the turrets are raised so that the pair of guns in each may fire over the lower. The disposition of these turrets and the number are very variable, however, the latest class of the French, five in number, represented by the *Flandre*, to be finished probably in 1916, carrying twelve 13.4-inch, in three turrets, or 4 guns in each. A discussion of these variations is, however, outside the scope of the present treatment.

The term "heavy gun" herein used will include, besides the 11-inch and heavier type of the German, the 10-inch of the Japanese and the Italians, the 9.4-inch of the French, and the 9.2-inch of the British, where such are combined with a main armament of heavier guns. All such more moderate guns, in fact all less than 13.5-inch, have been discarded in the newer constructions. It seems likely that the new battleship will in general carry nothing less, as a main battery, than eight or ten 15-inch guns; certainly nothing less than the 13.4-inch of the French. It may be said, in passing, that our newer ships carry 14-inch, though 16-inch are under discussion for new constructions. The 15-inch is now the established new battery of the British and the Germans; the French have not gone beyond the



British battleship *Dreadnought*, the first of the Dreadnought class to be built, 17,900 tons, carrying a main armament of ten 12-inch guns.



British battleship *Iron Duke*, 25,000 tons, carrying a main armament of ten 13.5-inch guns.



British battleship *Agincourt* (ex *Birinji Osman*), 27,500 tons, carrying a main armament of fourteen 12-inch guns.



13.4-inch, the Italians not as yet in actual construction beyond 12-inch; the latest Japanese ships completed and those building are armed with 14-inch.

Taking the 13.5-inch and the 15-inch as typical guns, the former is 52 feet long, weighs 76 tons, fires a shell of 1,250 pounds every two minutes with a muzzle velocity of 2,700 feet (or half a mile in one second), with a muzzle energy of 63,000 foot-tons and a penetration at 3,000 yards of about 23 inches of hard steel; the latter (the 15-inch) is 54 feet long, weighs 96 tons, fires a shell of 1,720 pounds as frequently as the other, with 2,500 feet muzzle velocity, a muzzle energy of 84,500 foot-tons and a penetration at 3,000 yards of 25 inches of hard steel. The gun, for a while at least, is victor against any thickness of steel carried by ships. This thickness is now being increased from the more usual 12-inch to 13.5-inches, or in the newest German constructions to 13.8-inches. In all cases it tapers to a thickness of from 4 to 6 inches at the ends. The turrets are usually of the same thickness as the heaviest part of the belt. Notwithstanding this powerful protection any of it is easily penetrable by even the 12-inch at 10,000 yards (five nautical miles), the 12-inch of 50 calibers (length) having a penetration at that distance of 14½ inches of hard steel; the 15-inch of 45 calibers a penetration of 18.8 inches.

But the battleship which can stand a good many of these ferocious blows, equal in muzzle-energy to lifting a battleship of 30,000 tons two-and-a-half feet in one second, has an insidious foe in the submarine which now can cruise almost any distance, and which is armed with a much more fatal weapon, the automobile torpedo, which has a range of 12,000 yards (six nautical miles) at an average speed of 25 knots. This torpedo, carrying in its head 300 pounds of guncotton, will, if it strike fair, sink the largest ship. But even with such a risk, the number, the offensive power,


the speed, and the great radius of action of battleships will, so far as we can now judge, control the sea.

The present warring powers, on the outbreak of the war in August, 1914, as regards the completed battleships of later types,—known technically as “capital” ships, as experts have agreed to call them,—stood in the following order of precedence, the numbers showing the ships of each of this later type: Great Britain 33; Germany 17; France 8; Japan 7; Italy 3; Austria-Hungary 5; Russia 0; Turkey 0. These figures do not show any real relation as to strength; they are merely the numbers of modern battleships of very varying power belonging to these several nations. Many elements, as speed, thickness and character of armor, etc., come in, but, above all, the weight of gun-fire.


Turkey would have stood in the place of Austria-Hungary in this showing but for an act by Great Britain which, no doubt, had much to do with Turkey's later stand. She had purchased from Brazil in December, 1913, a very powerful ship of 27,500 tons, building at Elswick, which was renamed the *Birinji Osman*. She had ordered at Barrow in 1911 another of 23,000 tons, called the *Reshadieh*. The former was 632 feet long, 90 feet beam, with 9-inch steel armor, tapering to 6 and 4 inches at the ends, turrets and barbetstes 9-inch, a speed of 22 knots, and a battery of fourteen 12-inch guns; the latter was 525 feet long, 91 feet beam, with 12-inch armor amidships, tapering to 6 at the ends, turrets and barbetstes 12-inch, a speed of 21 knots and a battery of ten 13.5-inch guns. They were ships of the first class and had cost Turkey the immense sum of about \$30,000,000. On August 5th, the day the Turkish flag was to be hoisted, they were seized by Great Britain.

The following is a tabulation of these “capital” ships, which, as well as the earlier battleships in service, all carry from 2 to 5 underwater torpedo tubes, with a tendency to as many as 8:






German battleship *Thüringen*, 22,500 tons, carrying a main armament of twelve 12-inch guns.



German battleship *Nassau*, 18,600 tons, carrying a main armament of twelve 11-inch guns.



German battle-cruiser *Moltke*, 22,640 tons, carrying a main armament of ten 11-inch guns.

*GREAT BRITAIN, 33 Ships.			GERMANY, 17 Ships.			
	Displacement.	Year of launch.		Displacement.	Year of launch.	
Eleven ships with 10 13.5 in.			Four ships with 12 12-in.			
Iron Duke . . . . .	25,000	1912	Helgoland . . . . .	22,500	1909	
Marlborough . . . . .			Ostfriesland . . . . .			
Ajax . . . . .	23,000	1913	Thüringen . . . . .		1910	
Audacious . . . . .			Oldenburg . . . . .			
† Erin . . . . .	22,500	1911	Five ships with 10 12-in.			
Centurion . . . . .			Friedrich der Grosse	24,310	1911	
King George V . . . . .			Kaiser . . . . .			
Conqueror . . . . .			Kaiserin . . . . .			
Monarch . . . . .			König Albert . . . . .			
Orion . . . . .	Prinz-Regent Luitpold . . . . .	1912				
Thunderer . . . . .						
Three ships with 8 13.5 in.			Four ships with 12 11-in.			
† Lion . . . . .	26,350	1910	Nassau . . . . .	18,600	1908	
† Princess Royal . . . . .		1911	Posen . . . . .			
† Queen Mary . . . . .	27,000	1912	Rheinland . . . . .			
			Westfalen . . . . .			
One ship with 14 12-in.			Three ships with 10 11-in.			
‡ Agincourt . . . . .	27,500	1913	† Goeben . . . . .	22,640	1911	
Ten ships with 10 12-in.			† Moltke . . . . .		1910	
Bellerophon . . . . .	18,600	1907	† Seydlitz . . . . .		1912	
Superb . . . . .						
Temeraire . . . . .	19,250	1908	One ship with 8 11-in.			
Collingwood . . . . .					† Von der Tann . . . . .	18,700
St. Vincent . . . . .	20,000	1910				
Vanguard . . . . .						
Colossus . . . . .	17,900	1906				
Hercules . . . . .						
Dreadnought . . . . .	19,900	1911				
Neptune . . . . .						
Six ships with 8 12-in.						
† Indefatigable . . . . .	18,750	1909				
† Indomitable . . . . .	17,250	1907				
† Inflexible . . . . .						
† Invincible . . . . .	18,800	1911				
† New Zealand . . . . .						
Australia . . . . .						
Two ships with 4 12-in., 10 9.2-in.			† Renamed from Turkish Reshadieh.			
Agamemnon . . . . .	16,500	1906	† Battle-cruisers.			
Lord Nelson . . . . .					‡ Formerly the Birinji Osman.	
			Belonging to Australia.			

[\*In the classification given in Volume I, page 127, all war vessels of 17,900 tons and upwards (and only these) are reckoned as "Dreadnoughts," including several which were to be completed in 1914.]

FRANCE, 8 Ships.			JAPAN, 7 Ships.		
	Displacement.	Year of launch.		Displacement.	Year of launch.
Two ships with 12 12-in. Courbet . . . . . } Jean Bart . . . . . }	23,100	1911	One ship with 8 14-in. *Kongo . . . . . }	27,400	1913
Six ships with 4 12-in., 12 9.4-in. Condorcet . . . . . } Danton . . . . . } Diderot . . . . . } Mirabeau . . . . . } Voltaire . . . . . } Vergniaud . . . . . }			18,028		
		Two ships with 4 12-in., 12 10-in. Aki . . . . . } Satsuma . . . . . }		19,800 19,350	1907 1906
			Two ships with 4 12-in., 4 10-in. Kashima . . . . . } Katori . . . . . }	16,400 15,950	1905
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, 5 Ships.			ITALY, 3 Ships.		
	Displacement.	Year of launch.		Displacement.	Year of launch.
Two ships with 12 12-in. Tegethoff . . . . . } Veribus Unitis . . . . . }	20,060	1912 1911	Three ships with 12 12-in. Dante Alighieri . . } Giulio Cesare . . . } Leonardo da Vinci }	19,400 22,340	1910 1911
Three ships with 4 12-in., 8 9.4-in. Erzherzog Franz } Ferdinand . . . . . } Radetzky . . . . . } Zrynyi . . . . . }		14,226	1908 1909 1910		
RUSSIA—None.			TURKEY—None.		

\* Battle-cruiser.

In addition to the list of first-class battleships here enumerated, there were in construction in Great Britain 10: the *Barham*, *Malaya*, *Queen Elizabeth*, *Ramillies*, *Resolution*, *Revenge*, *Royal Oak*, *Royal Sovereign*, *Valiant*, and *Warspite* of from 25,000 to 27,750 tons, carrying each eight 15-inch,

and 2, the *Emperor of India* and *Benbow* with ten 13.5-inch guns. In Germany there were 3 of 26,575 tons and twelve 12-inch guns, the *Grosser Kurfürst*, *König*, and *Kronprinz*, 3 battle-cruisers of 28,000 tons, eight 12-inch guns, and 100,000 horse power, the *Derfflinger*, *Lützow*, and 1 unnamed; and 2 battleships unnamed of 29,000 tons, carrying eight 15-inch guns. In France, 5 of 24,830 tons and twelve 13.4-inch guns, the *Béarn*, *Flandre*, *Gascogne*, *Languedoc*, and *Normandie*; 3 of 23,177 tons and ten 13.4-inch guns, the *Brétagne*, *Lorraine*, and *Provence*; and 2 of 23,100 tons and twelve 12-inch guns, the *France* and *Paris*. In Japan, the *Fuso* of 31,000 tons and twelve 14-inch guns and 3, the *Haruna*, *Hiyei*, and *Kirishima*, of 27,500 tons and eight 14-inch guns. In Italy, 3, the *Andrea Doria*, *Caio Duilio*, and *Conte di Cavour*, of 23,025 tons and thirteen 12-inch guns each. In Austria-Hungary, 2, the *Prinz Eugen* and *Szent Istvan*, of 20,000 tons and twelve 12-inch guns. In Russia, 4 battle-cruisers, the *Borodino*, *Ismail*, *Navarin*, and *Kinburn*, of 32,000 tons and twelve 14-inch guns; 4 battleships, the *Gangut*, *Petropavlovsk*, *Poltava*, and *Sevastopol*, of 23,000 tons and twelve 12-inch guns; and in the Black Sea 3, the *Alexander III*, *Ekaterina II*, and *Imperatritsa Maria*, of 22,500 tons and twelve 12-inch guns.


It takes but a very cursory examination of this table to appreciate Great Britain's superiority on the sea. Its absolutism is only modified by the submarine, and this only sporadically. Taken in a large sense her control may be said to be complete. Nor is this great disparity of power lessened as one examines further. For while the result of naval battles will depend mainly upon these "capital" ships, the battleships of the earlier period, that antedating 1906, carrying usually 4 12-inch guns mounted in two turrets (the German 11 and 9.4-inch), supplemented by heavy secondary batteries of 6-inch, 7.5-inch, and sometimes 8-inch, are

by no means to be ignored. Of these, Great Britain had 20 launched in 1894-1899, and 16 launched in 1900-1905, after which the big-gun ship occupies the battleship field. These 36 ships carry 144 12-inch guns and undoubtedly form a powerful accessory to the newer battle fleet. Germany had 20, 10 of which carried four 11-inch and 10 four 9.4-inch as against the British 12's. France had 12, Japan 12, of which 4 were taken from the Russians in the late war, besides 4 carrying each four 10-inch guns. Italy had 8 of mixed batteries, but still powerful ships. Austria-Hungary had 9, carrying, however, only 9.4-inch guns. Russia had 5, 3 of which are in the Black Sea, carrying 12-inch guns. Turkey had 2 bought from Germany, the *Kheyr-ed Din Barbarossa* and *Turgut Reis*, which had been the *Kurfürst Friedrich Wilhelm* and *Weissenburg*, the former completed in 1894, the latter in 1893; they had compound armor belts (iron, steel faced) of  $15\frac{3}{4}$  inches, with turrets of  $11\frac{3}{4}$  inches. Their batteries were six 11-inch and eight 4.1-inch.


In view of the foregoing, any anxiety on the part of Great Britain as to Germany's supposed rivalry is inexplicable on any other supposition than that she must always have a "scare." This in later years has come from France, Russia, and Germany in turn. Effective rivalry on the part of Germany was impossible in 1914 and was to be even less possible so far as the naval progress of the several powers had been fixed. To show the completeness of the truth of this statement in so far as 1914 was concerned, it is enough to say that the British had in service in that year in the "capital" ships 134 13.5-inch and 170 12-inch guns, with a muzzle energy of 16,728,430 foot-tons, against 98 12-inch and 86 11-inch guns of the Germans, with a muzzle energy of 8,639,200 foot-tons. In other words, the German power in capital ships was but 50 per cent of that of the British. The muzzle energy of Great Britain's



French battleship *Paris*, 23,000 tons, carrying a main armament of twelve 12-inch guns.



French battleship *Bouvet*, 12,000 tons, carrying a main armament of two 12-inch and two 10.8-inch guns.



Italian battleship *Dante Alighieri*, 19,400 tons, carrying a main armament of twelve 12-inch guns.



144 12-inch guns in the older ships was 5,326,800 foot-tons; Germany's 80 11's and 9.4's, 2,274,800. The summation of the whole subject is in the totals of the muzzle energies, in foot-tons, of the heavy guns of the two battle fleets: British, 22,055,230, German, 10,914,000; thus showing that the German naval power was under half the British. The addition of the French and Japanese navies (those of Italy and Austria-Hungary about offsetting one another, and that of Turkey being practically negligible), placed the sea-power of the Central Powers in a hopeless inferiority so far as battleships were concerned. There remained the numerous force of armored and protected cruisers, destroyers, torpedo boats, and, finally, though far from least, the submarines. These but accentuated the difference in power. They best appear in tabulation:

	GREAT BRITAIN.	GERMANY.	FRANCE.	JAPAN.
Armored cruisers	38 9,800 to 14,600 tons; 20½ to 23 knots.	9 8,858 to 15,550 tons; 19 to 23 knots.	9 7,578 to 13,780 tons; 21 to 23 knots.	13 7,627 to 14,620 tons; 20 to 21 knots.
Cruisers . . . .	73 2,200 to 7,700 tons; 19 to 25½ knots (5 belong to Australia). 16, 3,800 tons; 29 knots, building.	39 2,603 to 5,956 tons; 21 to 27 knots. 6, 5,000 tons; 27½ knots, building.	12 2,285 to 8,151 tons; 18 to 23 knots.	12 2,800 to 6,731 tons; 20 to 23 knots.
Destroyers . . .	218 20 building.	142 10 building.	83 4 building.	60
Torpedo Boats . (Excluding earlier types.)	70	47	153	16
Submarines. . .	76 20 building.	27 12 building.	70 23 building.	13
Airships . . . . (Data incomplete.)	15 50 to 720 H. P., about 240 aëroplanes and seaplanes.	20 360 to 1,080 H. P., about 500 aëroplanes and seaplanes.	22 160 to 2,000? H. P., about 500 aëroplanes and seaplanes.	?

	AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.	ITALY.	RUSSIA.	TURKEY.
Armored cruisers	1 7,185 tons; 22 knots.	9 6,396 to 9,956 tons; 20 to 22½ knots.	6 7,900 to 15,170 tons; 20 to 22 knots.	2 10,000 tons; 16 knots. 2,400 tons; 12 knots.
Cruisers . . . .	9 2,264 to 6,151 tons; 19 to 27 knots.	11 2,245 to 3,400 tons; 18 to 29 knots.	8 3,106 to 6,675 tons; 19 to 23 knots. 8,430 to 7,600 tons; 27½ knots, building.	2 3,432 and 3,830 tons; 22 knots.
Destroyers . . .	19	36 10 building.	105 36 building.	10
Torpedo Boats . (Excluding earlier types.)	58 27 building.	70 5 building.	20	10
Submarines. . .	10 4 building.	18 2 building.	25 18 building.	0
Airships . . . . (Data incomplete.)	?	2 About 150 aëroplanes and seaplanes.	10 About 500 aëroplanes and seaplanes.	?

Great Britain also bore on her Navy List the two great passenger ships *Mauretania* and *Lusitania* of 26.6 knots as auxiliary cruisers. They were fitted to carry a moderate battery and were allowed to fly the blue ensign. An annual subvention was paid to the Cunard company for these ships, the company holding in addition all their vessels at the disposal of the government for hire or purchase. Germany had four such auxiliaries of 23 and 23½ knots, the *Kronprinzessin Caecilie*, *Kaiser Wilhelm II*, *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, and *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*. France had several of less speed, and *La France* of 23.5 knots. Italy and Japan had a number of more moderate speed, and two of 23 knots. Russia had seven of comparatively moderate speed. All the Powers were well provided with coal and oil transports, mine-layers and mine-sweepers, repair ships, etc., too numerous to be detailed.





Shipping a torpedo on board the French submarine *Xiphia*.



Submarine running submerged, with periscope exposed.

The great aid of wireless telegraphy had come, too, to extend that vital thing—information, which could now be conveyed a thousand miles in a few minutes instead of being slowly conveyed by a cruiser. This and the aëro-plane have revolutionized scouting.

There must be considered, along with the actual floating material of a navy, the questions of dockyards and coaling and oil stations; for the modern warship is usually both a coal and oil burner. In Great Britain there are fourteen docks that will take the largest of British battleships and six are building. Abroad there is one such at Gibraltar, one at Malta, one at Singapore, and one building at Bombay. There are scores of large British docks under 600 feet in length and under 94 feet in breadth, so that there is ample provision for looking after injured ships. In Germany there are eight of the great docks with four more building, none of which have a width at entrance of less than 94 feet. France has four, one proposed, and one at Dakar on the west coast of Africa. Japan possesses two, with three more capable of taking the next to the greatest ships. Austria-Hungary has one, with several of smaller size. Italy has three and one is building, with others capable of taking ships of 550 feet, besides a number of more moderate capacity. Russia has one building and one capable of docking a ship 580 feet long and 83 feet beam. Turkey possesses two docks, the larger of which can take a ship with a length of 500 feet and a beam of 62.

In ships, in building, repairing, and docking capacity, the Entente Powers were thus immensely superior to the German-Austro-Hungarian and Turkish alliance. They had 51 "capital" ships against the latter's 22; 107 of earlier type against the latter's 29; 75 armored cruisers against 11; 202 submarines against 37. Their command of the sea was thus complete, except against raiders and against that yet

unknown quantity, the submarine. The Entente Powers, it is evident, had practical command of the coal, coaling stations, and oil supplies of the world.

There were, according to available data, in the British navy 150,609 officers and men, including marines; German, 79,197; French, 63,846; Japanese, 55,736; Austro-Hungarian, 19,531; Italian, 39,913; Russian, 52,463; Turkey, 4,000. This gives the Entente Powers a total of 362,567 against that of the Teuton-Turkish alliance of 102,728. Large reserves of trained men were available in each country except Turkey, where the navy was moribund. It is among the ironies of life, that while Great Britain confiscated, in July, 1914, the only real force which, with the exception of the two ex-German ships mentioned, constituted the effective power of Turkey's navy, a contract had been signed on April 29, 1914, between the Turkish Minister of Marine and a British syndicate, composed of the powerful firms of Vickers, Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., and John Brown, the chief constructors of ships and ordnance in Britain, by which all the Turkish dockyards were to be reorganized. The administrative control was to remain in British hands through a majority of British directors. No foreigners but British were to be engaged. A naval base was to be created on the island of Ismid, and the British Admiralty approved the lending to the Turkish government of certain persons on the British retired list. At the same time a British officer was acting as admiral of the Turkish fleet.

Such, in as full detail as space allows, were the several forces which, so far as the strategy of the circumstances would permit, were to be engaged on the sea. Little has been said of torpedo boats and destroyers, as their day, in the writer's opinion, may, in a large degree, be said to be past. The larger torpedo boat came to displace the early small and insignificant craft, in which millions of money

were sunk with small result; the destroyer replaced the torpedo boat, but it now serves chiefly as a scout and as a protection against submarines. It is still building, in some degree, Great Britain having had 20 under construction in 1914 and Germany 10, though it is difficult for some to understand their special value in these days of wireless telegraphy and airship scouting, unless against submarines. But the submarine, with its coming high speed and ability to disappear, is a much more effective torpedo boat than either of its predecessors. The destroyer is thus not much more now than a very fast, lightly-armed gunboat, having risen to a displacement of 1,000 tons, and a speed of 35 knots, burning oil and developing at will immense clouds of smoke which have the effect of the densest fog. The development of the submarine has been one of the chief of the many marvels of naval offense, and the end is still far off. Even in 1914 a German submarine of 214 feet length, 20 feet beam, with a submerged displacement of 900 tons, was nearing completion. It was to have a surface speed of 20 knots and an underwater speed of 10. But development far beyond this is coming, if not already here, and we shall have submarines of 2,000 tons submerged displacement, of high speed, and not less than five torpedo tubes. All are surface driven by interior combustion oil engines, which operate also to charge the electric storage batteries by which the submarine is driven when under water. For the submarine is, when submerged, a marine electric motor car, all efforts at direct driving being yet tentative, though encouraging. The question of the heat developed by continuous use of the engines when submerged is a chief element in the difficulties to be overcome. Nearly all the larger types carry a 14-pounder gun, which can be lowered flush with the deck when submerging and which can be in readiness for action within a minute after emerging, and

also a one-pounder, which is a fixture without any hinged fitting. Both are fitted for high-angle fire against airships. The larger submarines are expected to carry four 4-inch guns.


Mines, too, had reached a high development, and specially-fitted ships were used for their swift laying. This could be done with great rapidity through an opening in the stern to which the mine is brought by truck on a railway which bends downward through a passage-way in the stern, inclining at about 45 degrees. On the truck reaching the end of this inclined railway, the mine, now but a few feet from the water, is dropped and submerges to its prearranged depth by an automatic control. One of the most extraordinary developments in mining is the mine known as the Leon, a cylinder with a height of 5 feet 3 inches and a diameter of 21 inches, which, thrown overboard or ejected from a torpedo tube, can be set to oscillate at any depth desired. The duration of its flotation can also be fixed. One can readily see how quickly a coast can be strewn by mines as was done first on the British coast, a procedure quickly followed on the German. Anyone who examines the subject can only be amazed by the immense ingenuity and complexity given to the subject of underwater attack and defense in all countries having navies.

As previously mentioned, the automobile torpedo (all the newer ones being of the superheated, gyroscopically controlled type of 21 inches diameter and carrying about 300 pounds of guncotton) has become one of the most formidable of weapons, being now a serious competitor of the gun. All the more modern ships are fitted with underwater tubes, some of which are guaranteed to discharge torpedoes safely with the ship going at a speed of 28 knots; an amazing performance. Though the torpedo does not





Destroyer *Swift*, the fastest vessel in the British Navy: speed 39 knots.



British mine-layer *Iphigenia*



British battle-cruiser *Lion* in a 32,000 ton floating dry dock.

travel so fast as the shot, taking about four minutes to go 6,500 yards, a space covered by a shot from a 12-inch gun in nine seconds, its effect, if it strikes, is most deadly. Its increasing value is recognized in its larger application, the two largest ships built and building for the Japanese navy being fitted with eight underwater torpedo tubes each.

In no field was there greater activity preceding the war than in airships. The greatest attention has been given to motor engines which are now being produced with a weight of but ten pounds per horse power. The following particulars of a typical German design of the rigid type, given by Mr. Alexander Richardson in *Brassey's Naval Annual* for 1914, are interesting:

Displacement . . . . .	60 tons
Cubic Capacity . . . . .	1,900,000 cubic feet
Length . . . . .	700 feet
Diameter . . . . .	70 feet
Crew . . . . .	24
Rifle caliber guns . . . . .	6
Rounds of ammunition . . . . .	6,000
37-millimeter guns . . . . .	8
Rounds of ammunition . . . . .	800
Weight of bombs carried . . . . .	1 ton 8 cwt.
Total weight of armament . . . . .	5 tons
*B. H. P. of engines . . . . .	2,200
Speed (miles per hour) . . . . .	60

\* Brake Horse Power.

This type is built on a rigid frame of aluminum, covered with cloth, and with many gas compartments. The non-rigid type being of lighter construction can carry relatively greater weights. Each country was giving great attention to this subject; sheds and stations were building

everywhere. That war was in the air was soon to be more than a mere phrase.

Even this short résumé of naval practice is enough to show that the machinery of death had reached a development not anticipated even a few years ago. It would seem that a specially satanic ingenuity has been evolved in the many very able minds applied to the vast and complex subjects involved in naval progress, and to devising the means of destroying men, which would appear to be a passion almost equal in intensity to the great instinct of renewal of our kind. It is a great mystery. And what is the cost of this vast effort? In 1905 the total naval estimates by the warring states (excepting Japan and Turkey) was, in millions of dollars, as follows: Great Britain, 165; Germany, 56; France, 65; Austria-Hungary, 19; Italy, 25; Russia, 61. In 1914 this had risen to: Great Britain, 257; Germany, 117; France, 99; Austria-Hungary, 19; Italy, 52; Russia, 133. A vast total of \$677,000,000 in one year. The British budget carried for the fiscal year 1914-1915 an appropriation of £53,573,261. In this are included £149,400 paid by India, a contribution of £29,950 by Australia for retired pay and pensions of officers and men lent Australia for her navy of now 1 18,000-ton armored cruiser of eight 12-inch guns and 5 cruisers, 4 of which are from 5,400 to 5,880 tons, with main batteries of 6-inch guns. The British vote for new construction for the fiscal year 1914-1915 was the great sum of £15,171,106 or about \$75,000,000, to be expended in one year. Germany was to spend in this same financial year about \$35,000,000 in new construction, France about \$46,000,000, Russia, \$50,000,000. The total estimates in Italy and Japan were about \$50,000,000 each.

And what were these armaments to do? Great Britain had, sometime before the war, by arrangement with France,

largely withdrawn from the Mediterranean and had concentrated her fleet at home. There were in the North Sea and the English Channel, 43 battleships and 25 battle and armored cruisers under 7 admirals. The Germans had in the North Sea 24 battleships and 4 battle-cruisers under 5 admirals. The French had in commission in the Mediterranean (where there were then but 4 British battleships and 4 light cruisers) 13 battleships and 9 in reserve. Italy had in commission 7 battleships, a training squadron of 3, and 6 cruisers. Austria had 4 battleships and 3 in reserve. The situation as to the naval dispositions of France and Great Britain had been brought about by frequent consultations of the army and navy general staffs of these countries, mentioned by Sir Edward Grey in the enclosure No. 1, dated November 22, 1912, in No. 105 of the diplomatic papers published shortly after the beginning of the war, which showed an understanding, before the war, as to coöperation in the event of possible contingencies. This is emphasized by the orders given in May by the British Admiralty looking to the mobilization in July of the fleet in home waters. Thus, on July 18th, there were reviewed by the king, off Portsmouth, about 200 ships of all classes, stretching out approximately forty miles and carrying between seventy and eighty thousand officers and men. There were present 24 big-gun battleships, 35 older battleships, 18 armored cruisers, 31 light cruisers, and 78 destroyers, along with 23 seaplanes, 10 aëroplanes, and 4 airships. Said the London *Times* of May 28: "That this is being tried in July indicates that what Mr. Churchill calls the test of mobilization of the Third Fleet is really a mobilization for war, for this step would only be taken in view of the imminence of hostilities." Such a statement, made nearly two months before the event, would seem to show that the war did not take the British cabinet entirely unawares.

In Eastern waters the British had 1 battleship, the *Swiftsure*, 1 battle-cruiser, the *Australia* (of the Australian navy), 2 armored cruisers, the *Minotaur* and *Hampshire*, and 6 light cruisers, 3 of which were Australian. Germany had 2 armored cruisers, the *Gneisenau* and *Scharnhorst*, and 3 light cruisers, the *Leipsic*, *Emden*, and *Nürnberg*, all of which were to be heard from. France had 2 armored cruisers, the *Montcalm* and *Dupleix*. The Japanese fleet in commission was made up of 4 battleships, 6 armored cruisers, and 6 light cruisers. The German battle cruiser *Goeben* of ten 11-inch guns and the light cruiser, *Breslau*, in the Mediterranean, took refuge at Constantinople and thus, later, became practically part of the Turkish navy.

The advent of war thus found a number of scattered ships and, particularly, hundreds of merchant ships to which the war came as a lightning stroke. Of course, there could be for the German merchant fleet but disappearance by internment, return home where possible, or capture. The German cruisers were to begin a raiding of British commerce and actions with British men-of-war in which they were finally to disappear before superior forces, but not until they had shown an energy and a resolution which put them in the first rank of ability and accomplishment.

Moreover, Germany at home could but withdraw her battle force under the shelter of the North Sea sands which make her coast unattackable. These are to her a great and absolutely impregnable fortress. The Kiel Canal was now available for the transfer of the heaviest ships between the Baltic and the North Sea. The British fleet took refuge from the submarines on the west coast of Scotland, thus creating an impasse so far as battleship action was concerned. And it has so remained.



French submarine *Palais*.



Type of English submarine.



# THE MOBILIZATIONS



## CHAPTER XIII

### THE MOBILIZATION OF THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES

The "sinews of war." Survey of the financial resources of the belligerents. The situation in the leading financial nations. United Kingdom: London as banking center; the Bank of England; bills of exchange; London as the world's clearing-house. The crisis, Mr. Lloyd George and the government's measures; moratorium, £1 and 10-shilling notes, maritime insurance. France: the French as investors; the French banking system; the Bank of France and its currency; moratorium. Germany: exceptional features of the German situation; great development of credit; financial preparation; Imperial Bank; the financial measures in 1913; the financial war plan; the war-loan. Austria-Hungary: war-loan banks; supplementary currency. Russia: financial preparedness; reserve and circulation of the Bank of Russia; treasury notes; prohibition of sale of vodka; taxes in lieu of the abandoned revenue from spirits. Italy: recent great commercial gain; stability of the public credit; banks of issue; treasury notes; expansion of bank currency in 1914; issues of government notes and loans.

The material requirements for sustaining warfare have undergone an evolution during recent centuries no less fundamental than the development in the methods of fighting. The financial problem scarcely existed in the Middle Ages, when money was so scarce that public contributions were reckoned on the basis of services to be rendered and payments to be made in specific products. The performance of military service was an obligation attached to the tenure of land, and it comprised the duty of providing the necessary equipment, and frequently the necessary supply of food. The origin of a special problem of military finance was due to the creation of mercenary and standing armies which had to be paid, clothed, fed, and equipped with armor and weapons at the expense of the community.

The financial side of warfare increased enormously in importance with the tremendous growth in the size of armies, the remarkable progress in means of transportation, and the unparalleled development in fortifications, naval units, and engines of destruction since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Financial resources are universally regarded by civilized nations as the "sinews of war." Mr. Lloyd George proudly declared that victory in the world-war would rest with the possessor of the last hundred million. Financial management takes rank to-day by the side of strategic administration.

Germany was found to be financially unprepared to bear the strain of war in 1911; but in 1914 her financial readiness and alacrity have excited universal surprise. Evidently financial mobilization is required by highly-organized states no less than military mobilization as an initial process in a great conflict. Every industry in a belligerent nation feels the recoil, experiences with varying intensity the agitation of anticipatory anxiety and the transmitted shock of the collision of mighty forces, and must nerve itself to resist the impact or to bend without breaking before it. Wars of such tremendous dimensions as that of the Great Powers of to-day are waged with the whole economic strength of the states involved. Financial mobilization is the supreme test of efficiency in organization, of adaptability of character, and of economic soundness. The most essential, and at the same time most difficult, functions in such critical periods must be performed by the department of government finance and by the banking system. Financial mobilization has the twofold duty of reinforcing the business organization and procuring the necessary funds for military operations.

Before we consider the financial mobilization of the different countries, we should briefly survey their economic resources.

For convenience in tabulation the estimated wealth and the national debts of the six Great Powers have been brought together, as follows:

	Estimated wealth.	National debt.
Austria-Hungary . . . . .	\$25,000,000,000	\$3,799,000,000
United Kingdom . . . . .	85,000,000,000	3,305,000,000
France . . . . .	60,000,000,000	6,575,000,000
Germany . . . . .	80,000,000,000	4,999,000,000
Italy . . . . .	20,000,000,000	2,864,000,000
Russia . . . . .	40,000,000,000	4,450,000,000

The debt of Austria-Hungary as given above is the sum of the public indebtedness of Austria and Hungary individually and of their joint debt; that of Germany, the aggregate of the imperial and state debts. All estimates of national wealth are subject to a very wide range of variation, and are apt to be misleading. For even the physical valuation of a country is liable to considerable fluctuation without any corresponding change in the actual state of its material possessions. A more satisfactory basis for comparison is afforded by the national income, the aggregate total of individual incomes, which can be estimated with a tolerable degree of approximation in countries where there is a national income tax. Mr. Lloyd George places the national income of the United Kingdom at about \$11,000,000,000 annually, while Dr. Helfferich, director of the Deutsche Bank calculates Germany's at about \$10,500,000,000.

The estimate of the foreign investments of the three greatest lending nations, as presented in the second chapter of the first volume, is an extremely conservative one. For many authorities place the aggregate value of British overseas investments as high as \$20,000,000,000, French foreign investments at \$9,000,000,000, and German at \$7,500,000,000,

all yielding an average return of about 5%. The well-known economic authority, Sir George Paish, editor of the London *Statist*, estimates that Great Britain ordinarily increases her overseas investments by about \$1,000,000,000 annually; in other words, that she applies the entire volume of interest derived from abroad to increasing the amount of her capital invested abroad.

What a disheartening situation for the lingering adherents of the worn-out, threadbare theory of mercantilism, which maintains that the nation that buys more than it sells is becoming progressively poorer. The balance of trade against Great Britain ought to drain any nation in the world of its specie in less than three years according to this view. But Great Britain is the only nation where the paper money has been uninterruptedly redeemable in gold since May 1, 1821. The balance of trade against the United Kingdom ought to bankrupt any nation in the world in less than a generation. But in normal years the United Kingdom does not even require the \$1,000,000,000 coming in as interest from investments abroad. It turns back this entire sum to augment the volume of these investments. The continuation of such a process would involve bewildering possibilities. Let the reader pause to calculate the growth of a capital of \$20,000,000,000 at 5% compound interest for a generation, or for periods of fifty or one hundred years, and its capacity for absorbing the wealth of the globe! He will be surprised that in proclaiming the dangers of a British hegemony the Germans have failed to discover in British capitalism as formidable a menace to the independence of nations as in British navalism.

The British government was in a very favorable financial situation at the outbreak of the war because it had behind it a tradition of soundness extending back more than a century. The most distinguished British statesmen had

very often combined unusual economic talent with political sagacity. Successive cabinets, resisting inertia and ephemeral temptations, had maintained with admirable constancy the practice of providing an annual excess of revenue so that sums could be regularly set aside in the sinking fund for reducing the national indebtedness. Great Britain was the only power whose debt was actually smaller in 1914 than it had been a hundred years before. During the twelve years preceding the present struggle, when many of the continental budgets were registering deficits, and while the German Empire increased its public debt from \$650,577,000 to \$1,142,873,000, Great Britain discharged the entire addition to her indebtedness incurred during the Boer War. The financial record of the Asquith ministry, in spite of adverse criticism, is proof that democracy and economic stability are not incompatible. The tradition of financial prudence was a foundation of strength for the British government when the tempest broke.

Comparisons of the percentage of revenues derived from investment in government funds are a partial test of the relative confidence inspired by the British exchequer. In the period just preceding the war, when German imperial 4% bonds were selling at par, British consols bearing  $2\frac{1}{2}\%$  interest were quoted at seventy, returning a revenue, in other words, of approximately  $3\frac{1}{2}\%$  on the investment. The investor in British consols accepted a smaller return than the purchaser of German obligations apparently in consideration of the greater security.

In the financial situation created by the war Great Britain and Germany have individually assumed unique positions, in that Great Britain alone of all the belligerent nations and many neutral countries did not suspend specie payments, while Germany quite as exceptionally did not declare a moratorium.

London has quite commonly been regarded as the world's banking center; but London's preëminence does not by any means extend to all forms of financial activity. For instance, Paris exhibits greater capacity for absorbing the public loans of foreign states, and the cash reserves of several continental central depositories make those of the Bank of England seem diminutive by comparison. London, moreover, is usually not the cheapest money,—or credit,—market. For the discount rate is usually lower, and certainly more stable, in Paris.

An appreciation of the characteristic specialty of British banking requires a brief analysis of the system itself. In it the Bank of England occupies a peculiar position. It is the principal depository for the precious metals, the only bank in England whose notes are legal tender, and the leading institution in the United Kingdom issuing bank-notes, or paper currency. We can safely disregard the circulation of paper of all the other note-issuing banks of the kingdom.

By the Banking Act of 1844, its present charter, the Bank of England has authority to issue notes to the value of £18,450,000 (\$89,786,925) against securities and its investment in the public funds; but it must keep coin or bullion in reserve to cover every note that it issues in excess of this amount. In consequence of this restriction bank-notes are used for only a very small fraction of the commercial transactions of the country. Strangers in the United Kingdom are usually surprised at the infrequency of paper-money. All the bank-notes in the country do not represent as large a sum as a single day's clearings in the London clearing-house. But on the other hand, foreigners from the continent are often astonished at the very common employment of checks to facilitate payments. Checks have, in fact, been substituted largely for metal and bank-notes, and really constitute the most important part of the currency.





David Lloyd George.



Sir George Paish.

In spite of the precautions for safeguarding the issue of bank-notes, British banking has displayed noteworthy boldness and skill in its economy in the use of the precious metals. The joint-stock banks employ a high percentage of their funds in current operations, such as loans and discounts, so that their liquid reserve is usually less than 20% of their deposits. Further than this, about one-half of their liquid reserve consists of funds deposited in the Bank of England, and only about one-third of the deposits of the Bank of England are really covered by its metal reserve. It follows, therefore, that the joint-stock banks of the United Kingdom really conduct their affairs on a metal reserve amounting usually to less than  $13\frac{1}{3}\%$  of their deposits.

Although the amount of gold in the United Kingdom is actually less than that in the United States, France, or Russia, and very much less per capita than in the United States and France, British notions of banking are more intimately associated with gold than those of any other country. The readiness to discharge liabilities in gold, promptly and unreservedly, is regarded in Great Britain as the most essential part of a banker's business. Soundness and reliability are the features imprinted upon the countenance of British finance, both public and private; and the reputation for stability has been patiently acquired by unswerving allegiance to the gold standard. An English bank-note is payable at all times in gold upon demand, but a French bank-note is convertible into either gold or silver at the discretion of the Bank of France.

Banking, in a more particular sense, is the process of furnishing credit for facilitating the current operations of commerce and industry. The performance of this function is chiefly effected through the discounting, acceptance, or purchase, of bills of exchange. A bill of exchange is an order, based upon a consignment of merchandise, drawn

by the seller against the purchaser, instructing the latter to pay the stipulated price at the termination of a certain interval after presentation to the bearer or a specified third party. Acceptance houses and bill brokers are the principal agencies in London for the negotiation of bills of exchange. In discounting, the potential value of the bill is converted into as much cash as a promise to pay at the future date is actually worth at the current rate of interest. The capital for these transactions is mainly derived from advances by the joint-stock banks, and most of the bills find their way eventually into the portfolios of these institutions.

London as a banking center does not confine itself to the negotiation of credit for British commerce. Probably the stimulus derived from financing the world's greatest import trade was the principal agency in directing the attention of British banking to the field of international exchanges. Lombard St. finances a large part of the international trade of the world, and this has made London the great clearing-house of the world's exchanges. The credits and debits of all the countries meet and are balanced in London. A very attractive feature of bills drawn on London is the certainty that they will be converted into gold, the one universally acceptable standard of value.

A large part of the deposits of the British joint-stock banks, which amount altogether to about £1,000,000,000 (about \$5,000,000,000), is employed in dealing in bills of exchange, and a notion of the volume of these transactions may be gained from the estimate of £300,000,000 (about \$1,500,000,000) as the aggregate value at maturity of the bills held at any one time before the war by London houses.

The system of banking and exchange, with its delicate adjustments, its intricacies and ramifications penetrating every corner of the earth,—the nervous system of the commercial organism,—was naturally most sensitive to the

disturbances of war. The progress of the political crisis in the last week of July, 1914, was automatically reflected in the financial situation, and the economic crisis developed with such rapidity as to portend the immediate stagnation of the whole machinery of credit.

The most urgent problem in all the countries was due to the same causes, the feverish desire to withdraw coin from the banks and the tendency to hoard it. Consequently, at precisely the time when mobilization was making unusual demands on the circulating medium, the volume of available cash was greatly restricted. The increasing intensity of the stringency in London may be measured by the movement of the bank rate, which had to be raised very rapidly to protect the reserves of the Bank of England against the unusual inroads. The bank rate, which had stood at 3% since January 29, 1914, was raised to 4% on July 30th, to 8% on the 31st, and finally to 10% on August 1st, the highest level reached since 1866.

The stock exchange closed its doors on July 31st, when continental dealers were demoralizing the market by unloading securities in a frantic effort to liquidate some of their assets. As soon as the situation became threatening the joint-stock banks ceased purchasing bills of exchange and began calling in their call and short term loans from the discount houses and bill-brokers. The latter, finding it practically impossible to dispose of the bills of exchange which they had discounted or raise money in any other way to meet their liabilities, ceased buying bills, withdrawing in this way their financial support from the fundamental transactions of international trade. Consequently, the commercial activity upon which the British nation depends for a large part of its food and raw materials was threatened with sudden paralysis. Imagine the outlook for the accepting houses, the maturing within three months of

bills for the aggregate amount of £300,000,000, for the payment of which they had made themselves responsible, with the sources of cash and credit running dry on all sides! To make their situation seem more hopeless, a considerable fraction of these bills, representing probably about £120,000,000 (say \$600,000,000), were drawn on German and Austrian houses.

The assistance of the government was indispensable to stem the rising tide of panic which threatened to submerge the whole financial organization. Mr. Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, called about him an impromptu committee of the ablest financiers of the kingdom to devise appropriate measures of relief. Guided by the resourceful finance minister the government exhibited remarkable decision and promptitude. It undertook at the same time to relieve the financial stringency and guarantee the regularity of shipments of commodities from abroad.

First of all among the government's provisions, the *moratorium*—the legal postponement in the payment of obligations falling due—demands our attention. Mr. Lloyd George introduced on August 3d a "Bill to authorize His Majesty by Proclamation to suspend temporarily the payment of Bills of Exchange and payments in pursuance of obligations," which directly passed all stages in the House of Commons, and is known as the Postponement of Payments Act, 1914. A royal proclamation issued August 6th in conformity with this law postponed for the period of one month all payments in pursuance of contracts anterior to August 4th, and ordered that the sums involved should bear interest for the profit of the creditor from the day when he should offer the debtor an opportunity to pay.

The moratorium did not apply to wages and salaries, obligations arising under the Workingmen's Compensation Act, liabilities not exceeding £5, local rates and taxes, old



The British Foreign Office, London.



The Bank of England.



age pensions, maritime freights, and some other classes of liabilities. On the afternoon of August 3d an Order in Council extended the Bank Holiday for three days, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, November 4-6, so as to afford an opportunity of taking the necessary measures for relieving the currency supply.

On the 5th Mr. Lloyd George submitted a review of his action in the crisis to the House of Commons. He explained that the leading bankers, merchants, and manufacturers, with whom he had conferred, had assured him that it was not necessary to suspend specie payments. In commenting upon this determination he said:

“In this tremendous struggle finance is going to play a great part. It will be one of the most formidable weapons in this exhausting war, and anyone who, from selfish motives of greed or from excessive caution or cowardice, goes out of his way to attempt to withdraw sums of gold and appropriate them to his own use—let it be clearly understood that he is assisting the enemies of his native land, and he is assisting them more effectively, probably, than if he were to take up arms.”

The Chancellor of the Exchequer proceeded to announce the introduction into circulation of treasury notes in denominations of pounds and half-pounds (ten shillings) to increase the volume of currency. These were to be convertible into gold at sight at the Bank of England. The government expected to have such notes to the extent of £3,000,000 ready to be placed in circulation Friday, August 7th, upon the reopening of the banks, and this supply would be increased at the rate of £5,000,000 daily. The entire issue of these notes was limited in amount to 20% of the aggregate deposits of all the banks in the United Kingdom, in other words, the approximate sum of £200,000,000. They were actually issued to the extent

of about £54,000,000. The government advanced them to the banks at 5% interest. At the same time postal money-orders were declared legal tender as an additional contribution to the available currency.

The economic situation of Great Britain, particularly the dependence of the country on imported supplies, makes the continuation of regular communications by sea a vital problem in time of war. A sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defense had had under examination for more than a year a method for insuring war risks on merchant shipping. Mr. Lloyd George went over the whole plan on Saturday, August 1st, with a group of leading representatives of the shipping interests. Most of the British overseas shipping was insured by three large mutual associations. But the insurance thus provided only covered the vessels in case of war until they reached the nearest British port. As a result of the deliberations mentioned the government adopted an arrangement by which it undertook to reinsure 80% of the risk on voyages begun after the outbreak of the war, receiving the corresponding proportion of the premium, for which the maximum of about 5% was established (really five guineas per £100). But in actual practice the associations, which in any case were to retain 20% of the risk, continued generally to carry the entire insurance, and the rate fell to 3% or lower. A state insurance office was established for insuring cargoes.

The government guaranteed the Bank against any loss from discounting bills drawn before August 4th, and this assurance covered the bills drawn on German and Austrian houses. Accordingly, the Bank of England not only extended its credit once more to the discount houses, but invited the people who held the German and Austrian bills to turn them in and receive their cash. Two of the joint-stock banks actually refused to rediscount these bills

having confidence in their ultimate redemption by the debtors themselves.

The Germans have complacently regarded their struggle with the British as the modern counterpart of the conflict of the Romans and Carthaginians. But the modern nation of shopkeepers gives proof at times of a quality of undaunted assurance singularly like the sturdy self-reliance which was nourished of old on the Alban and Sabine hill-sides. The spirit of confidence which could regard bills on the enemy as the equivalent of cash recalls the unwavering steadfastness of the Romans who competed in auction for the field where Hannibal was actually encamped outside their city.

The banks opened Friday, August 7th, with the Bank of England's discount rate at 6%. It fell to 5% the next day. Signs of nervousness rapidly diminished. The circulation of the new notes concurrently, and at parity, with gold was remarkable evidence of confidence and stability. With the renewed financial assistance of the banks the dealers in bills of exchange were able to resume activity, and this set in motion the processes of international trade by restoring the encouragement and support of credit.

At the beginning of the war the floating indebtedness of the United States to Great Britain amounted to about \$350,000,000. When London required all its available resources to face the crisis and pressed its debtors abroad for payment, the demand for London exchange rose so high in New York that the price became practically prohibitory. Gold shipments were inadequate to relieve the situation. In this emergency the Bank of England arranged for the transference of gold from the United States to the care of the Canadian Minister of Finance in Ottawa, thus avoiding the difficulty and danger of trans-Atlantic shipments. Many neutral countries, particularly those in South

America, were impelled to establish *moratoria* by the fear that their metal reserve would be rapidly drained off into the vortex of the London money market.

The following table presents a summary of the movement of affairs in the Bank of England at various intervals during the critical month beginning July 29th, the figures representing millions of pounds.

July 29	August				July 29	August		
	5	19	26			5	19	26
38	28	38	44	Cash reserve				
47	65	95	110	Discounts and loans				
				Notes in circulation . . .	30	36	35	36
				Treasury accounts. . . .	13	11	14	24
				Deposits . . . . .	54	55	108	124

These figures reveal the rapid depletion of the reserve between July 29th and August 5th, and this tendency will appear all the more startling if we reflect that the Bank was open for business only three days of these seven, namely, Thursday, Friday, and Saturday, July 30th to August 1st inclusive. The weekly statements of the Bank of England are drawn up every Wednesday after banking hours, and furnish the basis on which the directors determine the bank rate for the ensuing week every Thursday morning. After the crest of the wave of apprehension had passed, the reserve steadily increased throughout the month. The unusual demand for cash is exhibited by the remarkable expansion of discounts; but this movement had its counterpart in the growth of deposits which more than offset it. The very slight increase in the circulation of notes is in marked contrast with the corresponding tendency in the other belligerent nations. The treasury account consists of the public deposits of the various departments of the government



Line waiting in the courtyard of the Bank of England to change notes into gold during the first week of August, 1914.



Crowds in financial district, London, during the days of tension.



which are administered by the Bank of England as the government's banker.

During the early stages of the conflict the British government obtained the necessary funds for conducting its military operations, as authorized by the extraordinary vote of supply of August 7th, by borrowing from the Bank, and issuing short term treasury notes. On August 19th the government issued such notes for the sum of £15,000,000 (\$72,900,000) maturing in six months at  $3\frac{21}{32}\%$  interest, and again on the 26th the same amount at  $3\frac{3}{4}\%$ .

In considering the financial resources of France we must always keep clearly in mind the proverbial instinct of economy of the French people, the very general distribution of the national wealth,—three-fourths of the families are proprietors of their homesteads,—the very extensive foreign investments, and the comparatively small excess of imports. Financial tendencies reflect the spirit of a nation of small capitalists. The French are very cautious investors as compared with the English. In the foreign field they usually prefer government bonds and municipal obligations with a fixed though modest return rather than speculative securities, such as industrials, which may yield a larger revenue, but are less trustworthy.

The ministries of finance and foreign affairs exercise a supervision over the listing of foreign securities on the Bourse, or stock exchange. But investors have at times been misled and considerable French capital has been immobilized in consequence of the improvidence or political designs of these ministries, whose authorization for the listing of securities is commonly regarded as a sort of official stamp of approval or endorsement.

The principal function of the French banks, as of the English, consists in supplying commercial credits, although the range of this activity as regards the international field is

very much more restricted than in London. The reports of four leading banking houses with branches all over France, the *Crédit Lyonnais*, *Société Générale*, *Comptoir d'Escompte*, and *Crédit Industriel*, showed aggregate deposits on June 30, 1914, of 5,504,000,000 francs (\$1,062,272,000), discounts 3,540,000,000 francs (\$683,220,000), advances and loans 1,080,000,000 francs (\$208,440,000), and cash reserves 602,000,000 (\$116,186,000). In addition, the smaller banks had deposits amounting to about 5,000,000,000 francs. It appears from the figures quoted that the French banks, like the English, carry a comparatively small reserve of actual cash. They have recourse to the Bank of France in case of emergency, and this central institution regulates the supply of currency by its exclusive function of issuing bank-notes, or creating paper money. The Bank of France rediscounts the commercial paper held by the other banks as required. That is, it discounts bills having three signatures, those of the drawer, acceptor, and discounting bank. The Bank of France is the banker for the banks.

The variable movement of affairs in the business world, at one time impetuous, at another languid, requires a monetary circulation which is flexible, which can be adapted to the oscillating course of commercial activity. In the French, as in most of the other continental banking systems, the paper currency, as supplied and regulated by the central bank, is the elastic element by means of which an otherwise rigid medium of exchange is adjusted to the fluctuating volume of business. This function of supplying elasticity to the currency is indispensable at the outbreak of war, when the financial requirements of the government rise suddenly to a maximum in executing the military mobilization, while at the same time the demands of the public, as we have already noted, are unusually great.

The intense anxiety preceding the war produced a formidable assault on the reserves of the Bank of France. The aggregate discounts increased from 1,541,000,000 francs (\$297,413,000) to 2,444,000,000 francs (\$471,692,000) during the week ending July 30th, while the circulation of notes advanced from 5,911,000,000 (\$1,140,823,000) to 6,683,000,000 (\$1,289,819,000), nearly touching the legal maximum, which at that time was 6,800,000,000 francs (\$1,312,400,000). Nevertheless, the bank retained the enormous metallic reserve of 4,500,000,000 francs (\$868,500,000), of which more than 4,000,000,000 francs were in gold.

The most disturbing factor in the monetary situation of the Bank of France was, of course, the demand made upon it by the state. Discounts of commercial paper may reasonably be regarded as resources but one step removed from cash. But capital advanced to the state was "locked up" for the time being. It was rendered incapable of speedy realization, and therefore withdrawn from the monetary forces which could be marshalled to face the sudden crisis. But by agreement the state could call on the Bank for advances up to the amount of 2,900,000,000 francs (\$559,700,000).

The French government was authorized by a law of August 5, 1914, "to take in the general interest, by decree of the Council of Ministers, any measures necessary to facilitate the execution, or suspend the effects, of commercial or civil obligations." The same enactment raised the legal maximum for the Bank's circulation of currency to 12,000,000,000 francs, and relieved the institution from the obligation of redeeming its bank-notes in gold or silver, giving them, in other words, enforced currency, and thus abrogating specie payments.

A decree issued on the 9th in accordance with this law postponed for thirty days the maturity of all obligations

falling due during the month of August. In consequence of this, the Bank of France ceased to receive cash in payment of its commercial loans or discounts. But, on the other hand, it was relieved from the excessive strain on its liquid resources which the continued redeeming of its bank-notes in cash would have entailed. Raising the legal maximum of circulation, which was not excessive in consideration of the circumstances and the bank's very large reserve, greatly expanded the institution's capacity for meeting the extraordinary demands which the situation laid upon it.

The financial situation in Germany and its evolution during the war present features of very great interest. The economic position of Germany has been exceptional. The displacement of Germany's commercial relations with other countries has been very much greater than the disturbance in the foreign intercourse of France or the United Kingdom. For a much greater percentage of Germany's trade had formerly been conducted with her present opponents, and her direct communications by sea were largely cut off in consequence of the partial blockade to which she was subjected. The adjustment of her industrial activity to the restricted field and altered requirements presented almost superhuman difficulties. Germany was thrown back almost exclusively upon her own resources. The currents of credit and exchange contracted their course within the national territory. Some features of the general economic development of Germany made the problem of adaptation to war conditions as interesting as it was trying.

The Germans had not increased their foreign investments very rapidly for a number of years. The amazing industrial development of the country had absorbed nearly all the growth in capital, as it had furnished employment for the considerable increment of the population. The

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
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Germans had even pushed forward their domestic industrial development faster than their capacity to accumulate savings or increase their liquid capital. The German industrial fabric was built up on credit to an unusual degree, and the very intimate administrative connection between the great industrial and financial concerns (the interlocking directorates) was a natural corollary of this situation. Besides, Germany had become largely dependent on French and English loans to finance the current movement of her domestic trade. The inflation of credit and apparent instability of the financial edifice had reached such a state, a few years ago, as to occasion serious apprehension.

The secret German report dealing with the augmentation of Germany's military strength, dated March 19, 1913, as published in the French Yellow Book, contains the following significant passage:

"Preparation must be made for the war from a financial point of view. There is much to be done in this direction. The distrust of our financiers must not be aroused, but, nevertheless, there are many things which it will be impossible to conceal."

The process of financial preparation which is here contemplated was really under way already. It is reported that during the last Moroccan crisis in 1911 the Kaiser asked a number of prominent financiers whether they were prepared to finance a war with a great power and received a negative answer. Dissatisfied at their unfavorable reply, he is said to have remarked: "The next time that I shall have occasion to ask this question, gentlemen, I expect a different response from you."

A central bank and the other financial institutions of a country which stand in intimate relation with it may be compared with a military base and outlying forts forming a common system of defense. The currency, which

constitutes the forces of financial warfare, is distributed from the central bank, as base, to the other banks, as peripheral fortresses, and the latter appeal to the former for their necessary reinforcements. An aggressive incursion, in case of financial panic, must first be resisted by the outlying positions, which may successfully repulse the attack, if their forces are capable of prompt mobilization. But if their resources are scattered and dissipated, they must have immediate recourse to the base of supplies; and this was precisely what happened in Germany in 1911, when the forces on the outer line of defense were so attenuated that the appeal for reinforcements was sent in from all sides at the first cry of alarm. The great Berlin banks were maintaining at that time cash reserves amounting to only about 7% of their deposits. The very strained condition of international relations in September, 1911, created a condition of intense uneasiness and occasioned heavy withdrawals from the banks, which appealed at once to the Imperial Bank for succor.

The paper circulation of the Imperial Bank is limited by statute to three times its liquid reserve; or, in other words, the reserve must be equivalent to at least  $33\frac{1}{3}\%$  of the circulation. As this reserve is made up partly of treasury notes we cannot designate it, in an inclusive sense, as a metallic reserve. In addition to the Imperial Bank in Berlin, Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg, and Baden have each retained their central banks authorized to issue paper currency. But the circulation of these minor institutions is relatively so small that we can safely leave them out of account in surveying the monetary situation.

The exceptional inroads in September, 1911, brought the reserve of the Imperial Bank down to 45% of its circulation of paper. If a war had broken out at that time, the bank would have had a legal margin for the expansion of the currency of only 800,000,000 marks (less than \$200,000,000);

and a conservative estimate placed the immediate requirements of the government in case of a great war involving general mobilization at about three times that amount.

During the following three years, however, a remarkable process of strengthening and reinforcement was carried out through the persistent initiative of the Imperial Bank, which is virtually an organ of the imperial government. It is largely owing to the untiring efforts of Herr Havenstein, President of the Imperial Bank, that Germany's financial solidity has disappointed the expectation of her foes throughout so many months of the world-struggle. Herr Havenstein's fame deserves recognition by as valid a title as that of the military chiefs of the General Staff; and it is a curious fact, that in a commercial age it is still necessary to insist that a position of equal distinction should be attributed to those whose function is to preserve as to those whose business is to destroy.

Herr Havenstein inaugurated his program by summoning the leading bankers to a conference in February, 1912, where he urged the necessity of fortifying their reserves, and of liberating themselves from dependence on temporary loans negotiated abroad. This was the beginning of a continuous, untiring effort to turn the banks from the improvident course to which their natural inclination had addicted them. For an increase in their liquid reserve meant a corresponding curtailment in the volume of their business. Natural cupidity prompted them to stretch every inch of canvas without regard for danger. In his endeavor to convert the banks to a full sense of responsibility for their ultimate salvation, Herr Havenstein was only partially successful. But the practice of the Imperial Bank itself set them an admirable example.

Its purchases of gold from abroad were twice as great in 1913 as in 1911. At the same time an unobtrusive but

effectual scheme for educating the public indirectly to the use of paper money was set on foot, so that a far larger portion of the gold coinage of the country could flow into the coffers of the Imperial Bank and repose quietly in its vaults. Some authorities advocated the eventual withdrawal of all the gold from circulation and the substitution of paper, which would not be an entirely inconceivable evolution. How long, we wonder, after gold had everywhere been withdrawn from circulation and human contact into the vaults of treasuries and central banks, to serve as an invisible pledge for the solvency of paper currency, would the inveterate and deeply-fixed habit of thought endure which regards the yellow metal as the absolute standard of value? And could the orderly adjustment of relative commercial values be maintained, if their common instrument of measurement were reduced to a virtually theoretical scale, or an abstract formula? The present reverence for gold as the corporeal essence of value may be likened to a sort of commercial idolatry, of vital importance in the actual organization of business, but, in spite of its long-established character, not eternally indispensable. At all events, the effect of the great world-contest upon monetary arrangements may demand attention as well as its results in the political condition of the nations.

Captains of industry like Krupp and Thyssen, the steel-kings of Germany, adopted the practice of paying their employees in paper money and the Prussian railway administration followed their example.

By what lowly indications can the imminence and progress of mighty historical movements be observed if only we possess the clairvoyance to apprehend their significance, to read the signs that are patent all about us! Who of us in accepting United States currency ever examines it to ascertain whether it is made up of gold or silver-certificates,





Crowd waiting to draw money from the Imperial Bank, Berlin.



An officer of infantry reading the announcement of war in Berlin.

treasury-notes, or bank-notes? How many of us are conscious of these distinctions in our paper money? We may reckon ourselves fortunate in that it is of such uniform soundness that we are relieved from an annoying pre-occupation in regard to the significance of its varied types. The recollection of some of us who have lived in Germany might now substantiate the rapid increase in paper money which has taken place in recent years in that country. Our memory may now confirm the statement that before 1906 there were no bank-notes of smaller denominations than one hundred marks (\$23.80). Perhaps we experienced a half-conscious sensation of surprise the first time that we received a five, ten, or twenty-mark bank-note. The sense of satisfaction in the thought of a purseful of glittering gold pieces remained just as vivid, although the reality became imperceptibly rarer. The possession of the new twenty-mark bank-note probably conveyed no meaning besides its buying power. The form and material had no intrinsic significance for us. And yet such monetary phenomena are the palpable indications by which financial weather-prophets scrutinize the future.

Part of the program for financial preparation was incorporated in the revenue bill which was passed in 1913, concurrently with the bill for increasing the military establishment. The measures enacted at that time augmented the means for the rapid expansion of the currency in case of emergency. It will be recalled that a treasure of 120,000,000 marks (nearly \$30,000,000) in gold had been preserved in the *Julius Turm* in the fortress at Spandau since 1871. This hoarding of the unemployed gold has sometimes been characterized as the survival of a primitive, barbaric instinct, as a relic of mediaevalism. But the truth of the matter is, that the Spandau treasure served as part of the nation's metallic reserve, as a basis for issuing currency in

the form of treasury-notes. It was a reserve hedged about with more stringent legal safeguards than the metallic reserve in the Imperial Bank. On the basis afforded by it the government issued treasury-notes, *Reichskassenscheine*, to the full value of the 120,000,000 marks. By the law of 1913 the reserve of gold in the *Julius Turm* was raised to 240,000,000 marks, the additional 120,000,000 being obtained from the Imperial Bank in exchange for treasury notes of equal value covered by the security of the gold itself. At the same time 120,000,000 marks in silver were coined and added to the treasure at Spandau; and it was provided that the entire mass of gold and silver coin, 360,000,000 marks (\$85,680,000), should be transported to the Imperial Bank, in case of war, on the first day of mobilization, to serve as a metallic basis for the issue of additional currency representing three times its value, 1,080,000,000 marks (\$257,040,000). In this way a sum of money would spring into being, as if by magic, large enough, probably, to cover the government's entire expenses for mobilization.

The results of the general propaganda for financial readiness, conducted with German persistence and thoroughness, were remarkable. By July 23, 1914, the day on which Austria-Hungary sent her fateful message to Serbia, the reserves of the Imperial Bank had risen to 1,756,000,000 marks (\$417,928,000), including imperial treasury-notes, which the Imperial Bank is authorized to include as part of the basis for its note-circulation, while the circulation of notes stood at 1,890,000,000 marks (\$449,820,000). In other words, the reserve had risen since 1911 from 45% to 93% of the circulation. On the basis of these figures, there was still a margin for increasing the circulation within the legal limit of 3,378,000,000 marks (\$803,964,000), a sum equivalent to nearly four-fifths of the entire public debt of the United States.

The financial measures at the outbreak of the Great War, while conveying the impression of reckless audacity, were as deliberately planned as the military. The plan of operations called for a colossal emission of paper money to provide for the tremendous initiatory expenses of the war and keep the machinery of trade and commerce in movement, the legally enforced currency of this paper circulation, and the safeguarding of the gold-supply. Gold is the most timid of commodities. It takes flight at the first suspicion of danger, or at the presence of cheaper money. The gold in Russia disappeared over night, as it were, at the rumor of a new issue of currency. The German Imperial Bank battened down the hatches on its gold reserve and proceeded to ride out the storm.

It is said that several months before the outbreak of the war Herr Havenstein addressed a more urgent appeal to the great banking houses cautioning them to restrict their credits, to subject their portfolios to prudent supervision, and not to depend too extensively on the central bank to rediscount their commercial paper. The banks undoubtedly curtailed their industrial loans and new investments and building activity were very much reduced.

The crisis brought enormous demands on the banks in Germany as elsewhere. As has already been remarked, a moratorium was not proclaimed, although the courts were authorized in individual cases, where formal application was made, to grant respites in the payment of obligations for periods usually not exceeding three months, if the circumstances merited this act of relief. The war was financed in its early stages by enormous temporary loans contracted by the government with the Imperial Bank. These loans were of course represented by increased note-circulation. The government's indebtedness to the Imperial bank rose from 315,000,000 marks (\$74,970,000)

on July 23d to 2,348,000,000 marks (\$558,824,000) on September 26th, when it fell very rapidly in consequence of the influx of money from the government's first public loan. The German mobilization of 1914, which has been called the greatest movement of men in the world's history, was certainly floated on the most formidable stream of paper currency ever issued within so short a space of time. The Imperial Bank was immediately relieved from the obligation of redeeming its notes in specie. The following table will illustrate the situation of the central bank at different intervals:

Date.	Metal Reserve marks.	Circulation marks.
July 23d . . .	1,691,000,000	1,891,000,000
July 31st . . .	1,528,000,000	2,909,000,000
August 23d . .	1,596,000,000	4,000,000,000
August 31st . .	1,610,000,000	4,230,000,000

During the same period, July 23d to August 31st, the aggregate discounts and advances increased from 751,000,000 marks (\$178,738,000) to 4,855,000,000 marks (\$1,155,490,000).

In addition to the ordinary banking machinery, two new classes of institutions were established to increase the facilities for credit. In the first place, the *Kriegsdarlehenskassen*, or war-loan bureaus, granted loans on approved collateral, securities, and non-perishable commodities. These bureaus issued notes in various denominations beginning as low as one mark as an offset for their loans. Such *Kriegsdarlehenskassenscheine*, or war-loan bureau notes, were not legal tender, although they could be legally treated by the Imperial Bank, when in its possession, as part of the resources constituting its basis for note-circulation. The Bank has in practice rigidly distinguished them from its "gold cover" in the reports illustrating its monetary situation.





P. L. Bark, Russian Minister of Finance.



Carl Helfferich, Director of the Deutsche Bank.

The *Kriegskreditbanken*, or war-credit banks, provided credit for parties who did not have suitable securities for the first mentioned institutions, such as shopkeepers who became embarrassed in consequence of the unfavorable state of trade. These banks were organized generally as joint-stock companies. Their capital was largely supplemented by the guarantees of corporations, municipalities, and chambers of commerce. The Imperial Bank agreed to discount their paper to the equivalent of four times the sum of their capital and the amount of the supplementary guarantees. Their credits were generally extended for periods of three months and at 4%.

The first German public war-loan excited unusual interest because it was the first public loan offered to the market by any one of the belligerent powers after the commencement of hostilities. The Reichstag in its historic session of August 4th had authorized the government to borrow 5,000,000,000 marks (\$1,190,000,000) for military purposes. On the basis of this law the public was invited to subscribe, during the period September 10-19, for treasury notes to the amount of 1,000,000,000 marks (\$238,000,000), bearing 5% interest, payable between 1918 and 1920, and for an indeterminate amount of public funds, bearing 5% interest also, without fixed date of maturity but not redeemable before October 1, 1924. The government reserved the right to transfer applications for treasury notes to the class of subscriptions for the permanent loan, since the treasury notes were positively limited in amount to the sum mentioned. Both classes of securities were offered at 97½%, so that the German government pays interest at 5.128<sup>8</sup>/<sub>39</sub>% on the sums actually realized. This price for money may be compared with 3¾% interest paid by the British government on the treasury notes issued August 26th.

In announcing the subscription for the public loan, the German government issued the following appeal to the patriotism of capitalists:

“We are alone, and the entire world is in arms against us. We dare not count on the assistance of neutrals; our own unaided resources must provide the necessary financial means for our defense. These resources exist and should make their appearance when the enemy is at hand, in a crisis when we must defend our existence and our position in the world. The victories already won by our armies in West and East justify the expectation that, just as in 1870-1871, the expenses incurred and the burdens imposed will eventually be borne by those who have assailed the peaceful life of the German Empire. But, foremost and above all, we must help ourselves. Enormous interests are at stake. Our enemies base their hopes on our financial debility. German capitalists! Give proof that you are guided by the same spirit of heroism which animates our soldiers on the field of battle. You have savings; show that these have been accumulated not only for your personal enjoyment, but also for the needs of the Fatherland.

“Corporations, institutions, savings banks, establishments, societies, you have all increased and prospered under the powerful protection of the Empire. Display in these crucial hours your gratitude, the acknowledgment of your obligation to the government. Banks and bankers, show by your brilliant organization what your influence on your clientèle can accomplish. It is no sacrifice, however, to subscribe to a loan which is presented at a moderate price and produces a high rate of income. None of your clients can plead the lack of available funds, since the most ample measures have been taken to render liquid the necessary sums.

“No German subject inspired with patriotism ought to hesitate in supporting temporarily the small loss occasioned

by the transfer of his capital. The German savings banks relax to the greatest possible extent for this occasion the restraints on the withdrawal of funds."

The results of the public subscription were as follows:

	Marks.	
Permanent loan .	3,121,001,300	(\$742,798,309.40)
Treasury notes .	1,339,727,600	(\$318,855,168.80)
Total . . .		
	4,460,728,900	(\$1,061,653,478.20)

Dr. Helfferich, director of the *Deutsche Bank*, in treating of this stupendous negotiation, declared: "There is no parallel in history for our war loan, and it will be no easy matter for any country on the globe to equal it." He compared it with the raising of loans in France to pay the war indemnity after 1870, the greatest financial achievement which had ever been performed at the time, when two years were required to raise the equivalent of 4,000,000,000 marks. The present war seemed to him to have afforded conclusive proof of the superiority of German organization, and he proudly declared that "calculations upon Germany's economical and financial debility are as fallacious as are their (the enemies') speculations upon a disharmony between German parties and states."

The measures adopted in Austria-Hungary to counteract the economic disturbances occasioned by the outbreak of the war were similar to those in Germany. But the Austro-Hungarian Bank discontinued the publication of its reports, so that it is impossible to trace the variation in its metallic reserve or obtain a survey of the other elements in the condition of this central financial institution. *Kriegsdarlehenskassen* were established in Vienna and Buda-Pesth, as in Germany, for the expansion of credit facilities. They granted loans on non-perishable commodities,

government bonds, and other standard collateral security at 1% above the current discount rate of the central bank, for a maximum term of three months. Their loans were counter-balanced by the issue of bills which circulated like currency. The Vienna institution was authorized to issue such bills to the aggregate value of 500,000,000 crowns (\$101,500,000).

Reference has been made in Volume I to the prudent policy of the Russian government of borrowing money at favorable opportunities as a provision against possible emergencies. In presenting the budget for 1914, M. Korkovtsoff, the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, made the following significant statement:

“The possession of available funds to consolidate the financial situation of Russia and remove any possible necessity of borrowing at unfavorable periods for credit operations is particularly appropriate in view of the present situation of the political interests of the different states.”

The Russian government entered the war with large accumulations of available cash. It had 517,000,000 roubles (\$268,840,000) on account at the Imperial Bank of Russia in St. Petersburg. Within twenty-four hours of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia, the Russian Minister of Finance, M. Bark, sent functionaries to Berlin to withdraw securities belonging to the Russian government deposited there amounting in value to about 20,000,000 roubles (\$10,400,000), and he telegraphed at the same time to Berlin bankers instructing them to remit deposits of the Russian government of about 100,000,000 roubles (\$52,000,000) to Paris, London, and St. Petersburg. At the beginning of the war the Russian government had credits of about 500,000,000 roubles (\$260,000,000) in Paris and London.

Not alone the condition of the imperial treasury, but that of the Bank of Russia was to all appearances very satisfactory. By its regulations the bank was not permitted to issue





Reading the proclamation of a moratorium in front of the Royal Exchange, London.



Enthusiastic Frenchmen on the streets of Paris singing patriotic songs after the declaration of war.

currency for more than 300,000,000 roubles (\$156,000,000) in excess of its cover of metal. But for many years the total value represented by the paper of the bank in circulation was actually less than the gold in its vaults. In August, 1914, the legal maximum for the circulation of bank-notes in excess of the metallic reserve was increased by 1,500,000,000 roubles. The value of the notes in circulation had risen to 2,553,000,000 roubles (\$1,327,560,000) on September 14, while the metallic reserve amounted to 1,844,000,000 roubles (\$958,880,000). Thus the reserve was still equivalent to about 72% of the circulation, a far from hazardous ratio. In the meantime the government had drawn on its credit at the bank for 286,000,000 roubles (\$148,720,000), had probably consumed a portion of its credits abroad, and had proceeded to the issue of treasury notes for 400,000,000 roubles (\$208,000,000) on August 28th at 5%, for 300,000,000 roubles (\$156,000,000) on September 1st at 5%, and again for 300,000,000 roubles on September 4th at 4%.

According to the original budget estimates for 1914 revenue and expenditures should have balanced at 3,558,261,000 roubles (\$1,850,295,000). As finally authorized this was increased to 3,613,569,000 roubles. The fact that there was actually a deficit of about 565,000,000 roubles (\$293,800,000) in the receipts as anticipated in the budget is chiefly due to the suppression of the sale of spirits under the state monopoly.

For about three hundred and fifty years the government had shared in one way or another in the profits of the sale of distilled liquors. The unprecedented act of self-denial in relinquishing the revenue from this long-established source was almost a revolutionary event in the history of Russian state finance.

On February 11, 1914, M. Kokovtsoff retired from his position as prime minister and minister of finance. It is

reported that his fall was partly due to his tenacity in maintaining the state monopoly in the sale of spirituous liquors. He was succeeded as prime minister by M. Goremykin, who had held the same position once before at the time of the first Duma in 1906, and who had been regarded as a reactionary bureaucrat. M. Bark, an eminent lawyer, was appointed to the post of minister of finance. The Tsar's instructions to him as he assumed the duties of this office directed him to "carry out a policy of radical reforms in the financial administration of the state and the economic life of the country," declaring that "it is inadmissible to permit the favorable financial position of the state to depend on the destruction of the moral and economic strength of the great multitude of Russian citizens."

These words referred to the *vodka* monopoly and the proposed suppression or curtailment of the consumption of spirits. A short time later a measure received the approval of the Imperial Council conferring powers of local option on the communes and towns with respect to the reduction or prohibition of the liquor traffic.

But the patriotic zeal which was born of the Great War furnished the incentive for accomplishing the great reform so ardently desired by public-spirited Russians. The appalling drunkenness that had hindered the mobilization at the time of the Russo-Japanese War was one of the underlying motives for this remarkable measure.

In the first place the government ordered the temporary suspension of the sale of vodka with a view to prevent disturbance and confusion in the mobilization. But petitions poured in from all sides to the ministry of finance, from administrative corporations and voluntary societies, appealing to the government not to reëstablish the sale of vodka. The prohibition was continued until August 25th, then prolonged until October 1st, and subsequently to the end

of the year, while town and provincial councils were given the privilege of local option in respect to the traffic in the lighter alcoholic beverages, as wine and beer. Finally the Tsar proclaimed that the sale of vodka by the government would not be resumed. There were about 3000 distilleries and 500 rectifying establishments in Russia, employing about 60,000 men and a capital of 250,000,000 roubles (\$130,000,000).

In consequence of the elimination of drunkenness the mobilization is said to have been accomplished in an unusually punctual and orderly manner. Reports from various parts of the empire testified to the diminution of crime and indigence and to the enhanced efficiency of labor. The increasing thrift of the people was revealed by the progressive growth of deposits in the savings banks. The monthly increment was 30,000,000 roubles (\$15,600,000) in December, 1914, and rose to 46,000,000 roubles (\$23,920,000) in March, 1915.

Special new taxes were introduced to counterbalance the loss of revenue from the sale of vodka. The tax on incomes derived from urban real property was raised from 6% to 8%. The so-called industrial tax on certain commercial operations was augmented 50%. The certificates of membership in the first merchant guilds in the cities were raised from 75 roubles (\$39) to 100 roubles (\$52), while those for membership in the second guilds were increased from 30 roubles (\$15.60) to 40 roubles (\$20.80). The tax on the capital and revenue of such enterprises as are required to publish their balances was raised 5%, while enterprises which are not obliged to publish statements of their affairs were required to pay 7% of their profits. The taxes on insurance and matches and the excise on beer were increased, and a small tax was levied on railroad tickets for the benefit of the Red Cross. A special war income tax

was imposed on all incomes exceeding 1,000 roubles (\$520) varying from 16 roubles (\$8.32) up to 15,600 roubles (\$8,112) for all incomes exceeding 190,000 roubles (\$98,800).

A controversial investigator, intent upon gathering evidence to show that the Triple Alliance had exercised a blighting effect upon Italy, might scrutinize the record of Italian foreign trade with much satisfaction. He would probably be tempted to declare that the commerce of the country languished while devotion to the Triple Alliance was in its prime, and that Italy entered upon a period of unparalleled commercial prosperity from the very day that her attachment to this combination commenced to wane. The following comparison of the value of Italian foreign trade at various intervals, expressed in thousands of dollars (that is, 000 omitted in each case), will afford some idea of the change in the situation:

	1880.	1895.	1905.	1913.
Imports . . .	245,128	238,916	369,209	702,089
Exports . . .	226,457	211,801	308,221	483,255

The "unfavorable" balance is largely covered by the sums spent by foreigners in Italy and by the remittances home from Italian emigrants. The maintenance in recent years of parity in exchange is proof that this "unfavorable" balance is not an abnormal circumstance. In fact the prosperity of Italy has progressed in unison with the increase of this discrepancy between exports and imports.

The world had scarcely adjusted its habits of thought to the results of the revolutionary economic development of Germany during the last generation, when it was bewildered by the discovery that in some respects the progress of Italy during the decade and a half before the war has been almost more phenomenal, and certainly more unexpected.

The united Kingdom of Italy inherited, with the glorious tradition of the *Risorgimento*, or period of national regeneration and unification, an oppressive burden of debt which continued to grow, in consequence partly of prodigality in the administration. An excess of expenditure was the normal condition of the public finances down to 1896. But from 1901 to 1910 there was an excess of revenue aggregating 678,000,000 lire (\$130,854,000). An important consequence of the greater financial stability was the conversion of the public debt.

About one-fifth of the receipts of the Italian treasury are derived from the direct taxation of private incomes. For purposes of assessment the personal sources of income are divided into four categories, which are, respectively, (*a*) investments, (*b*) productive occupations employing both capital and labor, (*c*) labor, and (*d*) the positions of public functionaries; and the rate of taxation on these several classes varies in the descending order, the highest, 20%, being levied on the first. The establishment of this maximum rate in 1893 had the effect of reducing the net income from 5% government securities, as belonging to the category (*a*) of investments, to 4%. Since 1906 the government has been able to reduce the net interest on these securities, first to  $3\frac{3}{4}\%$ , and later to  $3\frac{1}{2}\%$ , while guaranteeing the perpetual exemption of this quota of profit from further encroachment by the revenue tax. These securities remained at about par until the commencement of the war against Turkey. The outbreak of the war in Europe in the summer of 1914 brought them down to 86; but they rose to 91 before the close of the year.

Formerly there were six banks in Italy authorized to issue notes; but irregularities in the management of the Bank of Rome led to the reorganization of the national banking system in 1893 and the reduction of the number

of note-issuing banks to three, which are the Bank of Italy, the Bank of Naples, and the Bank of Sicily. The operations of the two latter are small as compared with the first. The three are required to maintain a metallic reserve not less in amount than 40% of their circulation. At the end of December, 1914, the aggregate reserves of these three banks amounted to about \$291,400,000, their note circulation to \$440,700,000, and their resources and liabilities balanced at about \$1,250,000,000. These totals were materially increased all around by the time of Italy's entrance into the war. In addition to the circulation of the notes of the banks, the treasury was authorized to issue bills to the value of 700,000,000 lire (\$135,100,000).

The ordinary commercial banks of the kingdom had an aggregate capital of 556,000,000 lire (\$107,308,000) and deposits of 1,097,000,000 lire (\$211,721,000) at the close of 1913. Savings deposits in all the classes of institutions had increased in amount from about 200,000,000 lire in 1882 to 7,450,000,000 lire (\$1,437,850,000) in 1912.

The Italian government did not neglect the advantages of their opportunity of observing the course of the European conflict for ten months before taking part in it, and comprehensive measures were adopted for preparing the country in both a military and an economic sense against the contingency of war. Expenditure on an unusual scale was required to replace the wastage of the operations in Tripoli and bring the army to the necessary standard of efficiency and equipment. The receipts of the treasury during the fiscal year terminating June 30, 1914, had been 2,523,000,000 lire (\$486,939,000), the expenditure 2,687,000,000 lire (\$518,591,000). On December 8, 1914, the Finance Minister, Signor Carcano, presented estimates according to which expenses for the current year would amount to about 3,847,000,000 lire (\$742,471,000), the receipts to 2,400,000,000; in

other words, there would be a deficit for the fiscal year 1914-1915 of about 1,447,000,000 lire (\$279,271,000). About two-thirds of this prospective deficit was attributable to the supplementary grants already made for the army and the navy, and the remainder to the diminution in ordinary revenue on account of the shrinkage of trade in consequence of the war.

Decrees issued shortly after the outbreak of the European struggle in the summer of 1914 doubled the legal maximum emission of currency by the banks and authorized the issue of treasury notes to the value of 250,000,000 lire (\$48,250,000), secured by fractional silver coinage and of bills of state to the amount of 175,000,000 lire (\$33,775,000). For the absorption of its unfunded debt, the government issued a series of securities, bearing  $4\frac{1}{2}\%$  interest, at 97, for the amount of 1,000,000,000 lire (\$193,000,000). This loan covered the remainder of the expenses for the war against Turkey and the military preparations in 1914. It was entirely subscribed within the kingdom itself.

By the law passed May 22, 1915, almost unlimited powers were conferred on the government to take the necessary financial steps for carrying on the war, and in June, 1915, a second loan bearing  $4\frac{1}{2}\%$  interest was floated at 95.

## CHAPTER XIV

### THE MOBILIZATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES

Universal service, reserve, and mobilization. Political aspect of mobilization. Mobilizations: in Serbia; in Austria-Hungary, partial mobilization ordered on July 28th, extended to Galicia on the 30th, became general on August 1st; in Russia, partial mobilization on July 29th, general mobilization on the 31st; in Germany, military preparations, general mobilization on August 1st; in France, precautionary measures, general mobilization on August 1st; in Belgium, August 1st decreed first day of mobilization. Dispersal of British naval units postponed; navy mobilization ordered August 2d; concentration of the Expeditionary Force. Time required for mobilization. Assignment of reservists. Equipping the German reservist. Railway service in France. French army corps' headquarters. Trains required in France. Transporting the British Expeditionary Force. Headquarters of the Germany army corps. Military administration of German railway service. Secrecy of military movements.

As we have had occasion to notice in preceding chapters, the fundamental principle underlying all modern continental armies is universal military service. The French Revolution inspiring the whole people with a frenzy of patriotic enthusiasm produced the *levée en masse*, which swept aside the antiquated systems of the eighteenth century, when armies were made up of comparatively small bodies of highly-trained soldiers, and heralded the national armies of the present. But Prussia in the hour of her humiliation was the first to adopt a short-term, universal military service intended to provide military training for all able-bodied citizens by a continuous process, so as to produce the "nation in arms."

The slowness of her possible enemies to appropriate this basic principle of military service gave Prussia an

Deutsch. Teilweise Mobilisierung.

## Kundmachung.

In Österreich-Ungarn wurde von Seiner Majestät eine teilweise Mobilisierung ~~(von~~ <sup>der</sup> ~~Einberufung~~ <sup>Einberufung des</sup> ~~Einberufenen~~ <sup>Einberufenen</sup> angeordnet.

Diejenigen Dienstpflichtigen, welche aus diesem Anlass einzurücken haben, werden hierin durch Einberufungskarten verständigt. Den Einberufenen werden die Reisekosten vergütet.

Zur Erfüllung des Reisekostenbeitrages haben sich jene Einberufenen, welche nicht über die erforderlichen Reise Mittel verfügen, unter Vorweis der Einberufungskarte bei der nächstgelegenen k. u. k. Vertretungsbehörde zu melden.

Den übrigen Einberufenen werden die Reisekosten nach den bestehenden Vergütungssätzen nachträglich ausbezahlt.

Einberufene, deren Wohnsitz der Monarchiegrenze (Einberufungsstation) näher ~~gelegenen~~ <sup>gelegenen</sup> ist, als dem Amtssitze der nächstgelegenen k. u. k. Vertretungsbehörde, haben sich direkt in die Einberufungsstation zu begeben.



Notice posted in London calling up Austro-Hungarian reservists.

ARMÉE DE TERRE ET ARMÉE DE MER



ORDRE

DE MOBILISATION GÉNÉRALE

Par décret du Président de la République, la mobilisation des sources de terre et de mer est ordonnée, ainsi que la réquisition des animaux, voitures et fournitures nécessaires au complément de ces armées.

Le premier jour de la mobilisation est le  
dimanche 2 Aout 1914

Tout Français soumis aux obligations militaires doit, sous peine d'être tenu pour réfractaire, régler des lofs, avec une prescription du FASCICULE DE MOBILISATION, pages colorées annexées dans son livret.

Sont visés par le présent ordre TOUS LES HOMMES non présents sous les Drapeaux, quel qu'ils soient :

1° L'ARMÉE DE TERRE  
SERVICES AUXILIAIRES;

2° L'ARMÉE DE MER, compris les INSCRITS MARITIMES et les ARMATEURS de la MERISE.

Les Autorités civiles et militaires sont responsables de l'exécution du présent décret.

Le Ministre de la Guerre.

Le Ministre de la Marine.

Placard posted August 1, 1914, ordering general mobilization to begin the next day in France.



enormous advantage. Austria did not adopt it until after 1866, France until after 1870. The reserve, or whole body of physically fit trained citizens, returned to civil life but ever available for military service in time of war, is the product and greatest advantage of universal short-term service. By means of the reserve the armies can be increased fourfold or more when active operations become necessary. The advantages of such an enormous body of trained citizens depend largely upon the rapidity with which they can be assembled at points where their services will be effective. This movement, known as mobilization, is therefore a process of critical significance. A mobilization involving millions of men is an affair of tremendous difficulty, presenting limitless problems. In particular, it lays an unparalleled burden on the transportation system of the country. Without the practical experience afforded by the annual maneuvers it is doubtful whether the elaborate organization of Germany would have stood the test successfully.

The youngest reservists join their old regiments in case of mobilization. All the others, the greater part of the reserve in the comprehensive sense (Reserve, Landwehr, Territorial Army, Landsturm, etc.) have their own regiments and officers. To simplify recruiting and mobilization, the regional army corps system has been devised, in which each corps is permanently located in a certain district, from which it draws its recruits annually, and gathers its reservists in case of war.

The proper distinction is not always drawn between military preparation and mobilization. The first consists in the movement or redistribution of the troops of the standing army while still on a peace footing, the collection of supplies, preparatory transportation measures, etc. The second refers exclusively to the calling up of reservists and

requisitioning of horses for the purpose of raising the army from a peace to a war footing. It is generally admitted that military preparations in the above-mentioned sense may properly be taken by any government, when it believes that the diplomatic situation is strained, without giving its neighbors justifiable grounds for resentment. But in consequence of the recent development in the rapidity and accuracy of military movements, and the emulous zeal with which strategists calculate, and strive to appropriate, every preliminary advantage, priority of mobilization is looked upon as an element of success no less fundamentally important than it is indivisible in its nature, and therefore a provocation. The existence of such an element of advantage is a constant source of suspicion. Mobilization by any power at a time of diplomatic crisis is regarded as a threat by rival powers. It destroys all confidence in the pacific intentions of the power that takes the step. The nations were drawn headlong into the present gigantic struggle ostensibly by a premature mobilization. It follows that a consideration of the order in which the different belligerents commenced to mobilize is of capital importance. Serbia was the first of the belligerent nations to mobilize. General mobilization was ordered in Serbia, as has already been observed, at three o'clock in the afternoon of July 25th.

A partial mobilization in Austria-Hungary to meet the situation in Serbia was naturally the next in succession. Count Berchtold made the statement in a dispatch to the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in London that until the Serbian reply had been received, July 25th at six o'clock in the afternoon, Austria-Hungary had made no military preparations, but that the Serbian mobilization compelled her to do so. If by "military preparations" Count Berchtold means in this instance mobilization, his declaration has not been disproved. Even the report of the Russian

consul in Prague on July 26th, that mobilization had been ordered, is probably premature.

The Russian consul in Fiume reported on July 28th that a state of siege had been proclaimed in Slavonia, Croatia, and Fiume and that reservists of all classes had been called up. The French Havas agency reported also on the 28th that eight Austro-Hungarian corps were being mobilized, and this agrees with a communication by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs stating that the mobilization of half of the Austro-Hungarian army had been ordered on the 28th, since the Austro-Hungarian establishment comprises altogether sixteen army corps. The Russian ambassador in Vienna reported on the 28th that the order for general mobilization had been signed; but this statement must have been due to an error with regard to the scope of the partial mobilization. The report does not state that the order had been issued or that mobilization had been commenced. The French ambassador in Vienna submitted the following report on the 29th: "The French consul at Prague confirms the mobilization of the eighth army corps, which had already been announced, and that of the Landwehr division of this army corps. The cavalry divisions in Galicia are also mobilizing; regiments and cavalry divisions from Vienna and Buda-Pesth have already been transported to the Russian frontier. Reservists are now being called together in this district."

There is an apparent discrepancy in the information on this subject furnished by Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador to Austria-Hungary. Although he telegraphed from Vienna on August 1st: "General mobilization of army and fleet," his subsequent special dispatch on the rupture of diplomatic relations contains the following statement: "Russia replied to the partial Austrian mobilization by a partial Russian mobilization against Austria. Austria

met this by completing her own mobilization, and Russia again responded, with the results which have passed into history." If the earlier statement was correct, that Austria-Hungary proceeded to general mobilization on August 1st, Russian general mobilization, which was put into effect early on July 31st, was not a reply to it, but preceded it. In connection with this apparent contradiction a statement by M. Sazonoff may be noticed. In a summary of the situation sent to Russian diplomatic representatives abroad, after alluding to the formula for an accommodation with Austria-Hungary, offered by Russia on the 30th and rejected by Herr von Jagow on the same day, the Russian Foreign Minister added: "Meanwhile in St. Petersburg news was received of a general mobilization on the part of Austria. At that time military operations were going on in Serbian territory, and Belgrade was subjected to further bombardment. In consequence of the failure of our peace proposals, it became necessary to take larger military precautions."

The evidence for the date of Austria-Hungary's general mobilization is therefore conflicting. It points in part to a date anterior to the Russian general mobilization, in part to August 1st. This contradiction creates a problem of considerable importance, because the priority of a general mobilization in Austria-Hungary would have a very important bearing upon the question of moral responsibility involved in Russia's general mobilization. The Austro-Hungarian Red Book affords the basis for a conjecture which would explain the apparent incongruity. In the course of a long conversation between M. Sazonoff and Count Szápáry on July 29th allusion was made to the uneasiness in Russia occasioned by Austria-Hungary's mobilization of eight army corps for action against Serbia. On the 30th Count Berchtold pointed out in a dispatch to



Russian reservists leaving to join the colors.



German army and navy reservists obeying the order of mobilization.



Count Szápáry that Austria-Hungary had mobilized exclusively against Serbia, proof of which was the fact that the first, tenth, and eleventh army corps, whose headquarters were at Cracow, Przemyśl, and Lemberg respectively, had not been mobilized. But he added that in consequence of the military measures taken by Russia, Austria-Hungary would have to extend her measures. On the 31st a communication by Count Berchtold to the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic representatives contained the following statement: "As mobilization has been ordered by the Russian government on our frontier, we find ourselves obliged to take military measures in Galicia."

These "military measures in Galicia" would surely include the mobilization of the three above-mentioned Galician army corps at least. We may readily surmise that this measure taken on the 30th, which brought the mobilized part of the Austro-Hungarian forces up to eleven army corps at least, out of a total of sixteen, was inaccurately reported as a general mobilization and furnished a motive for a more extensive mobilization in Russia. This conjecture might explain the undoubtedly erroneous opinion that Austria-Hungary precipitated the crisis by her earlier general mobilization.

Still another statement apparently contradicts the view that general mobilization in Austria-Hungary was proclaimed as late as August 1st. It is contained in a report by M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, on July 31st, in the following words:

"General mobilization for all men from nineteen to forty-two years of age was declared by the Austro-Hungarian government this morning at one o'clock. My Russian colleague still thinks that this step is not entirely in contradiction to the declaration made yesterday by Count Berchtold."

The mention of a declaration by the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister doubtless refers to the conversation of Count Berchtold and M. Shébéko on the 30th which was conducted in a friendly spirit, and in which Count Berchtold remarked that while Austria-Hungary would have to extend her mobilization, this did not imply an attitude of hostility. Bearing in mind the view of the Russian ambassador as expressed to his French colleague with reference to the measures cited in the latter's report, we may again explain an apparent incongruity by the supposition that the extension of the Austro-Hungarian partial mobilization to Galicia was misinterpreted as a general mobilization.

That the general mobilization in Austria-Hungary was formally announced on August 1st is established by practically indisputable evidence. The official press in Vienna and Buda-Pesth contained the following notice that morning:

"According to an official communication of July 31st, His Majesty the Emperor has ordered the general mobilization of the army, fleet, both *Landwehren* (the Austrian and Hungarian), and the mustering in of the Landsturm. This measure is occasioned by the mobilization ordered by Russia. No concealed aggressive tendency is involved in the measures commanded by His Majesty, but only a precautionary step for the indispensable protection of the monarchy."

Stated concisely, our conclusions with regard to the successive steps in the Austro-Hungarian mobilization are these: a partial mobilization against Serbia, probably ordered on July 28th, involving eight army corps, was extended to embrace the Galician frontier on the 30th, and was finally merged in a general mobilization on August 1st.

The misinterpretation of the sense of two documents in the diplomatic correspondence has created an erroneous opinion concerning the date when Russia commenced to

mobilize. Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, in reporting his conversation with M. Sazonoff and the French ambassador on July 24th, represented the Russian Foreign Minister as declaring that he "thought that Russian mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out. The dispatch from the Tsar to the Kaiser on July 30th, in which the hope was expressed that Russia's military preparations would not compromise the Kaiser's position as mediator, contains the following statement: "The military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago. On the basis of these passages the impression has been produced that Russian mobilization was under way as far back as July 25th or even the 24th. But the truth is, that the expression "to be carried out" as attributed to M. Sazonoff does not here refer to an action already proceeding, but to an undertaking which must eventually be put into execution. The decision to mobilize taken on the 25th was only a contingent decision, and it was not carried into effect until the 29th. A report of M. Bienvenu-Martin, acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in France, on July 26th, furnishes the information that on the day before the Russian council of ministers considered the mobilization of thirteen army corps intended eventually to operate against Austria-Hungary, to be made effective upon notice given by the Russian Foreign Minister in the event that Austria-Hungary should bring armed pressure to bear upon Serbia. In general the evidence is not at variance with this statement. There is considerable evidence which shows that active military preparations were in progress from the 25th onwards, but the evidence which has been adduced to prove that mobilization commenced before the 29th is scarcely sufficient in the face of the categorical denials.

The German ambassador transmitted a message of General von Chelius, German honorary aide-de-camp to the

Tsar, dated July 25th, stating that the maneuvers at the camp at Krassnoye-Selo had been suddenly interrupted, the regiments returned to their garrisons, and the military pupils raised to the rank of officers without waiting until the customary period in the fall, and that preparations for mobilization against Austria-Hungary were being made. On the 26th the German ambassador forwarded a communication of the German military attaché to the General Staff in Berlin, in which the conviction was expressed that mobilization orders had been issued for Kieff and Odessa.

As early as the 26th Count Pourtalès endeavored to impress upon M. Sazonoff the peril involved in employing a mobilization as a means of diplomatic pressure. For as soon as the purely military view of the General Staffs prevailed, the situation would get out of control. In reply M. Sazonoff assured the ambassador that not a single reservist or horse had as yet been called up. Only preparations were being made in the Kieff, Odessa, Kazan, and Moscow districts, which naturally faced towards Austria-Hungary. On July 27th the German military attaché reported that the secretary of war had given him his word of honor that, while general preparations were being made, no order to mobilize had been given, no reservists had been called, and no horses had been mustered. He said that if the Austrian forces crossed the Serbian frontier, such military districts as are directed towards Austria-Hungary, Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan, would be mobilized, but under no circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilna, and St. Petersburg. This conversation had taken place late on the evening of the 26th.

The *Daily Chronicle* correspondent in St. Petersburg reported on the 28th: "Already a rapid mobilization is proceeding in the west and southwest virtually from the German frontier to the Black Sea." Reuter's correspondent





Regiment of Canadian "Highlanders" on its way to mobilization camp at Valcartier.



Troops marching through Vienna in July, 1914.

stated on the 29th that a partial mobilization had been ordered the night before, confined to the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan, and affecting the Austrian, not the German, frontier. The greater definiteness of the Reuter report, which can be harmonized with the statement of the French acting Foreign Minister, as cited above, commends it as more trustworthy. The statement of the *Daily Chronicle* is probably due to the common and perhaps not unnatural error of confusing military preparations with mobilization.

A communication to the Russian ambassadors dispatched by M. Sazonoff on August 2d stated that the Russian government had been compelled to order mobilization of the four districts mentioned above in consequence of Austria-Hungary's action. The statement was added: "This decision was caused by absolute necessity, in view of the fact that five days had elapsed between the day of the handing of the Austrian note to Serbia and the first steps taken by Russia, while at the same time no steps had been taken by the Viennese cabinet to meet our peaceable overtures, but on the contrary the mobilization of half the Austrian army had been ordered." This would indicate that Russia's first definite decision to proceed to a partial mobilization was made on the 28th, and from the Reuter dispatch we learn that the decision was made on the evening of the 28th. Likewise on the 28th M. Sazonoff telegraphed to the Russian ambassador in Berlin informing him that the Russian government would announce mobilization in the four districts on the next day. A comparison of these documents would lead to the conjecture that the mobilization orders were issued on the evening of the 28th, probably as soon as news of Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Serbia had been received, but that they were not made public, and therefore that mobilization did not actually commence,

until the 29th. The British ambassador reported Russian partial mobilization on the 29th.

The St. Petersburg correspondent of the Paris *Temps* reported on the 29th that mobilization was really proceeding in the districts of Warsaw, Vilna, and St. Petersburg, although no public announcement of this had been made. The military organization in these localities was directed against Germany, and so if the report of the *Temps* was true, the uneasiness which was rapidly developing that same day in German ruling circles was reasonable. This report was almost more sensational than any statement from German sources. On the same day the German military attaché at St. Petersburg reported a conversation with the Russian Chief of Staff in which the latter gave his word of honor in the most solemn manner that nowhere had there been a mobilization, viz., calling in of a single soldier or horse up to the present time, *i. e.* three o'clock in the afternoon. When the attaché remarked that he had received news of the calling in of reserves in the different parts of the country, including Warsaw and Vilna, the Chief of the General Staff declared that such news was wrong. But the attaché went away with the impression that the statement made to him was a deliberate attempt to conceal the true state of affairs.


It is interesting to compare in this connection the letter of the Belgian attaché in St. Petersburg written on the 30th and intercepted in the German mails. The significant part of the text of this communication is as follows:

“This morning an official communication in the newspapers announced that the reserves in a certain number of governments have been called to the colors. Anyone who knows the custom of the official Russian communications to keep something in reserve can safely maintain that a general mobilization is taking place.





German warship in course of construction at the Krupp works, Kiel.



The French first class battleship *Normandie* in construction at Saint-Nazaire.

“The German ambassador has this morning declared that he has reached the end of his efforts which since Saturday he has been making without interruption for a satisfactory arrangement, and that he has almost given up hope.

“To-day they are convinced in St. Petersburg, and even have definite assurance, that England will support France. The assurance of this support carries great weight and has contributed considerably to give the military party the upper hand.

“In the council of ministers which took place yesterday morning differences of opinion still showed themselves; the declaring of a mobilization was postponed, but since then a change has appeared, the war party has attained the upper hand, and this morning at four o'clock the mobilization was ordered.”

The mobilization here referred to is of course the partial mobilization, but the statement that it was not ordered until four o'clock on the morning of the 30th is puzzling. Perhaps the scope of the partial mobilization was rapidly expanded until it was merged in the general mobilization as the natural culmination of a succession of one or more intermediate stages.

The British ambassador in St. Petersburg telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey on the 31st: “It has been decided to issue orders for general mobilization. This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Serbia. Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations and she cannot afford to let her get a start.” M. Paléologue sent a similar statement to M. Viviani, and Count Szápáry wired Vienna on the same

day: "The order for the general mobilization of the entire army and fleet was issued early to-day."

The *Times* correspondent in St. Petersburg reported on the 31st: "A general mobilization has been ordered. Never within living memory has Russia lived through a day of such emotion. The government decided on mobilization late Thursday (the 30th). This step was forced upon it when it became apparent that the Germans were purposely delaying their official notice of mobilization in order to place Russia in a position of inferiority. To have hesitated longer would have been to court disaster."

The evidence seems conclusive that the general mobilization was decided late on the 30th and that the order was published and put into execution early the following morning.

That Russia's general mobilization preceded those of both her original opponents appears to be incontestable; and it will be generally recognized, at least among neutrals, that by taking this fateful step Russia assumed a very grave responsibility. Germany had repeatedly warned her of the serious consequences. Perhaps, as the Germans assert, the British Foreign Secretary, who claimed to be actuated solely by the desire to maintain peace, exposed himself to the charge of criminal negligence, or even hypocrisy, by failing to remonstrate in vigorous terms against Russia's action. More likely the rapidity of events outran his discernment and deprived him of an opportunity for intercession.

The degree of Russia's responsibility, or culpability, will depend upon the extent of Austria-Hungary's previous measures. It will vary greatly in the judgment of unbiased persons, partly because the issue is still a novel one. There is no established canon of international ethics which covers it. It would be useless dogmatism to take one's stand

upon the doctrine of the final, unlimited sovereignty of the state,—which is so emphatically proclaimed by many leading German authorities in other connections,—and argue that Russia had the unquestionable right to act as she chose on her national territory. The urgency of the situation seemed to transcend the most elementary formal restrictions. The advantages of priority of mobilization are too decisive; the danger for Germany was too imminent. Russia's step was a threat. An elementary instinct of defense impels us to smite the hand which reaches for the concealed weapon.

Germany could instantly have freed herself from every peril by renouncing her support of Austria-Hungary's seemingly aggressive policy. But the abandonment of Austria-Hungary would have involved the weakening, or even dissolution, of the alliance upon which Germany's security, if not existence, was believed to depend. The fear of isolation in the center of Europe brooded over Germany like a black specter. True, Germany could have exorcised this danger by the voluntary restitution of Alsace-Lorraine. But such a proposition, with the still prevailing non-rational notions of national honor, would have involved humiliation. It was practically unthinkable.

The Russian mobilization was a cardinal fact. But it may be explained, palliated, perhaps even excused, by a consideration of the actual international prospect as it appeared to the chiefs of the Russian state at the time when the step was taken.


The German Foreign Secretary had just rejected Russia's conciliatory proposal which had been formulated at the urgent appeal of the German ambassador in St. Petersburg. Austria-Hungary was bombarding Belgrade and was evidently determined to crush all resistance; and in spite of her protestations that she would not destroy the integrity

or independence of her enemy, she steadfastly refused to eliminate from the text of her demands the very articles which would fatally impair the independence of Serbia. Germany, whose Kaiser had once declared that nothing should be done anywhere without her consent, insisted that the contest between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was one in which the rest of Europe had no concern.

Most of the accounts of preliminary military preparations and alleged mobilization in Germany come from French sources which are apt to be colored by a desire to inculcate a potential enemy. Military activity in the German frontier fortresses was reported in Paris as early as July 25th. On the following day preparations for the movement of troops were reported in the French capital. On the 27th the *Temps* declared that local mobilization had begun; and on the 28th the same paper stated that the covering troops on the German frontier had been put on a war footing by calling up reservists. On the 27th the French consul at Basel informed the Foreign Office that the German officers who had been spending their vacation in the neighborhood had been summoned to return to Germany four days before, and that owners of motor vehicles in the Grand-duchy of Baden had been notified to place them at the disposal of the military authorities two days after an eventual second notice.

The French consul at Christiania reported on the 26th that the German fleet which had been cruising in Norwegian waters had received orders to concentrate at Stavanger and put to sea, presumably to return directly to Germany. The return of the fleet and its eventual concentration at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven were officially announced in Berlin on the 28th.

On the 30th the correspondent of the *Temps* in Berlin denied that there had been any mobilization of the German army. The French consul in Munich reported on the 29th



At the outbreak of the great war the German army was divided into twenty-five army corps, enumerated I to XXI, the I, II, III Bavarian, and the Prussian Guard, whose headquarters are in Berlin.



that under pretext of a change in the autumn maneuvers the non-commissioned officers and men of the Bavarian infantry regiments at Metz, who were on leave in Bavaria for harvesting operations, had received orders the day before to return immediately to their barracks.

We have already noticed how on July 30, 1914, the French ambassador in London reminded Sir Edward Grey of the exchange of letters which took place on November 22, 1912, whereby Great Britain and France agreed to consult together as to the expediency of active coöperation in case either expected an unprovoked attack by a third power. M. Cambon claimed that the peace of Europe had never been more seriously threatened than at that time, and as proof, he handed to the British Foreign Secretary a paper calculated to prove that German military preparations were more advanced than those of France. This memorandum, which had been supplied by M. Viviani, stated that the German army had its advance-posts on the French frontiers the day before (presumably the 29th), whereas the French outposts had purposely been kept back ten kilometers from the frontier, because the French government wished to avoid every appearance of aggression. The whole sixteenth corps from Metz with a part of the eighth from Trier and Cologne were occupying the frontier from Metz to the border of Luxemburg. The fifteenth corps from Strassburg had been massed on the frontier. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine had been forbidden to cross the frontier under penalty of being shot. Thousands of reservists had been called back to Germany from abroad. All these statements, even if they were authentic, refer only to precautionary military measures, not to mobilization proper. Diplomatic usage and etiquette, as we have seen, has tended to emphasize the distinction between the two, regarding the former as justifiable in certain

circumstances. Probably a similar strengthening of the border garrisons was going on at the same time in France.

About one o'clock on the afternoon of the 30th a sensation was created by the appearance of a special edition of the *Lokal Anzeiger* on the streets of Berlin announcing general mobilization in Germany. This was the afternoon following the Extraordinary Council at Potsdam; and the belief that the sheets of the *Lokal Anzeiger*, which is usually a semi-inspired paper, were gotten ready in anticipation, at a hint from the government, lent support to the conviction that measures of a decisive character had been considered at the memorable meeting of the evening before.

The extra edition was quickly confiscated and the premature announcement suppressed. Herr von Jagow immediately telephoned to the foreign embassies denying the report. The Russian ambassador had already sent a dispatch to St. Petersburg with the startling announcement that Germany had ordered mobilization. He straightway sent a second telegram to recall the statement contained in the first; but it is doubtful whether the impression which had been produced was entirely neutralized. From this time the Russian officials insisted that the German government was mobilizing secretly. On this same day Herr von Zimmermann, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed one of the foreign ambassadors that the military authorities were urging mobilization, but that up to that time the haste of the General Staff had been successfully counteracted.

M. Sazonoff declared on the 30th that absolute proof was in possession of the Russian government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia, more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland. This and similar statements are too vague to be taken seriously. They are in a class with the evidence for Germany's



German fleet anchored in Kiel Bay.



British fleet anchored off Portsmouth.



posthumous charges against Belgium; the world has waited a long time for the publication of the "absolute proof."

The correspondent of the *Daily Chronicle* in Paris reported on the 31st such activities of the German military authorities on the frontier as the barricading of highways, while the *Times* correspondent claimed that Germany had really been carrying on an extensive mobilization in secret. Such a statement is without support. Probably only local reservists were being incorporated in some of the frontier garrisons, a process which, as already remarked, was doubtless going on in France also.

Martial law (*Kriegsgefahrzustand*) was proclaimed in Germany at two o'clock on the afternoon of the 31st, after news of the general mobilization in Russia had been received, and at a time when the German authorities claimed that military preparations in France had reached a threatening stage. This decree permitted the military authorities to control the means of communication and transportation. The proclamation of martial law is frequently a preliminary to mobilization, since it insures the safety and secrecy of the movements of troops. It was believed in France that martial law as decreed in Germany was simply a means for concealing the general mobilization which was really in progress.

The decree for the general mobilization in the German Empire, with the exception of Bavaria, was issued at six o'clock in the afternoon of August 1st in the following terms:

"I hereby decree: The German Army and Imperial Navy are to be placed on a war footing in accordance with the Plan of Mobilization for the German Army and Imperial Navy. The second of August, 1914, shall be fixed as the first day of mobilization."

Berlin, August 1, 1914.

WILLIAM I. R.

V. BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

Mobilization was extended to the Bavarian army by decree of King Ludwig of Bavaria at 7.20 the same evening.

It is impossible to prove that any partial mobilization in Germany preceded the general mobilization which was thus ordered.

Special editions of the papers were immediately circulated in Berlin announcing the decree of general mobilization of the army and navy. The news spread with incredible rapidity and was received with tremendous demonstrations of patriotic enthusiasm, some of which have already been described.

The *Temps* announced on the 26th that the garrisons of the great French fortresses on the eastern frontier, Toul, Nancy, Neufchâtel, and Troyes, had been mobilized and the soldiers sent to the individual forts the day before. This refers, probably, to the concentration of the garrison troops, not to the calling up of reserves. Similar measures were being carried out at Metz across the frontier. At the same time officers were being recalled from leaves of absence in France just as in Germany. On the 27th the German ambassador in Berne reported that the maneuvers of the Fourteenth French Army Corps had been discontinued.

According to the *Times* correspondent in Paris on the 29th six French army corps on the eastern and north-eastern frontiers were being brought up to their full peace strength. On the same day the French ambassador in Berlin informed Herr von Jagow, who was receiving disquieting reports regarding French military preparations, that the French government had done nothing more than the German had done, namely, recalled officers on leave.

On the 31st the *Times* correspondent in Paris reported that a cabinet council had decided to bring the French covering troops on the frontier up to a war footing by incorporating 40,000 reservists drawn from the immediate

localities. He also stated that the French troops were being held ten kilometers back from the frontier.

The order for general mobilization was issued in France at 3.40 in the afternoon of August 1st after news had been brought of the proclamation of martial law in Germany. The government claimed that it was an essential measure for protection because they had positive evidence that behind the screen of martial law Germany was really putting her mobilization into execution. The condition of martial law was therefore mobilization with another name.

Belgium, as we have already had occasion to observe, took such precautionary measures as her military establishment permitted as soon as the international situation demanded it. On July 29th her army was placed on a strengthened peace footing, which signifies that three classes of reserves were recalled to the colors and added to the single class of recruits of which her active army was normally composed. Later, complete mobilization was ordered, Saturday, August 1st, being reckoned as the first day.

By a singular coincidence the British navy, a power on the sea which far surpasses in relative strength the German army on land, was in a position for immediate action at the beginning of the diplomatic crisis. A formidable concentration of naval units had been made for the royal review off Portsmouth on July 18th.

On Friday, July 24th, as soon as intelligence of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia created a feeling of uneasiness, Mr. Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, took the step on his own initiative of postponing the dispersal of the naval units which had been assembled for the royal pageant. Later, his colleagues indorsed this measure, and decided to make it public on the 27th, when it created a considerable impression on the continent. The decision to


mobilize was made on Sunday, August 2d, on the day that the British government gave its promise to protect the coast of France. The notices calling out the Naval Reserves were issued to the press for publication on Monday morning, and so thorough had been the preparation that the naval reservists were all in their places ready for action by the evening of the same day.

In the strict sense of the term, as already defined on page 429, it is inaccurate to speak of a British mobilization taking place in August, 1914, for the peace and war-footings of the British Expeditionary Force sent over to France were the same. Accordingly, there was a concentration of British troops, but no mobilization. Yet the popular confusion in the usage of these two words and the very close relationship between the movement of the British Expeditionary Force and the disposition of armies on the continent necessitates at this point a brief notice of the steps by which the British contingent took its place beside the forces of its ally in southern Flanders.

The concentration of the Expeditionary Force began on August 4th, and on the 11th King George went down to Aldershot to bid them Godspeed. The concentration of this force was conducted with remarkable secrecy. Like a phantom it passed from the shore of Great Britain. Scarcely a hint of its movements, of the point and date of departure from England, or arrival on the continent, got into the papers until its landing on French soil had been accomplished. Yet it was well known in Boulogne as early as the 8th that extensive preparations were being made for the reception of the British.

The Expeditionary force sailed from Southampton and disembarked at Calais, Boulogne, Havre, and St. Nazaire.

The following statement was issued by the British Press Bureau on the 17th at night:





Map showing German advantage in strategic railways on the eastern frontier.

“The Expeditionary Force, as detailed for foreign service, has been safely landed on French soil. The embarkation, transportation, and disembarkation of men and stores were alike carried through with the greatest possible precision and without a single casualty.”

The scheme of mobilization both in France and Germany provided for the completion of the all-important process at the expiration of twenty days with a regular succession of events occurring day by day within this given period. Accordingly, the fixing of the starting-point, the designation of the first day of mobilization, is an indispensable feature of the order to mobilize. With this variable element once established, the rest moves with almost automatic precision along predetermined lines.

Within an hour or two after the decision of the central authority had been made, the order for mobilization had been flashed to the remotest communes of each country. The printed notices held in readiness were immediately posted. Members of the territorial army or the Landwehr, as the case might be, took their places as sentinels to guard the railway bridges, stations, and other vital points on the lines of communication. The days during which mobilization was in progress were numbered consecutively, and the military credentials of each reservist contained an indication of the day on which he was required to present himself at the depot of his regiment. We have already observed that recruiting and the assignment of recruits to army corps and regiments is regulated on a territorial basis. Each army corps has its definite circumscription, and within this area a district is assigned to each of the regiments which compose the army corps.

In considering mobilizations the imagination spontaneously turns to the German mobilization as the prototype, the model and standard. While it would be too much to

say that the arsenals and military storehouses of Germany contained a particular equipment, individually labelled and designated, for every man who was subject to summons in a general mobilization, such a statement would be a natural, and not very misleading, exaggeration. For there was at hand sufficient material for the equipment of all who were required to appear, and the annual muster of reservists furnished a fairly accurate basis for the proportional number of garments needed for each standard measurement.

The German reservist reported first at a storehouse where he received a bundle of clothing containing two complete field uniforms: two coats, two pairs of trousers, two pairs of leggings, two pairs of shoes, four pairs of socks, two sets of under-clothing, a helmet, a repair-kit, and blankets. With these he received a metal tag with his official number to be worn suspended from the neck next to the body. His civilian costume was deposited with the clerk. After this the reservist went to the armory and received his rifle, belts, and ammunition. In the cities regiments were ready to move in from four to six hours; but in the country from twelve to twenty-four hours were required.

The success of mobilization depends largely upon the efficiency and punctuality with which the railways execute their task. The most fundamental characteristic of the present war is the unprecedented importance of the service performed by the railways. It will stand out in history, distinguished from all previous struggles, as the war of machinery and technical ability. But of all the mechanical appliances, other than the weapons themselves, the railway has discharged the most necessary, although perhaps not the most spectacular, service. Nearly all western Europe is covered with a dense network of railways extending as far as the Russian frontier of Germany. Numerous

lines bring all parts of Germany's eastern frontier into convenient communication with each other and with the interior of the country, and the same is true in lesser degree of the northeastern frontier of Austria-Hungary. But the situation on the Russian side of the border is far different. New York and Oregon side by side would present the contrast in relative density of railway lines which exists between Germany and the adjacent regions of Russia.

Mobilization in the majority of cases involved the three-fold transportation of the reservists: firstly, from their domicile to the regimental depot; secondly, from the regimental depot to the place of concentration for the army corps; and thirdly, from this latter point to the position designated for the army corps in the general plan of campaign.

In France especially the burden on the railways in consequence of the European crisis was augmented by the throngs of summer tourists and other travellers in frantic haste to return to their homes in anticipation of the upheaval. During the week from July 25th until August 1st about 500,000 travellers returned to Paris or passed through the city on their way home, and about 200,000 foreigners took their leave of the French capital. But as soon as mobilization was announced the French railways passed under the direction of the General Staff and were closed for a time to civilian traffic. During the twenty days of mobilization the trains circulated on the principal lines of France day and night at intervals of ten minutes or even less. The reservists were admitted to the trains upon presentation of their credentials on the day when they were summoned to appear. They were transported to the depots or barracks of their respective regiments of the active army, where they received their equipment and arms. As fast as the regiments were filled up to their

war-footing, they were conveyed to the place of concentration of their army corps. Finally, the army corps were transported to their positions in the theater of hostilities.

The headquarters of the French army corps were as follows: I, Lille; II, Amiens; III, Rouen; IV, Mans; V, Orléans; VI, Châlons; VII, Besançon; VIII, Bourges; IX, Tours; X, Rennes; XI, Nantes; XII, Limoges; XIII, Clermont-Ferrand; XIV, Lyons; XV, Marseilles; XVI, Montpellier; XVII, Toulouse; XVIII, Bordeaux; XIX, Algeria; XX, Nancy; XXI, Épinal.

A brief calculation will reveal the unusual volume of traffic involved in the general mobilization in France. We shall deal approximately with the larger masses of the first-line army without going into minor variations and exceptions. We may begin with a computation of the problem of conveying the army corps to the front, the third in the series of movements enumerated above. Freight and passenger cars—as generally throughout the continent—were employed indifferently, as might be gathered from the familiar device on the outside of the former:—*Hommes 36 (-40), Chevaux 8*. In view of the vastly superior number of freight cars available we can scarcely assume that the average accommodation per car for cars of all kinds was more than forty men. The French regiment on a war footing numbers 3000 men, and would require, therefore, two trains of about forty cars each. The eight regiments of infantry of an army corps would fill sixteen trains and would require two other trains for such equipment as wagons, portable field-kitchens and machine-guns, together with the officers and their horses. As for the artillery, a flat-car is required for each standard field-piece with its caisson. The twelve batteries,—each of four guns,—which make up a regiment, require forty-eight cars. But the



British Expeditionary Force: a regiment of Highlanders marching through Boulogne.



men, horses, parks, munitions, and other equipment bring the required rolling stock for the artillery regiment up to five trains, and that for the three regiments forming the complement of the army corps to fifteen trains. About two hundred cars are generally required for the horses of a single cavalry regiment and a train for the men. But the larger part of the cavalry regiments are not directly attached to any corps. The special services require from ten to fourteen trains for every corps.

Our calculation has been based upon the minimum requirements in rolling stock for an ideally economical employment of space. In reality about seventy trains were required for the conveyance of the normal units of each army corps as expanded to a war-footing. There were twenty-one army corps. But in time of war, as was shown above (page 303), only the youngest reserves were incorporated with the existing regiments, the others formed new units practically doubling the number of regiments. We have to reckon, therefore, with the numerical equivalent of forty-two army corps of the first-line, which would require about 3,000 trains on the basis of the above calculation. But the transportation of the army corps, after their mobilization had been accomplished, from their headquarters to the front represents not more than a third of the actual service performed by the railways, reckoned on the basis of the number of trains in operation, for the first-line troops alone. If we add the transportation of the reservists to their regimental depots, and that of the regiments to the places of concentration of their respective army corps, we may conclude that the mobilization and concentration of the first-line troops alone involved the running of about 10,000 trains within the period of twenty days.

Besides this the British Expeditionary Force was conveyed from the ports of disembarkation, Calais, Boulogne, Havre,

and Saint-Nazaire, to Mons in about eight days, August 12-20, an operation which involved the running of about 420 trains continuously day and night. For about a week the military trains on the Northern Railway (*Chemin de fer du Nord*) followed one another at intervals of six minutes.

The headquarters of the German army corps were as follows: I, Königsberg; II, Stettin; III, Berlin; IV, Magdeburg; V, Posen; VI, Breslau; VII, Münster; VIII, Coblenz; IX, Altona; X, Hanover; XI, Cassel; XII, Dresden; XIII, Stuttgart; XIV, Carlsruhe; XV, Strassburg; XVI, Metz; XVII, Dantzig; XVIII, Frankfurt-on-the-Main; XIX, Leipzig; XX, Allenstein; XXI, Saarbrück; I, Bavarian, Munich; II, Bavarian, Würzburg; III, Bavarian, Nuremberg; Prussian Guard, Berlin.

The service performed by the railways in Germany was even greater than in France. The German railways requisitioned for military purposes are subject to the orders of the military authorities in regard to the regulation of traffic. A General Inspector of Communications and Railways is appointed on the outbreak of war, who takes the place of the Chief of the General Staff in relation to the railways and determines the general principles for their administration. A Military Railway Chief issues the instructions for the control of the service. Line-commanders superintend the execution of the military dispositions on the respective lines committed to their charge. Schedules for the operation of the railways during the transportation of the troops are kept constantly in readiness in time of peace. They provide for the running of the greatest number of trains which each line can accommodate. The Military Railway Chief decides how many of these trains shall actually be put in operation. Whenever mobilization is ordered the date is inserted in the time-tables which are ready at hand and they are immediately posted up in the

stations. The speed of the military trains usually varies from about fifteen to twenty miles an hour. For convenience the twenty-four hours of the day are divided into six periods of four hours each. The trains are timed at uniform intervals throughout the day, except that one of the six periods is left vacant to allow for delays in the operation of the trains as arranged in the schedule for the other five periods.

The actual operation of the trains within the field of military movements may be taken over by the military at the order of the General Inspector of Communications and Railways. In this case a special traffic manager is appointed, or a military railway directorate with a director at its head, to whom an adjutant and a staff physician are assigned. The manager—or the directorate—has charge of the operation of the lines under his supervision. This official takes rank as a regimental commander.

Mobilization in Germany, as in France, found hundreds of thousands of people away from home for their summer holidays. Nearly all were immediately impelled by the desire to return without delay, before communications should be interrupted. The regular time-tables seem to have remained in force during the first two days of mobilization, the military schedule taking effect on August 4th.

It is said that 120 trains, each composed of fifty-five cars, were required for the conveyance of each army corps to its designated position at the front. The greater apportionment in cars and trains, as compared with that for the French army corps, might be explained in part by the larger number of horses and guns, and the more extensive special equipment of the German army corps. But perhaps the above-mentioned assignment provided likewise for the reserve division which corresponded to each army corps.

After a few days, civilians were admitted, so far as there was room, to the military local trains, four or five of which were operated daily in each direction on the main lines at a speed of about fifteen miles an hour. Enormous quantities of baggage clogged the channels of communication at the principal railway centers. About 120,000 pieces of baggage had accumulated at the leading stations of Berlin. All these were eventually cared for, even the articles belonging to English and French travellers being faithfully sent forward through the neutral countries.

An exceptional attention for about 5,000 Americans was a number of special trains, known as *Amerikanerzüge*, made up of corridor and restaurant cars, which carried the trans-Atlantic guests to Holland for their homeward sailing. Circulars were distributed in these trains leaving Berlin containing the farewell greetings of the Fatherland, an ostensibly trustworthy account of the causes of the war for dissemination in America, and the prediction that the victorious issue for German arms would soon afford an opportunity for the resumption of business and profitable residence in Germany.

Day and night the loaded troop trains passed in almost unbroken succession in Germany, thundering over the bridges and disappearing into the tunnels. The soldiers on their way to the front were greeted with boundless enthusiasm and abundantly provided with food and drink by eager throngs wherever they stopped. But gradually as the troops departed into the mysterious distance of uncertainty and peril, a grim, expectant silence settled over the country, ominous of the terrible energy of approaching action. The movement of the armies was shrouded in impenetrable concealment. The plan of campaign and even the identity of the chief commanders remained for the time a secret. Reservists hurried from the embrace of

relatives and friends to an unknown destination and unknown dangers. For a time the German people resigned not only all control, but even all knowledge, of their destiny. They were in the situation of the passengers confined below on shipboard during a great storm, who can only trust blindly in the judgment of the officers, being ignorant alike of the extent of the danger and of the measures taken for their safety. The strict suppression of all information brought ample compensation, no doubt, in the success of the initial operations.

Whatever our attitude may be with respect to the supposed utility or justification of war, whether we regard it as sublime or detestable, we shall probably not withhold our highest admiration for the several mobilizations in general, and for the German in particular, considered for itself, as the most stupendous organized movement of men and utensils which the world has witnessed, the supreme triumph of human ingenuity, the marvellous culmination of a plan of which all the parts, elaborated to the smallest detail with tireless industry, have been combined with un-failing amplitude of vision. The most ardent German Jingo and the most inoffensive pacifist will perhaps agree in the wish that this wonderful phenomenon will never be eclipsed.



## APPENDIX

### DESPATCH FROM THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR AT BERLIN RESPECTING THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT

(It is in this confidential letter that the ambassador relates the "scrap of paper" incident.)

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.*

Sir,

*London, August 8, 1914.*

In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength

of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date, and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would

necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about 20 minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded--just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen.

I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I.

After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 P.M. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never despatched.\*

At about 9.30 P.M. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow a written summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night.

In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermann left me, a flying sheet, issued by the *Berliner Tageblatt*, was circulated stating that Great Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before His Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the embassy was soon overpowered, and the attitude of the mob became more threatening. We took no notice of this demonstration as long

\* This telegram never reached the British Foreign Office.

as it was confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing-room, where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happening. Herr von Jagow at once informed the Chief of Police, and an adequate force of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that moment on we were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantness occurred.

After order had been restored Herr von Jagow came to see me and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behavior of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had not been authorized by the Government; in fact, the Chancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement should be issued and he had replied, "Certainly not, until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision to that effect that only a small force of police had been sent to the neighborhood of the embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to disturbances. It was the "pestilential *Tageblatt*," which had somehow got hold of the news, that had upset his calculations. He had heard rumors that the mob had been excited to violence by gestures made and missiles thrown from the embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology could have been more full and complete.

On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor sent one of His Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message:—

“The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those titles.”

I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery.

On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about 11 o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel handed me my passports—which I had earlier in the day demanded in writing—and told me that he had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood that I preferred the route *via* the Hook of Holland to that *via* Copenhagen; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed to this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr von Jagow couched in the most friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such articles as time allowed.

The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong force of police was posted along the usual

route to the Lehrter Station, while the embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrangements ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A retired colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to the Dutch frontier, and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds which thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped from insulting us; but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier.

Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behavior of my staff under the most trying circumstances possible. One and all, they worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval and military attachés, secretaries, and the two young attachés buckled to their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside and inside hundreds of British subjects clamoring for advice and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support, often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so readily and cheerfully gave to me.

I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all by my American colleague, Mr. Gerard, and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to see

me to ask how he could help us and to make arrangements for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to himself, and his calmness and *savoir-faire* and his firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and able hands.

I have etc.,

W. E. GOSCHEN.



## APPENDIX

### OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE TREATIES GUARANTEEING THE INDEPENDENCE AND PERPETUAL NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM

*Treaty between Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and  
Russia of the one part and Belgium of the other. Concluded  
and signed at London, 19 April 1839.*

In the name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity:

ARTICLE I. His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, His Majesty the King of the French, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the King of Prussia and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, declare that the articles hereto annexed and forming the tenor of the treaty concluded this day between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand-Duke of Luxemburg, are considered as having the same force and value as if they were textually inserted in the present act, and that they are thus placed under the guarantee of their said Majesties.

ARTICLE II. The Treaty of 15 November 1831, between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the King of the French, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the King of Prussia and

the Emperor of all the Russias, is declared not to be binding upon the high contracting parties.

ARTICLE III. The present treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London in six weeks, or sooner, if it can be done. This exchange shall take place at the same time as the ratifications of the treaty between Belgium and Holland.

In faith of which the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and set the seal of their arms.

Done at London, the nineteenth April, in the year of grace one thousand eight hundred and thirty-nine.

(Seal) PALMERSTON      (Seal) SYLVAIN VAN DE WEYER  
(Seal) SENFFT  
(Seal) SEBASTIANI  
(Seal) BÜLOW  
(Seal) POZZO DI BORGIO

*As will be seen, the above treaty confirms the provisions of the other treaty signed the same day "as having the same force and value as if they were textually inserted in the present act."*

*The following is a complete translation of the other treaty except that some of the long, unimportant articles are condensed.*

## APPENDIX

OFFICIAL COPY MADE AT BRUSSELS CONFORMABLE TO  
THE COLLATED TEXT, WORD BY WORD, OF THE  
ORIGINAL INSTRUMENT SIGNED BY THE  
RESPECTIVE PLENIPOTENTIARIES

*Treaty made and signed at London, 19 April 1839, between  
Belgium and Holland, relative to the separation of  
their respective territories.*

In the name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity :

His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand-Duke of Luxemburg, taking into consideration their treaties concluded with the Courts of Austria, of France, of Great Britain, of Prussia and of Russia, to wit: by His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the 15 November 1831, and by His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand-Duke of Luxemburg, this day, their said Majesties have named as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the Sieur Sylvain Van de Weyer, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, Officer of the Order of Leopold, Grand-Cross of the Order of Ernest of Saxony, of the Order of the Tower and the Sword, of the Military and Religious Order of Saints Maurice and Lazarus, Commander of the Royal Order of the Legion of Honor, etc., etc.:

And His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand-Duke of Luxemburg, the Sieur Salomon Dedel, Commander of the Order of the Lion of Netherlands, Commander of the Order of the Polar Star of Sweden, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty,

Who, after having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following articles:

ARTICLE I. The Belgian territories shall comprise the southern provinces of Brabant,

Liège,  
Namur,  
Hainaut,  
West Flanders,  
East Flanders,  
Antwerp, and  
Limburg,

Such as they have formed part of the united kingdom of the Netherlands, constituted in 1815, with the exception of the districts in the province of Limburg set out in Article IV.

The Belgian territory shall comprise, in addition, the part of the grand-duchy of Luxemburg set out in Article II.

ARTICLE II. His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand-Duke of Luxemburg, agrees that, in the grand-duchy of Luxemburg, the limits of the Belgian territory shall be as described hereunder:

*(Then follows the description of the line of frontier to be established between Belgium and the grand-duchy of Luxemburg.)*

ARTICLE III. For the cessions made in the preceding article, a territorial indemnity shall be assigned to the King of the Netherlands, Grand-Duke of Luxemburg, in the province of Limburg.

ARTICLE IV. In the execution of the part of Article I relative to the province of Limburg, and as a consequence of the cessions made by His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand-Duke of Luxemburg, in Article II, his said Majesty shall possess, either as Grand-Duke of Luxemburg, or to be united with Holland the territories whose limits are set forth hereunder:

*(Then follow [1] the lines of the territory on the right bank of the Meuse, forming the part of Limburg to be ceded; and [2] the boundaries of the territory to the south of Dutch Brabant on the left bank of the Meuse to be similarly ceded to Holland. The former Dutch limits in the province of Limburg, on the left bank of the Meuse shall belong to Belgium, except the town of Maestricht and a strip of territory of 2400 yards.)*

ARTICLE V. His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand-Duke of Luxemburg, shall come to an agreement with the Germanic Confederation and the agnates of the House of Nassau as to the application of the stipulations made in Articles III and IV, as well as to all the arrangements that may be necessary in relation to said articles, both with the above-named House of Nassau and the Germanic Confederation.

ARTICLE VI. In virtue of the territorial arrangements stipulated above, each of the two parties renounces reciprocally, in perpetuity, all claim upon the territories, towns, places and spots situated in the limits of the possessions of the other party, as described in Articles I, II, and IV.

*(Provision is made for the commissioners of the two countries to meet at Maestricht to mark out the said limits.)*

ARTICLE VII. Belgium, within the limits indicated in Articles I, II, and IV, shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State.

She shall be held to observe the same neutrality toward all the other States.

ARTICLE VIII. Provides for the regulation of the flow of the waters of Flanders.

*(Then follow details.)*

ARTICLE IX. Provides for the free navigation of rivers and navigable streams which separate or flow through the adjacent territories of the two countries.

*(Then follow details.)*

ARTICLE X. The use of canals that cross both countries shall continue to be free and common to their inhabitants.

It is understood that they will enjoy reciprocal advantages on the same conditions; and that neither party shall impose other than moderate dues for the navigation of the canals.

ARTICLE XI. The commercial communications by the town of Maestricht, and by that of Sittard, shall remain wholly free and cannot be restricted under any pretence.

Further stipulation is made as to keeping the roads from the above-named towns to the German frontier unobstructed and in good condition, and that only moderate tolls shall be levied.

ARTICLE XII. Provides that if Belgium shall open a new road or canal which shall extend to the canton of Sittard, Holland shall permit the continuation of such road or canal at the expense of Belgium to the frontier of Germany, and provides further for levying of dues and tolls.

ARTICLE XIII. Provides that Belgium will assume the charge of five million Dutch florins for annual interest and the capital thereof of the public debt of the Netherlands; for the validity of such debt; the payment of interest; its finality of obligation in respect of the public debt of Holland on the part of Belgium; and for the method of

transfer of debt, and the delivery of archives, charts and documents belonging to Belgium.

ARTICLE XIV. The port of Antwerp, in conformity with the stipulations of Article XV of the Treaty of Paris of 30 May 1814, will continue to be solely a port of commerce.

ARTICLE XV. Works of public or private utility, such as canals, roads, or others of similar character, constructed in whole or in part at the cost of the Netherlands, shall belong, together with the benefits and charges appertaining thereto, to the country in which they are situated.

*(Then follows an agreement as to what shall be considered as charges on such works.)*

ARTICLE XVI. Provides for the restoration of all properties sequestrated in Belgium during the troubles, for political reasons.

ARTICLE XVII. Gives right to persons in territory transferred by the treaty to dispose of their property and remove to the other country.

Further, expressly renounces on the part of both countries the right to tax as aliens the subjects of the other.

ARTICLE XVIII. The status of mixed subject, as relates to property, shall be recognized and maintained.

ARTICLE XIX. Adopts the regulations of the treaty between Austria and Russia of 3 May 1815, which are an integral part of the Acts of the Congress of Vienna, relating to mixed owners, their election of domicile, the rights which they may exercise as subjects of one or the other State, and to the conditions of neighborhood in respect of properties lying on each side of the frontier, for both owners and properties in Belgium, Holland or the Grand-Duchy of Luxemburg.

Mineral products are included in the products of the soil mentioned in the treaty of 3 May 1815 referred to.

Further, all alien taxes are agreed to be null and void in Belgium, Holland and the Grand-Duchy of Luxemburg as among the three countries.

ARTICLE XX. No person in the countries of changed dominion, shall be sought out or disturbed in any way for any direct or indirect participation in political events.

ARTICLE XXI. Provides for payment of pensions and salaries to all persons entitled thereto in conformity with the law in force on 1 November 1830.

It is agreed that such pensions and salaries as are due to persons born on Belgian territory shall be a charge on the Belgian treasury and of those born on Netherlands territory shall be chargeable to that country.

ARTICLE XXII. Prescribes the regulations for adjusting claims of Belgian subjects.

ARTICLE XXIII. Stipulates that all judgments rendered in civil and commercial actions and the acts of public officials of Belgium shall be upheld in the parts of Limburg and the Grand-Duchy of Luxemburg that are to be transferred.

ARTICLE XXIV. Provides for the evacuation of the territory by the military forces and the transfer by the civil authorities, in fifteen days, or earlier, if possible.

ARTICLE XXV. In pursuance of the stipulations of this treaty, there shall be peace and friendship between His Majesty the King of the Belgians, on the one part, and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Grand-Duke of Luxemburg, on the other part, their heirs and successors, their States and their respective subjects.

ARTICLE XXVI. The present treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London in six weeks, or earlier, if possible. This exchange shall take place at the same time as that of the ratification of the treaty made this day between His Majesty the King of the Netherlands,

Grand-Duke of Luxemburg, and Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and of Bohemia, the King of the French, the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the King of Prussia and the Emperor of all the Russias.

In faith hereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and set thereagainst the seal of their arms.

Done at London, the nineteenth day of April in the year of grace one thousand eight hundred and thirty-nine.

*(Seal)* SYLVAIN VAN DE WEYER.

*(Seal)* DEDEL.



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